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THE EARLY THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF
ALEXANDER ROMANOVICH LURIA
MICHAEL PAUL GEORGE HAMES
ABSTRACT: Alexander Luria (1902-1977) is famous as a founder of 
neuropsychology, but his early theoretical development has never been seriously 
investigated at any length.
Part I, The Early Years, deals chronologically with Luria's development from 
1921-6. It looks at his intellectual background, his early experiments using his 
combined verbal and motor response method of investigating the structural 
dynamics of stress. It examines his use of objective approaches to reflexes in 
Pavlov, and his attempt to combine it with Freud’s psychodynamic approach. 
Luria’s early collaboration with Lev Vygotsky is explored, together with their 
joint and individual attempts to resolve the apparent methodological impasse this 
combination presented to explaining the nature of higher psychological processes. 
Part II, The Nature o f Human Conflicts, looks at the liberating effects of Gestalt 
theory on their thinking, together with their criticisms of it. It concentrates on 
Luria’s series of experiments up to 1930, and how his development of the 
‘fimctional systems’ approach resolved many of the problems. Luria thereby 
provided the neuropsychological basis for much of Vygotsky’s approach.
Part III, Cultural-Historical Theory, is short. It looks at some of the origins of the 
theory and the attacks on it, together with some of the reasoning behind Luria’s 
expeditions to Central Asia to compare modes of perception and thinking in 
different forms of society.
The overall theme of this thesis is how Luria and Vygotsky struggled to explain 
the developing role of higher psychological functions on an objective 
experimental basis, and how in the course of ontogenetic development the 
neuropsychological organization of cognitive functions and human behaviour is 
dialectically transformed. This process explained how phylogenetic, ontogenetic, 
social and historical factors were integrated in the course of development. It 
therefore also potentially allowed for the methodological integration of 
psychology into a unified science.
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Alexander Romanovich Luria (1902-1977) 
Chronology of Major Events and Publications 1917-37
1914-1918
World War I 
1917
February and October Revolutions 
1918-21
Russia invaded by many foreign armies and counter-revolutionary armies
financed by the West
Luria studied at the University of Kazan
1920
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud)
1921
Russia introduces the New Economic Pohcy to help recovery 
The Mentality o f Apes (Koehler)
1922
Luria founded the Kazan Psychoanalytic Society
1923
Luria’s first booklet published
Luria moved to Moscow and married Vera Nikolaievna Blagidova 
Luria became secretary of the Institute of Psychology and head 
of its experimental laboratory
He also became secretary of the All-Russian Psychoanalytic Society 
Twenty Years ’  Experience in the Objective Study o f the Higher Nervous Activity 
o f Animals (Pavlov)
1924
Lenin died. Stalin moved into a powerful position 
Trotsky became increasingly marginalized
Luria placed in charge of the sub-faculty of psychology and its laboratory at the 
Communist Academy of Education
He began his celebrated series of experiments into affect, conflict and will 
Vygotsky lectured in Petrograd and joined the Moscow Institute of Psychology
The German Ideology Part I (Marx & Engels)
1925
Kurt Goldstein published major articles on neuropsychology 
The Dialectics o f Nature (Engels)
Psychoanalysis as a System o f Monistic Psychology (Luria)
Consciousness as a Problem for the Psychology ofBehaviour (Vygotsky)
1926
Intention, Will and Need (Lewip)
The Methods o f Reflexological and Psychological Investigation (Vygotsky)
Luria’s writings began to show the influence of the ideas of Goldstein and Lewin
1927
Trotsky sent into ‘internal exile’
Luria resigned as secretary of the Psychoanalytic Society
Vygotsky and Luria began to formulate ideas on Cultural-Historical Theory
1928
Luria developed his initial version of the concept of functional systems
1929
Stalin expelled Trotsky from Russia. He started the first Five-Year Plan and began 
to introduce the system bearing his name, which included the oppression and 
exploitation of the workers and peasants, the elimination of opposition and 
independent thinking
Luria met members of the Gestalt school in Berlin
He then met other leading members of the international psychology community
at the international conference in New Haven where he presented two papers
He found a publisher for his research in America and handed over
the completed part of the text
His first marriage was dissolved
1931
Luria led the first expedition to Central Asia to compare the cognitive and perceptual 
behaviour of culturally and socially different groups 
He was strongly criticized on his return and increasingly hostile attacks 
were made on Cultural-Historical Theory
Vygotsky’s team was broken up, and several leading members, including Luria, 
relocated to the Ukraine to work in the Kharkov Psycho-Neurological 
Institute of Medicine
1932
Luria led the second expedition to Central Asia
He was again attacked and banned from organizing a third expedition
The Nature o f Human Conflicts (Luria)
1933
Hitler gained power in Germany
Famine in the Ukraine as a result of Stalin’s agricultural policy 
Luria was warned to keep a low profile and keep out of Moscow, 
because of the threat of arrest 
Luria married Lana Pimenovna Linchina (1904-78)
1934
Luria returned to Moscow full-time and worked with Solomon Le vit at the
Medico-Genetic Institute studying twins
Death of Vygotsky
Thinking and Speech (Vygotsky)
1936
Decree on Pedology in effect makes most of child psychology unacceptable 
Luria resigns his two posts and becomes a full time medical student
1937
Execution of major psychologists barely noticed among the mass of victims of 
Stalin’s purges
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1
Problems in the Investigation of the Early Work of Alexander Luria
There are several monographs devoted to the work of the Russian psychologist 
and neuropsychologist Alexander Romanovich Luria (1902-1977). Most of them 
are devoted to various aspects of his work in neuropsychology. There are also 
collections of papers dedicated to his work, together with biographies and 
contributions towards a biography together with autobiographical works. There 
are however no works that attempt to look at the period of his early career in 
psychology (1921-1936) as a whole, nor does any detailed work exist that 
attempts to make sense of this period as a whole. This is surprising given that 
when Stephen Toulmin (1978) dubbed Vygotsky “the Mozart of psychology” he 
also described Luria as its “Beethoven”. The period of their interaction was 
important - a view that Luria expressed many times -  both for the results of their 
interaction and the development of Luria’s own ideas.
At first this preface looks at some of the problems involved in examining this 
phase of Luria’s career. It does so by focusing on issues that arise almost 
spontaneously from reading his autobiography. The Making o f Mind. This book 
has proved invaluable, because it provides useful information and is the only one 
to include coverage of this whole period, though important episodes are omitted. 
One of Luria’s editors, Michael Cole, however, made plain in the introduction 
and epilogue that the work presented difficulties. Here I have made comments 
arising from it to indicate the range and significance of the problematic areas 
relevant to this thesis.
Most obvious is the startlingly few references to Luria’s family, or to the 
problems he faced as a scientist after Stalin overthrew the ‘Old Bolsheviks’ and 
introduced what I think is best described as his state-capitalist regime, which by 
1936 effectively prevented the functioning of psychology as an independent 
science. Even after Stalin’s death in 1953 his legacy remained and Luria was 
compelled to politically censor his comments up until his death (Cole 1992, 
personal communication).
9Elena Alexandrovna Luria’s posthumously published 1994 biography of her 
father provides further information, especially on certain aspects of the family, 
and the impact of Stalin’s repressions on it. Her mother told Michael Cole that 
Vygotsky went to Luria’s father and warned him to get his son out of sight (Cole 
1992, personal communication). Certainly Luria was under great risk of arrest in 
1933-4 (E. Luria 1994, chapters 5 and 6). Yet, his enemies alleged that, even as 
late as 1936, Luria was prepared to orally defend the theoretical views for which 
he had been subjected to a witch hunt in the early 1930s (G.F. 1936, cited in E. 
Luria 1994, 75). Luria recognized that the continuing attacks on psychologists 
including himself meant that it was impossible to continue in psychology and he 
resigned his posts in December 1936 to become a full-time student at the First 
Moscow Institute of Medicine. Although this was one logical development of the 
work he had been doing throughout the mid-193Os, he clearly had no other 
choice. He was not alone, but his timing saved his life. His close friends and 
colleagues Isai Sapir, Solomon Levit, and Isaak Shpilrein were arrested (Levit in 
January 1937) and subsequently executed. This provided a clear signal from the 
state that independent views and those that continued to argue for them would be 
eliminated. Elena Luria’s account suggests that her father survived by the skin of 
his teeth, because he moved to an inconspicuous position at the time when he did 
(ibid. 75-6).
It is at that point that my thesis ends, but the pressures on Luria remained and 
explain why he had to self-censor. We have recently learned that Luria’s brother- 
in-law was arrested in 1937, and his sister, Lidiia Romanovna, was eventually 
rescued from the prison camps only by her father’s intervention. Roman 
Albertovich Luria held a position as a Kremlin doctor specializing in gastric 
disorders. Fortunately the gastric pains of the Prosecutor General, Vyshinsky, 
were such as to allow Roman Al’bertovich to persuade him to commute Lidiia’s 
sentence to exile (Levitin 1998, 11, 41-2). In 1953 when Stalin’s paranoia 
produced the so-called ‘Jewish doctors’ plot’ (cf. Rapoport 1991), “Alexander 
Romanovich expected to be arrested from one day to the next, and so kept a small 
suitcase ready containing his necessities” (E. Luria 1994,146).
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But while Luria’s self-censorship consisted of omitting information about his 
family and politics, and only publishing certain of his researches and those of 
Vygotsky when he felt it was safe to do so, his self-effacing approach presents 
bigger difficulties for the period before 1936. He concluded his autobiography 
with the following comment, “People come and go, but the creative sources of 
great historical events and the important ideas and deeds remain. That is perhaps 
the only excuse I had for writing this book” (Luria 1979a, 188).
This approach, that of the self-effacing scientist at the service of humankind, was 
consistent with his long-held beliefs. It accounts for some of the opaqueness that 
most readers find in the book. Luria’s death prevented the completion of the 
checking of the text, and his anticipation of it may have led him to concentrate on 
important scientific developments in psychological thinking without sufficient 
explanation of their genesis -  or of his specific role in their genesis.
He had written just prior to the above conclusion, “There is no [biographical] 
subject of exceptional abilities -  I have none. ... But there is the atmosphere of a 
life, beginning at that unique time which was the start of the Revolution. There is 
a period of exploration, the meeting with a genius [i.e., Vygotsky] and falling 
under his influence, and the series of deeds that a scholar could accomplish 
during a rather long life” (Luria 1979a, 187-8). While here Luria praises the 
creative surge that accompanied the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, (with the 
implicit comparison of the repression of both Tsarism and Stalinism), his own 
role remains unarticulated. Thus it is not apparent how his role meshed, interacted 
or contrasted with his collaborators.
One of Luria’s major collaborators in the second half of his career, E.D. 
Khomskaia, writes of his modesty, avoidance of disputes, and complete lack of 
vanity. He avoided professional advancement in order to remain active at his 
experimentally creative work (see Homskaya 2001, Introduction and 
Conclusion). As a consequence, “he spoke rather modestly of himself and the 
epoch, not mentioning the difficulties he had to overcome”. It is “evident that 
Luria, being free of all vanity, underestimated the scale of his personality and
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contribution to international psychological science” (ibid. 113). There are 
numerous examples, and additional reasons for his behaviour.
Cole (1979, 189) relates how he could rarely persuade Luria to talk about the 
social and personal context of his work. Nor could he get him to seriously discuss 
his early work. He continually played it down while at the same time reiterating 
that Vygotsky was a genius. Oddly enough Cole notes (ibid. 224) that Luria 
“could no longer tell me why the man had so excited him.” Perhaps this may be 
excused in that Luria was a man in his mid seventies with a heart condition that 
was about to kill him, whose wife was also dying from an incurable and painful 
illness.
Luria, in a lecture in 1974, discussed briefly his first published book. 
Psychoanalysis in the Light o f the Main Trends in Contemporary Psychology, 
written at the age of 20 in 1923. He describes its origin in sufficient detail to 
preclude any question of memory loss. He tells how he took galley proofs of “a 
review of books on psychoanalysis” he had written “and made a book of them” 
(cited in Levitin 1982, 152-3). There is no way that this precocious 
methodological analysis and comparison of aspects of psychoanalysis and 
contemporary trends in psychology could be described merely as a collection of 
book reviews! Here it could be assumed that he was simplifying in order to 
entertain his audience of students.
In The Making o f Mind  Luria writes of the use of the seminal concept of 
‘functional systems’ in relation to the work of P.K. Anokhin and N.A. Bemshtein. 
He writes that the term was introduced and developed by Anokhin in 1935 (Luria 
1979a, 124), yet Luria used it before 1930. As we shall see Anokhin and 
Bemshtein’s definitions of functional systems were different in emphasis to 
Luria’s and involved different elements and concepts, which are equally 
important. I assume Luria used Anokhin’s version initially to promote the 
concept, but also to seek some form of cover from attack behind a purely 
physiological-neurological version. This also promoted the important but unjustly 
neglected works of his colleagues, one of whom, Anokhin, was a lifelong friend.
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Luria then stuck to this version of its origins. It does not help clarify Luria’s own 
role however.
At the end of a chapter on the work Luria undertook for what eventually became 
his doktorat, he wrote that the application of the techniques and approaches that 
he used “did not lead to a basic reconstruction of psychology as a science. That 
enormous task, which was beyond my limited capacities, presented itself to me 
quite unexpectedly in 1924. In that year I met Lev Semenovich Vygotsky. This 
event was a turning point in my hfe as well as in the lives of my colleagues in 
Soviet psychology” (ibid. 37).
This passage crystallizes several key issues. The dramatic effect of Vygotsky on 
his contemporaries is unquestioned. His daughter’s 1996 biography of him 
gathers convincing testimony of his charismatic appeal and lasting influence. But 
we must beware of investing him with mythic powers. It is evident that the 
overwhelming part of Luria’s doktorat was carried out independently of 
Vygotsky. Two of the latter’s biographers, Rene Van der Veer and Jaan Valsiner 
(1991, 184), go to the extreme of suggesting that the collaboration of Vygotsky 
and Luria only became serious in 1928 or 1929. Certainly they often worked in 
different areas. laroshevskii dubs Vygotsky’s first year in Moscow as the 
“defectological year” (Yaroshevsky 1989, 121), because of his concentration on a 
new field, which involved the education of the deaf and dumb. On his return fi-om 
an international conference on the subject, which took place in London in June 
1925, Vygotsky suffered a bad attack of tuberculosis. Prevented thereby fi’om 
working at the Institute of (Experimental) Psychology, he then wrote his work. 
The Psychology o f Art (ibid. 139-40). He was more seriously ill in 1926. But we 
know that in spite of this he co-wrote two prefaces with Luria published in 1925 
and 1926. And Van der Veer and Valsiner (1991, 13) themselves cite a letter 
written by Vygotsky to Luria, dated March 5, 1926. Vygotsky says, “I very much 
deplore the fact that in this difficult time of crisis I am not with you at the 
Institute... How seriously we have to think about our [scientific] fate and the fate 
of the cause that we undertook, when K.N. [Kornilov] and the other bosses do not 
wish to think about it”. Unfortunately we are not informed what this ‘cause’ was.
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Both Luria and Vygotsky were working to produce a psychology that could lead 
to a comprehensive understanding of the individual, and both tried to envisage 
systems by which this could be achieved -  whether biologically, physiologically, 
neuro logically, or in terms of society and the role of language -  and ultimately a 
combination of all these approaches. And it was not until the late 1920s that they 
both saw that a major part of the solution to these systemic complexities lay in the 
issues involved in development.
The necessity for a change in the methodological approaches of psychology was 
evident to both Luria and Vygotsky even before they met. This was surely a 
major factor in Luria’s thinking when he ensured that Vygotsky was recruited to 
his department in 1924. How they succeeded in producing these methodological 
developments by 1930 is a major concern here. They certainly collaborated in 
some tasks from the very beginning (cf. Radzikhovskii and Khomskaia 1981). No 
one disputes Vygotsky’s influence on Luria, but precisely how this was effected 
before 1929 has rarely been investigated -  and certainly not at length. Equally 
relevant, but as yet uninvestigated -  indeed barely even raised (ibid. 9, n.l) -  is 
the question of whether and, if so, how Luria might have influenced Vygotsky. 
By and large, Luria’s playing down of his own early work, coupled with his 
praise for Vygotsky, has ensured that writers on Vygotsky have tended to present 
the latter as initiating and arranging virtually everything and Luria as acting 
largely as a transmission belt and as a major organizer of experiments. Although 
this may be convenient for some writers on Vygotsky, a writer investigating 
Luria’s early work can hardly accept this as a fait accompli or simply focus on 
those works that Luria researched independently. For even the notionally 
independent works must willy-nilly exhibit the effects of interaction: The Nature 
o f Human Conflicts, the 1932 American translation of Luria’s research, does 
share quite closely some of Vygotsky’s concerns in some of the later research. 
Similarly some of the earlier experiments parallel some of Vygotsky’s theoretical 
lectures and writings. The use of the concept of ‘functional systems’ is just one 
indication that there are major theoretical advances implicit in the work, despite 
Luria’s remarks to the contrary. It is impossible to dispute Khomskaia’s view that 
“during these early years (1924-1934; the years of collaboration with Vygotsky),
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Luria actively participated in both the practical and theoretical birth of the new 
science” (Homskaya 2001, 83).
As Vygotsky and Luria jointly and singly grappled with the methodological 
issues and their concrete application, the advances and the problems of one would 
be of concern, interest and stimulation to both. This interaction is known in some 
circumstances, and I make no apology for raising the possibility in others. One 
problem with presenting these parallels and possible interactions is that the 
evidence provided here comes mainly from the published articles. It is not 
possible to say who got one particular idea first, because, although the articles 
may derive from earlier lectures, new ideas may have been added later. Similarly, 
delays in publication and unreliable publication dates are confiising factors. In 
The Making o f Mind, Luria presents the arrival of Vygotsky after having already 
discussed most of the work for his doktorat, even though Vygotsky arrived just 
after it was begun. Here I have tried to illuminate the parallels and presumed 
interactions of Luria and Vygotsky. Although this has the merit of allowing this 
to be shown, and thus improving the historical accuracy of their collaboration and 
development, there is inevitably some overlapping and duplication of arguments 
in their separate papers -  for example in Chapter Four. And given the caveats I 
have made concerning the articles, the precise chronology of their interaction is at 
best imperfect. It is, however, important to examine this. Ultimately the questions 
about influences may only be answered when Vygotsky’s correspondence and 
Luria’s diaries and correspondence become available. While my suggestions are 
provisional, I do think that both my approach and the framework of this thesis 
help in posing the questions that should be asked.
I feel that many writers, notably those who are not writing about Luria 
specifically, are quick to make judgments or assumptions about Luria’s work. 
One feels obliged to answer these points even though many of them might appear 
sectarian. In order to counter this problem, and to draw those concerned and 
interested in Luria into the discussion, I have adopted an exploratory approach. I 
have tried to raise or speculate about relevant issues, so that if the reader wishes 
to disagree with my conclusions, he or she can then investigate other options. In 
the course of the work I do occasionally draw conclusions that are initially
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plausible within the context, but are subsequently shown to be partial. Some 
conclusions remain provisional or are only arrived at on the balance of what we 
know. Within reason this seems a sensible course of action. The exploratory 
approach has I feel also been a necessary one. Only with the completion of this 
thesis is it now possible for me to envisage a more conventional and traditional 
approach to giving an account of Luria’s theoretical development.
The focus on methodology explains the famously varied range of research by 
Luria in this phase of his career. “Every investigation proceeds in cycles, and the 
attempt to complete one cycle is at the same time an attempt to begin planning the 
problems of subsequent researches”(Luria 1932a, 169). He may have labelled his 
early works ‘pilot studies’, but he certainly considered them all significant 
enough to write about. The thread connecting these works is the attempt to study 
the systems of human behaviour as a whole and in their many aspects and 
relationships, together with the methodological implications and practical 
experiments this entailed. The practical experience and learning involved in this 
process provided an invaluable foundation for Luria’s subsequent development, 
and one that proved extremely useful for both Luria and Vygotsky in the 
development of their theories and in the organization of their investigations. The 
construction of a methodology that could be applied to psychology as a whole 
science, as opposed to a set of discrete disciplines, was a crucial element of 
Vygotsky’s work. But also, and like Luria, he was a practical psychologist. 
Grounding psychology on a materialist basis that extended throughout the science 
was his chief concern in the 1920s.
In some respects the tasks of this thesis are made easier today by the accessibility 
of Luria’s writings, including his autobiographical writings, together with the 
biographies of others. The translations of Vygotsky and the biographies of him 
are a major source of information, as are the many other writings o f and on the 
period and its leading actors. It certainly makes it easier to raise the issues 
previously mentioned. Indeed this is one of the major aims, and I hope it will 
prove useful to investigators if and when the letters, diaries and texts become 
fully accessible. In turn they will hopefully then be able to offer a more 
authoritative resolution to these questions. Luria’s The Nature o f Human
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Conflicts, his major publication of the time, was, his contemporaries considered, 
so poorly translated that it is not easy to hilly grasp the importance of this period 
of Luria’s work (cf. VI, i,157; VII, iii, 212). As I write, a Russian edition of the 
book, based on the Russian manuscript, is being prepared for publication. But 
there are many other deserving candidates for new editions. It is also well known 
that of the material that Luria collected on his Central Asian expeditions of 1931 
and 1932, only a quarter was published. A Russian publication appeared only in 
1974 - after Luria was persuaded that it was safe enough to do so -  when he 
published his account. Cognitive Development: Its Cultural and Social 
Foundations (1976). There have in the recent past been problems with access to 
Luria’s personal archives (cf. Levitin 1998, 2, 45), but there now seems to be an 
improvement. This thesis and its questions will therefore hopefully contribute 
towards this ongoing process of learning and re-evaluation.
The other major aim is to show the underlying unity of Luria’s work in this 
period, both in terms of practice and methodology, and how this work developed. 
I agree with Luria’s conclusion about the earliest period of his work in Kazan up 
to 1923. Luria (1979a, 27) writes, “Throughout this period of my life I was 
naively groping. Still, after fifty years, I have the feeling that many of these 
activities were significant in my further development as a psychologist. In later 
years the surface appearance of my research changed a great deal. But the central 
themes that had guided my initial efforts remained”. Thus Luria clearly 
considered this period before he met Vygotsky as vital for his subsequent work, 
as well as the period after he met Vygotsky.
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The Organization of the Thesis
In practice the writing of this thesis was made easier by the fact that the long­
standing ‘crisis in psychology’ meant that Luria, like Vygotsky, had to come to 
grips with the strengths and weaknesses of key approaches to psychology in 
general. This provides, therefore, a contribution, though a partial one, to the 
‘history of ideas’ in psychology. Luria’s theoretical and methodological response 
and development were based on working his way through and beyond such
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approaches. This provides a framework of development -  one common to many -  
though of course the solutions varied. I was surprised at the extent of the ferment 
of ideas that existed at the very beginning of this period. The discussion and 
clarification of some of these ideas fortuitously served the purpose of priming the 
reader to some extent for certain later discussions.
We tend to assume that the work of Pavlov and others was an intrinsic part of 
Luria and Vygotsky’s scientific background, providing both with a start on their 
materialist basis, and a provocation to them to criticize him and his assumptions. 
This is o f course true, but we must remember that the collection of Pavlov’s 
lectures on conditional reflexes was first published as late as 1923. Vygotsky and 
Luria’s responses to this and subsequent editions of Pavlov’s work (Pavlov 1928) 
show how much this continued to stimulate them and improved the materialist 
basis not only for their individual work, but also for their collaboration.
Part I of the thesis. The Early Years (1921-1926), finds Luria, and Vygotsky, 
attempting to both use, and find a way past, reflexology and psychoanalysis. The 
first four chapters deal at length with these problems. This is important for 
allowing us to see how they singly and jointly attempted to deal with this. Despite 
being critical of certain elements within these schools from the very beginning, 
and increasingly so over this period, they still found themselves to some extent 
dependent on these schools and, though wishing to break free, being, in a sense, 
still restrained.
Part II, The Nature o f Human Conflicts, abandons a strict chronological approach 
in order to deal with the research that was eventually published in 1932 under this 
title. However, the first chapter. Chapter 5, deals with the enormous effect of 
Luria’s contact with Gestalt theory in showing him, and Vygotsky, ways out of 
their previous dilemmas. Chapters 6 and 7 deal mainly with the experimental 
research that went into the book and the new theoretical approaches this entailed. 
Here I concentrate almost entirely on Luria in order to bring out his ideas. For, in 
this period, he developed major theoretical approaches.
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The existing translation of The Nature o f Human Conflicts^ on which these 
chapters are based, is, as previously mentioned, so poor that it needed both 
revising and ‘reinterpreting’ to bring out Luria’s emerging theory. Therefore I 
make no apology for the extensive quotation of this ‘retranslation’. Without it, it 
is difficult to understand the major changes in Luria’s thinking. Since it is a 
‘retranslation’ I feel obliged to present my version of Luria’s words to the reader 
particularly in what I think are the significant areas. I hope the selection of 
quotations itself shows how Luria’s theoretical ideas developed. It is rather 
unusual both to ‘retranslate’ and thus re-present a work in a different Hght to the 
extent that I have done here, but it is both a necessary and valid part of the history 
and philosophy of psychology. Only when this work is made accessible and 
comprehensible does it become possible to assess and appreciate its full 
significance.
I do, of course, add further elaboration and clarification throughout. An 
assessment of contemporary reviews of the book is given in the final section of 
Chapter 7, which also includes a discussion on the various forms of the concept 
of functional systems and their development in this period.
Parts I and II form the major part of the work. They are so to speak the foundation 
stones for everything that follows in Luria’s career. Part III is something of an 
epilogue, but it is labelled as a ‘Part’ in order to draw attention to the fact that it 
deserves to be given far more weight. This deficit, which I hope to address 
elsewhere, is due to word limitations. I felt it was more important to concentrate 
on the earlier period of Luria’s development and his own research, not only 
because they are insufficiently discussed, if at all, but also because they have both 
general theoretical significance and because they ground his other work. Part III, 
ideally would discuss Luria’s role in the Vygotsky team’s investigation of child 
development, and his own contributions to the field. It would discuss at length his 
expeditions to Central Asia to compare cognitive approaches in different forms of 
society, and finally it would look at Luria’s comparisons of child development in 
twins.
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As it is, the space available for Part III, Cultural-historical Theory, limits the 
options considerably. The change in Russia’s political, social, economic and 
academic climate is briefly addressed. I attempt to explain the reasoning behind 
Vygotsky and Luria’s development of cultural-historical theory. Usually this 
crucial theoretical aspect gets lost in the detail of the investigations. Here 
unfortunately there is barely room even for a sketch of Luria’s expeditions to 
Central Asia in 1931 and 1932, but the theoretical contribution will, I hope, offer 
the opportunity to step back and look at the theory as a whole. Appendix 1 offers 
an account of how the ideas of Vygotsky and Luria on language and socio- 
historical development originated in the ideas of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744- 
1803), and these were taken up earlier by others, including Karl Marx. It involves 
the recognition that in this respect Vygotsky and Luria here form part of a much 
wider, though not adequately understood, historical school. I hope thereby to 
remedy what I see as a large omission in our understanding of Vygotsky. The 
Appendix has considerable bearing on the contents of Part III and the work as a 
whole.
There is insufficient space for an overall bibliography of Luria works, only for 
those works referred to. The most comprehensive bibliography is to be found in 
Homskaya 2001, but the transliterateration is in an appalling state and there are 
many mistakes and omissions. Elliger and Scheerer’s 1980 bibliography of works 
in English, French and German is still useful for this period. Works mentioned in 
my references are only those quoted and those mentioned in respect of further 
reading in psychological areas.
The thesis shows Luria’s development, but it is only strictly chronological where 
possible and/or desirable. It therefore requires both some priming of the reader 
regarding specific questions, and some cross-referencing as part of the on-going 
commentary. In order to avoid confusion with the various works by Luria that are 
analysed here, together with their parts and their chapters, I have adopted a 
special form for my own cross-references. I have changed the chapter and section 
headings to all Roman numbers -  e.g. (cf. Ill, ii). Where page numbers are also 
relevant these cross-references are presented as e.g. (cf. Ill, ii, 74). (The 
‘Contents’ page provides chapter headings and the titles of their subsections). I
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have avoided using endnotes except in Appendix 1. I believe that including 
relevant comments in the text does not, by and large, affect readability. All square 
brackets contain my own comments or additions. Occasionally I have added my 
initials to emphasize a comment of mine. All italicized words in quotations are in 
the original unless stated otherwise.
I have chosen to include a lot of quotation from Luria and works that influenced 
him directly, or that I think are relevant. This is important, because this has not 
been done before and because it is crucial not only to understand Luria’s 
development, but also to demonstrate it. In sections devoted to particular works 
or chapters by Luria, particularly from The Nature o f Human Conflicts, I have 
often simply used the page numbers in the references. In general, in a case where 
several quotations from the same page are used in sequence, the reference will be 
found in the final quotation. Where possible I have checked or made my own 
translations of the German texts cited. I have also made a very few short 
translations from the Russian. Although I readily admit the limitations of my own 
abilities in Russian, they have however given me an insight into the limitations of 
other translations from the Russian in this period. These generally relate to the 
inability of the reader to comprehend their meaning in English! Therefore I have 
freely amended such translations. Fortunately Nadege Renaud has allowed me to 
use her typescripts of some of Luria’s early untranslated works (Luria 1923a, 
1926c, 1932b), and to read parts of her translation of Elena Luria’s biography of 
her father (E. Luria 1994). Although in Russian Luria is credited with having an 
elegant style, this is rarely evident in English translations. Nadege Renaud 
provides a model of how it should be done.
For the transhteration of Russian names and publications I have generally 
adopted the Library of Congress scheme, though I have omitted diacritical marks. 
I have however kept to some standard transliterations in a few well-known cases, 
including the subject of the thesis. Alexander Romanovich Luria should be 
rendered Aleksandr Romanovich Luriia, but since Luria is an international Jewish 
name, and Alexander also a standard transliteration, I feel this is acceptable. In 
general, in the text, I have also included Russian patronymics, or at least full 
initials, when introducing their bearers.
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PARTI
THE EARLY YEARS
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Chapter 1: Kazan 
I
Family, University Studies, & Early Influences
Alexander Romanovich Luria was bom on 16 July 1902 in Kazan, a town near the 
Volga, several hundred miles east of Moscow. He was brought up as a member of 
a professional non-religious Jewish family. His father, Roman Al’bertovich Luria 
(1874-1944), together with his three brothers, received a higher education in 
Russia, despite the quota system, which discriminated against those of Jewish 
origin. Though too poor to own an overcoat, he nevertheless completed his 
medical studies and graduated from Kazan University in 1897 and also studied in 
Germany. Alexander and his sister Lidiia, bom in 1908, were brought up in a 
family where German was a “second native language”. Evgeniia Viktorovna nee 
Haskin (died 1950), Alexander Romanovich’s mother, was the daughter of a 
master watchmaker. She qualified as a dentist in Warsaw, then part of the Russian 
empire, and formed her own private practice. From this she helped to finance her 
husband’s scientific career. Although he had been offered a post in a university 
pathology laboratory, the Ministry would not allow it, because of his ethnic origin. 
He defended his doctorate in the year of Alexander’s birth. The subject was 
‘Sensory Nerves and the Diaphragm in the Innervation of Breathing’. Although he 
gained no significant university work until much later, his private practice was 
renowned throughout Kazan. Alexander loved both his parents, though 1 would be 
surprised if he was not just a little in awe of his father (based upon E. Luria 1994, 
chapter 1).
After the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 the discriminatory barriers were removed 
and Roman Al’bertovich’s career took off. His son Alexander described his family 
as typical of the Russian intelligentsiia. “We considered ourselves progressive and 
had no religious traditions. Although we were sympathetic to the revolutionary 
movement, we were not directly involved in it” (Luria 1979a, 18).
Roman Al’bertovich became professor of Advanced Medical Training in Kazan in 
1920, and then in Moscow in 1930. He became a Kremlin doctor in the 1930s. 
“His fundamental work was dedicated to the question of the pathology of the
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digestive system, which he treated from the perspective of I.P. Pavlov’s studies” 
(Vvedenskii 1954, vol. 25, 479). Luria was also concerned with the effects of 
malaria and syphilis on the internal organs. He became well known as one of the 
first to study the role of the psyche in the origin and course of internal diseases 
(cf. the references in ibid. and E. Luria 1994, Homskaya 2001. Cf. also the article 
by R. A. Luria 1987, and a review by Sagal 1944).
He naturally hoped and expected that his son would follow in his footsteps and 
was appalled when Alexander Romanovich became involved with the “non- 
scientific” field of psychology. The younger Luria was well aware of his father’s 
standing in the medical profession. One assumes he was glad to investigate 
different fields from his father, and the spirit of the times naturally encouraged 
this. On the other hand, Luria’s later comment would seem to apply almost from 
the very beginning: “I have always leaned toward clinical and physiological 
psychology” (cited in Cole and Cole 1971, 88). And the effects of such an 
upbringing must surely have been profound - not simply on Alexander 
Romanovich’s scientific application and concern with methodology, but also on 
the prodigious work-rate for which he was famous throughout his long career.
He studied at Kazan University from 1918 to 1921 and obtained a degree in 
‘‘Humanities” (Luria 1974, 254). The dramatic changes following the Revolution 
meant that the content of some courses continually changed. Luria says that he 
joined the Law department, but that it quickly became the department of Social 
Sciences (cited in Levitin 1982, 150). Sometimes the teaching staff left, in other 
cases they changed their courses. Luria (1979a, 17) notes his lack of a systematic 
education at university, but, like others, was invigorated by the many creative 
changes.
Luria joined in enthusiastically in the many student discussions, notably of what 
he terms “utopian socialism” -  as a youth Luria “considered himself a follower of 
Tolstoy” (Cole 1979, 199). “Under these conditions student discussion and student 
initiated projects soon came to dominate the professors’ lectures” (Luria 1979a, 
20). Luria became president of a student society, the Association of Social 
Sciences, which was wealthy enough to publish its own books.
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He was interested in the history of social thought and considered writing a trilogy 
on how ideas originate, spread, and work, “a modest proposal for a start”, he later 
observed (cited in Levitin, ibid.). During his researches he looked at psychological 
sources -  Hoffding, Wundt, Ebbinghaus, Titchener, the Wuerzburg School, and 
other leading lights of early psychology. As he told his students in 1974, he found 
these approaches to be so “lifeless”, that they were “responsible for my abiding 
aversion for psychology, much of which I have preserved to this day” (cited in 
Levitin ibid. 150-1).
On 18 February 1921 the famous “communist-anarchist”, Peter Kropotkin, died in 
Moscow aged 79. Although he had supported Russia’s entry into World War I and 
strongly opposed the Bolsheviks, the latter showed great respect for him and his 
books remained in print until the early 1930s. Luria’s first publication (Luria 
1921a), to which he never subsequently referred, was Kropotkin as a Social 
Thinker. It was published in 1921 -  presumably as a posthumous appreciation.
Kropotkin advocated the creation of an egalitarian society that would meet 
everyone’s needs and allow them to develop their potential. He was the most 
prominent exponent of the view -  notably in his book Mutual Aid -  that co­
operation and solidarity within biological species was more common than 
competition, and thereby offered a better chance of survival. In this he supported 
Darwin against the so-called “social Darwinists” who promoted the notion of the 
“survival of the fittest” (cf. Avrich 1988, 57-8). Presumably Luria would have 
expressed these strong points especially if, as he claims, he was interested in 
utopian socialism. He says, “The Revolution freed us to discuss new ideas, new 
philosophies and social systems, especially the younger generation. None of my 
friends were familiar with Marxism or scientific socialist theory, and neither was 
I. Our discussions had not got beyond the utopian socialist schemes that were in 
the air in those days” (Luria 1979a, 18-9).
Luria’s second publication was a preface to and translation of Lujo Brentano’s 
Attempt at a Theory o f Needs (Luria 1921b). Brentano (1844-1931) was on the 
right wing of German Social Democracy -  a so-called “Katheder” socialist, or
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armchair professor. He wrote on economics and social need (cf. Sheehan 1966). 
The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia accorded him a larger entry than the entry on his 
brother Franz, the well-known philosopher (written by Vygotsky). In Lujo’s entry 
the noted economist and economic historian I. I. Rubin discussed his writings on 
wages and social need and also listed Luria’s translation in the references (Rubin 
1927). Luria’s interest in both Kropotkin and Brentano seems, at least 
circumstantially, to relate to need or, more precisely, need as mediated by society. 
Although Brentano’s title, Versuch einer Theorie der Beduerfnisse, has been 
mistranslated as the “Theory of Human Drives” (cf. Luria 1979, 21), there is no 
attempt at biological reductionism in it. Nor does Brentano show any awareness of 
psychoanalysis. Although he does discuss social deprivation, the pamphlet is 
wide-ranging. At the point when one wonders how he proposes to integrate his 
many points, he does introduce Gustav Fechner’s concept of threshold with 
respect to stimuli. But his major point, one, which I think, would have been of 
major interest to Luria, is that, in distinction from other animals, humans require 
not only physical satisfaction of their needs, but also psychological satisfaction. 
This latter has parameters set by “the cultural level of the society, the standard of 
living of the [given] class, and the particular demands of the individual” (Brentano 
1908, 65). Human needs are affected not only by cultural and historical 
development, but also by a need for change, again unique to humans. In a sense, 
human needs are therefore unlimited. Together with the pamphlet’s general 
discussion, this argument would certainly have opened Luria’s mind to non­
reductionist approaches to the question of need. Interestingly, although Luria does 
not discuss Brentano’s work in his encyclopaedia entry on “Drives” (Luria and 
Sapir 1930), it is given in the references, so presumably Luria still recommended 
it for further reading.
Luria wrote that Brentano’s work explored “the needs that set human behaviour in 
motion and this came very close to the issues that were of interest to me” (cited in 
E. Luria 1994, 18). This confirms my comment, as does his remark that, together 
with another work, it “led me to develop a concrete psychological approach to the 
events of social life” (Luria 1979a, 21). This other work was L.I. Petrazycki’s 
influential 1905 work. Introduction to the Study o f Law and Morality: The
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Foundations o f Emotional Psychology. [NB. Petrazycki, a Polish name, is 
rendered as Petrazhitskii in Russian.]
For us it is difficult to imagine a law book having the cultural impact that this one 
did. For an alleged law student, such as Luria, it offered an ideal transition from 
law to the investigation of social and psychological needs. It was cited 
substantially in Vygotsky’s Psychology o f Art (1971). It almost certainly 
contributed to the development of the latter’s experimental methodology through 
the “method of provocation” (Petrazycki 1955, 24-5 -  cf Vygotsky 1971, 189). 
Petrazycki is recognized as an influence on social psychology (Petrovsky 1990, 
36) and he was a major influence on the Bolshevik commissar for justice and 
writer on psychoanalysis, M. A. Reusner (N. S. Timarsheff 1955, xxxii). [NB. 
‘Reusner’ is often transliterated as Reisner, occasionally as Reissner, as with his 
famous daughter Larissa, and also as Reussner].
Petrazycki (1955, 8) wrote that “legal phenomena consist of unique psychic 
processes... expressed, incidentally, in the unique form of ascribing to different 
beings, or to certain classes of such beings, ‘duties’ and ‘rights’... ”. Yet, he 
noted, (ibid. 12), that human “capacity to experience the complicated processes 
that constitute legal phenomena... emerged only with the attainment of a certain 
level of culture... and in particular the attainment of a certain progress in 
language.” If one is framing laws, one should have some understanding of human 
psychology and the motivation of human actions. Petrazycki found contemporary 
psychology unsatisfactory in this respect.
Contemporary psychology, according to Petrazhitskii (ibid. 22-3) was determined 
to artificially divide human behaviour into three areas:
(1) Cognition (sensations and ideas); (2) feelings (pleasures and sufferings) and (3) 
will (aspirations, active experiences). [While the first two categories were 
essentially passive, the third was active. But he sought] experiences in our psychic 
life not fitting within any one of the three categories, but possessing a bilateral, 
passive-active nature... These impulse-stimuli -  such as experiences of hunger
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(appetite), thirst, and sexual excitation -  we may term passive-active, bilateral 
experiences.
He replaced the three category system by (1) bilateral “impulsions” and (2) 
unilateral experiences -  cognitive and feeling (passive) and volitional (active). “In 
the life of animals and man, ‘impulsions’ act as the principal and directing psychic 
factors of adaptation to the conditions of life...” (ibid.).
Although the mixed nature of human motivations and actions had been noted 
before -  especially in Pavlov’s analysis of conditional reactions -  Petrazycki did 
not use his ideas to support an overall theory, but spelt out their methodological 
implications. “The appropriate method of discovering impulsions may be termed 
that of interaction,” which may be found by the placing of obstacles in the way of 
normal forms of behaviour. “This experimental method of diagnostics may be 
termed the method of provocation” (ibid. 24-5). This method was adapted by 
Vygotsky to understand how young children moved from one “stage of 
development” to another.
Unfortunately, little of Petrazycki’s work has been translated and I do not believe 
he extended his theorizing to practical experimentation itself. But the work 
certainly influenced Luria (cf. Luria 1923a, 23) and his reception of it almost 
certainly prepared the ground for his own practical experimentation. Petrazycki 
also raises the notion of the reciprocal recognition of introspection as a 
“precondition prior to the comprehension of the psychic experience of others. The 
corresponding scientific methods of cognition may therefore be called the joint 
method of inward and outward observation” (Petrazycki 1955, 16). Although not 
an original insight, raising it in terms of the methodology of the psychological 
investigation of development may well have been useful for both Vygotsky and 
Luria.
Luria’s concern for methodology led him to read the German neo-Kantian 
philosophers Dilthey, Windelband and Rickert. “Dilthey was especially interesting 
because he was concerned with the real motives that energize people and the 
ideals and principles that guide their lives”. Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911)
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proposed a Realpsychologie, a methodology “in which man would be studied as a 
unified dynamic system”. It would be “a practical psychology, based on an 
understanding of people as they live and behave in the world” (Luria 1979a, 22).
Although inspired by Dilthey, Luria criticized his descriptive approach. There is 
however more to Dilthey -  and presumably to what Luria read - than is revealed 
by the latter’s autobiography. Dilthey’s critique of contemporary psychologies and 
his methodological conclusions reverberate, admittedly anonymously, in the 
debates of the 1920s and in Luria’s own experimental research. Dilthey criticized 
neo-Kantian cognitive theories, positivist, and synthetic or “constructionist” 
approaches to psychology. His own “philosophy of experience and reality”, which 
in some respects ultimately derived fi*om the historical approach of Herder, 
repeated many of the criticisms of contemporary philosophy and psychology that 
Herder had made (see Appendix 1). Dilthey criticized the discrete and partial 
approach of empiricism and, by implication, associationism, promoting instead the 
role of the Wirkungszusammlung, or dynamic system, both in history and 
psychology (for the former cf. Makkreel 1992, 31411).
In Ideen ueber eine heschreibende und zergliedernde Psychologie (1894) [Ideas 
on a descriptive and analytic Psychology], Dilthey wrote, “The law of structure 
and the character of the mental components is simultaneously teleological and 
causal” (Dilthey 1976, 92). Without the teleological element - biological 
development and its role in adjustment to the environment and maturation - there 
would be no development in life.
The development of a human being cannot be inferred from Schopenhauer’s 
concept of blind will or from the play of isolated, individual, mental powers 
described in the systems of [Johann] Herbart or the materialists. Development in 
man is directed towards securing a pattern of mental life adjusted to his 
environment. All mental processes co-operate within us to produce such a pattern, 
giving shape, as it were, to the mind; for even when we distinguish and separate we 
create relationships and, thus, connections. The formulae of transcendental 
philosophy about the nature of our synthesizing faculty are only abstract and 
inappropriate expressions for this quality of our mental life which creates
30
development and pattern. [He adds], the way these connections are given to us 
determines the point of view from which we analyse them (ibid.).
Language, myth, religious tradition, custom, law and other organizations are 
products of the collective mind in which human consciousness, to use Hegel’s 
phrase, has become objectified and so open to analysis. Man does not discover 
what he is through speculation about himself or through psychological experiments 
but through history. Dissecting the products of the human mind ... to give us 
insight into the origin, forms and function of the mental structure must combine the 
analysis of historical products with the observation and collection of every 
available part of the historical processes by which they were produced. The whole 
historical study of the origin, forms and workings of men’s mental structure 
depends on the combination of these two methods (ibid. 93).
A clear echo of this can be found in the approach of cultural-historical school that 
Vygotsky, Luria and their associates founded around 1929. Such ideas clearly had 
roots in some psychological thinking before Vygotsky and Luria had even been 
bom. The roles of biology, history and social experience all have a part to play in 
the development of an individual.
Dilthey’s comments on the methodological implications for psychology are 
significant in reflecting the practical development of Luria and Vygotsky. “The 
decisive fact for the study of mental stmcture is that the transitions from one state 
to another, the effect o f one on another are part o f our inner experience'  ^ (ibid. 
94). Luria was quite rightly critical of Dilthey’s reliance on mere description of 
the experience of these transitions. But the study of these transitions themselves 
was the lifeblood of his and Vygotsky’s work in the 1920s.
Dilthey believed we must not simply think of these transitions and states as 
separate. “Mental life ... is always an encompassing unity. Mental functions have 
been dififerentiated in it but they remain tied to their context”. With the maturity 
that development brings “the person is now no longer at the beck and call of 
stimuli. He inhibits and controls his reactions; he chooses when he will adjust 
reality to his requirements” (ibid. 94-5). All Dilthey’s comments, here admittedly 
a small selection, undoubtedly reflect nineteenth century thinking -  some of it
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derived from Hegel. At the same time, if we take them more materialistically, 
their practical relevance appears, with the hindsight of the careers of Luria and 
Vygotsky, to be undeniable.
But it is this hindsight that is crucial here. Vygotsky’s reading of Hegel and the 
Ukrainian writer on language A. A. Potebnia (1835-91) made him appreciate the 
role of human development and some of its methodological complexity. The role 
of language in these qualitative transformations was central to this issue. With 
Luria it could be argued that Petrazycki and Dilthey raised, at least in part, some 
of the same issues. It is said that cultural-historical theory arose from the interest 
of Vygotsky and Luria in the writings of Marx and Engels. It is true that their 
writings certainly helped Vygotsky and Luria to appreciate and make concrete the 
issues (cf. Hames 2000). But the seeds had already been planted by other writers. 
Indeed, as I argue in Appendix I all these issues had already been raised by Herder 
in the eighteenth century. A large part of what I take to be the misperception of 
the work of Vygotsky and Luria -  especially in the West -  is the ignorance and 
misperception by large sections of the Anglo-American intelligentsia of this whole 
Herder-derived approach to human development, history and language.
Luria is also presented as being dependent on Vygotsky’s depth of learning. While 
it is certainly true that the older man grasped these issues more firmly and with 
more assurance, the evidence presented here shows that the 20-year old Luria was 
in some respects also moving down a similar path. On the other hand, while Luria 
would have found it difficult to avoid reading the historical, social and 
developmental elements, his exposure to them does not appear to have led to their 
absorption into his current thinking. Given that Luria was later considered to have 
a good grasp of Marxism, it may be that his slowness to catch on to these elements 
explains his comment that, ‘‘Properly speaking, I never really mastered Marxism 
to the degree I would have liked. I still consider this to have been a major 
shortcoming to my education” (Luria 1979a, 30). To be fair, Vygotsky, generally 
considered to have had the advantage over Luria in this respect, did not move into 
these areas himself in any significant way until the late 1920s. This may be 
explained partly by the fact that part I of the German Ideology, which contains 
Marx’s most significant, though brief, contribution on human nature was not
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published until 1924, and Engels’ contribution to general scientific theory, 
Dialectics o f Nature, the following year -  both in Russia.
On the other hand, a practical scientist has to work with the materials available at 
the stage to which his or her science has developed. It is thus of major significance 
that, for all their insights, neither Herder, nor any who exhibited his influence, 
directly or indirectly, namely Marx, Hegel, Potebnia, Petrrazycki and Dilthey, 
produced a practical psychology. Mere exposure to their ideas was not enough. 
Confrontation with the practical scientific problems of psychology remained a 
prerequisite. Here Luria’s experience with practical experimentation throughout 
the 1920s must be considered a major element in the success of both himself and 
Vygotsky.
II
Engagement with Psychoanalysis and the Schools of Russian Psychology
In 1922 Luria wrote Principles o f Realistic Psychology, a book “which exists in a 
single hand-written copy” of 200 manuscript pages. In 1974 he described it as 
“childish ... but nonetheless interesting” (cited in E. Luria 1994, 19). Using 
Windelband’s distinction between nomothetic and idiographic sciences -  those 
governed by general laws and those concerned with individual processes -  Luria 
suggested that psychology could combine both: studying “the concrete individual 
man” and revealing regularities, thus making it “a science of individual laws” 
(ibid.). In 1924/5 he cited his manuscript, O Printsipakh ReaVnoi Psikhologii, as 
dwelling in some detail on the criticism of the metaphysical use of psychological 
‘elements’ (Luria 1994, 173, n.5). He later explicitly states that he was attempting 
both to use Dilthey’s Realpsychologie and to place it on a more scientific footing 
by avoiding Dilthey’s descriptive method. The little that he tells us about this 
work suggests that this was his attempt to resolve Dilthey’s shortcomings (Luria 
1979a, 23).
Luria’s methodological concerns and aversion for existing psychologies is shown 
by his publication through the student association of In Search o f the Living Man,
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a book by a certain Professor Kruglikov. This work “gave vent to our 
dissatisfaction with the lifeless, depersonalized, dreary psychology of the time” 
(cited in Levitin 1982, 151). He also published a book by Konstantin Sotonin 
called Temperaments. He subsequently reviewed this work, and was generally 
favourable to this “sketch”, but unfavourable to its successor. The Idea o f the 
Philosophical Clinic. He criticized the latter for its methodology and failure to use 
the psychoanalytic approach to psychotherapy. The former appears to have
revived the idea of the four temperaments for the sake of creating a
symptomatology -  as did Pavlov (1928, 390). The evidence of sensitivity to such 
a temperament, e.g. involving pleasure, was manifest in the speed of reaction to 
such stimuli. Luria’s reviews (1923c, 102, 104-5) suggest that while he may have 
found Sotonin’s ‘sketch’ to be stimulating, both works were deeply flawed.
In this Kazan period Luria was groping his way towards a study of human needs, 
motivations, behaviour and ideas using a variety of sources -  economic, legal, 
ethical, socialist, philosophical, physiological and psychological. Although he 
writes of his enthusiasm for the Revolution, he offers no evidence of having read 
any Marxist writings. His focus on and view of the individual reflects the
influence of Kant on the authors that he read as opposed to the Herderian
influences that appear at times in the work of Petrazycki and, more particularly, 
Dilthey. Nevertheless, Luria’s interest in concrete, individual behaviour and his 
frustration with traditional psychological approaches pushed him onwards.
Luria notes that at the time he was wrestling with the problems of Dilthey, he 
came across the writings of Freud, Adler, Jung and other members of the 
psychoanalytic school.
Many of Freud’s ideas seemed speculative and somewhat fantastic to me, but the 
study of emotional conflicts and complexes using the association method seemed 
promising. Here, I thought, was a scientific approach that combined a strongly 
deterministic explanation of concrete, individual behaviour with an explanation of 
the origins of complex human needs in terms of natural science. Perhaps 
psychoanalysis could serve as the basis for a scientific Realpsychologie, one that 
would overcome the nomothetic-idiographic distinction” (Luria 1979a, 23).
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[NB. Whether Luria’s manuscript of the Principles o f Realistic Psychology 
actually extends to the use of psychoanalysis is not clear (ibid. 24)].
The immensely pro-active Luria, at the age of 20, set up the Kazan Psychoanalytic 
Society and wrote to Sigmund Freud. Freud responded favourably both to Luria 
and to the Society’s creation. He also authorized the translation of one of his 
smaller works (E. Luria 1994, 21). It is difficult to follow the precise sequence of 
both influences and events in Luria’s student life. Many of his concerns and 
interests were developing simultaneously. From 1921 to at least 1925, however, 
the psychoanalytic element of his work was to be a dominating one. Luria’s own 
contributions to the field are written with both care and caution. He was also to 
play a major role in the life of the psychoanalytic movement in Russia, and in 
reporting its activities to the outside world. The Kazan Psychoanalytic Society 
was organized in the summer of 1922. Of the 14 members, 7 are listed as doctors 
of medicine, one of the latter was also a psychologist. There were 4 other 
psychologists, or students of psychology. Luria is listed as “psychologist, 
president of the Association of Social Science” (Luria 1923b, 397).
When Luria graduated fi*om Kazan University in 1921, his father continued to 
urge him to go into medicine. Luria remained set on becoming a psychologist, but 
he compromised and pursued both careers. “At that time it was possible to be 
enrolled simultaneously in more than one school. So I began taking medical 
classes and completed two years of medical school before interrupting my studies, 
which were only resumed after many years. Simultaneously I spent time at the 
Pedagogical Institute and the Kazan Psychiatric Hospital” (Luria 1979a, 25).
Undoubtedly this increased the range of Luria’s contacts at a time when he was 
building the Society. Dr. R. A. Averbukh was one of the more prominent active 
members, and another prominent member who joined in October 1922 was Dr. B. 
D. Fridmann. Averbukh and Fridmann were psychologists. Some of the doctors 
had also studied in Zurich. They presented clinical reviews of cases of neurosis, 
and also discussed Freud’s theories, sometimes critically (E. Luria 1994, 21). As 
Secretary of the Society, Luria sent regular reports to the international section of
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the psychoanalytic movement. He summarized the talks and reports that were 
given at the Kazan meetings. His first talk, given at the inaugural meeting on 
September 7 1922 considered that “experimental ‘mosaic’ psychology, which 
studied not the personality, but its separate elements, has reached its limits... 
Psychoanalysis is one ... [new] method of the analysis of personality as a whole, 
and of late it has established its position as a classical method”. His second talk in 
October discussed “the psychoanalysis of costume”. Woman dressed in a 
“sexually passive” way, but men in a “sexually and socially active” way. “The 
analysis of dress is one method of [obtaining a] psychological symptomatology” 
(Luria 1923b, 397-8). This was almost the only time Luria spoke of the social 
aspects of the psychoanalytic concern with sexual behaviour. His daughter adds 
that the talk discussed times when these rules no longer held -  such as during 
carnival -  and also discussed the role of military uniforms and the clothes of those 
in positions of power and authority (E. Luria 1994, 22fï).
Throughout his active period in the psychoanalytic movement Luria took as full a 
part in the discussion following the talks as any other member in Kazan or 
subsequently Moscow. As secretary, he did of course write the reports, but his 
veracity and efficiency in reporting the talks, and sometimes the discussions, has 
not been questioned. One discussion, in November 1922, on the relevance of 
analysis to folklore and literature, agreed that it was relevant, but not always 
applicable. “The analysis of symptoms -interpretation of dreams, association 
experiments, and so forth -  remains the classical method of psychoanalysis” 
(Luria 1923b, 398). Given the importance attributed to literature and folklore by 
some members of the Moscow Psychoanalytic Society, this assessment is 
evidence of the seriousness with which the members of the Kazan Society viewed 
their priorities. It also mirrors the concerns of the international movement about 
the state of the Moscow organization (cf. Miller 1998, 61). Kazan was far from 
puritan, however; and Luria himself gave a talk on Leonid Andreiev’s play Sawa 
four months later (ibid.).
In December Luria (1923d) discussed five distinct directions in contemporary 
Russiein psychology. Firstly, the pre-Wundtian philosophically idealist writers S. 
Frank and A. N. Vvedenskii (Petrograd) and N. A. Vassiliev (Kazan), secondly.
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G. I. Chelpanov (1862-1936) head of the Moscow Institute of Psychology, who 
urged the importance of experimentation, but at that time still in a largely 
subjectivist way. He taught many well-known psychologists such as P. P. 
Blonskii, and K. N. Kornilov, who replaced him in 1923. Thirdly, the Petrograd 
school of A. F. Lazurskii (1874-1917) promoted experiments that attempted to 
replicate natural conditions. But by rejecting philosophical and psychological 
approaches his approach became largely biological. Next Luria addressed the 
work of I. P. Pavlov (1849-1936) and V. M Bekhterev (1857-1927). Their 
competing schools investigated both physiology (including that of the brain) and 
the forms of behaviour that could be examined by means of physiology. Finally, 
he mentioned what he called the biochemical trend. Luria’s only published 
comment was that “the original reflexological school of so-called objective 
psychology represents a special interest for Russia in that, in a number of 
problems, it comes close to psychoanalysis. [On the other hand,] Russian 
psychoanalysis is still too young, and has not yet achieved anything original” 
(Luria 1923d, 115). This conclusion remained central to Luria’s thinking 
throughout his involvement with psychoanalysis.
In his autobiography he explains that while working his way through Jung’s 
Studies o f Diagnostic Associations and William James’s Varieties o f Religious 
Experience -  both of which impressed him -  he came across some papers by 
Bekhterev and Pavlov.
What immediately impressed me was that both men had objective approaches to 
problems that psychologists were able to discuss only in subjective terms. I was 
especially excited by Pavlov’s experiments involving conditioning. Most of us 
have come to accept as commonplace his demonstration that it is possible to 
measure excitatory and inhibitory processes in the central nervous system which 
mediate the way in which peripheral stimulation produces salivary reflexes. At the 
time, however, they were revelatory in their implications (Luria 1979,25-6).
It was this approach that Luria adapted and which initially helped guide his work 
within psychoanalysis. Luria’s enthusiasm, however, probably relates to the first 
edition of the work published in the West and now known as Lectures on
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Conditioned Reflexes volume one as this was only published in 1923 (Pavlov 
1928), i.e., a little later.
At the All-Russian Congress of Psychoneurology, held in Moscow on 10-15 
January 1923, there were eleven lectures including a repeat by Luria of his talk on 
clothing and psychoanalysis. Also speaking were well-known stalwarts of the 
Moscow Psychoanalytic Society. The psychiatrist and historian of psychiatry, I. 
V. Kannabikh, lectured on psychogenic illness, the analyst and translator of Freud, 
Dr. Moshe Wulff (1878-1971), on psychaesthenia and phobias, and the writer on 
literature and editor of the Freud translations, I. D. Ermakov (1875-1942), on 
childlike play (Luria 1923d, 114). Subsequently when in Moscow Luria showed a 
recent book of his to Otto (O. lu.) Schmidt. Together with his wife Vera (V. F.), 
Schmidt (1891-1956) was another prominent member. Among his many talents, 
including that of being a famous scientist and (later) a polar explorer, he was 
Director of the Gosizdat State Publishing House (cf. Graham 1987, 386ff; for 
references to the whole group cf. Etkind 1997). In 1923 he brought out a new 
edition of Luria’s pamphlet Psychoanalysis in the Light o f the Main Trends in 
Modern Psychology. This was a “considerable edition -  some five hundred 
copies” (cited in Levitin 1982, 153).
ni
First Major Publication on Psychoanalysis and First Experiments
Luria’s 1974 lecture almost gives the impression that this pamphlet was merely an 
extended series of reviews of books on psychoanalysis originally published in a 
Kazan literary journal that he subsequently decided might make into a book (ibid. 
152). But the comments he makes are far too loose for our purposes. In the 
preface to the work he writes, “The material for this pamphlet was used for a 
range of papers delivered at the Kazan Psychoanalytic Society”. He states that the 
survey of psychological and psychoanalytic literature he makes is made for a 
specific purpose. Namely, “to show the place which psychoanalysis nowadays 
occupies in the science of the nervous -  psychological life of the personality”, and 
“to present a brief survey of the starting points from which the current theories of
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psychoanalysis derive” (Luria 1923a, 1). That the work arose from his lectures to 
the Society is clear from his own reports of the meetings. This is especially 
evident in his lecture in Kazan on 18 February 1923 on “Some Principles of 
Psychoanalysis”, which clearly covers some of the same ground as the pamphlet 
(cf. Luria 1923d, 116). This is also true of another lecture with the same title as 
the pamphlet, given on 5 March 1923 (Luria 1923e, 238).
There are 46 pages of text in this pamphlet. In the postscript Luria apologizes for 
the consequences of its brevity, including the omission of such major areas as 
child development. Seventeen pages represent the final chapter, which comprises 
two sections. The first is on psychoanalytic “biographies” illustrating the effects 
of a child’s relationship with its parents. There is an extended commentary on two 
works on Alexander the Great and Tsar Alexander I. Fortunately there seems to be 
little mileage in comparing Luria’s character to that of his namesakes. The second 
section is on collective psychology, together with comments on the role of 
symbols. This chapter does indeed read like a review of the literature. It also 
demonstrates Luria’s attitude to history at that time. He concludes that “these 
works will open the way to an analytical history of religion and the psychology of 
peoples which will incontestably in future supplant mere historical description” 
(Luria 1923a, 48). This confirms his comments about his early lack of 
understanding of Marxism, or indeed of Dilthey’s relation to the historical 
tradition.
But the earlier, more substantial chapters demonstrate a significant grasp of the 
overlapping areas of psychoanalysis and psychology. This is particularly evident 
in the first chapter, “Contemporary Psychology and Psychoanalysis”. Much of this 
relates to the seemingly perpetual “crisis in psychology”, especially in 
experimental psychology. In its various discrete studies, conventional psychology 
failed to concern itself with the functional unity of human behaviour. It failed to 
study the dynamics either of action, behaviour, personality, psychotherapy or 
psychopathology. This weakness explained why it was still unable to contribute 
adequately to applied psychology - such as psychotechnics (the psychology of 
work), psychotherapy or educational psychology. Earlier psychoanalysis itself is 
not immune from criticism. “Its weakest link ... was that it was split off from
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normal psychology and that it laboured considerably more over the casuistic 
material of psychopathology than its own principal methodological 
foundation”(9). Luria’s concern with methodology remains paramount, as before.
But just as Russian psychologists such as Pavlov, Bekhterev, Lazurskii and 
Kornilov had begun to develop a more dynamic approach, so the faults of 
psychoanalysis were now being rectified. Implicitly Luria seems to be saying that 
there is a developing convergence. He hopes this convergence will continue to 
develop, and this is where his place will be. “Progressive directions in 
psychological and psychoanalytic thought started to talk the same language and to 
agree upon similar positions” (ibid.). They shared “the principle of an integral, 
biological psychology, of the dynamic study and understanding of human 
behaviour” (10). He found support for this position in statements of Ernst 
Kretschmer and Eugen Bleuler, and in the positions of several schools including 
one that later became known as the Gestalt school. Western behaviourism, the 
“neo-Freudians”, who included W.H.R. Rivers (1864-1922), and the so-called 
“functional” school, among whom he included M. la. Basov. Although these 
schools were very diverse, Luria was encouraged that their experimental focus 
seemed to be converging productively. To see the early Luria as an exponent of 
psychoanalysis, pure and simple, would therefore be very misleading.
The following chapter, “Starting Principles in Psychoanalysis”, made no pretence 
to be comprehensive, due to what Luria considered the flood of seminal works. 
Although these theories are widely known, it is useful for us to understand what 
Luria considered central at that time in order to understand the enormous steps 
that he took in the 1920s. He discussed Freud’s early examination of apparently 
trivial phenomena, but even here reactions to stimuli “are regulated by the very 
same principle which holds significance for the life of the whole personality... 
Finally, all this mental activity is regulated by the striving towards pleasure and 
by an active repugnance for suffering and pain” (16). In extreme cases of the 
latter, memories may be forced from the conscious mind.
At the basis of each experience lies the relationship of the personality to the world:
attraction or repulsion. Thus, the teleological aspect of all psychological
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experiences, fiindamental to psychoanalysis, is introduced into psychology. It 
allows psychology to move from the descriptive to the explanatory... Each 
psychical phenomenon possesses vital value and significance and is embedded, 
sometimes unconsciously, in the drives lying at the basis of a given phenomenon. 
They just have to be laid bare for the phenomenon to be explained... Freud called 
these principal foundations of the psychoanalytical system [his] ‘metapsychology’ 
( 18).
In 1933 Freud wrote, “the theory of instincts [drives] is, so to speak, our 
mythology. Instincts are mythical entities magnificent in their indefiniteness” 
(Freud 1974, 95). Methodologically Luria had adopted Freud’s position and 
Freud’s determinism, but as a scientist, it remained for him to verify these 
determinisms or, failing that, to exhibit the mechanisms that might be considered 
consistent both with physiological theory and with such a metapsychology.
His criticisms of traditional psychology’s approach to thinking are, however, 
legitimate. It did assume that thinking was primarily logical and, simultaneously, 
that it was comprised of abstract, atomized elements. In contrast, psychoanalysis 
envisaged “consciousness together with its fundamental aspect, thinking, as 
functions o f the personality as a whole with its drives, needs, emotions and sets” 
(Luria 1923a. 19). Luria does not comment here on the apparent contradiction 
between this position and the views of Dilthey and others on the historical nature 
of thinking and the possible transformational effects of thinking itself on human 
behaviour. These were issues that he was subsequently to face during the 1920s, 
but in stages until he was able to confront, together with Vygotsky, all these issues 
simultaneously.
In the third chapter, “Teachings of Psychoanalysis on Personality and its Drives”, 
Luria admits that tracking down the drives beneath the observable psychical 
phenomena is a major task, indeed their study is “the most fiindamental and 
difficult issue facing psychoanalysis” (21). He also notes that in the work. Drives 
and their Vicissitudes, Freud defines a drive as an internal stimulus, which 
manifests itself in many ways (cf. Freud 1984b, 114fQ. Even the sex drive, the 
prototypical drive, may be manifested basically, “crudely”, or through the
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mediation of many forms of social 'refinement' or variation. Later Luria discusses 
the ego’s instincts concerned with the needs of self-preservation and self- 
assertion, and Alfred Adler’s corollary to it, the inferiority complex and forms of 
compensation.
The mechanisms of the operation of drives followed the reflex model, as Freud 
pointed out in The Interpretation o f Dreams and subsequently (cf. Freud 1976, 
686, 719ff, 757). Although the work of Pavlov and Bekhterev in this field was 
important to Luria, he considered of special relevance those places where 
psychoanalysis independently discovered, by its own methods, mechanisms that 
reflexology had also found. These included not only the basic stimulus-reaction or 
inhibition, but the repression and revival of unconscious “traces”, together with 
displacement as the basic mechanism of neuroses. As we shall see, this 
concentration on finding the connections between parts of the dynamic nervous 
system was to prove a major interest to Luria throughout his life. Although he 
later rejected Freud’s metapsychology, acquaintances of Luria of a psychoanalytic 
persuasion believed that throughout his life he utilized approaches associated with 
psychoanalysis. Writers on psychoanalytic movements often tend to believe ‘once 
a psychoanalyst, always a psychoanalyst,’ even if covertly. Although Luria was 
extremely enthusiastic about psychoanalysis in his youth, he was above all a 
scientist. If he did remain open to Freud and some of his concepts, it was because 
he, as a scientist, found them to be useful and consistent with his own ideas. But it 
was merely one source of ideas, and a declining one at that, among many others.
Luria refers also to Freud’s latest work, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). 
Here repetition, Luria says, is for Freud, “the fundamental mechanism, the basic 
principle according to which the entire psychological life is constructed"' (Luria 
1923a, 31-2). At this stage Luria does not elaborate on the many forms repetition 
takes in this work, notably Freud’s speculations on biological regression.
While still at the Kazan Psychiatric Hospital Luria undertook his first exploratory 
studies of psychiatric patients. These patients included Dostoevsky’s 
granddaughter. “While I was able to fill notebooks with her fi*ee associations, I 
was in no position to carry out my plan to use such data to capture ‘the concrete
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reality of the flow of ideas’. In fact, just posing the problem in this way makes it 
clear why such an approach could lead nowhere” (Luria 1979a, 24). This may be 
taken to mean that he found the existing form of free association to be 
unsatisfactory in terms of understanding the dynamics of the disturbed mind, and 
possibly of locating the patient’s hidden concerns. Obviously, from a therapist’s 
point of view, such an approach is valuable only in certain situations. For Luria, 
attempting both to extend and ground psychoanalysis scientifically, this approach 
failed not only to locate the sources of the complexes, but the structure and 
dynamics of the disturbances. Luria does not appear to have attempted other forms 
of psychoanalytic therapy. It may explain why in the postscript to his pamphlet 
Luria wrote that he “did not touch at all on the psychoanalytic teachings on 
neuroses, an area with which this author feels incompetent to deal” (Luria 1923a, 
49). But, in this context, we can appreciate that, for Luria, the limitations were not 
restricted to those of his own personal abilities. He was to return to the subject 
later.
Luria was more successful with his first experiments. He took a job as a 
laboratory assistant at the Institute of the Scientific Organization of Labour. His 
experiments took place at a printing works where he was also employed. One 
concerned the effects of fatigue of workers in the type foundry where heavy metal 
intoxication was a major hazard. The other experiment involved a reflexological 
method of studying suggestibility (Luria in Levitin 1982,153).
The former experiment studied the effect of hard work on mental activity. He used 
an old Hipp chronoscope he had found “to measure the influence of verbal 
instructions on [the workers’] reaction time. It was my first attempt to discover the 
role of speech in regulating reaction time” (Luria 1979a, 26). He was not 
impressed by the results though.
The other experiment involved the use of a Kornilov dynamometer, which he and 
his colleagues had obtained.
[This machine] was just a convoluted pipe with mercury. By pressing a valve on
top of a cylinder one could measure not only the speed, but also the intensity of the
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reaction. A curious fact attracted my attention. The dynamometer curve was 
recorded on a smutty drum and was usually regular in shape, but was irregular 
when the person tested revealed an affective reaction, i.e., when he was for some 
reason concerned about the experiment. That observation would later play an 
important role in my life...(cited in Levitin 1982, 153)
The subject’s speed of reaction was measured, and then Luria would suggest to 
him that he was growing weary. In the next rotmd of tests Luria “found that the 
reaction time became much longer. I thought that the increase during the 
intervening period could be used as a measure of the individual’s suggestibility” 
(ibid.). The title of Luria’s paper. Toward a Method o f Psychological Investigation 
(Luria 1922), clearly suggests his awareness of its potential methodological 
significance.
Luria’s attempts to get his results published demonstrate considerable enterprise. 
First he decided to publish a journal, then persuaded Professor N. A. Mislavskii, a 
noted physiologist, to be an editor. (Luria’s father had studied for his doctorate at 
Mislavskii’s physiological laboratory). Next he made his first visit to Petrograd to 
invite no less a scientist than the eminent V. M. Bekhterev to be an editor. Luria 
hinted that he would be available as secretary for the journal. Bekhterev agreed 
providing “that the word ‘reflexology’ be added to the title I suggested for the 
journal. Problems o f the Psychophysiology o f Work Hygiene. It was duly added. 
Finally Luria went to Krestovnikov’s soap factory and procured some yellow 
wrapping paper on which to print the journal (E. Luria 1994, 25, cf. Luria 19231).
According to Luria’s autobiography these articles were seen by Professor K. N. 
Kornilov (1879-1957), newly appointed head of the Moscow Institute of 
Psychology, and attracted his attention. According to Luria’s 1974 talk:
I wrote a letter to Kornilov in Moscow in which I told him that I had read his book 
on reactions, found it interesting, and was enclosing my own papers on the same 
subject. To my great surprise [!], I received a letter from him with an invitation to
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come to Moscow .,. Kornilov was casting about for pupils, and here was a young 
provincial lad also working with a [Kornilov!] dynamometer. Why not invite him?
In the autumn of 1923 I joined the staff at the Institute of Psychology... Incredible 
though it may sound, I was appointed academic secretary (ibid. 154).
There appears to have been another pressing reason for Luria to move to Moscow, 
which would also suggest that he was actively seeking the move. This was to 
assist in the reorganization of the Russian Psychoanalytic Society. In 1922-3 
Russia contained one eighth of the membership of the International 
Psychoanalytic Association. Kazan’s membership was slightly more than 
Moscow’s. Kazan had already joined the Association. The Moscow group’s 
application was blocked by those members of the international movement, who 
believed that there should be only one nationally centralized association. The 
negotiations for Moscow’s entry were protracted and complicated. This situation 
was resolved by combining the Kazan and Moscow societies into the All-Russian 
Psychoanalytic Association, which was definitively admitted to the International 
Association in April 1924.
Apparently Luria was charged with facilitating this change. On 4 September 1923 
the Kazan group decided that “in view of the centralization of the Russian 
psychoanalytic movement, it is considered desirable for members o f the Kazan 
Psychoanalytic Association to enter the All-Russian Psychoanalytic Association 
based in Moscow. For the moment it has been agreed to transfer A.R. Luria, and 
doctors B. D. Fridmann and R. A. Averbukh to Moscow” (cited in Marti 1973, 
219-221). This was probably to raise the proportion of medically trained members 
in the city and set a more serious medical orientation in the organization (Miller 
1998, 61). This resolution appears to have been simultaneously passed in 
Moscow. Luria became secretaiy of the reorganized Association. He was barely 
twenty-one.
Luria’s own assessment of this period is important and, I feel, both correct and 
worth repeating. “Throughout this period of my life I was naively groping. Still, 
after fifty years, I have the feeling that many of these activities were significant in 
my further development as a psychologist. In later years the surface appearance of
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my research changed a great deal. But the central themes that had guided my 
initial efforts remained” (Luria 1979a, 27).
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Chapter 2: Moscow: 
The First Years
I
The Psychoanalytic Society, the Institute of Psychology, and *the Combined 
Motor and Verbal Response Method’
Another possible reason for the move to Moscow was Luria’s forthcoming 
marriage to Vera Nikolaevna Blagovidova, also a student at Kazan University. 
She became an actress at the Moscow studio of Alexander Tairov, one of post­
revolutionary theatre’s ‘big five’. In Moscow Luria’s interest in painting, poetry, 
architecture and theatre developed, and he became friends with Sergei Eisenstein. 
Luria never referred to his first wife in his autobiographical writings. She fell in 
love with another man, perhaps when Luria was in America in 1929. Luria 
accepted this and they remained on friendly terms, but lost touch. After her 
parents’ deaths Luria’s daughter (by his second wife) found Vera and wrote about 
her (cf. E. Luria 1994). After their divorce Luria moved in briefly with his parents, 
who had recently moved to Moscow.
Over the course of the next three years Luria continued working in the 
overlapping areas of psychoanalysis and psychology. The period was marked by 
his efforts to reconcile the two, and contains his major psychoanalytic writings. 
He also began the long series of experiments that was to lead to his doktorat. The 
arrival of Vygotsky in Moscow in 1924 made a substantial impact, and this busy 
period also marks the beginning of their collaboration. The 1920s as a whole may 
be viewed as a long period of fermentation that led to the major theoretical 
advances of the late 1920s, but there were also notable events and decisions made, 
not simply in Russia at large, but in the theoretical development of both Luria and 
Vygotsky.
In 1924 Luria reported that in the autumn of 1923 several new members had 
joined the Russian Psychoanalytical Society in Moscow, including Averbukh,
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Fridmann and himself from Kazan, and Sabina Spielrein (1885-1942), the well- 
known analyst recently returned after many years in Western Europe. Luria 
described himself as currently assistant at the Institute of Psychology. The first 
meeting of the Society took place on 18 October 1923, so we may assume that 
Luria had already settled in Moscow by then.
As secretary of the Society, Luria reported on both it and the State 
Psychoanalytical Institute with which it was closely associated. A committee 
conducted the business of both Society and Institute. This comprised the 
president, vice-president, secretary and two committee members, respectively: 
Ermakov, O. lu. Schmidt, Luria, Spielrein and Wulff. (Schmidt, Spielrein and 
Wulff preferred the transliteration of their names back into their original German 
as opposed to the conventional Shmidt, Shpilrein and Vulfi). The Institute was 
founded in Moscow in 1921. Until the autumn of 1923 its primary role was as a 
children’s home and laboratory on psychoanalytic lines, but in the autumn of 1923 
its work was greatly extended (Luria 1924a, 258).
Thanks in particular to Alexander Etkind’s findings we now know a great deal 
more about the Institute. There was a close connection between leaders on the left 
of the Revolution and the Institute. In his published writings Luria never touched 
on this, but in the manuscript of the 1974 lecture he mentions that “Radek and a 
slew of others” supported it (cited in Etkind 1997, 197, though not in Levitin 
1982). Karl Radek, second husband of Larissa Reusner, and son-in-law of M. A. 
Reusner, was a leading supporter of Leon Trotsky and the Left Opposition to 
Stalin and his associates in the mid-1920s. It seems to be unarguable that Trotsky 
and his colleagues played a key role in obtaining state support and financing for 
the Institute from 1923-5 (Etkind 1997, chapter 6). Viktor Kopp, as ambassador to 
Germany and a member of the Society (ibid. 250-1), probably solicited and 
obtained financial support from Germany, including food shipments for the 
children’s home, known as the International Solidarity Children’s Home. In 
addition to such luminaries of the Revolution, Luria probably met other members 
of the government. It is thought that several left their children at the home, when 
they were abroad or away from Moscow on government business. Luria later 
informed M.G. laroshevskii that Stalin sent his son there (laroshevskii 1994, 36).
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Luria reminisced about the luxurious Riabushinskii mansion, where Gorky 
subsequently lived, that housed the Institute. “I had a splendid office with silk- 
lined walls in which I sat with an air of great solemnity and which was the scene 
of fortnightly psychoanalytic meetings. The first floor was occupied by our 
psychoanalytic society and the second floor by the psychoanalytic kindergarten”, 
i.e., the children’s home (cited in Levitin 1982, 160).
At the Institute of Psychology “the staff were young and inexperienced. None 
W61S older than twenty-four, [apart from Kornilov, the director,] and few had 
proper training, but everyone was extremely enthusiastic...” (Luria 1979a, 31). 
Kornilov sought to distinguish his school of “Reactology” and the work of the 
Institute from that of Pavlov and Bekhterev. By attempting the objective 
measurement of mental behaviour through reactology, he proposed to lay the basis 
of an objective and materialist psychology, which would overcome psychology’s 
separation from or reduction to physiology. In 1921 he wrote, “what we label 
psychical processes are little more than a particular kind of physical energy” (cited 
in Rahmani 1973, 25). The institute was supposed to reform the whole of 
psychological science by abandoning Chelpanov’s idealistic approach. Kornilov 
spoke in 1923 of the need to apply Marxist philosophy to psychology” (ibid.). 
Luria (1979a, 31) notes that the study of reactions involved a wide range of work 
including rats and mazes, the motor reactions of adults, and problems of 
education. Naturally Kornilov’s dynamometer was to play a major role in the 
study of motor movement. As regards the teaching programme Luria followed the 
experience of many other new teachers by keeping a day ahead of his students. 
L.V. Zankov and 1. M. Soloviev were among his students.
Luria wrote (ibid. 31-2), “It is difficult to characterize my feelings at the start of 
my professional life except perhaps to say that they were highly ambivalent. 1 was 
in full sympathy with the Institute’s efforts to develop objective methods of 
research. 1 did not think much of the efforts to measure mental energy; Kornilov’s 
mechanistic scheme was clearly an oversimplification.” But he did regard it as a 
step forward. Kornilov published the work of his staff including some of Luria’s 
subsequent work, and seems to have considered it significant (cf. Kornilov 1930, 
277). Nevertheless Luria reported that “differences with Kornilov began almost
49
from the begiiming as we did not like his approach” (E. Luria 1994, 32, also cited 
in Levitin 1982, 155). Although Luria had theoretical and methodological 
differences with Kornilov, professionally he seems to have had a fairly free hand. 
He was put in charge of his own laboratory, titled the “Affective Reactions 
Laboratory”. He was also provided with staff for this, including a younger 
colleague, who was to work with him for much of the 1920s, and in later life. This 
lifelong friend, Alexei (A. N.) Leont’ev (1903-79) was also to prove as adept as 
Luria in improving his experimental apparatus (ibid. 156).
Over a short space of time, the Institute developed, and its departments were 
headed by major figures in Soviet psychology. Luria reported that his own 
department, that of General Experimental Psychology, was led by Kornilov whose 
co-workers were Pavel Blonskii (1884-1941), the educational psychologist, and N. 
A. Bemshtein (1896-1966), now recognized as one of the world’s leading 
scientists in the physiology of movement. Professor M. A. Reusner headed the 
Social Psychology department, Isaak Shpilrein (1891-1937), brother of Sabina 
Spielrein, headed Applied Psychology, A. B. Zalkind (1888-1936), 
Psychopathology, Nikolai Rybnikov, Child Psychology, and V. M. Borovskii, 
Animal Behaviour. In his department, Luria was “scientific co-worker of the first 
rank”. His role in this key department was to prove pivotal for the experimental 
investigations of Vygotsky and his associates. (For further details of Luria’s 1926 
report see Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991, 128-31).
Two of Vygotsky’s biographers make a plausible case that the methodological 
framework that Kornilov provided gave scope for Vygotsky to develop when he 
joined the Institute in 1924 (Van der Veer & Valsiner 1991, chapter 6). As a 
corollary of this they argue that Luria probably did not hold critical views of 
Kornilov at the time, and from my comments this also seems plausible. On the 
other hand they do accept Vygotsky’s critique of Kornilov from 1926. He wrote 
that Kornilov’s “new system lays the concept of reaction -  as distinct from the 
reflex and the mental phenomenon -  at the basis of a third way in psychology. The 
integral act of the reaction includes both the subjective and the objective aspect ”. 
That is, “the new theory accepts the doctrine of psychophysical parallelism ”, and 
so forth (Vygotsky 1997b, 314). On the other hand “the works of Kornilov are the
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beginning of this methodology [to resolve the crisis in psychology], and anyone 
who wants to develop the idea of psychology and Marxism further will be forced 
to repeat him and continue his road. As a road it is unequalled in strength in 
European psychology. [It could]... lead to the creation of a theory of 
psychological materialism” (ibid. 332). This was because Kornilov’s ‘reactology’ 
advanced beyond Pavlov by admitting consciousness as a legitimate subject of 
study for psychology. Reactions could be studied in more fields than Pavlov was 
then prepared to admit. As laroshevskii puts it, “It was due to this theory that a 
decisive impetus was given to the movement of Soviet psychology towards 
Marxism” (Yaroshevsky 1989, 136).
The fact that Luria reported his criticisms of Kornilov both in print and in the 
1974 talk suggests to me that he was serious. Since, like Vygotsky, he also both 
praised the step forward Kornilov had made, it suggests that they were of like 
mind on this. To suggest that Luria’s recollections are “armed with hindsight 
concerning Kornilov’s ‘fall into disrepute’ in the early 1930s” (Van der Veer & 
Valsiner 1991, 127) is unworthy, especially as Luria does not repeat the criticisms 
that accompanied this fall. That Vygotsky’s biographers do not impute the same 
motives to Vygotsky leads one to speculate on their impartiality.
Luria decided “to try and create an objective psychoanalysis, i.e., to devise a way 
to measure affective experiences and complexes in some objective way, for 
example, in reactions” (cited in Levitin 1982, 155). He also describes this 
approach as “experimental psychoanalysis” (1979, 32). Strictly speaking, this 
involved experimental situations that he saw at that time as both relevant and 
significant for psychoanalytic theory and practice, but were not exclusively 
confined within that framework. Indeed when he wrote The Nature o f Human 
Conflicts (1932a), based on his researches, he had moved beyond psychoanalysis 
and was still able to locate these experiments within his new framework.
Luria describes the development of his famous combined motor and verbal 
response method, a term usually and misleadingly abbreviated to the “combined 
motor method”. He describes how he found Kornilov’s dynamometer to be too 
crude for his purposes and replaced it with an approach based on Ermakov’s
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apparatus. This was “a pneumatic table with an aluminium plate attached. It was 
used to study the dynamic components of writing: a person wrote on the plate and 
a pneumatic receiver reflected the pressure, all of which was then recorded on a 
drum. It was a far more sensitive instrument, showing the character and form of 
reaction, the writer’s degree of confidence...” (cited in Levitin 1982, 155). The 
change introduced by Luria was substantial and its object different. Its aim was 
not simply the recording and timing of the verbal responses, but also the 
measurement of the motor responses that accompanied the verbal responses. This 
was achieved by replacing Ermakov’s pneumatic table with two pieces of 
equipment, each containing a rubber ball (or bulb), one for each hand. The subject 
was to press the ball with his right hand simultaneously with his response to the 
given word, while the left hand was to remain passive. In instances where the 
experimenter’s word provoked an emotional response in the subject, delays in 
responding, together with tremors manifested in the recording of the movements 
of both hands, were evident. The active hand, usually the right, was assumed to 
convey the effects of the central nervous system. The passive hand was to monitor 
the effects on the peripheral nervous system, especially on occasions when 
disturbances spilled over into that area. [Photographs of the apparatus can be 
found in Luria 1932a, 25-6, and E. Luria 1994, the eighth photo following page 
96]. In some experiments he “also measured breathing, pulse rate and electro- 
physiological changes” (Luria in Cole & Cole 1971, 79; cf. also Luria 1932a, 27).
It was a major development of word association experiments. As we know, Luria 
was famihar with Jung’s Studies o f Diagnostic Associations (1907). Comments by 
Jung from this work and associated papers are quite revealing. “Galton, Kraepelin, 
Aschaffenburg, Sommer and others have introduced into psychology a very 
simple experiment in which a word is called out to the subject, who must respond 
as quickly as possible with the first word that occurs to him. The reaction time 
between the stimulus and the response can be measured...” (Jung 1973, 524). 
Jung accepted that these reaction times demonstrated affective phenomena (ibid. 
546). From Jung’s account it is clear that such experiments were far from being 
the exclusive concern, let alone the invention of psychoanalysis. In one study he 
refers to its use in criminal cases, and cites experiments by William Stem, Hans 
Groos, Max Wertheimer and Julius Klein (ibid. 318, 328-9). But naturally the
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method was attractive to psychoanalysts. “No one can get out of his own skin. We 
act as our psychological past, i.e., as our cerebral organization dictates. For this 
reason we have to expose ourselves in the association experiment in exactly the 
same way as we do in our handwriting” (ibid. 420). Jung found that “by means of 
the association experiment, aided by Freud’s psychoanalytic method, I have 
succeeded in proving that all neuroses contain certain complexes, whose 
disturbing influences have a disease-producing effect”. But he also accepted “that 
more or less autonomous complexes occur everywhere, even in so-called 
normals” (ibid. 602). Thus even in psychoanalytic writings, the association 
experiment was not necessarily to be interpreted in terms associated exclusively 
with psychoanalysis.
As we saw in the previous chapter, Luria felt that psychoanalysis had much to 
leam from Russian physiology and reflexology. In many respects they appeared to 
speak the same language. In The Interpretation o f Dreams Freud wrote, “All our 
psychical activity starts from stimuli (whether internal or external) and ends in 
innervations”. As regards the psychical apparatus: “its first structure followed the 
plan of a reflex apparatus, so that any sensory excitation impinging on it could be 
promptly discharged along a motor path” (Freud 1976, 686, 719). Similarly 
Bekhterev, founder of the school of reflexology, wrote before his death in 1927, 
“It is true that [Freud] intends this comparison to be taken figuratively but, clearly, 
in discussing complex psychic phenomena, even he cannot dispense with the 
scheme of the reflex”. Indeed “we cannot help seeing the correlation of 
reflexology with Freud’s doctrine... first of all in so-called catharsis... which is 
equivalent to discharge of a ‘strangulated’ affect...” (Bekhterev 1932, 417,413). 
None of this should be surprising since the ‘father’ of Russian physiology, I. M. 
Sechenov (1829-1905), had written in 1866, “All psychical acts ... develop by 
way of reflex. Hence all conscious movements resulting from these acts and 
usually described as voluntary, are reflex movements in the strict sense of the 
term”. “There are [however] many [sequences of] psychological reflexes whose 
last member, i.e., movement, is inhibited” (Sechenov 1965, 80, 89; cf. Todes 
1981).
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Both Pavlov and Bekhterev were far from uncritical of Freud, but since all saw 
energy flow as the basis of their systems, each had their own versions of 
inhibition, displacement, regression, neurosis, and so forth -  each using similar or 
identical terminology. Thus it was to be expected that many Russians, both 
amateurs and professionals, would see these schools as compatible. M.G. 
laroshevskii quotes an American visitor reporting Pavlov as saying that reading 
Freud helped him arrive at the concept of inhibition (cited in Etkind 1997, 239). In 
view of Sechenov’s comments above we may consider that, if true, Pavlov was 
being excessively diplomatic. By comparison, it is usual in the West to see 
psychoanalysis as relatively self-sufficient.
In 1923 Trotsky wrote, “it is clear to anyone, even the uninitiated, that the work of 
our physiologist Pavlov is entirely along materialist lines. But what is one to say 
about the psychoanalytical theory of Freud? Can it be reconciled with materialism 
as, for instance, Karl Radek thinks, and I also, or is it hostile to it” (Trotsky 1991, 
247)? In exile in Vienna before the First World War, Trotsky and Kopp came to 
know psychoanalysis through their friend Adolf Ioffe, and actually attended 
meetings. Ioffe, a leading Bolshevik both before and after the Revolution was 
involved with psychoanalysis both as a patient and a writer. He apparently wrote 
for the psychoanalytic journal Imago (as Joffe), as did Sabina Spielrein and Vera 
Schmidt (cf. also Miller 1998, 186, n.40). He does not appear in the minutes of the 
Psychoanalytic Society as he spent much of the time as an ambassador. Although 
Trotsky famously said that the Revolution did more for Ioffe’s sanity than 
analysis, Etkind (1997, 234) states that in 1924 when ambassador to Vienna, he 
was accompanied by his psychiatrist, Kannabikh. In a letter to Pavlov in 1923 
Trotsky acknowledged that as regards psychology he was something of a 
dilettante. He seems to have been familiar with Freud’s work Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle (1920), for he says to Pavlov. “Your studies of conditional reflexes often 
seem to involve the theories of Freud”. In the latter “psychological processes are 
presented as a complex superstructure”, but Freudians themselves “look into a 
deep and relatively dark well”, and “even make a series of witty and interesting, 
yet scientifically arbitrary guesses about the attributes of the bottom [of the well]” 
(Trotsky 1927). Here Trotsky’s metaphor echoes Pavlov’s own 1910 comparison 
of physiologists building the base and psychologists the superstructure (Pavlov
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1928, 113). Could Pavlov provide some scientific anchor for these “half-scientific, 
half-belletristic methods” (Trotsky 1927)? Trotsky persevered with his hopes for 
psychoanalysis until his death, as well as his criticisms of it (see Hames 1999, 49, 
n. 5 for the references).
In view of the wealth of contemporary testimony to the significance and relevance 
of psychoanalysis to psychology and physiology, it would be a mistake to treat 
Luria’s involvement with the former simply as a naïve youthful association as he 
later portrayed it. Luria was not ready to confront the more dramatic elements of 
Freud’s metapsychology. But from the start Luria seems to have followed 
Bekhterev’s view that Freud’s earlier position was mistaken in attributing the 
psychoneuroses exclusively to sexual trauma, and recognized that Freud’s 
subjective approach needed objective experimentation to validate it.
Vygotsky also considered the relevance of psychoanalysis for speech and 
thinking. In 1925 he considered that the development of methods to demonstrate 
the reactions between them was most important. “Psychoanalysis is one of these 
methods” (Vygotsky 1997c, 74). Indeed “the unconscious mind also refers to 
reflexes that have not been translated into other systems”. It is a corollary of the 
view that “to be conscious of one’s experiences means nothing less than to 
possess them in object form as a stimulus for other experiences”, and that 
consciousness provided “the mechanism for translating reflexes from one system 
into another” (ibid. 71). Perhaps here he was commenting obliquely on the work 
of his new colleague, Luria, to which we will now turn.
II
On the Historical Significance of Luria’s Method, and its Application in the 
1924 Moscow University ‘Examination’ Experiments
Luria and Leont’ev published their report on their first joint experiment two years 
after it took place, (Luria and Leont’ev 1926), though the first translated version 
appeared in 1932 (Luria 1932a, chapter II, section A). Their rationalization of its 
organization might initially appear straightforward and empirical. In the 1970s 
Luria said “we assumed that emotional disturbances led to the disorganization of
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behaviour and to neuroses. The problem was to demonstrate these phenomena 
objectively” in terms of the symptoms and mechanisms, and indeed the 
therapeutic implications. [But, in reality], “our stimulus - the word -  evokes a very 
complicated, hidden, neurodynamic process. Sometimes the process of generating 
a speech response is regular, at other times there is emotional vacillation or 
obstruction of the process. Every sharp fluctuation in bulb pressing, every 
tendency to delay the speech response, suggests emotional disorganization, and 
both the associative process and the motor reaction are changed” (Luria in Cole & 
Cole 1972, 79).
In hindsight the key question begins to emerge -  what is this “very complicated, 
hidden, neurodynamic process”? Freud’s speculations and the investigations of 
Pavlov had opened a vast field. Kornilov had sought ways of measuring mental 
energy. Jung had adapted word association tests for new investigatory purposes. 
Luria had come up with an experimental procedure that began to objectively 
measure and show the systematic nature of all these areas of investigation. As 
Radzikhovskii and Khomskaia put it (1981, 8), Luria’s discovery of the combined 
verbal and motor method “had one latent aspect”, it was “a kind of 
‘methodological time bomb’”. At the time “the main difficulty was how to 
interpret the results obtained [in terms of systems-MH\. It was impossible to build 
up any integral notion about the sphere of human emotions and motivations 
(although this was, in the final analysis, where Luria was heading), without a 
definite general psychological theory. But a psychological theory capable of 
assimilating the data obtained by Luria simply did not exist [at that time]” (ibid.
9).
The above comments are probably the most profound to have been made about 
Luria at this stage of his career. Because of his self-effacement it is easy to fall 
into a view of him as working through a series of experiments, but otherwise 
seemingly not being able to capitalize on them in terms of major theoretical 
advances. This could not be further from the truth. The gap between the results 
and a theoretical framework was simply too wide to be bridged at that time even 
by the collaboration with Vygotsky. But the impression that Luria was rescued 
from this dead end by being diverted by Vygotsky into other lines of work in the
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late 1920s is over-simplistic in the extreme. In reality Luria (and Vygotsky) spent 
the 1920s examining various theories and approaches with a view to developing 
and amplifying all their work by evolving their own theoretical framework. Hence 
all the later work was related in one way or another to the implications of this 
work, which may be expressed by the question ‘how do the higher mental 
processes operate from a systemic point of view?’ The later work can appear to be 
separate, but in reality the two sets of work are intimately connected.
Radzikhovskii and Khomskaia (ibid. 19, n.l) raise the opposite question to the one 
normally raised, “What role did this contact with Luria have in Vygotsky’s 
scientific career?” Their article does not attempt to answer it. The methodological 
time bomb they mention is seen by them as “important for understanding Luria’s 
subsequent scientific career” (ibid. 8), but the questions it raised surely also 
stimulated Vygotsky’s thinking. Luria’s assessment of this relationship tends to 
confirm my own.
My own work was permanently changed by my association with Vygotsky and the 
ingenious studies of our students. At the same time that we were carrying out this 
new line of work [into child development], I was still conducting studies using the 
combined motor method ... but the focus on my work began to change. Although I 
had begun with an interest in studying the dynamic course of emotions, Vygotsky 
saw in my research a model for studying the relation between complex \ohmtary 
movements and speech. In particular he emphasized the way in which speech 
served as an instrument for organizing behaviour [my emphasis - MH] (Luria 
1979a, 51-2).
In the combined verbal and motor procedure lay great possibilities for studying 
the processes engendering affect. Although, as we have seen, Luria did admit to 
measuring breathing, he regularly pointed to the limitations of using pulse, blood 
pressure and breathing as Wundt and others had done (e.g. Luria 1932a, 170-1). 
His method, in contrast, could both measure in which direction a process was 
progressing, and which processes were involved. In a paper written in 1928 with 
M. S. Lebedinskii on using the method to assist in diagnosing functional neuroses 
and other nervous disorders and diseases he elaborated further.
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Repeated experiments demonstrate to us that in the representation of a motor curve, 
a whole range of interesting and, for the illness concerned, characteristic processes 
find expression. For this very reason the associative reaction and the motor 
impression in our experiments form, as it were, a unified system of functions 
[einheitliches Funktionssystem]. Every change in the central processes finds its 
expression in the motor indicator: every disability, fatigue, inhibition, as well as 
affective agitation alter in intensity the discharge of the motor reactions 
(Lebedinsky & Luria 1929, 474).
In this we can see not only the connection and contradiction of different processes, 
but begin to understand the nature of the operation of the brain. It operates not 
simply in discrete localized units or modules, nor as an overall form of activity -  
but in terms of specific changing neural pathways and fimctions - or, as they came 
to be called ‘fiinctional systems’. This is what I imderstand by the application of 
the term ‘time bomb’ to Luria’s method. Luria’s concept is, of course, distinct 
from Anokhin and Bemshtein’s self-regulating system. In contrast, the stimuli, 
that may initiate an activity, which may be linguistic and conditioned by cultural 
practices, are part of the system as well. The German-American linguist Edward 
Sapir used the term in respect to language. “If language can be said to be 
definitely ‘localized’ in the brain, it is only in that general and rather useless sense 
in which all aspects of consciousness can be said to be ‘in the brain.’ Hence we 
have no recourse but to accept language as a fully formed functional system 
within man’s psychic or ‘spiritual’ constitution. We cannot define it as an entity in 
psycho-physical terms alone, however much the psycho-physical basis is essential 
to its functioning in the individual” (E. Sapir 1921, 9). Sapir’s book was published 
in Russia in 1933 or 1934, and used by Vygotsky in Thinking and Speech. There 
is no evidence of Vygotsky or Luria being aware of this book before then. Luria 
appears to have used and then developed the term independently, and i f  
Lebedinskii and Luria’s use of the term ‘system of functions’ is its first 
appearance in this sense, then it can be attributed to the implications of using 
Luria’s ‘time bomb’. Needless to say, the implications of this for Luria and 
Vygotsky were enormous. I have felt the need to offer this ‘advance warning’ of
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the implications of Luria’s early work, but this is not the appropriate chapter to 
elaborate it further.
A comparison of the theoretical issues, which Luria raises in the introduction to 
his account of the following experiment, with the design and reports of the 
experiment itself, demonstrates total consistency of viewpoint. This suggests that 
the published accounts of the experiment perhaps altered but little between 1926 
and 1929, the year of the latter’s arrival at the publishers. Khomskaia’s description 
of Luria’s approach to the organization of experiments is instructive here. “He 
always planned his activity according to the demands of a particular goal and tried 
to obtain a concrete result for his work. ‘The image of the result’, as in Anokhin’s 
approach, was always present in his mind...” (Homskaya 2001, 115). If we accept 
that the theoretical implications of both the theory and the report of the 
experiment today seem so wide reaching, then it is impossible to believe 
otherwise than that some of the potential was evident at the time. It is true that 
there is evidence of the use of terminology used by the Gestalt-influenced 
neurologist Kurt Goldstein, (Nahe- und Fern-wirkung, Kurzschluss) but this has 
no apparent bearing on the experimental design itself, and may indeed already 
appear in Luria’s first Russian account of the experiment (Luria & Leont’ev 
1926). As we shall see in Chapter 5, Luria’s thinking was already showing the 
impact of the Gestalt school in 1926.
Luria begins the introduction, “The Problem of Neurodynamic Investigation of 
Affect”, by pointing out that usually the symptomatology of affect was portrayed 
simply as the systemic disorganization of active human behaviour. How the 
separate connecting systems related to each other within this process was 
insufficiently studied. Luria admitted that his aim was not to describe all the 
symptoms himself, but he did feel that it was possible to differentiate cases of 
generalized diffuse affect from those where a “conspicuous contour of the 
concentrated affect, which appeared only in association with definite stimuli. 
[These stimuli] extended only to certain reactive systems that manifested a very 
definite structure, whose forms we were able to study” (Luria 1932a, 44). 
Although properly speaking, a structural state was not a very satisfactory term, 
“even the affective chaos ... always manifests a lawfulness”. Included within this
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dynamic there usually appeared a stage of diffused affect, but even so this 
sequence and its recognizable stages needed examination.
As regards the mechanics of affective states few, save Pavlov and W. B. Cannon, 
had undertaken any physiological research. Did “the affect change the very nature 
of the reactive process?” In terms of the dynamics of the whole process, however, 
its “course ... only becomes comprehensible when we take into account the 
leading role played by the higher forms of behaviour, and the more complex 
psychological systems”(45). But what other systems did it change -  did it extend 
beyond the active, voluntary systems? He concludes, “our investigation proceeds 
from the limits of the neurodynamic analysis and becomes significantly wider, 
truly psychophysiological” (46).
The traumatic effects of examinations and their consequences are now familiar to 
millions of people. Actually the ‘examination’ Luria refers to in his study of 
examination trauma was a review by a commission of the student’s work. It arose 
because, since the Revolution, access to universities had been open and free, but 
shortages of staff and facilities prompted the decision to undertake a chistka -  a 
purge or ‘weeding out’ of those in the university who were deemed to be 
academically deficient. Of course the idea of a purge may remind the reader of 
Stalin’s purges of the 1930s, but since Lenin was dead but a few months and 
Stalin was not yet exercising power one assumes that this was basically the sort of 
weeding out that occurs in western universities. There was however an element of 
positive discrimination in that those deemed both academically deficient and 
socially privileged led the exit. Unfortunately it is difficult to judge this aspect on 
the information provided by Luria (ibid. 47-8). I may prove to be wrong on this, 
but as someone whose own teacher’s reported responses certainly suggested that I 
was personally subject to negative class discrimination regarding my applications 
for Oxbridge in the 1960s, I find the case for positive discrimination more 
appealing. In the Russia of the early 1920s -  a land of mass deprivation and 
illiteracy - it would seem elitist to dispute it.
Nevertheless Luria was well aware that this experience would be more traumatic 
than other forms of ‘examination’. “This had very specific conditions for the
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investigation of an acute mass effect”. Although he notes previous such 
experiments, his own went further in that “we took students directly from the line 
awaiting ‘examination’, so that some of them were ‘examined’ only a few minutes 
after our experiment” (48). Here one can sympathize with his modern-day critics. 
This would certainly be prevented today by a committee on the ethics of 
experimentation. Luria’s case would have been that to measure real affective 
disorders - still brought on today by the administrative procedures of universities 
-  was more scientifically valid than artificially created situations. It was a rare 
occasion when he could present the same stimuli -  individual words -  to a number 
of subjects and objectively compare their reactions. He went further and in some 
cases the subjects agreed to retake the test after they had completed their reviews, 
thereby facilitating a comparison of Fern- und Nahe-Wirkung (long- and short- 
range effects -  cf. Goldstein 1971a, 140 for the use of the term Nahe-Wirkung). In 
this way he was able to compare the reactions at the height of their trepidation and 
after their agitation had diminished. He was therefore able to chart the dynamics 
of the affective disorder and measure some of its effects. Although one might 
consider this experiment insensitive and attribute it to the arrogance of youth or to 
a scientist unconcerned with the personal feelings of his subjects, we know from 
Luria’s later work with brain-damaged patients, that this was certainly not the 
case. Furthermore one could argue that he was actually providing objective 
evidence of the harm rendered by such institutional devices.
Thirty students were examined by Luria and Leont’ev - nineteen were women, 
eleven were men. Of these eleven consented to the repeat experiment to examine 
the expected subsequent reduction in tension {Entspannung). [Luria’s use of 
German terms is unexplained. Another term used, Entladung -  discharge, is also 
so widespread a concept that no special theory is called to mind]. A control 
subject, unaware of the purpose of the review, also took part. His responses 
remained calm throughout. The stimuli consisted of three groups, each stimulus 
being one word. It was considered to fall into one of these groups on the basis of 
its relation to the review. Critical words included ‘examination’, ‘commission’, 
and ‘roll-calT. Indifferent words were everyday words like ‘dress’ or ‘pipe’, and 
doubtful words included ‘student’, ‘constitution’ and ‘broom’. The stimuli were 
measured in four groups -  the word following a critical word was measured
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separately to measure the possibility of the reaction to the critical word producing 
an after-effect in the form of a diffuse affect. In the statistical tables and graphs 
the results are very clear and support the approach presented in Luria’s 
introduction (cf. Luria 57ff for the stimuli and results).
Luria’s account compares the reactions of the control and two typical subjects to 
the critical stimulus word “cleansing”. The control subject exhibited stable and 
regular reactions. The behaviour of the notionally separate verbal and motor 
systems was completely co-ordinated. Their responses occurred simultaneously. 
“Precisely these properties of the regulation of the neurodynamic process are 
destroyed in the state of acute diffused affect” that the others manifested (51). The 
verbal responses were slower and sometimes stalled. “The affect provokes a 
functional lowering of the associative possibilities” (ibid.). Indeed “the failure of 
co-ordination ... begins with a collapse of higher regulation and ... disturbs the 
co-ordination with the motor sphere” (52). Luria refers to the “primitive forms” of 
associative verbal responses -  not simply excitability and distortion but responses 
to incidental and accidental stimuli that are usually ignored. Meanwhile the 
excitation results in impulses that destroy motor co-ordination.
Luria considers it “a law of affective behaviour” that “in the affective state the 
motor setting has a tendency to be directly realized, the excitation does not meet 
with any delay, with any inhibition, and immediately proceeds to its terminus. 
That which is damaged is the restraining system, the barrier which inhibits the 
direct appearance of the motor act, and which enables the co-ordination with other 
reactive systems to occur” (55). Shortly after, in reference to a related experiment 
fi*om 1927 he writes, “Recent analyses prove that behaviour in a state of affect 
causes the organism to revert to long past, primitive stages of development of the 
neurodynamic mechanism” (ibid. 68). Here, although the book does refer to the 
work of the pioneering neurologist John Hughlings Jackson (1835-1911) and 
others, such quotes are more consistent with the works that he was then familiar 
with, namely Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle and W.H.R. Rivers’ Instincts 
and the Unconscious (1922). Both these works refer to the examination of the so- 
called “War Neuroses” and the revision of psychoanalytic theory that this 
engendered.
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I conclude that what Luria published about this experiment in 1932, which he 
stated was based on his 1926 article (Luria 1932a, 47), is largely consistent with 
his approach in 1924. Some of Kurt Goldstein’s terminology does appear, but it is 
not central to the experimental design. This reveals the astonishing conceptual 
level he had attained by 1924, and the enormous leap he had made in his 
experimental organization and assumptions. I think it also shows already the 
potential awaiting himself and Vygotsky when they began seriously to investigate 
both aphasia and child development.
Ill
The Russian Psychoanalytic Society in its Heyday
In his first report as Secretary of the Russian Psychoanalytic Society Luria 
presented an organization that was active and flourishing. The State Institute 
extended its work beyond that of the Children’s Home and laboratory. It set up a 
series of lectures given by Ermakov, Wulff and Spielrein for physicians, 
educationahsts, psychologists and students. Wulff s lectures were introductory, 
Ermakov’s dealt with principles and psychotherapy, and Spielrein’s course was 
titled “The Psychology of Subliminal Thought”. A range of seminars was given. 
Others were reported to be in preparation -  including “Research into Complexes” 
by Luria. Ermakov, Wulff and Spielrein directed Averbukh and Fridman’s work 
in a newly opened outpatient department, and Ermakov and Spielrein ran a special 
children’s outpatient department. There were twelve children aged 2 to 4, and 
younger children were expected at the Children’s Home and Laboratory. The 
laboratory had collected many observations on the games and speech of children, 
together with observations of their sexual life (Luria 1924a, 258-9). A pamphlet 
on this research by Vera Schmidt was published in Germany in 1924 (republished 
as V. Schmidt 1969. Cf also W. Schmidt 1930). A series of books was published 
by the society under the imprint A Psychological and Psychoanalytical Library. It 
comprised translations of Freud, mainly by Wulff. This series was edited by 
Ermakov. His studies of Pushkin and Gogol were among the various other works 
that it contained (ibid. 260). 1924 was undoubtedly the high water mark of 
psychoanalysis in Russia.
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On 15 November 1923 Sabina Spielrein spoke to the society on “Aphasie thinking 
and infantile thinking”. A number of writers of the psychoanalytic persuasion are 
convinced that Spielrein’s views lie at the basis of the ideas of both Luria and 
Vygotsky. Attempts to link her to Vygotsky have never made much sense as there 
is no evidence that they ever met, nor did he ever refer to her works. The 
suggestion by Etkind (1997, 174) that Vygotsky acquired the idea of internal 
speech from Spielrein is frankly absurd, given Vygotsky’s earlier reading of 
Alexander Potebnia (cf. Kharitonov 1991 and Nadia Kerecuk’s articles and 
forthcoming translation of Potebnia’s Thought and Language). Although Luria 
was a colleague of Spielrein’s at the State Institute, he never referred to her work 
either. Fortunately we can assess her talk since it had been published in Geneva 
before she returned to Russia. She did refer to Hughlings Jackson, Henry Head 
and other leading experts on aphasia, but neither Luria nor Vygotsky were 
interested in aphasia at that time. Nor did they have access to their principal works 
-  Head’s Aphasia and Kindred Disorders o f Speech was not published until 1926, 
and most of Jackson’s writings were relatively inaccessible until 1932. Spielrein’s 
article proposes that in infant speech and aphasia links between verbal language 
and the visuo-kinaesthetic subconscious are evident, and this latter link may be 
crucial for the development of language (Spielrein 1923). This was not an area of 
investigation for Luria. Of course Jackson was one of the few people whom Freud 
praised, both in On Aphasia (1891), and elsewhere (cf. Sulloway 1979). Several 
writers have attempted to make the link Jackson-Freud-Luria (cf. Solms & Saling 
1986, Solms 2000). Although Jackson and Head appear to have helped Luria and 
Vygotsky finalize a framework for their ideas in the early 1930s, I would argue 
that this helped them consolidate their break with psychoanalysis (cf. V, iv, 146- 
7;VII, ii, 199-205 & iii, 216).
Throughout 1924 the Children’s Home suffered a series of crises. Although there 
were inspections and some hostile comment (cf. Marti 1976), Etkind’s access to 
various archives has provided an account, which, while still confusing, extends the 
parameters. Although there are those that blame the state for the closure, 
apparently the female teachers at the home did not get on with the director 
Ermakov, and protested at their lack of training in psychoanalytic techniques.
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Eventually the home and the State Institute were separated. The staff were sacked 
at the end of 1924. Technically the home was still open, but in fact it was finished. 
In August 1925 both the home and the State Institute were formally dissolved. The 
society continued, though presumably decided not to publicly report these events 
to the international movement. Sabina Spielrein retired to Rostov-on-Don, but 
otherwise the members of the society continued to meet, sporadically after 1930 -  
the international movement received a report in 1930, and membership lists for 
1931 and 1933. Allegedly it continued despite a hostile government until 1936, 
though the evidence for this is thin (Etkind 1997, 210-7).
Nevertheless 1924 was a busy year for Luria and the All-Russian Psychoanalytic 
Society. On 29 May Luria spoke on “Psychoanalysis as a System of Monistic 
Psychology”. Luria reported (1925a, 243), “The old experimental psychology was 
always idealistic and like a mosaic. Psychoanalysis alone had the courage to take 
two big steps towards a monistic ‘whole-psychology’, firstly by pointing to the 
erogenous zones as contributory factors in mental development (the fundamental 
principle of organic psychology), and secondly, by considering personality in its 
inter-relations with the environment”. As we shall see this is consistent with the 
published article (Luria 1925b) in that it attempts to examine both internal and 
external stimuli in their several manifestations. What he does not report is that 
through his examination of the external stimuli, he attempted to reconcile the 
materialism of Marxism with what he saw as the materialism of psychoanalysis.
We do not know for sure when Luria joined the Communist Party. Marti (1976, 
216) states that the Kazan troika, including Luria, together with the Schmidts, 
allegedly related to the Bolshevik commissar V. V. Schmidt (1886-1940), 
Reusner, Kopp, A. B. Zalkind, A. K. Voronsky -  indeed probably the majority of 
the society’s members -  were also members of the Party. Unfortunately, although 
we know this to be mostly true, Marti provides no references. In Luria’s case we 
know he actively supported the ideals of the Revolution, but it has also been stated 
that he did not join the Party until 1943 (cited in Homskaya 2001, 113). More to 
the point in respect to his article, however, is the attempt by Kornilov to use 
Marxist philosophy to improve the theory and methodology of psychology. 
Although it is often assumed that Luria learned his Marxism fi’om Vygotsky,
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Kornilov would have certainly spurred him on. In January 1924 Kornilov gave a 
lecture on “The Dialectic Method in Psychology”, a year before the publication of 
Engels’ The Dialectics o f Nature. In 1925 he edited a volume entitled Psychology 
and Marxism (see below), which included Luria’s article. The translation of his 
Psychology in the Light o f Dialectical Materialism, though later (Kornilov 1930), 
includes most of the references used by Luria in 1925, extending to Feuerbach’s 
Against the Dualism o f Body and Soul, Flesh and Spirit. On the other hand it is 
more than likely that Luria sat down and ploughed through the works himself, and 
then gradually clarified his ideas about the relevant aspects of Marxism. Although 
parts of Luria’s article were almost certainly written after his first presentation of 
its subject matter, he was prepared to discuss the issues again at the beginning of 
1925 as part of a big public debate on psychoanalysis, Marxism and materialism.
Perhaps the Psychoanalytic Society felt the need to raise its materialist profile in 
the context of the de facto closure of the Children’s Home. Wulff became 
president and Ermakov became joint vice-president with Trotsky’s ally, Viktor 
Kopp. Luria remained on the committee with Kannabikh. Presumably this new 
committee organized the debate, though it is interesting that, as we have seen, 
Kornilov edited a collection which included Fridmann’s contribution to the debate 
as well as Luria’s. Luria undoubtedly played a key role in this, and we give his 
report below. It has not been translated before and providing a substantial extract 
fi*om it makes an appropriate conclusion to this section, because it not only 
discusses the various theoretical currents, but also because it gives the flavour of 
the times.
The broadest of the discussions [initiated by the Society] was that concerning the 
philosophical-scientific bases of psychoanalysis. The Russian Revolution drew 
much attention to the scientific philosophy of Marxism and so-called dialectical 
materialism. Any scientific methodology, whose principles would always be 
philosophically based, was discussed from this standpoint, and the debate about 
psychoanalysis and Marxism was one of the most interesting. One side in the 
debate viewed psychoanalysis as a method based entirely on a scientific, i.e., 
natural-scientific, materialist foundation. Psychoanalysis appeared to these 
colleagues as a thoroughly monistic system, characterized by its dynamic and to 
some degree dialectical viewpoint. Some articles by holders of this view appeared
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in the autumn of 1924. Indeed those of Al. R. Luria [Luria’s standard self­
reference], “Psychoanalysis as a System of Monistic Psychology”, Dr. B. 
Fridmann, “The Psychoanalysis of Freud and Historical Materialism”, are both in 
the collection Psychology and Marxism [(Kornilov 1925) - as was a chapter by 
Reusner. Inconsistencies between the real date and the printed date of publication 
were common. Luria’s article is examined in the following chapter]. Others will 
shortly appear as a second collection. Psychoanalysis and Materialism (articles by 
Dr. M. Wulff, Al. Luria, B. Fridmann, W. Rohr, and others) [This was not 
published]. The other side in the debate took another position and stood firmly as 
the principal opponent of psychoanalysis. Its members asserted that psychoanalysis 
held idealistic assumptions, its main theories had little to do with materialism, and 
its metapsychology merged with metaphysics. The principal leader of this 
tendency, [V.] lurinets is unfortunately a thoroughly philosophically oriented man, 
rather than a natural scientist. He began the debate in the journal Pod Znamenem 
Marksisma. [His attack on psychoanalysis (lurinets 1924) was probably the major 
catalyst for these debates]. Some scholars, including Professor Fritsche, a noted 
student of the theory of art agree with him, and at the beginning of this year [1925] 
two debates took place.
One, on psychoanalysis and Marxism, took place in the Moscow Press House; the 
second, on psychoanalysis and the psychology of art, took place in the Communist 
Academy. At the first debate, which took place over two evenings and attracted 
many listeners, lurinets spoke against psychoanalysis, which in turn was 
represented by a number of scholars, mainly members of the Russian 
Psychoanalytic Society. Dr. M. Wulff, Professor Reusner, Professor Charasov, W. 
Rohr, Al. Luria, Dr. A. Zalkind, J. Schaffiz, Dr. Fridmann, Dr. Vnukov and others 
spoke in favour of psychoanalysis.
Since these debates some tendencies have differentiated themselves with regard to 
hitherto unnoticed philosophic adjustments within Russian psychoanalysis, we 
would like to elaborate on them here. Apart from the supporters and opponents of 
psychoanalysis, there are also scholars who accept an amended psychoanalysis, and 
others who are attempting to rebuild psychoanalysis along original lines. For 
example, a scholar like Professor Reusner, the noted Russian jurist and sociologist, 
belongs to the group. In his studies of the psychology of religion he completely 
accepts psychoanalysis, but he believes that some of the more recent theories of 
psychoanalysis, for example the metapsychology, depart somewhat from the earlier
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position of psychoanalysis, and are difficult to reconcile with materialist 
philosophy. The other tendency is most marked in the article “Freudism and 
Marxism” in Krasnaia Nov’ [1924, 4, 21], and other articles in specialist 
publications, by Dr. A. Zalkind. He holds the view that, in the dynamic and active 
stance of psychoanalysis, the person and the psyche are a unity of competing 
objectives, an insight of great value. This tendency believes that it is not necessary 
to understand the psychoanalytic theories of sex and libido. In Zalkind's opinion 
psychic energy arises in the organism as a whole under the influence of the social 
environment. Only in cases where the organism is separated from the social 
environment, will the energy in the ‘lower’ courses be transferred and used for 
purposes of individual activity (e.g., all forms of sexual activity). But the main 
drives of human life are the social instinct and the drive for power, and Dr, Zalkind 
believes there to be a Russian “Adlerian reflexology”. This last deserves emphasis, 
since Dr. Zalkind has taken the trouble to translate the whole psychoanalytic 
system into the language of objective psychology and reflexology.
In Russia the influence of the so-called objective psychological tendency, (in 
particular physiology), based on the work of I. Pavlov, V. Bekhterev and K. 
Kornilov, is very large. The achievements of these objective schools have much of 
significance to offer for psychoanalysis (see the special article on this, [i.e., Luria 
1926a -see IV,ii]). Therefore it is quite understandable that the tendency to yoke 
the two scientific courses together, and to join the psychoanalytic interpretation of 
psychic and pathological processes with the positions and mechanisms of the 
physiological school. Several psychologists and psychoanalysts are now pursuing 
their work along these lines (Luria 1925b, 397-8).
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Chapter 3: Problems of Theory and Methodology 
I 
Vygotsky on the Significance of Speech for a Critique of Reflexology
The application of the combined verbal and motor method to word association 
was not simply an advance on its use in psychoanalysis, but was an implicit 
criticism of the failure of psychoanalysis to do objective research. In conversation 
with Michael and Sheila Cole in later years Luria said that despite “the arbitrary 
interpretations that were already characteristic at that time ... we felt that 
emotional states, complexes and the dynamics of mental life could be analyzed 
from an objective physiological point of view”. At the time he felt that 
psychoanalysis and objective research were compatible. But Cole then asked, 
“What indicators of emotional disturbance did you substitute for the Freudian 
approach?” Luria’s answer, “The combined motor method...” (Cole & Cole 1971, 
79) is revealing. In retrospect he admits that his method replaced Freud’s, but the 
implication is that it also went beyond Freud’s theories. Luria may not have 
possessed a theory capable of explaining its findings at that time, but the method 
had something equally valuable. Namely, it raised issues about the nature of the 
workings of the psyche and human behaviour. It demanded answers and provoked 
Luria and then Vygotsky into seeking answers until they could provide a theory. 
This would take time until they arrived at a series of investigations in the late 
1920s, which in turn were based on theories that they found themselves forced to 
come up with. Part of this process involved continual attempts to clarify where 
they had arrived in their theoretical positions together with an assessment of the 
problems and faults in the theories and methodologies of their contemporaries and 
seniors.
The Second Russian Psychoneurological Congress took place in Petrograd 
January 3-10 1924. Kornilov took his staff there from the Institute. Kornilov gave 
his speech on psychology and dialectical materialism. Other speakers included 
Bekhterev, Chelpanov and A. A. Ukhtomskii (1875-1942). This was obviously 
considered at the time to be a major event. Making his debut at the Congress was 
an educational psychologist from the provincial town of Gomel’. Who actually
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invited Lev Semenovich Vygotsky (1896-1934) to speak is not known. (For 
Vygotsky’s early career cf. Vygodskaia & Lifanova 1996/1998, also Yaroshevsky 
1989, Van der Veer and Valsiner 1991). He gave three speeches, but he is mainly 
noted for the speech Methods o f Reflexological and Psychological Investigation. 
Luria remembered that ‘Vhen Vygotsky got up to deliver his speech, he had no 
printed text from which to read, not even notes. Yet he spoke fluently, never 
seeming to stop and search his memory for the next idea. Even had the content of 
his speech been pedestrian, his performance would have been notable for the 
persuasiveness of his style. But his speech was by no means pedestrian” (Luria 
1979a, 38). Luria was so impressed that “he set about persuading Kornilov ... to 
immediately invite this person, known to no one, to work in Moscow at the 
[recently renamed] Institute of Experimental Psychology. Lev Semenovich 
accepted this invitation” and began work there in the autumn (Luria 1977, cited in 
Vygodskaia & Lifanova 1996, 74/ 1998,1, 58. Cf. also Luria, cited in Cole & Cole 
1971, 82). No contemporary has disputed Luria’s account, though the suggestion 
that he was pushing at a relatively open door has also been implied. What led 
Luria to take this course of action? Although technically Luria was to be senior to 
Vygotsky in the department, in hindsight, as regards ideas and influence, it might 
appear as if Luria had headhunted his own leader!
Although we don’t know precisely what Vygotsky said in Petrograd, he published 
an article in 1926 under the same title. The content probably bears some relation 
to what Vygotsky actually said -  though how close the relationship was remains 
speculative. The contents of the article would certainly be sufficient to explain the 
impact the speech had on the congress. In it, he investigated the basis of 
reflexology in stimuli and reflexes, examined its potential, and the inconsistencies 
of its leading practitioners Pavlov and Bekhterev. It should be noted that Pavlov 
liked to distinguish his work from Bekhterev’s reflexology, and preferred to call it 
physiology or the science of behaviour, but in the writings of Vygotsky and others 
it was assimilated under the term reflexology. Vygotsky widened its scope, raising 
issues that it had failed to address, and in that sense seemed to be attempting to 
transcend it. In so doing, further methodological issues arose, both explicit and 
implicit. But in the article these are not yet developed. It is easy to see why 
attention became focused on Vygotsky. The criticisms he raised were felt by many
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and often implicit in their work. Having put them together forcefully, he 
inevitably appeared as someone who offered the promise of resolving the new 
issues that thereby arose. Others would surely want to see what he produced.
The faults he finds with reflexology arise from its failure to address the problem 
of speech. “That speech has to be considered a system of conditional reflexes 
hardly needs any discussion: for reflexology it is almost a truism” (Vygotsky 
1994a, 29). Surely this view could lead to the merging of the methodologies of 
reflexology and psychology? Unfortunately the reflexologists could not include 
the interrogation of a subject in an experiment, as they believed it involved the 
latter’s subjectivity and processes that were not manifest. Bekhterev (1932, 61-2, 
200), a softer target in this respect, provided the paradoxical conclusion that 
“From the standpoint of reflexology subjective investigation is permissible only 
on oneself’. Vygotsky (1994a, 31) notes that Bekhterev followed Sechenov in 
demonstrating “that thought is ... an inhibited reflex, a reflex that is non­
manifest,” and this is particularly true of verbal thinking. “Thus, either we refrain 
from the study of human behaviour in its most essential forms or we introduce the 
obligatory registration of these non-manifest reflexes into our experiments. 
Reflexology has to study both thought and the whole mind if it wishes to 
understand behaviour” (31-2). Inhibited reflexes are also objective.
[We can study them, because] reflexes do not act separately ... but club together in 
complexes, in complex groups and formations that determine human behaviour.
The laws of composition of reflexes into complexes, the types of these formations, 
the sorts and forms of interaction within them and the interaction between whole 
systems -  all these questions have paramount meaning for the most acute problems 
of the scientific psychology of behaviour. [Already we can speak] about the 
undeniable interaction of different systems of reflexes, about the reflection 
(interpenetration) of some systems on others, and we can even in general provide a 
preliminary clarification of the mechanism of this reflection. The response part of 
each reflex (movement, secretion) becomes itself a stimulus for a new reflex from 
the same system or another system (32).
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Vygotsky chooses to italicize the final sentence of this paragraph. But as a 
precursor of the work that he and Luria subsequently undertook the whole passage 
could be highlighted.
He continues (ibid.), “Although I never came across such a formulation in any of 
the works of the reflexologists, its truth is so obvious that it is evidently only 
omitted because it is tacitly implied and accepted by everybody”. Furthermore, 
given “the gigantic, colossal role that precisely the mind (that is, the non-manifest 
group of reflexes) plays in the system of behaviour, it would be suicidal to refrain 
from exposing it through the indirect path of its reflection (bearing) on other 
systems of reflexes” (33). The Wuerzburg school’s use of the self-reporting of 
subjective consciousness was unscientific in that it placed the subject in the role of 
the observer, but there were several ways in which verbal responses could be 
incorporated within experimental procedures that avoid this (cf. 43-4). To refuse 
to incorporate the objective phenomena of the mind, even though its content was 
subjective for the subject, was a dereliction of scientific responsibility. 
Methodologically, “in essence, dualism is the real name of Academician Pavlov’s 
and Bekhterev’s point of view” (39).
Thus far, everything that has been stated by Vygotsky is consistent with what 
Luria was doing in his experimental practice. Vygotsky’s formal methodological 
legitimation of this approach would have been sufficient grounds not only to 
encourage Luria’s continuation of this work, but also to persuade him of the value 
of such a potential ally. But Vygotsky expanded the scope of his arguments much 
further. Not only did Vygotsky discuss the examination of reflexes within the 
unconscious and consciousness, but also the social aspects of thinking and speech. 
These were his lifelong concerns, stimulated by his previous linguistic studies and 
experience in educational psychology.
Vygotsky could see the amusing side of his exposition as well. “To claim that 
consciousness too has to be understood as a reaction of the organism to its own 
reactions, one has to be a bigger reflexologist than Pavlov -  so be it...” (40). He 
aligned himself here with members of the Gestalt school who accused psychology 
as a whole and behaviourism in particular of the same sin: failing to develop a
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single accepted methodology (42). It might therefore be possible to see Vygotsky 
as an outright critic of reflexology, but this would only be true from a 
methodological viewpoint. He wanted physiology to be an intrinsic component of 
psychology, to ground it materialistically. Pavlov continued to see psychologists 
as subjective and did his best to ensure their ideas did not contaminate physiology 
to the extent of fining his laboratory staff who used psychological terms in 
defining their animal subjects’ states of mind. At this time he was reporting on the 
creation of experimental neuroses and eventually moved further into psychiatry 
(Pavlov 1941). Vygotsky criticized reflexology from within, pointing out the 
logical contradictions of its failure to engage with higher mental activity in 
humans. Thus it was the concept of “a reflex of the second order” that Pavlov 
spoke of in 1910 (Pavlov 1928, 105), that enabled Vygotsky to speculate further.
Stimuli and reflexes were crucial for Vygotsky to enable him to raise the issues of 
consciousness and the unconscious. But this required far more than a simple reflex 
act. As we have seen ‘V/ze response o f each reflex (movement, secretion) becomes 
itself a stimulus for a new reflex from the same system or another system'"' 
(Vygotsky 1994a, 32). This is why, in a psychological interrogation, a subject is 
no longer a witness, an outside observer, but an inherent part of the experiment. 
The response cannot be treated simply as a conversation, “but as a system o f 
stimuli with an accurate registration of each sound” (34). “Indeed, in man, a group 
of reflexes that we should strictly call the system of ‘reflexes of social contact’ (A. 
B. Zalkind) easily stands out. These are reflexes to stimuli that in their turn can be 
created by man... These reversible reflexes, that create the basis of consciousness 
... also serve as the basis for social interaction, and the collective co-ordination of 
behaviour, which incidentally points to the social origin of consciousness”. From 
the whole variety of stimuli this group of social stimuli clearly stands out, because 
these stimuli are reversible. Hence the subject can determine his “behaviour in 
another way from all others... Speech is on the one hand a system of reflexes of 
social contact and on the other hand primarily a system of reflexes of 
consciousness, that is, for the reflection of the influence of other systems” (35). 
Vygotsky continued, “that is why the key to the resolution of the problem ... of 
the recognition of another person’s mind lies here. The mechanism of 
consciousness of the self (self-consciousness) and the recognition of others is the
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same; we are conscious of ourselves only because we are conscious of others... 
We are conscious of others only to the extent that we are another to ourselves, that 
is, to the extent that we can perceive our own reflexes as stimuli” (35-6).
Consciousness itself “is correlative activity within the organism itself, within the 
nervous system, correlative activity of the human body with itself’ 
(41).“Consciousness is an indisputable fact, a primary reality, a fact of the greatest 
significance, and not a secondary or accidental one... As long as the new 
psychology does not make both ends meet, the problem of consciousness will not 
be stated clearly and fearlessly and it will not be solved in an experimentally 
objective way” (ibid.). Luria singled out this aspect of Vygotsky’s talk in his 
autobiography (Luria 1979a, 38).
Although many of these relationships of language and consciousness were implicit 
or explicit in the writings of Herder (cf. Appendix I), Vygotsky reintroduced and 
amplified them within the framework of the reflexological approach to 
psychology. It immediately resonated with at least some of his audience. 
Vygotsky’s talk foreshadows much of his work, especially his later major 
writings. The connections made here between the growth of self-consciousness 
and its social origins were to provide a strong link with the Marxist approach and 
hence Vygotsky and Luria’s joint work of the late 1920s. At this stage however 
Luria did not attempt to formally develop this area of work, but continued his 
research into another area that Vygotsky raised, namely, the interaction of reflexes 
and groups of reflexes.
Finally, it should be pointed out that Vygotsky’s whole approach to language, 
consciousness and self-consciousness is implicitly infrised with the concept of 
feedback. Vygotsky’s future colleague N. A. Bemshtein formally introduced this 
concept into physiology in the 1930s when he applied it to the neurology of body 
movements (cf. Kozulin 1984, chapter 3). It had long been implicit in the 
linguistic philosophy of Herder and his successors. It is commonplace today, 
when seeking a response, to ask for feedback. But it had also been implicit in the 
work of Sechenov, and Pavlov’s own characterization of conditional reflexes as 
‘signals’ helped lay the basis for its formal introduction. In the early 1920s
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physiologists were hoping to move beyond Pavlov’s concept of the ‘reflex arc’, 
where reflexes were treated as one-way transmissions. A reflex arc is a chain 
composed of an afferent nerve with a ‘receptor’ (receiving apparatus) and 
‘analyzer’, a central part described as a ‘conductor’ and ‘connector’, and an 
efferent nerve acting as an ‘effector’ (cf. Pavlov 1928, 242-3). Pyotr Kuzmin 
Anokhin, then a researcher for Pavlov, may also have attended Vygotsky’s talk 
and may have met Luria there for the first time (K. Anokhin 2001, personal 
communication). In 1935 in his exclusively physiological version of the concept 
‘functional system’ Anokhin assumed that such a system was self-regulatory, i.e., 
dependent on feedback. The theoretical consequences of an as yet implicit 
feedback approach to speech and consciousness would also in time be made clear 
in the work of Luria and Vygotsky in the study of the interactions and 
interpenetration of these groups of reflexes. Luria’s employment of the subjects’ 
hands in his combined verbal and motor procedure made certain assumptions 
about their movements (cf. Luria 1929a, 173; 1932a, 175). Indeed, in a paper 
written in 1928, he made explicit use of some of Bemshtein’s research (Luria 
1929a, 135).
II
‘Psychoanalysis as a System of Monistic Psychology’
Psychoanalysis as a System o f Monistic Psychology, written and probably 
published in 1924 -  despite the official publication date, concentrates, not entirely 
uncritically, on the materialistic dimensions evident to Luria in psychoanalysis. 
Here, as we would expect, the role of reflexes, stimuli, and the objective quality of 
registered verbal responses in psychological experiments is assumed. Vygotsky 
focused on seeking recognition that the physiological side of psychology should 
not be separated from speech, consciousness and thinking -  and hence society. 
Luria’s article can be seen as complementary in that he too went beyond what he 
termed the old scholastic psychology, by introducing both Marxism and 
psychoanalysis into the debate. This could be considered unwise, as he himself 
would admit later. But he was not alone in this. It may be that he only grasped a 
portion of psychoanalysis and misconstrued its other elements. If so, it was a 
common failure both of Russian scientists and the Russian intelligentsiia.
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including not only many of his colleagues such as, to some extent, Vygotsky, but 
also Trotsky.
Luria rehearsed again his arguments against the old psychology. It studied 
psychological phenomena in discrete, isolated elements, mechanistically and with 
no attempt to understand them in motion, dynamically - or how they operated 
together within the personality of the whole human being. Correctly he saw the 
old psychology as being incompatible with the scientific materialism elaborated 
by Marx and Engels. He criticized the atomistic nature of the old ‘mosaic’ 
psychology.
Of course a system of psychology built in this way was not even able to begin the 
study of something such as an integrated neuropsychological process, the real basis 
of human activity that characterizes man’s behaviour, motives, responses and so 
forth... [It] had long since given up studying the whole man, to say nothing of man 
as a creature shaped by the specific conditions of his socio-economic and, above 
all, his class situation (Luria 1978b, 9).
He saw psychoanalysis as offering a dynamic scheme that appeared, at least in 
part, to be consistent both with this desired approach and with Marxism. Although 
he would later judge the grander claims of psychoanalysis to be both reductionist 
and metaphysical, at that time no sensible scientist could afford to ignore it 
completely. We should not dismiss Luria’s work as a youthful aberration, but 
instead analyse it in terms of what he could see of value in psychoanalytic 
approaches, and how they would work as a catalyst to his ideas. If, like Luria or 
Vygotsky in the 1920s, one was trying to build a genuinely scientific psychology, 
one could not start from scratch. Many of the available building blocks were 
cracked or flawed, but some of them offered a temporary advance, and the 
opportunity to create something better.
Psychoanalysis “proposes a monistic and dynamic approach to the personality. 
Instead of studying things in isolation, it would study continuous processes that 
reflect the organic continuity between the life of the child and the mind of the 
adult human being” (10-11). Luria noted “the fundamental similarity between the
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respective approaches of psychoanalysis and reflexology” (41, n. 59). 
Psychoanalysis distinguished two types of stimuli affecting the human organism 
and, in turn, eliciting reactions. These were “external stimuli, coming from the 
biological and social environment, and internal stimuli, originating in 
physiological processes taking place in the body and its various organs” (18). 
Although, in principle, psychoanalysis did not distinguish between the two, it 
focused on the internal stimuli, otherwise known as drives (ibid.).
Psychoanalysis shifted the theory of mental phenomena to an entirely new plane, 
that of the organic processes taking place in the human organism as a whole. It 
thereby made a decisive break with the metaphysics and idealism of the old 
psychology, and has laid the first solid foundation (together with the theory of 
human responses and reflexes) for a materialist, monistic psychology that takes a 
positive approach to the mind of the whole person (30). It has taken two major 
steps: it has affirmed the inter-relatedness of individual mental functions, and it has 
reintegrated the mind into the overall system of organs and their biologically 
determined activity (30-1).
Although it is easy to construe this as it stands as a form of biological determinism 
-  making it indeed a complementary approach to Vygotsky’s emphasis on 
cognition, Luria was not a biological reductionist. He concluded:
If the system of psychoanalysis is to measure up better to the requirements of 
dialectical materialism, however, it must develop a fiilly dynamic dialectic of 
mental life and take a third step toward a holistic approach to the organism. It must 
now integrate the organism into a system of social influences. Only then will the 
theory of neuropsychological activity advance from mechanical materialism to 
dialectical materialism. It is with these aspects of psychoanalysis that we shall be 
dealing in a later work (31). [To make this passage more coherent I have included 
note 62 within the text].
Luria is here admitting that more work needs to be done before the physiological, 
neurological and biological elements of psychoanalysis can be linked to the social 
and economic elements of Marxism. I think therefore Vygotsky, after his later 
change of mind about psychoanalysis, missed the point when he criticized Luria’s
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article on the grounds of eclecticism -  for Luria had clearly stated that what 
Vygotsky called a “monstrous combination” had yet to be fully and satisfactorily 
effected (cf. Vygotsky 1997b, 259). But it was reflex theory itself, which 
Vygotsky supported that elicited this eclecticism. Differing sets of internal, 
external and social stimuli almost inevitably required different sets of 
explanations.
On the other hand, Vygotsky’s criticism is correct from the point of view of the 
respective methodologies. But even here Luria recognizes that much of Freud’s 
work is speculation, as Freud himself freely admitted. Luria cites Freud as hoping 
that science would eventually provide the research that would support his theories. 
Luria criticizes “the ambiguous formulations presented in psychoanalytic 
systems” and “the subjective terminology which Freud himself says was 
provisional and needed to be replaced by an organic terminology” (Luria 1978b, 
21; cf. also 14, 23, and 36, notes 29 and 30). He seems to go beyond Freud’s 
interests and call on the research into the endocrine system (4, 21), something to 
which Freud, for all his claims, paid scant attention. If one can judge by the 
minimal references to hormones and glands in the New Introductory Lectures on 
Psychoanalysis (1933), which contains the majority of his remarks on the subject 
(Freud 1974), he was dismissive of any significant independent role for the 
endocrine system. Luria’s approach to psychoanalysis thus involved elements of 
faith, pragmatism, and criticism.
The term ‘monistic’ in his title refers to the work The Development o f the Monist 
View o f History by G.V. Plekhanov (1856-1918), the ‘father’ of Russian Marxism. 
Under the Tsarist regime he had used the term ‘monism’ as a term representing 
Marxist philosophy that would pass the censors. It represents an integral 
materialist view of nature, humans and their thinking. Plekhanov was also the first 
to use the term ‘dialectical materialism’ as an alternative to Marx’s term 
‘materialist dialectics’.
Feuerbach’s work. Against the Dualism o f Body and Soul, Flesh and Spirit, also 
impressed Luria. “Feuerbach brilliantly anticipated many of the concepts of the 
new psychology. His arguments for a monistic approach to the individual, about
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feelings, about the relationship between cerebral activity and the activity of the 
organs of the body were altogether a classic prototype of a sound and profound 
approach to the problem of individual personality” (Luria 1978b 33, n.l2). 
Although Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-72) was notorious in Marxist circles for his 
abstract and ahistorical conception of individuals, in this work Luria’s judgment is 
correct (cf. Feuerbach 1904, 340).
Luria’s first attempt to come to terms with Marxism was only partially successful. 
He referred to works by Marx and Engels that are relevant to the psychology of 
the personality. He had clearly gone to great lengths in his studies -  referring to 
original works in German including the original 1895-6 publication in Neue Zeit 
of Engels essay The Part Played By Labour In The Transition From Ape To Man. 
Surprisingly the English translation (Luria 1978b) omits the quotations from 
Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach, Engels’ Anti-Duehring, Ludwig Feuerbach and the 
End o f Classical German Philosophy and other works he used to support his 
methodological criticisms of idealist approaches to science (for the Russian 
version see Luria 1994). He does, however, praise the dialectical materialist 
methodology, which recognizes that material conditions ceaselessly change -  in 
distinction to what he calls “metaphysical materialism”. “This is where Marxism 
introduces its dynamic view of things and events as a necessary principle and 
draws a firm line between itself and the static, metaphysical view of things that 
tends to see phenomena as discrete, isolated, unchanging essences, not as 
processes” (Luria 1978b, 5-6). “With respect to the problems of the mind, this 
approach does postulate an integral concrete person as its subject matter, not 
isolated functions of the mind, as had been the practice in general psychology” 
(11-12). Here, I believe, is the basis of Luria’s attempt to link psychoanalysis and 
Marxism. Material processes were central to both of them. On the other hand, 
Luria’s remark that “in Marxist theory the mind is conceived as a reflex to social 
stimuli” (33, n.l 1), explains why reflex theory in itself encouraged the above- 
mentioned eclectic approach. These remarks also show that not only had he not 
yet had access to Marx’s comments on the role of language, and could not yet use 
Marxism’s full potential, but also that he and his fellow scientists needed to 
expand their horizons.
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Freud’s work relied too much on speculation, and he failed to engage in 
experimental research to validate his ideas, thought Luria, but at least he 
approached the personality as a dynamic, material unity. And, of course, he also 
shared many recognizably scientific approaches and concepts of this dynamic, 
material unity with Russian physiologists. The monistic potential of 
psychoanalysis became evident through the dynamic processes of this 
psychological unity. For instance, the psychic energy associated with mental 
trauma may be ‘converted’ to somatic energy in neuroses or hysteria (16-17). 
Freud described the concept of drive as on the “borderline of the mental and the 
somatic”. Drives were “an active ingredient of all the mental manifestations of the 
individual, selecting from among the multitude of stimuli only those that are 
suited to it, and in this way enabling the organism to actively adapt to the 
environment” (19-20). It was well documented by psychologists that associations, 
memories, and observations -  including the statements of witnesses -  were all 
affected by subconscious processes and preferences (ibid.). Even the concept of 
pleasure could be seen not as a subjective abstraction, but as the organism’s 
measurable relief from the bombardment of so many internal and external stimuli. 
Such findings make “mind an integral part of the organism’s system. It can hence 
no longer be studied in isolation” (21). They were also in line with Luria’s view 
that psychology was a “biosocial science” (4). Thus “psychoanalysis is heading in 
the direction of a monistic theory of individual behaviour” (15).
Here Luria makes plain what attracts him to psychoanalysis. Today such an 
approach would be considered a one-sided view of psychoanalysis, an 
interpretation driven by his own scientific pre-occupations. We have to remember 
that Freud was primarily a therapist and a theorist of therapy. Admittedly his early 
work had been in the fields of biology and neurology, but he accepted from the 
beginning in the 1890s right up until the 1930s that there would never be enough 
known about the workings of the mind in his lifetime to explain what he wanted to 
know. Hence his justification for the role that speculation openly played in his 
theorizing (cf. Stewart 1969, 30-2). In this light it was inevitable that any scientist 
excited by psychoanalysis would willy-nilly have to interpret it and develop it in 
the light his own scientific research and experimentation. It is a logical 
contradiction to develop science from a largely ‘mythological’ position; yet
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whether recognized as such or not, it is nevertheless often used as a catalyst to 
scientific development. W.H.R. Rivers’ classic work. Instincts and the 
Unconscious (1922), is a case in point. The so-called ‘war neuroses’, the effects of 
the trauma of battle, clearly showed that the unconscious could not be viewed 
simply as the province of the libido as many of the responses manifested were 
instantaneous and could not be ascribed to the suppression by a superego.. Rivers 
died before any formal break with psychoanalysis could occur, but Ernest Jones’ 
review certainly disassociated the movement from the first edition of the book 
(Jones 1920). Freud’s response to arguments such as those of Rivers was that they 
had misunderstood psychoanalysis (Freud 1921, 1-4). As we shall see. Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, though affected by the debate, subsumed the arguments 
almost without mention within a very unorthodox speculative solution.
Vygotsky’s later comments (1997b, 262), that Freud was critical of Marxism, and 
that “not a single psychoanalytic journal would, of course, publish” these papers 
of Luria and his associate Fridmann, might be true. But, as we have seen, the 
Internationale Zeitschrift fuer Psychoanalyse, under the overall editorship of 
Freud, did publish Luria’s account of the 1925 Moscow debates. All this is beside 
the point, however. Luria’s article was designed for a Russian audience that was 
Marxist. It could be said that, in some sense, he was attempting (unknowingly) to 
fulfil Trotsky’s request to Pavlov. When, on the other hand, Luria published in 
psychoanalytic journals, he attempted to present the ideas of Russian 
physiological psychological scientists to the psychoanalytic movement. The 
symptoms of naivety, eclecticism and misrepresentation of psychoanalysis and 
Marxism should be seen for what we, with the luxury of hindsight can see, 
namely, that Luria was attempting to create a new more comprehensive, and more 
scientific, psychology.
When Luria first lectured on the above topic he was not yet 22. He thought he was 
improving psychoanalysis, and leading it into more objectively scientific realms. 
His conclusion (already quoted), that further steps should be undertaken, was 
intended seriously. He stated that his article constituted the first chapter of a book 
entitled Principles o f Psychoanalysis and Modern Materialism, and he also hoped
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to discuss the relevance of Alfred Adler’s theories for social psychology (Luria 
1978b,3,39n.48).
When Luria spoke above of drive “selecting from among the multitude of stimuli 
only those that are suited to it, and in this way enabling the organism to actively 
adapt to the environment” (ibid. 19-20), he left his own interpretation of the role 
of social stimuli unclear. In Freud’s early so-called ‘Project [for a Scientific 
Psychology (1895)]’ “the regulation of the flow of drive energy was the main 
function of the psychical apparatus” (Stewart 1969, 193). Luria cited 
Ukhtomskii’s theory of ‘the dominant’, whereby centres of great excitation tend to 
attract and subsume the energy of non-dominant centres of excitation, thus 
providing a way for the organism to choose between stimuli. Luria’s use of it to 
account for the evolution of the primacy of the genital over other erogenous zones 
(Luria 1978b, 40 n. 51) suggests that his interest in the systemic and 
neurodynamic aspects of psychoanalysis did not yet fully incorporate a pro-active 
role for the higher mental functions. Perhaps this would be resolved in his future 
investigation of Adler.
But the prospects were not encouraging. On March 10 1909 these issues had 
arisen at a scientific meeting of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. Alfred Adler 
gave a talk on the psychology of Marxism. As a member of the Austrian Social 
Democrat Party and allegedly an acquaintance of Trotsky, Adler approved of 
Marx’s work. Even in terms of psychology, Marx saw "'’the primacy o f instinctual 
life^\ by which he presumably means the basic human needs, which capitalism 
failed to satisfy. (Those very needs which the student Luria was driven to 
investigate!)
Their gratification is achieved indirectly by aggression, encompassing the 
conditions of production [i.e., class war]... [After the achievement of socialism], 
on a somewhat higher level of civilization, there appear altruistic ideas such as 
sympathy, charity, tenderness, and modesty, which are henceforth to rule the 
world. Psychoanalysis, however, has shown us that these ‘ideas’ are neither innate 
nor derivatives of a moral sense, but are built up of opposing impulses, which stem 
directly from the life of instincts. They are reaction formations, which bring about
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an affective state that expresses itself as sensitivity (to debasement, degradation, 
ultimately to soiling) (Nunberg & Fedem 1967, 173).
So much for social relationships, love, nurturing, co-operation or Kropotkin’s 
‘mutual aid’ -  let alone the possibility of the development of rational behaviour! 
Reaction formations, it was agreed, was also the appropriate term to describe the 
formation of opposing classes under capitalism.
In response to the comments of this meeting, which clearly calls for dramatisation, 
Adler rejected suggestions that Marxism was a religious substitute, or possibly a 
neurosis. I have to confess I failed to understand the relevance of Freud’s 
reference to the ‘spinach of the Alps’ (cow pats), but he did make the sensible 
comment that “Adler has failed to offer us any evidence of our line of thought in 
Marx. Rather Adler has tried to present the psychological foundation for Marxist 
positions” (ibid. 175). He suggested that Adler should continue his work and 
publish it. Despite Adler’s conclusion that he wished “to stress that Marx’s entire 
work culminates in the demand to make history consciously'' (ibid. 178), one is 
left with the abiding impression that psychoanalysis would not countenance 
explanations of human behaviour, unless they derived fi*om instincts. Or, as Freud 
put it in 1933, “strictly speaking there are only two sciences: psychology, pure and 
apphed, and natural science” (Freud 1974, 179). Yet in the same work he said, 
“the theory of instincts is, so to say, our mythology. Instincts are mythical entities, 
magnificent in their indefiniteness. In our work we cannot for a moment disregard 
them, yet we are never sure that we are seeing them clearly” (ibid. 95). Thus the 
problem of combining Marxism with psychoanalysis has always been a fi’aught 
one due to the latter’s self-proclaimed reductionism. Hence the criticism that Isai 
Sapir later made of Wilhelm Reich. Though Reich said that he espoused Marxism 
and the cause of the working class, and was to be expelled from the 
psychoanalytic movement, his scientific position remained reductionist (cf. I. D. 
Sapir 1929-30: 1929, 940; 1930, 145-6). During the mid-1920s Sapir became a 
friend of Luria’s, and undoubtedly argued the same point forcibly with him.
There are alternate theories regarding how the organism selects between 
competing stimuli. One of these is relevant both for the following section, and for
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the subsequent development of both Luria and Vygotsky - namely the position of 
Herder. As I argue in Appendix I, his views on human nature and language greatly 
influenced Marx, among many others. In Ideas on the Philosophy o f the History o f 
Humankind (1784-9), he argues that humans are not specialists and experts like 
other animals. Although they do have instincts, these do not dominate human 
behaviour in the same way, because, as generalists, humans have to vary their 
activities more. “Of all the instincts that imply a relationship with others [my 
emphasis-MH], the sexual instinct is the most powerful... Sex, like everything 
else about man, was designed, accordingly for voluntary control” (Herder 1969b, 
268). The neurologist Kurt Goldstein (1878-1965) cited similar remarks by Herder 
to argue against reductionist approaches to instincts (Goldstein 1939, 478). In 
1925 Vygotsky also cited Marx’s version of Herder in The Psychology o f Art 
(1987, 78-9), “by placing excessive emphasis on the role of the unconscious, 
psychoanalysts completely negate that of consciousness. According to Marx, [in 
The German Ideology], consciousness forms the sole distinction between humans 
and animals. ‘The early human is distinguished from sheep only by the fact that 
with him consciousness takes the place of instinct, or that his instinct is a 
conscious one.’ [Marx & Engels 1976, 44]”. This approach, which Luria would 
shortly meet with in Vygotsky, also offered a dynamic view of what would 
become commonly known as neuropsychology, but would additionally introduce a 
much more significant and active role for the higher mental functions.
As we shall see in the following section, Vygotsky and Luria were quite capable 
of using contemporary neurological theories, other than Ukhtomskii’s, to explain 
the organism’s choice of stimuli to respond to. But I do think the indirect 
influence of Herder helped eventually to set the tone of their own responses.
in
‘Consciousness as a Problem in the Psychology of Behaviour’
On October 19 1924 Vygotsky gave a talk at the Institute in Moscow, attended by 
his new colleagues. It amplified what he had said about consciousness and 
language in his talk in Petrograd. It was published in 1925. Consciousness as a
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Problem for the Psychology o f Behaviour began with a long quotation from 
Marx’s Capital, volume 1 (Marx 1976, 284). Marx wrote:
A spider conducts operations which resemble those of a weaver, and a bee would 
put many a human architect to shame by the construction of its honeycomb cells.
But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect 
builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax. At the end of every labour 
process, a result emerges which had already been conceived by the worker at the 
beginning, hence already existed ideally. Man not only effects a change in the form 
of the materials of nature; he also realizes his own purposes in those materials. And 
this is a purpose he is conscious of, it determines the mode of his activity with the 
rigidity of a law, and he must subordinate his will to it.
As is shown in Appendix I, this famous quotation, which Vygotsky used on 
several occasions, was taken by Marx from Herder. Apart from the embodiment of 
humanity in the architect, everything else can be found in Herder’s Essay on the 
Origin i f  Language (1969c). Vygotsky’s own works show no evidence of his ever 
having read Herder, though he would have known Herder’s ideas in some form 
indirectly through the work of A. A. Potebnia, whom he did study. Although Marx 
does not mention language in this quotation, Vygotsky had no problem linking 
this epigraph to language.
Vygotsky wrote that he had “merely outlined ... some very preliminary ideas” 
(Vygotsky 1997c, 79). The February talk had been a forthright critique and 
theoretical amplification of the practice of reflexology and had considerable 
support. Here he was putting forward his own case, a much more important 
operation. But his introduction was equally forthright, another clarion call. After 
listing several scientific approaches applied to animals, humans and indeed the 
world, all of which could be found in Bekhterev’s magnum opus (cf. Bekhterev 
1932), he said that there was a notable absence. There was not a single law of the 
psychology of human behaviour that formulates the relationships or 
interrelationships of phenomena that are unique to human - as distinct from animal 
- behaviour. How was one expected to bridge the gap between the conditional 
reflex and the discovery of the laws of relativity? “The disparity between the roof
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and the foundation, the absence between them of the building itself, easily 
demonstrates how early it is to formulate fundamental principles on the basis of 
reflexological material and how easy it is to take laws from other areas of science 
and apply them in psychology” (Vygotsky 1997c, 64). How simple and yet how 
unscientific, but how prevalent a practice.
Although Vygotsky’s analogy was not uncommon in psychology, it also echoes 
the state of Russia: a backward country with mass illiteracy, put back decades by 
wars, invasions, and civil war promoted by its capitalist opponents. Yet a country 
recovering and hoping in time to create a new form of society. Vygotsky’s 
comments of the roof and the foundations of a building seem to me to reflect the 
contemporary desires to transform society and science and to spread both literacy 
and scientific understanding throughout that society. It is more than a narrow 
scientific dispute; it reflects the hopes and expectations of a people and its 
intelligentsiia hoping for a new society.
Certainly psychology needed to distinguish humans from other animals. “Man is 
by no means a sack of skin filled with reflexes and the brain is not a hotel for 
conditional reflexes that happen to drop in together” (cf. ibid. 66). Here Vygotsky 
is commenting on a notorious remark by the leading Bolshevik, Nikolai Bukharin 
(1888-1938), from his recently published work. Historical Materialism. “If we 
examine each individual in his development”, said Bukharin (1926, 98), “we shall 
find that, at bottom, he is filled with the influence of his environment, as the skin 
of a sausage is filled with sausage meat. Man ‘is trained’ in the family, in the 
street, in the school. He speaks a language, which is the product of social 
evolution... Each individual at bottom is filled with a social content”. Although 
the comment about the social evolution of language shows that Bukharin was not 
entirely a generalizing reductionist, that he was aware of certain specific 
psychological mechanisms, Vygotsky felt he had to challenge him. It epitomized 
his comments about the application of approaches and formulas from other areas 
to psychology without thinking through their relevance.
Similarly biology was used to devour sociology, and physiology psychology. 
Vygotsky argued that it was wrong to apply Pavlov’s law of the extinction of
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conditional reflexes to humans. Over-stimulation of one area in animals would 
eventually lead to loss of reaction, yet no one suggested applying this theory to 
education. Again, Ukhtomskii’s law of the dominant -  that centres of excitation 
attract the excitation of other non-dominant centres -  does not necessarily apply to 
humans. In man “each extraneous stimulus diverts and weakens attention” 
(Vygotsky 1997c, 65). It could be argued that Vygotsky was, strictly speaking, not 
comparing like with like, but that was also the point he was making. Humans have 
behaviours that are different. Psychologists had to struggle for their own scientific 
space, and could not allow their ideas to be reduced to such simplifications. In 
retrospect Vygotsky would almost certainly have applied his comments to 
psychoanalysis, but he was not ready for that. For an article that Vygotsky 
described as tentative, the taking on of both a leading politician and the ‘old 
psychology’ was perhaps enough.
Nevertheless, as Charles Sherrington (1857-1952) recognized, “the nervous 
system works as an integrated whole”, and this, said Vygotsky, “should form the 
basis for a theory of the structure of behaviour” (66). Luria agreed with this and 
had also referred to Sherrington. He also agreed that reflexologists had only 
studied a narrow range of behaviour. He would have accepted without question 
the proposition that “we must not study reflexes, but behaviour -  its mechanism, 
composition and structure”(ibid.). So far reflexology had only studied the salivary, 
and defensive motor reflexes and conditional reflexes of the first or second order. 
Yet “consciousness should not be viewed as a second series of phenomena”. This 
was the crux of the issue for Vygotsky. “Consciousness is the problem of the 
structure of behaviour” (67) was his method of approach. This increased the 
theoretical horizon of any examination of the nervous system. Of course, Freud 
had examined consciousness in relation to the environment and the unconscious, 
so even if Luria had adopted a reductionist view, he could also accept Vygotsky’s 
position. As we saw in section I of this chapter, this aspect, above all, is what he 
remembered most.
The detailed argument was new. Firstly, Vygotsky pointed out, following Marx, 
that humans did not simply adapt to an environment, to stimuli, but adapted the 
environment to suit their own purposes -  here he reviews the passage on the
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architect and the bee. Secondly, following Sherrington, he sees the outcome of the 
struggle of different groups of receptors for the common path as involving the 
collaboration of both major and minor reflexes. Although a struggle is involved, 
the singleness of action supports the view that normally “the reflex is an 
integrative action of the organism” (Sherrington, cited in ibid. 70). Thirdly, 
Pavlov used the term ‘chain reflex’ to describe a sequence of reflexes, but once 
we raise the possibility of the involvement of various systems of reflexes, i.e., a 
chain whose reflexes transfer between systems, we can apply it to our 
understanding of consciousness. “The capacity of our body to be a stimulus 
(through its own acts) for itself (for new acts) is the basis of consciousness” (71). 
“The psychological unconscious represents those reflexes that are not transmitted 
to other systems. There may be endlessly varied degrees of awareness, i.e., of 
cooperation between the systems connected to the mechanism of the active reflex. 
To be conscious of one's experiences is nothing other than to have them as an 
object (stimulus) for other experiences. Consciousness is the experience of 
experiences...” (ibid.) Thus “consciousness is always an echo, a response 
apparatus” (72). Thus far Vygotsky has suggested how physiology can be used to 
include consciousness within an integral system. But he also suggests extending 
its role from that of a mere echo.
“A circular reaction ... feeds its own reflex back into the organism via the 
centripetal currents that originate in the process, and ... this mechanism lies at the 
basis of consciousness”. But “a circular reaction is not a simple combination of 
two reflexes, but a combination in which one reaction is steered and regulated by 
the other one. A new aspect of the mechanism of consciousness takes shape: its 
regulatory role with respect to behaviour” (ibid.). Vygotsky’s insertion of 
consciousness into the concept of the circular reaction seems not only to raise the 
concept to something approximating a feedback system, but indeed a conscious 
feedback system. And additionally he introduces the crucial question of its role in 
the regulation of behaviour, and the search for the mechanisms of such regulation. 
Luria’s first major Moscow experiment had involved the regulation of behaviour 
and the characteristics of its breakdown. Vygotsky’s new formulations must have 
made an enormous impact on Luria. If, ultimately, psychoanalysis failed both to 
connect with objective psychology, and the instincts of Freud’s work did not
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substantially progress beyond the status of ‘myth’, Luria had a whole new 
complementary, and closely related field available, crying out for someone like 
him to research it.
In a summary that would have pleased Kornilov, Vygotsky added, “consciousness 
may [thus] be ... reduced to the transmitting mechanisms of reflexes operating 
according to general laws, i.e., no processes other than reactions can be said to 
exist within the organism” (73). Therefore non-manifest reflexes (tacit speech), 
internal reflexes which are not accessible to direct observation by the observer, 
can oAen be exposed indirectly, in a mediated way, via the reflexes that are 
accessible to observation, and for which they form the stimuli” (ibid.). And in 
conformity with Luria’s practice, word association and psychoanalytic methods 
were acceptable for this purpose.
Conceiving of consciousness as an intrinsic part of the nervous system had 
another methodological advantage for Vygotsky. This origin of consciousness lies 
in experience “and thus the fact that it is conditioned by the environment. Being 
determines consciousness -  for the first time, and after some elaboration, this law 
can acquire precise psychological meaning and reveal the very mechanism of its 
determination” (76). Here Vygotsky introduces another major concept of Herder 
and Marx, that being determines consciousness. But as the penultimate section 
shows, although it can be an individual consciousness, it is also a social 
consciousness. This section repeats many of the points of the earlier talk -  about 
reversible reflexes (words), ‘reflexes of social contact’. And how “the mechanism 
of knowledge of the self (self-consciousness) and knowledge of others is the 
same” (77). Vygotsky had successfully, though not consciously, resurrected key 
aspects of the linguistic philosophy of Herder within the framework of 
psychology, and in the context of recent research. It was an extremely plausible 
position, which promised a broader and consistent perspective for psychology. Yet 
Vygotsky and Luria were not to start investigating in depth the relationships 
involving language and these mechanisms until the late twenties.
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Chapter 4
Biology and Metaphysics, Physiology and the Promise of a Scientific 
Psychology, and Affect in Murder Suspects.
I
Freudian Metaphysics and the Search for Alternative Approaches
Vygotsky’s interest in psychoanalysis was apparently of a more limited scope than 
Luria’s. He referred to Freud in his posthumously published work. The 
Psychology o f Art. In connection with this he was invited, presumably by Luria, to 
speak as a guest at the Psychoanalytic Society on “The Application of the 
Psychoanalytic Method in Literature” on 4 December 1924. Luria summarized its 
contents, “In certain cases aesthetic stimulus may produce ‘pain’ as well as 
aesthetic pleasure. Thus every poetic creation is ambivalent in character: its form 
is that which renders perception not easier, but more difficult and induces a 
transformation effect” (Luria 1925c, 244). In his article on consciousness 
Vygotsky discussed the social nature of language. “The individual aspect is 
constructed as a derived and secondary aspect on the basis of the social aspect and 
exactly according to its model. Hence the dual nature of consciousness: the notion 
of the double is the picture of consciousness that comes closest to reality. It comes 
close to the differentiation into ego and id that Freud disclosed analytically. He 
[Freud 1984c, 364] says that ‘in its relation to the id, [the ego] is like a man on 
horseback’”, i.e., not always in control. (Vygotsky 1997c, 77). Although 
Vygotsky uses Freud’s metaphor for his own purposes, his familiarity with it, and 
preparedness to use it, display a close interest in Freud’s writings.
This is evident in a preface by Vygotsky and Luria, which preceded Moshe 
WulfPs introduction to the first Russian edition of Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle. It may be that Vygotsky and Luria contributed different sections of it, 
though it is rather strange that Vygotsky subsequently wrote of it in 1926 
(Vygotsky 1997b, 265) using the phrase “in the preface that I wrote”. This may be 
of little consequence, but as we shall see, the differing evaluations of 
psychoanalysis and subsequently different criticisms of it by Luria and Vygotsky 
rumbled on until after 1930. Furthermore, while Vygotsky’s initial reactions to
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psychoanalysis are often presented today as sounder than Luria’s, some of 
Vygotsky’s remarks suggest that those elements of naivety that Luria himself 
admitted to, were complemented by those of Vygotsky.
In the preface they write, “in Russia particularly, Freudian psychology is very 
popular, not only in learned circles, but also among the general reading public. 
During the past few years almost all Freud’s works have been translated into 
Russian and published. In fi’ont of our eyes, a new and original psychoanalysis is 
beginning to form in Russia, which, with the theory of conditional reflexes, 
attempts to synthesize Freudian psychology and Marxism and to develop a system 
of reflexological Freudian psychology in the spirit of dialectical materialism. Such 
a translation of Freud into Pavlov’s language is an attempt to decode the dark 
‘depth psychology’, and it is living proof of the great vitality of this theory and its 
inexhaustible research potential” (Vygotsky and Luria 1994a, 10-1). As regards 
the work being introduced, even before its translation, “a lively discussion of the 
problems raised in it began in Russian scholarly circles” (15) -  as we saw from 
the comments arising in Trotsky’s letter to Pavlov. “Even orthodox 
psychoanalysts sometimes pass over this work in silence. ..” (11).
The first half of Beyond the Pleasure Principle is, for Freud, relatively 
uncontentious, and Vygotsky and Luria pass this by. It is the part that deals with 
Freud’s overt speculations about the life instincts and the death instincts that 
concerns them. They consider Freud’s previous work to have been revolutionary 
and intrepid, but the present work “contradicts some fimdamental ideas which had 
earlier been put forward by Freud himself’ (11). Some would, however, differ (cf. 
the commentary in Freud 1984d). Freud posed the life instincts as disruptive, 
creating tension by means of excessive amounts of stimuli. In contrast, the 
pleasure principle sought relief from this. Having examined the repetitive 
behaviour of some infants, Freud discussed the role of repetition in life. He 
concluded that we unconsciously sought to repeat earlier stages -  not simply of 
our life, but the evolutionary stages of life itself. Indeed it was the reversion to a 
‘primitive’ survival system that W.H.R. Rivers suggested in order to explain the 
‘war neuroses’. This system bypassed conscious processes and therefore could not 
be attributed to the Freudian concept of the superego’s censorship (Rivers 1922).
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[Joseph Ledoux (1998) has recently proposed just such a separate pathway for 
memory via the amygdala]. Freud, however, barely mentions the ‘war neuroses’. 
Nor, incidentally, does he refer either to Ernst Haeckel’s formulation that 
‘ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny’, Sabina Spielrein’s earlier work on the death 
instinct, or his own interpretation of Hughlings Jackson’s ideas of neurological 
evolution and dissolution. In itself this is, of course, no reason to discount their 
influence, and we shall look later at Haeckel (cf. V, i, 119, & iv, 146-7) and 
Jackson (cf. V, iv, 146-7; VII, ii, 199-204). Instead, however, he refers to Ewald 
Hering, Schopenhauer, and the principle of Nirvana. In regard to instincts, he 
writes, “our views have from the very first been dualistic, and today they are even 
more definitely dualistic than before —now that we describe the opposition as 
being, not between ego-instincts and sexual instincts but between life instincts and 
death instincts” (Freud 1984d, 326).
The pleasure principle of the title is subsumed within the death instinct. As 
Vygotsky and Luria put it, “even more elementary than this [pleasure] principle, 
and however paradoxical it may sound, is the principle of the death instinct, which 
is a basic, primordial and universal principle common to all living matter” 
(Vygotsky and Luria 1994a, 12). Not surprisingly they note (ibid.) that “one may 
easily get the impression that in this case we are dealing with metaphysical 
speculation rather than scientifically reliable propositions”. Perhaps Freud is 
“attempting to smuggle in the decadent philosophy of Nirvana and death under the 
guise of biological principles” (13). Although the work is speculation, it is, 
nevertheless, scientific speculation. “It is metapsychology, not metaphysics. This 
work is a step beyond the boundaries of empirical knowledge, but not into the 
realm of the transcendental and supersensory, only into the domain of the hitherto 
insufficiently explored and unilluminated... [Freud] would be only too happy to 
exchange the metaphorical language of psychology for physical and chemical 
terminology...” (ibid.).
Once and for all [Freud’s hypothesis] breaks completely with any teleological 
concepts in the spheres of psychology and biology. Every instinct is causally 
dependent on its previous condition, which it strives to reinstate. Every instinct has 
a conservative character and is impelled backwards and not forwards. And this is
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how a bridge (a hypothetical one) is thrown across the science of the origins and 
development of organic life to that dealing with inorganic matter. Thus, in this 
hypothesis, for the first time, the organic whole is decisively integrated into the 
general framework of the world (14-5). At the root of all the proposals in this book 
lies one single tendency, namely an attempt to produce a general biological scheme 
for psychic life (16).
The concluding paragraphs are remarkable. Vygotsky and Luria ask that, if the 
above position holds, “how can humanity’s development from lower to higher 
forms be explained?”
[Freud suggests that the answer lies] in the external conditions of the material 
environment in which the individual exists. It is they that represent the true basis of 
progress, it is they that create the real personality and make it adapt and work out 
new forms of psychic life; finally they are the ones that suppress and transfer the 
vestiges of the old conservative biology. In this respect Freud’s psychology is 
thoroughly sociological and it is up to other psychologists who find themselves in 
better circumstances than Freud to reveal and validate the subject of the materialist 
foundations of this theoiy (ibid.).
According to Freud, the history of the human psyche embodies two tendencies, the 
conservative-biological and the progressive-sociological. It is from these factors 
that the whole dialectic of the organism is composed and they are responsible for 
the distinctive ‘spiral’ development of the human being. This book represents a 
step forwards and not backwards along the path to the construction of a whole, 
monistic system, and after having read this book a dialectician cannot fail to 
perceive its enormous potential for a monistic understanding of the world” (16-7). 
[Thus] bourgeois science is giving birth to materialism... (17).
Vygotsky and Luria certainly place a more optimistic, ‘progressive’ gloss on 
Freud’s views than Freud did himself. Given the ‘mythological’ nature of Freud’s 
speculations, it seems reckless to attempt to build a materialist science on such 
speculative foundations. Luria’s own account in Psychoanalysis as a System o f 
Monistic Psychology is, by comparison, relatively cautious. There he talks of 
internal and external stimuli. This account seems, by contrast, to be far too 
adventurous for him. The emphasis on the contradiction between conservative-
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biological and progressive-sociological, together with the talk of the ‘spiral’ 
nature of development suggest that it was more likely to have been a formulation 
of Vygotsky that employed Hegelian logic. Luria’s earlier approach might be 
considered eclectic by some, but, like reflexology, its methodology relies on 
stimuli and reactions. It could therefore be argued that it was consistent - even if it 
thereby initially failed to account for higher order systemic features. In contrast, 
the joint version outlined above relies on the combination of two contradictory 
systems, of which one is purely speculative. If one was to diagnose one version as 
being the more eclectic, their joint version is the clear favourite. Although it might 
seem to offer a major advance for Luria, by changing the emphasis from stimuli to 
dynamic Hegelian systems, these were notional, unlike the ones he was working 
on using the combined motor method.
Therefore it is surprising that in the Historical Meaning o f the Crisis in 
Psychology, written in 1926, Vygotsky not only strongly criticizes Freud, but also 
differentiates his own views from Luria’s, which he describes as eclectic, yet, at 
the same time, he continues to defend Beyond the Pleasure Principle. His defence 
of it remains firm, yet his memory of how he actually introduced it is highly 
selective and, for this reader, inaccurate. “In the preface which I wrote for the 
translation of Freud’s book ... I attempted to show that the imaginary construct of 
a death drive, despite the whole speculative nature of this thesis, ... satisfies the 
need of modern biology to master the idea of death... Indeed, death is a universal 
law of living matter”. It cannot be treated as if it made no sense or simply in an 
abstract negative sense -  a view endorsed by both Engels and Hegel (Vygotsky 
1997b, 265-6).
It was precisely this idea that I defended in the ... preface..., the need of biology to 
master the concept of death from a fundamental viewpoint... Despite this, I did not 
declare Freud’s solution to this equation to be a highway in science or a road for all 
of us, but an Alpine mountain track above the precipice for those free of vertigo. I 
stated that science needs such books as well: they do not reveal the truth, but teach 
us the search for truth, though they have not yet found it. I also resolutely said that 
the importance of this book does not depend upon the factual confirmation of its 
reliability: in principle it asks the right question (266).
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The disparity between the positions adopted in the preface and his defence of it 
represents a major shift. Namely, an attempt to defend the book on biological as 
opposed to psychological grounds, and an attempt to defend it as speculation 
concerning a specific issue, rather than as a guide to psychological methodology. 
Vygotsky’s defence is quite unusual, and his use of Engels is misleading. In the 
Dialectics o f Nature, first published in Russia in 1925, Engels writes of death in 
strictly orthodox scientific terms -  i.e., cell death or chemistry (Engels 1987, 495, 
572). A more charitable explanation of Vygotsky’s comments is given by 
laroshevskii. Vygotsky suffered recurrent bouts of tuberculosis, one of which 
finally claimed his life in 1934. The 1926 bout was extremely severe, though he 
wrote The Historical Meaning o f the Crisis in Psychology while in hospital. Luria 
told laroshevskii “that the doctors believed [Vygotsky] was a terminal case. 
Vygotsky himself whispered that he only had a few months to live”. Hence, for 
him, “the problem raised by Freud was not just an abstract theoretical issue, but 
also an intimate and personal one” (Yaroshevsky 1989, 170-1).
Vygotsky’s preface to an edition of Lazurskii (1925) casts an interesting, if 
confusing, light on both the preface to Freud and the later comments. It concerns 
Pavlov’s concept of the conditional reflex, which he considered “could also be 
called connective” (Asratyan 1953, 92). “Due to this mechanism the organism can 
establish infinitely varied connections and relationships with the environment” 
(Vygotsky 1997d, 58). Its importance is crucial.
The mechanism of the conditional reflex is a bridge thrown from the biological 
laws of the formation of hereditary adaptations established by Darwin to the 
sociological laws established by Marx. This very mechanism may explain and 
show how man’s hereditary behaviour, which forms the general biological 
acquisition of the whole animal species, turns into man’s social behaviour, which 
emerges on the basis of man’s hereditary behaviour under the influence of the 
social environment. Only this theory allows us to give a firm biosocial footing to 
the theory of the behaviour of man and to study it as a biosocial fact. In a sense, 
Academician Pavlov is quite right in saying that this theory must form the 
foundation of psychology: psychology must begin with it (ibid. 59).
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Vygotsky continued to reiterate the sentiments of this last sentence for years (cf. 
Yaroshevsky 1989, 112, 212-3). Vygotsky’s statement could equally well have 
been written by Luria. It also omits all mention of psychoanalysis, as though, in 
this context, it were an optional extra to be slotted into the discussion of hereditary 
behaviour according to taste. On the other hand Vygotsky’s emphasis on the role 
of biology in psychology could explain why in 1926 he saw Freud’s contribution 
in terms of biology. His concern with seeking ‘bridges’ is here transferred from 
that of moving from inorganic to organic matter to that of moving from biology to 
sociology.
We know that Vygotsky supported V.A. Vagner’s criticism of Pavlov’s attempt to 
explain all instincts in terms of reflexes, but Vagner (1849-1934) was better 
known for his views concerning evolutionary development. Although there was a 
‘pure’ line of instinctual development, Vagner also proposed another line of 
‘combined’ development whereby the ‘intellect’ develops on the previous 
structures. “The relationships between ‘instinct’ and ‘intellect’ were viewed by 
Vagner as those of gradual subordination of the former by the ‘intellect’ in the 
course of phylogenesis” (Van der Veer and Valsiner 1991, 195). Although all 
appear to agree on the influence of this theory on Vygotsky, its influence is only 
attributed to the late 1920s. Clear evidence is lacking for this earlier period. 
Vygotsky was almost certainly weighing such things in his mind.
In the preface to Lazurskii he continues, “only a scientific system which discloses 
the biological meaning of mind in behaviour will point out exactly which new 
element [my emphasis-MH] adds to the organism’s reaction and will explain mind 
as a behavioural fact. Only such a scientific system can claim the title of a 
scientific psychology. Such a system has, however, not yet been created” 
(Vygotsky 1997d, 60-1). He adds:
It will come as a broad biosocial synthesis of the theory of animal behaviour and 
societal man. This new psychology will be a branch of general biology and at the 
same time the basis of all sociological sciences. It will be the knot that ties the 
science of nature and the science of man together. It will therefore be most
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intimately connected with philosophy, but with a truly scientific philosophy which 
represents the combined theory of scientific knowledge and not the speculative 
philosophy that preceded scientific generalizations (ibid. 61).
This was an approach that was consistently developed after 1926. Here Vygotsky 
is making a much more realistic suggestion than in either the preface to Freud or 
the subsequent comments, but - paradoxically and just like Luria - simultaneously 
with the views he expressed in favour of Freud.
In a later article in the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, Luria and I. D. Sapir (1930, 
613) criticized the “metaphysical characteristics” of the life and death instincts, 
and Freud’s assumption that all other instincts derived fi’om them. “It is easy to 
see how far these attempts depart from scientific psychological approaches to the 
question of drives, here presented as primordially given very primitive processes 
of an almost cosmic order. The classification itself serves as an attempt to express 
in psychological terms the processes of the disintegration and restoration of living 
matter”. Luria and Sapir’s article was actually printed in 1928, but held up while a 
key political article on the All-Union Communist Party was revised (Scheerer 
1984, 322). But Luria had already used another encyclopaedia article to criticize 
other instances of a metaphysical approach in psychoanalysis, namely, the 
‘psychologistic’ explanations and Nietzschean philosophy to be found in the work 
of Adler (Luria 1926b). This short entry clearly confirms that the exploration of 
the impact of external social stimuli, whose investigation in the work of Adler had 
been promised by Luria in 1925, had also come to nought. Luria still occasionally 
referred to other aspects of Adler’s work. Vygotsky, although critical of Adler, 
went further, finding his conception of ‘compensation’ to be of interest for his 
work with what were termed “abnormal children” (cf. Van der Veer & Valsiner 
1991, 65ff.).
This period in the work of Luria and, more surprisingly, Vygotsky might leave 
one confused. Superficially it appears as though their work was taking them willy- 
nilly in the right direction, but they were continually being diverted, but this is not 
really so. It is more to do with oiu* expectations -  or perhaps just this reader’s 
expectations - and here Vygotsky’s case is very instructive. He is probably best
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known for his book. Thinking and Speech (1934). His talks in 1924 discuss 
language and consciousness, notably, in reference to Pavlov, as a system of inter 
and intra-personal reflexes. They seem like a natural preamble to his book. 
Similarly his comments above on conditional reflexes and the “extra element” 
seem to be leading inevitably in this direction. In one well-known passage he cites 
Marx’s remark that “the anatomy of man is the key to the anatomy of the ape”, 
which he explains. “A certain stage of development and the process itself can only 
be understood when we know the endpoint of the process, the direction it took, 
and the form into which the process developed... Having arrived at the end of the 
path, we can understand more easily the path in its entirety, as well as the 
significance of its different stages” (Vygotsky 1997b, 235). Yet in this 1926 work 
he did not develop this insight. In hindsight it could be said that, as a Marxist, 
Vygotsky did not yet fully grasp where some of Marx’s ideas came from -  
especially concerning human nature, language, consciousness, and the role of 
language in mediating consciousness. Marx, as an heir of the Enlightenment and 
of Herder, thought that humans were potentially capable of organizing their lives 
rationally. Like Herder, he did not think that humans were innately rational, but 
that rationality could be developed as humans gradually and scientifically 
understood their relationships to nature, their own history and the distortions 
introduced by various forms of the economic organization of societies. In the 
1920s, however, psychologists still tended to see materialism as related 
exclusively to physiology and biology. As Vygotsky wrote in 1926, “the new 
psychology proceeds from instincts and drives as the basic core of the mind...” 
(Vygotsky 1997d. 61).
Thus an attempt to apply Vygotsky’s interpretation of Marx’s dictum to his own 
work does not yet illuminate all the stages of Vygotsky’s - or Luria’s 
development. They thought that working from the bottom up was a necessary and 
unavoidable phase in the theoretical development of psychology, and that 
eventually they would arrive at the area of higher mental functions. The 
alternative, working from the top down, especially in relation to language and 
consciousness, almost inevitably leads to idealist distortions, displayed historically 
in an enormous variety. Luria and Vygotsky, like their contemporaries, mined the 
seams of physiology, psychoanalysis, and empiricist research in pursuit of a
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materialist psychology. And although they recognized the one-sidedness of these 
approaches, they also considered them certainly understandable and often 
legitimate. Vygotsky’s Historical Meaning o f the Crisis in Psychology, a book 
more praised than read, makes many interesting and relevant methodological 
points about transforming psychology into a unified science. He, however, never 
claimed it to be a blueprint for psychologists; Vygotsky knew the direction, but 
not the solution -  at least not this side of the socialist transformation of society (cf. 
Vygotsky 1997b, 332, 342). With regard to language, it might seem that his early 
references to Potebnia and Potebnia’s use of Humboldt were not necessarily 
evidence of an interest in the application of language theory to psychological 
development, but stemmed more from his literary background. Similarly his 
references to language in respect of reflexes might be seen as simply a logical 
corollary to Pavlov’s theory -  a commentary rather than a theoretical development 
with language as a key. That this was not the case is evident from his remarks on 
the inter- and intra-personal role of language. It has also been claimed that 
Potebnia’s ideas played a crucial role in Vygotsky's work in the late 1920s 
(Kerecuk 2001, personal communication). On the other hand, it was also explicit 
in Pavlov’s distinction of unconditional and conditional reflexes that the latter 
could be open to voluntary control. Hence it was possible to use these sciences 
without reducing psychology simply to an epiphenomenon of them.
Pavlov argued (1928, 113) that “the simple, the elementary is always conceivable 
without the complex, whereas the complex cannot be conceived without the 
elementary”. Vygotsky (1997b, 236) criticized this position, as did Luria (1926c). 
The position that ‘the whole is greater than the sum of its parts’ is almost 
inescapable with regard to human psychology, and, as we shall see in the 
following chapter, Vygotsky and Luria’s appreciation of this was enhanced by 
their reading of the recent Gestalt school of psychology’s focus on this very 
approach. Thus, although Vygotsky and Luria continued to use Pavlov and, to a 
lesser extent, psychoanalysis, they were well aware how reductionist they could 
be, and also that there were several countervailing positions that gave scope for 
development. On the other hand, neither Vygotsky nor Luria found the 
alternatives totally satisfactory.
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Several other issues would be illuminated in the light of such an interpretation of 
Vygotsky’s development. It would explain why Vygotsky’s creative period began 
several years after his arrival in Moscow. And why the most significant phase of 
Vygotsky and Luria’s collaboration was delayed until this period. In the earlier 
phase Luria’s difficulties and admissions of youthful naivety were not dwarfed by 
Vygotsky’s magisterial solutions, but mirrored in Vygotsky’s own struggles to 
create a scientific psychology. But this is not the whole story in respect of the role 
that language played in Vygotsky’s thinking in the period around 1926. Although 
the above interpretation seems to be a distinct option, Vygotsky, as we shall see, 
did introduce language in a key role, but one with a seemingly less high profile.
Luria was to retain his active ties to the psychoanalytic movement until 1927. 
Both he and Vygotsky retained an interest in its less fanciful ideas. But my 
reading of Vygotsky’s attempt to justify the preface, and Luria’s rejection of 
psychoanalytic metaphysics is that both felt they had gone too far in accepting 
Freud’s metapsycho logical pretensions. Making sense of human psychology 
requires theorizing, and elements of psychoanalytic thought had proved to be a 
catalyst to Luria. Freud’s metapsychology, on the other hand, had proved to be a 
diversion. Luria’s recognition of this probably explains why he never wrote the 
book of which Psychoanalysis as a System o f Monistic Psychology was intended 
to be a part. Luria had intended to publish an article on The Experience o f 
Objective Psychoanalysis (cf. Kozulin 1984, 89) in a work to be edited by 
Kornilov, which did not appear (cf. V, iv, 141-2; VI, iii, 170ff), and he also 
referred to another unpublished article. The Dynamic Moment in Psychoanalysis 
(mentioned in Luria 1926a, 41). Both these probably refer to the experimental 
work he began in 1925, and hence did appear later within an amended format. 
When in the Nature o f Human Conflicts, Luria (1932a, 150-1) does again refer to 
“experimental psychoanalysis”, the quotation marks suggest to this reader that it is 
intended more in the sense of an analogy, or even in self-deprecation, though, of 
course, the ambivalence is unmissable. We will start to examine this in the third 
section of this chapter. In section two we will look at how Luria tried to show the 
significance of Russian physiology for the psychoanalytical movement.
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Fortunately Vygotsky and Luria’s previous support of Freud’s metapsychology 
did not noticeably affect their practical work, other than in their rationalizations of 
it. And even here it is possible to argue that they also possessed parallel, and much 
more realistic, rationalizations. These were not only showing their effects in their 
practical work, but also developing a momentum of their own. By 1926 Vygotsky 
appears to have found the “new element” that extended conditional reflexes. In 
another preface, this time to Thorndike, he writes, “new links may be established 
... by combining a conditional reflex with a new stimulus. In other words, new 
links may be formed and develop not only on the basis of innate, but also on the 
basis of conditional reflexes”. Conditional reflexes of the second degree and 
beyond -  super-reflexes -  “allowed man in particular to develop all complex 
forms of mental activity and work activity” (Vygotsky 1997e, 156). “In short, 
man’s behaviour is revealed in all its real complexity, its enormous significance, 
as the dynamic and dialectical process of a struggle between man and the world 
and within man. This is the first basic idea of the new psychology” (ibid. 157).
Eventually Pavlov too extended his scope beyond conditional reflexes of the 
second order, and reflexes as ‘signals’ (cf. Pavlov 1928, 123, 382) to what he 
called the second signal (or signalling) system (Pavlov 1941, 93, 113-4, 179,181). 
For a scientist in his eighties -  the works were written in 1932 and 1935 -  it was a 
major step for Pavlov to formally extend reflexes to speech.
The first system of signalling reality is the same in our case as in the case of 
animals. But words have built up a second signalling system, which is peculiar 
only to us, being a signal of the primary signal. The numerous stimulations by 
word have, on the one hand, removed us from reality, a fact we should constantly 
remember so as not to misinterpret our attitude towards reality. On the other hand, 
it was nothing other than words which made us human, but this, of course, cannot 
be discussed here in greater detail (ibid. 179).
Unfortunately Pavlov did not live to elaborate or make concrete the implications. 
He had long been overtaken by the younger generation, but, as we have seen, 
these felt there were other problems in Pavlov’s concept of the reflex. In 
conversation with Michael Cole, Luria clarified Vygotsky’s views. “It was
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Vygotsky who provided the theoretical solution to the problem [of the higher 
forms of mental activity]. He accepted the idea that even the most complex 
psychological processes are based on the combination of elementary reflexes, but 
he felt that attempts to reduce mental activity to a system of reflexes was the 
wrong way to proceed” (Luria, cited in Cole & Cole 1971, 82; cf. Yaroshevsky 
1989, 112-3). Here, then, we have a kind of confirmation that Vygotsky’s 1924 
lectures were not a direct form of logical preamble to his later work, nor, 
implicitly, did he yet have the solution in 1926. On the other hand, Luria tells us 
of another area of investigation involving Vygotsky and language. “Vygotsky and 
I first tried to find out what brain mechanisms were the basis for the regulating 
role of speech in 1926 at the Clinic for Nervous Diseases” (Luria, in Cole & Cole 
1971, 88). Although their initial assumptions were apparently proven to be wrong, 
the role of speech in the regulation of behaviour was to become one of their major 
concerns - indeed a concern that was intimately bound up with Luria’s life work.
n
A Review of Russian Physiology
Modern Russian Physiology and Psychoanalysis^ to which Luria referred in his 
1925 report on the Moscow debates (see the end of chapter two), was finally 
published in the psychoanalytic press in early 1926. In it he recapitulates, 
amplifies and extends his earlier comments, notably on the relevance of 
Ukhtomskii’s artificial creation of a dominant reflex for the psychoanalytic 
concept of drive, together with the work of Pavlov and his school. He also looks at 
the work of N. E. Vvedenskii. We will look first at his comments on Ukhtomskii 
and Vvedenskii, which are interesting in their own right. Then we will look at the 
areas of Pavlov’s work that are new to Luria’s published work. It was probably as 
a result of two works published in 1925, one by Pavlov and one by his colleagues, 
that Luria was stimulated into writing the article that is the subject of this section. 
All these areas offer tantalizing glimpses of the way Luria was thinking about 
neurology, and point to the future development of his ideas. Although remaining 
on the surface deferential to Freud, it too points the way to “the new psychology”.
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Luria begins by stating that a number of psychoanalytical concepts had been 
endorsed by the findings of experimental biological research. He again 
specifically mentions that concerning “internal secretions” (hormones). “In the 
latest works on the physiology of nerves we also see a clear endorsement of 
psychoanalytic positions” (Luria 1926a, 40). Specifically, Luria addresses a major 
topic, which seems to bypass the solution both of Psychoanalysis as a System o f 
Monistic Psychology and the preface to Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle by 
Vygotsky and himself -  i.e., the contrasting of internal and external stimuli, of 
drives and social influences. Namely, “the fundamentally deeper relationship of 
internal and external stimuli, treated by Freud in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in 
which he voiced the opinion that the drive (the inner impulse) is, in the final 
analysis, only the deposit [Niederschlag\ of earlier impulses, which arose from the 
outside world” (49-50). The findings of Russian physiologists were here 
particularly significant.
A. A. Ukhtomskii’s theory of the dominant began with a “study of the physiology 
of the sexual drive of the frog”. This concluded that:
A special centre of arousal exists in the nervous system which takes over incoming 
stimuli to the organism and dominates the residual reflexes. This centre was called 
the ‘dominant’ by Ukhtomskii, for demonstrating its continuity and persistence on 
behalf of the dominant arousal... Its basic qualities correspond fully to the 
definition of drive as a continuous inner stimulus that Freud gave. ... During the 
action of the dominant other reflexes become inhibited -  that means that in the 
presence of a permanent arousal (a drive) all the activities which have no relation 
to it become weakened or cease. Stimuli directed at other reflexes are, as it were, 
taken over by the dominant processes and thereby strengthen them (50). [Luria 
added:] These laws are well known to us from psychoanalytic practice (51).
The well-known stereotypical behaviours of frogs are not necessarily a sound 
basis on which to base any form of human psychological analysis, and Vygotsky’s 
previous criticism of this is more than justified in the light of our well-knovm 
differences from frogs. But Luria was concerned here with more fundamental 
issues, namely the problem of whether or not it would be possible “to artificially 
produce [my emphasis-MH] such a centre of permanent arousal that obeyed the
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laws of the dominant. Freud .. .conjectured that the drive itself was in principle not 
to be distinguished at all from manifest stimuli, and that at the beginning of 
organic development the drives were perhaps only the condensing of manifest 
stimuli within the cell” (ibid.).
Ukhtomskii’s research showed that it was indeed possible to produce “a ‘deposit’ 
of manifest stimuli in the muscular-nervous apparatus”. By intensive stimulation 
he created a dominant reflex in a muscle. Thus “the excitation in muscle B was 
taken over by the dominant reflex of muscle A. In the muscle-nerve preparation, 
therefore, ... an elementary model of drives was created, and thereby the 
connection was demonstrated in principle between a manifest and a permanent 
internal stimulus, the drive. Freud’s conjecture thereby obtained its experimental 
confirmation, if only in a preliminary and elementary form” (ibid.). At this stage 
Luria linked the development of drives to the history of the organism’s 
relationship and adaptation to the environment. This is an approach that is far 
from being the exclusive property of Freud. Indeed, Pavlov, in a similar fashion, 
proposed that conditional reflexes could be transformed through inheritance into 
unconditional reflexes (cf. Pavlov, cited in Asratyan 1953, 96). It bypasses both 
the eclecticism of which Vygotsky accused him, and also the eclecticism in which 
Vygotsky partook. This was a model that at some level could also be related to the 
acquisition or organization of higher mental functions, together with Vygotsky’s 
propositions concerning conditional reflexes of higher degrees. On the other hand, 
Vygotsky appears to have supported V.A. Vagner’s opposition to this argument.
The physiologist N. E. Vvedenskii (1852-1922) (not to be confused with the 
philosopher A. N. Vvedenskii) was also significant for psychoanalysis, said Luria, 
for “confirming experimentally that inhibition is only a result, and a special form, 
of over-stimulation” (Luria 1925a, 48). “Vvedenskii characterized this inhibition 
as ‘parabiotic’. He considered it to be not only an inevitable consequence of every 
corresponding process of stimulation, but also to be a biologically useful 
mechanism. One which supports the organism in its efforts in preparing to cope 
with too great a number of stimuli, which could become dangerous to its life or its 
orderly fimctioning” (48-9). It was thus consistent with the operation of the 
pleasure principle and the reduction of tension. “From the standpoint of
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Vvedenskii’s physiology, the mechanism of repression appears as a special case of 
parabiotic inhibition. The feeling of aversion which can be traced back to over­
stimulation thus leads to an excessive stimulation of the cortex, whose 
consequence must be a ‘parabiotic inhibition’ of the cortex, and consciousness” 
(49). Pavlov also saw stimulation and inhibition “as different sides, different 
manifestations, of one and the same process”, which can nevertheless be 
transformed into one another, depending on whether the body needs to preserve 
energy (cited in Asratyan 1953, 110, cf. also 118-9).
Although the whole section connected to Pavlov’s work is significant, especially 
as regards the types of experimental research Luria was undertaking, the first part 
crystallizes some of the new ideas crucial for the development of Luria’s thought. 
Kurt Goldstein considered Luria’s comparisons of the approaches to nervous 
processes of Pavlov and psychoanalysis to be “unusually interesting and his 
conclusions careful” (Goldstein 1939, 308). Luria sets the scene:
Classical physiology could not comprehend the possibility of ‘psychogenesis’, 
mainly on the extremely primitive basis that it proposed. In the final analysis all 
human activity was to be completely dissected into a number of constant, 
unchanging, and strictly localized functions, which could be traced back in turn to 
the activity of quite specific ‘brain centres’. It would uncover the centre for speech, 
for writing, for ‘notions’, and so forth, so that one gets the impression of a system 
quite close to the phrenological views of Gall (Luria 1926a, 40-1).
This was the physiology associated with ‘faculty psychology’ and 
‘associationism’.
These views were made redundant in psychology by dynamic ways of thought, 
which conceived the psyche and human behaviour as a moving equilibrium, which 
changed continuously under the influence of internal impulses and the influences 
of the outside world. Psychoanalysis placed this position most clearly at the 
forefront; other psychological systems followed it, such as behaviourism and the 
new Gestalt psychology (41).
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At this point Luria refers to his 1923 book. Psychoanalysis in the Light o f the 
Basic Tendencies in Modern Psychology, a work he evidently considered still to 
be of value. He also referred to his article, The Dynamic Moment in 
Psychoanalysis, for which he optimistically gave the publishing date as 1925. It 
was not published. He continues, “A similar process is indicated for the 
development of modem physiology. By this we mean above all the alteration of 
concepts o f ‘brain centres’ and the working of the cerebral cortex, and equally the 
change of the physiological outlook especially regarding the above-mentioned 
question of psychogenesis” (ibid.). This occurred in the work of I.P. Pavlov, 
whose investigations of the secretion of digestive juices in dogs accidentally came 
across areas of psychogenic events. The conditional reflexes, where a reflex was 
prompted indirectly by a signal, e.g. a bell presaging food for the dogs, led to 
salivation. That is, the bell induced a psychic act, which in turn brought on the 
salivation.
Thus the organism presents a system that is connected with the variety of the 
outside world by a free mechanism, a system of moving equilibrium, which 
possesses the facility of complex adjustment. From this viewpoint it is 
understandable why the organism always possesses the possibility of responding in 
veiy different ways to new circumstances in the environment. Thus the problem of 
‘psychogenics’ receives a physiological basis (42).
Nevertheless, Luria recognized that these statements required further experimental 
data and supplementary hypotheses.
I.P. Pavlov proposed the notion that, alongside the stable, long-standing brain 
centres, were dynamic, temporary, ‘conditional’ centres that, as it were, build 
themselves anew every time - whenever the perceptual field encountered new 
stimuli. These ‘arousal centres’ are joined to other stronger centres which draw 
over to themselves the energy of almost every specific temporary centre and will 
impose on them its own reaction, so that in these cases they also react to a 
‘conditional reflex’ (42-3. Relevant passages for the last three paragraphs include 
Pavlov 1928, 324, 330, 332).
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The problem of the function of these ‘temporary centres’, and thus also that of 
psychogenesis, thereby becomes one of the basic problems of physiological 
mechanism and hence obtains not only its thorough foundation, but also its place in 
the general lawfulness of organic events. It becomes comprehensible as a case of 
the connection of several nervous centres, through which a complex perception 
leads to a change of activity of the centres entrusted with organic functions (43).
Luria is here talking about the relevant chapters of the third Russian edition
(1925) of Pavlov’s \vork. Twenty Years' Experience o f the Objective Study o f 
Higher Nervous Activity in Animals (cf. Pavlov 1928 chapters 33, 35, & 36). 
Although it relates to psychogenesis, it refers to the adaptation of the animal to its 
environment at a relatively simple level compared to some operations performed 
in a human’s higher mental functions. Nevertheless, it seems to me as if Pavlov 
supports a basic model of the operation of the brain that, by confirming Luria’s 
own researches, helped to confirm him against competing views of its operation. 
The latter were those of the old extreme localizationists and those who proposed 
overall activity. Although one shrinks from proposing Pavlov as an early 
precursor of the theory of neuroplasticity (!), it is even possible to see in Luria’s 
comments, perhaps for the first time, a germ of something like the concept later to 
be known as that of the ‘functional system’. It lacks the sophisticated 
ramifications of the concept that he applied to it after 1929. It is not as yet situated 
in a discussion about ontogenetic development: hence it does not deal with how 
such systems arise and develop in the higher mental functions. It has therefore not 
been visualized in terms of the varied environmental influences of culture and 
historically developed forms of cognitive mediation in those higher mental 
functions, but it is there at least in embryonic form -  here somewhat ironically as 
a dinner bell! That said, 1 think we shall find that the term ‘functional system’ is 
implicit in Luria’s own combined verbal and motor method, and that Pavlov’s 
comments merely encouraged Luria, and give us the opportunity to see how his 
mind was working. One can assume that, with this probing mind, Luria was bound 
to develop it further, especially as his close friend Vygotsky was, as we have seen, 
thinking along similar lines. Vygotsky used the first (1923) edition of Pavlov’s 
work for his book, Pedagogicheskaia Psikhologiia (1926), though apparently
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more in relation to an extension of conditional reflex theory (cf. Yaroshevsky 
1989, 71-4), rather than to move beyond it.
Pavlov’s research extended beyond such simple forms of psychogenesis to the 
investigation of the consequences of apparent contradictions that could be induced 
within the psychogenic scheme. Notably Pavlov trained a dog to respond as part 
of a conditional reflex to a note of a particular pitch -  but to no other pitch. 
“Physiologically speaking, that means he connected the function of a specific area 
of the brain to the activity of the pre-digestive system and, at the same time, 
inhibited other neighbouring areas” (Luria 1926a, 43). An animal ‘Vith a labile 
nervous system” was tested using a range of different pitches. It was easily able to 
distinguish the sounds in the simpler exercises -  responding to, or ignoring, the 
sound.
But as soon as an excessively difficult exercise [in discrimination] was set for the 
animal, the correct discharge of the reflexes was interrupted, and eczema broke out 
on its skin. This eczema went when the dog was allowed to quieten down. Here we 
have a clear demonstration under experimental conditions of a psychogenic 
symptom elicited from a dog. [This involved] ... a flight from the difficult 
exercises set by life into a neurotic symptom, or by the conversion of an affect. The 
problem of psychogenesis receives a physiological foundation (43-4).
And, furthermore, one involving what psychoanalysis would describe as an 
affective mechanism. Later (cf. VII, i) we will discuss Luria’s own study of 
‘natural’ and experimentally introduced emotional conflicts into humans. There 
the same concept, termed by Luria the ‘conflict of setting’, led to a much greater 
development in understanding the processes involved, especially in relation to the 
operation of the higher mental processes in humans. Although freely admitting the 
influence of Pavlov and his students (Luria 1932a, 206-7, 209), Luria had the 
enormous advantage of being able to measure the various reactions of humans 
simultaneously, and thus the interactions of their verbal and motor processes.
“In the recent [Works o f the Laboratory o f I.P. Pavlov volume 1 (1925)], Pavlov’s 
colleagues consider the conception of affect as a disruption of the normal
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discharge of iife-functions. They have graphically shown that its mechanism can 
become reduced completely to [a state of internal] conflict by an extremely 
difficult problem in life” (Luria 1925a, 44). Luria cites further evidence from the 
school’s experiments. The effect of a small amount of water seeping under a 
laboratory door, bringing back traumatic memories for the animal survivors of the 
Leningrad flood of 23 September 1924, induced similar reactions to those in the 
original event. Other experiments resulted in ‘nervous breakdowns’, e.g. “an 
abrupt change in behaviour: they curtailed their movements, became limp, and 
reacted weakly to stimuli”, depending on the animal being of an “inhibited type” 
(ibid. 46, cf. Pavlov 1928, 343-5). In other animals equally traumatic, but overt, 
reactions were induced. Luria concluded, “it is totally clear what significance an 
experimental confirmation of reaction types in physiology can have, together with 
assessment of constitutional types with respect to the field of psychic variations” 
(Luria 1926a, 46).
Finally Luria looked at the instigation of sexual inhibition, or rather, repression, 
induced in the Pavlov laboratory. It was found that stimulation of a particular area 
of skin in the hind leg of a normal dog produced a reaction that “showed all the 
signs of sexual attainment”. To remove this “inhibitory reactions were developed 
in neighbouring parts of the skin. A circle of inhibitory reactions gradually “drove 
in” until the sexual reactions were ehminated.
[As a result of] this artificial repression of the sexual reaction the character of the 
dog altered completely. Until then lively and active, the animal became sluggish, 
spineless, immobile and reacted only with difficulty to the its surroundings. This 
fact seems to be of extraordinary importance since, here in animals, a purely 
physiological experiment has brilliantly confirmed the thesis demonstrated by 
psychoanalysis of the overwhelming significance of the sexual apparatus for the 
whole psyche (47).
Kurt Goldstein later commented that it was “not quite clear whether Luria intends 
to explain facts discovered by psychoanalysis more on biological grounds or vice 
versa” (1939, 309). Thus we conclude Luria’s last published extended paper 
aimed specifically at a psychoanalytic audience. Although it is clear that Luria
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continued to consider both Pavlov and Freud to have produced significant work, it 
was through his own experimental work and that of his colleagues, physiologists 
and others that he related primarily to both. Confirming ideas common to 
psychoanalysis and other approaches was to be his ‘contribution’. After all, as we 
have seen in the preface to Freud, analysts were not as well placed as 
psychologists to reveal and validate the material foundations of psychoanalytic 
theory! Seemingly the role of psychoanalysis as a catalyst to his thinking 
remained significant, but it was he who was to do the independent research, 
research that could also be accommodated within newer theoretical approaches. 
Psychoanalysis as such was a therapeutic approach, and its adherents probably 
provided Luria with little feedback. In both the short and the long run he was the 
one to develop new hypotheses and theories. He was to provide in a short time 
new methods of diagnosing functional neuroses, before going on to the diagnostic 
work for which he is most famous, in neuropsychology.
in
Affect in Murder Suspects
Fortunately, the ‘external stimuli’ of psychological ideas in the 1920s, together 
with Luria’s own ideas and ‘internal stimuli’, were sufficient to power his thirst 
for research throughout these years, and for the rest of his life. Among this 
research was a series of investigations that took place over five years into the 
question of affect in suspected criminals. Although this started in 1925 he did not 
publish his findings until he had completed a representative and varied sample of 
results. The published accounts are in Russian (Luria 1927a & 1928a), English 
(Luria 1932a -  probably written 1928-9), and German (Luria 1930a), [the latter 
two are available to me]. “But that was only the tip of the iceberg”, said Luria in 
1974. “A huge unpublished manuscript has been left over from those days. 1 
recently turned it over to the Institute of Criminology, and it appears to have 
evoked some interest” (cited in Levitin 1982, 158). The destination of the 
manuscript is given, perhaps more precisely, as the Serbskii Institute of Forensic 
Examination (Homskaya 2001, 17).
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“We proceeded on the assumption that a person who had, say, committed a 
murder and concealed the fact is sure to react affectively to the attributes of the 
murder. His overriding concern is not to betray himself and, naturally, all the 
words that remind him of the murder would lead to affective complexes which we 
could detect” with our results from the use of the combined verbal and motor 
method -  as in the Moscow University experiment (Levitin 1982, 157). Initially, 
Luria set himself the task of deciding which two of a group of five people had 
been read a particular story. The two were soon revealed through the use of the 
combined method and a list of words connected with the story. After this 
“fanciful” test run (detailed in Luria 1930a, 154-61), Luria turned to the real thing. 
Although he refers to many of the previous experiments involving criminals, all 
such experiments had taken place after conviction (Luria 1932a, 79). So “I went to 
the Prosecutor’s office in Moscow, explained our idea, and soon a laboratory was 
organized there, and we were given an assistant, a young detective by the name of 
Lev Sheinin (who later became a well-known writer of detective stories). We were 
allowed to study the case and the suspects before they were questioned” (cited in 
Levitin 1982, 157). They were thus able to choose in advance words that would be 
relevant to the circumstances of the crime, though avoiding the actual deed, and 
place them on the list of word stimuli. This account is confirmed (Luria 1930a, 
142), where he also makes it clear that the research was pure science and not used 
in the legal prosecutions (ibid. 162, note). In The Nature o f Human Conflicts Luria 
elaborates, “we were in a position to perform our experiments on subjects who 
had been arrested a few hours before... When required by the experimental 
conditions, we obtained suspects before they were questioned and before they 
were told the cause of their arrest”. Sometimes, in order to uncover the structure 
of the process, experiments were repeated after the trial. Arrested suspects, 
subsequently found to be innocent, were among those who took part. Over five 
years, fifty subjects were examined. The majority of these “were murderers or 
suspected of murder” (Luria 1932a, 79-80).
Luria was dissatisfied with the earher research with criminals, which had at one 
time been fashionable, but often did not use real criminals (ibid. 98). His later 
paper which is strictly concerned with the experiments, deals with his precursors 
in greater depth (Luria 1930a, 139-44). The American subtitle of Luria’s 1932
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book was “Emotion, Conflict and Will”. These words characterize what gave his 
experimental designs the edge over previous work. Those suspects were examined 
before the verdict were not only already emotionally upset, but, if guilty, were 
placed in a situation of having to deliberately attempt to repress reactions to 
certain word stimuli. The similarities with Pavlov’s experiments are evident here, 
and he was quite open about them. Secondly, in contrast to the relatively passive 
examinations of earlier experimenters, the use of the combined verbal and motor 
response method involved the subject in both verbal and manual responses, i.e., 
active responses involving more neural networks that tended to betray the 
subject’s emotional responses even more through their interaction (Luria 1932a, 
98).
The emotional trauma was considered to exhibit primary and secondary effects. 
The former related to and increased in relation to the circumstances and 
magnitude of the crime; the latter to the circumstances of the arrest and the 
expectations concerning the outcome -  the punishment for serious crimes such as 
murder could be execution (77-78). Although the suspect was likely to be 
exceedingly upset, was it possible to separate out responses to the word stimuli 
which appeared to link him to the crime? And was there a difference between 
those experiencing primary effects alone and those with additional, or mainly, 
secondary effects? A survey of eight murderers and two controls is shown. The 
primary effects on the murderers were such that their reactions were disturbed 
throughout the experiment, almost regardless of the word stimuli. The same 
response was displayed by suspects who were later found to be innocent. As a 
consequence, in the version from 1928-9 (i.e., Luria 1932a, unlike Luria 1930a), 
Luria introduces research and concepts derived from other work of his that took 
place after the first criminal investigations. He compares the responses of the 
murderers with those of children of different ages. He writes, “in the child aged 
twelve and a half, the standard setting of language reactions is already established 
at a definite speed, and the behaviour at this stage is completely organized”. On 
the basis of these comparisons he concludes that the disturbed reactions and 
disintegrated co-ordination of the criminals resemble those of younger children 
who have not yet developed such skills (83). He later concludes (95) that the 
motor excitability demonstrated here “is evidence of the weakness of the
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‘functional barrier’, of that difficulty in controlling excitation, and separates it off 
from the motor area, which is characteristic of a functional neurosis as well as of 
the actual affect”. Under these conditions Luria concluded that there was “no 
remarkable difference” between primary and secondary effects (96). In the 
following chapters we will begin to look at this new research and the new 
concepts that Luria was forced to employ.
Nevertheless there were cases where it was possible to measure reactions to 
individual stimuli as had occurred at Moscow University. In a sample of five cases 
using subjects who also included those subsequently found to be innocent, and 
those guilty of minor crimes, Luria achieved usable results. These enabled him to 
predict the actual criminals from other suspects. “We were able to use subsequent 
criminal evidence to verify our hypotheses” (Luria 1979a, 35).
Finally, Luria commented on the therapeutic effects of confession -  consistent 
both with Christian and psychoanalytic practice. “Admission of guilt removes 
from the criminal those restraints which controlled each of his steps and every one 
of his thoughts and created an extremely acute conflict of very marked tension. 
Thus confession is a path to the relief of affect and to the re-establishment of a 
more normal functional life” (Luria 1932a, 115). But “we were least concerned 
with the criminological application of our work” (Luria, cited in Levitin 1982, 
158). In part II we will look at the experimental situations that Luria considered 
more significant, though chapter 5 will be mainly devoted to the impact of the 
ideas of Gestalt theory on Luria.
113
PART II
THE NATURE OF HUMAN CONFLICTS
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Chapter 5 
The Influence of Gestalt Psychology 
Introduction
Part II of this thesis is largely devoted to Luria’s book. The Nature o f Human 
Conflicts, published in America in 1932. In 1929 Luria attended the Ninth 
International Congress of Psychology in New Haven, Connecticut. He brought a 
copy of his work specifically to find a publisher. He placed it with the New York 
publisher Liveright. Afterwards he sent the final parts, containing his experimental 
work up until 1930, together with concluding and introductory chapters. W. 
Horsley Gantt, his translator, wrote, “I have made a close translation of the actual 
experimental work, without alterations or omissions. Owing to the large size of 
the book, however, the discussions I have sometimes condensed; Chapter XI and 
particularly Chapter XII [the last two chapters] I have abstracted quite freely 
without adhering to the style of the author” (Luria 1932a, viii). In addition to the 
excessively literal translation, which simply does not work in English, the book is 
difficult to digest, because there are so many ideas, implicit and explicit, 
contained within chapters devoted to experiments, together with more theoretical 
chapters. In contrast Henry Head’s Aphasia and Kindred Disorders o f Speech
(1926) is divided into two volumes, the second of which deals with the individual 
cases, whereas the first deals with the general argument with illustrations from the 
cases. This model would seem to be appropriate for many approaches and 
theories, which revolve around individual casework. Although Luria’s researches 
often hinged around the examination of individuals, and extended to diagnosis, 
much of the work involved many subjects, thus providing adequate samples for 
statistical analysis. Nevertheless, in retrospect, I feel Luria’s work might have 
benefited from a different structure.
It may be that the forthcoming edition of the Russiap ot-iginal will provide the 
missing commentary that links the argument from chapter to chapter, and that 
Luria’s conception is shown to be vahd. Michael Cole (2002, personal 
communication) confirms that in the new edition there is a significant amount of
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new material in the third part of the book. Barely 27 years old when he went to 
America, Luria’s opportunism has certainly been justified historically. By the time 
of the book’s American publication, Luria was under attack in Russia, and 
continued to be. If he had delayed further and reflected at length on its 
implications and presentation, it might never have been published anywhere. As it 
is, while the failure to publish the work in Russia under Stalin and his immediate 
successors is explicable, the continued failure to publish it within the last thirty 
years is something of a mystery.
In Part I of this thesis a generally chronological approach was adopted in order to 
show both Luria’s development and the theoretical context in which it developed. 
I included Luria’s experiments with Moscow University students and his research 
into affect in criminals and suspects within this framework. It is neither possible 
nor desirable to attempt a strictly chronological approach with the book as a 
whole. Part I showed many of the theoretical problems facing Luria (and 
Vygotsky) at that time, part II shows Luria’s experimental response to them. 
Although the varied sequences of experiments took place over several years, few 
were published at the time, and, by and large, in The Nature o f Human Conflicts 
they are all informed by the positions he took as he was writing up the book. 
Therefore Part II will look at the work and its theories as a whole, rather than in 
strict chronological order.
Despite the criticisms, we owe W. Horsley Gantt a great debt of gratitude for 
translating one of the masterpieces of psychology. We owe him a double debt for 
also translating key works of Pavlov (Pavlov 1928, 1941). A comparison of the 
works shows what an enormous revolution Luria introduced into psychology. 
Although at times directly inspired by Pavlov’s experiments, and also initially by 
psychoanalytic questions, the book marks a decisive step beyond both Pavlov and 
Freud, and is explicitly critical of them. This is not disputed in the case of Pavlov. 
In the case of psychoanalysis there are several respected scholars who think 
otherwise. I attribute this largely to misunderstandings on their part. Wishful 
thinking plays a part in the views of others. Therefore my response involves 
discussing the sources of misunderstanding. A brief postscript to this chapter 
(section iv) will look at Pavlov and Freud. But firstly it makes sense to examine
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the major role of the Gestalt school of psychology in moving the discussion 
forward from where we left it at the end of chapter four, and Luria’s responses to 
these new ideas. In many ways this discussion, in itself, shows how Luria moved 
on from Pavlov and Freud. The first two sections of this chapter examine articles 
written by Luria on the approaches of the Gestalt movement. The third part looks 
at its further influence on The Nature o f Human Conflicts. In the following 
chapters the book itself will be examined as a whole, and then in detail.
‘Questions of Principle in Contemporary Psychology’
There is no doubt that both Luria and Vygotsky were highly impressed and 
influenced by the Gestalt school in the mid-1920s. Even though there were 
differences of approach from the beginning, Luria and Vygotsky held the leading 
members in high regard as serious scientists and in the early 1930s they invited 
Wolfgang Koehler, Kurt KofQca and Kurt Lewin to join Luria’s expeditions to 
Central Asia. Lewin and Koehler were unable to come. After Vygotsky’s death 
Lewin and Koffka, together with many others, not associated with Gestalt theory, 
such as Adolf Meyer and Karl Lashley, wrote of their admiration for Vygotsky. In 
1936 Lewin and Lashley expressed their willingness to contribute a chapter to a 
posthumous Festschrift in his honour (Vygodskaia and Lifanova 1999, IV, 22-3; 
Zeigamik, cited in Van Der Veer and Valsiner 1991, 288). Unfortunately the rise 
of Hitler in Germany in 1933 dispersed the German academic community and 
closed down areas of research in the same way that Stalin completed the closing 
down of branches of psychological research in 1936, so that Vygotsky’s 
Festschrift never materialized. Another more considerable consequence of the 
combination of these two events was that it prevented Luria from submitting his 
and Vygotsky’s own developments to such a serious and respected scientific 
audience, thereby putting back the reception of their full achievements for 
decades.
In July and August 1925 Luria accompanied his father on a trip to Germany. 
Luria’s daughter reports that they visited Frankfurt, Hamburg and Cologne, but 
makes no mention of Berlin. She does, however, cite an archivist of German
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psychological material, O. Bulgakov, to the effect that Luria did make the 
acquaintance of Kurt Lewin in 1925 (E. Luria 1994, 43-4). Lewin, though not one 
of the founders of Gestalt psychology, was already a prominent member of the 
movement, and from this period onwards he directed a famous group of 
researchers in Berlin. This must have impressed Luria considerably. Several of 
Lewin's team were Russian, including Gita (G.V.) Birenbaum, and Bluma (B.V.) 
Zeigamik (cf. A. Marrow 1969, especially Appendix B). Both subsequently 
returned to Russia to work with Vygotsky. Luria met the leaders of the Gestalt 
movement and the Russians when en route to America in 1929. Zeigamik, who 
became a lifelong friend of Luria, reports on meeting this youth, and how Koehler 
and Lewin were astounded at his emdition (E. Luria 1994, 44). Lewin’s theories 
played a prominent role in The Nature o f Human Conflicts. Luria introduced 
Eisenstein to Lewin in 1929 to discuss forms of artistic expression (Homskaya 
2001, 39).
In 1926 Luria wrote an article for the Russian journal. Pod Znamenem Marksisma 
(Under the Banner of Marxism), and in 1928 another for its German namesake. 
Both these articles deal substantially with the work of the Gestalt school. 
Although Lewin’s researches do not figure largely in either, it is clear that the 
reception of the work already undertaken by such figures as Wolfgang Koehler, 
Max Werheimer, Kurt Koffka and Kurt Goldstein marked a sea-change in the 
ideas of Luria, and also Vygotsky. It removed the apparent impasse that both 
Luria and Vygotsky had reached, and must have been enormously exciting for 
them. Therefore I have quoted substantially from these works.
Luria opens his 1926 article. Questions o f Principle in Contemporary Psychology, 
by stating that “Contemporary psychology is going through a period of intensified 
constmction and revision of its most fundamental postulates. It can be said that the 
first stage of this exercise, namely clearing the ground for new directions and 
systems, has been accomplished” (Luria 1926c, 1).
[At the basis of this lay] the behaviour of man, living in the fully determined 
conditions of society, which became the fundamental subject of the new 
psychology. The increasing requirements of practical life drove out the tasks of
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deep self-contemplation, the study of one’s consciousness, and so on. Instead of 
these what came to the fore was the task of understanding the mechanisms behind 
human acts, as well as their motives, the forces organizing man’s responses to 
demands set him by the environment, briefly to understand the whole mechanism 
underlying man’s adaptation to the environment (ibid.).
This was apparent in the applied fields of psychotechnics, medical, educational, 
forensic, social and comparative psychology. This was manifested in two ways: 
Russian and American psychology focused on how to study human behaviour 
objectively, whereas the new German psychology, Gestaltpsychologie^ asked 
“What is human behaviour and upon which principles should its study be based?” 
(2). “How has this system of behaviour been constructed? Can this system be 
divided into separate small elements or does it constitute an integral and 
indivisible system? Is this system organized according to a mechanical principle 
or according to one which approximates to the organic?” (3).
“The old academic psychology ... considered that the psyche evolved fi’om 
separate elementary psychic processes. It knew of various single elements of the 
psyche such as sensations, feelings, volitional impulses, and so on. From these and 
by means of associations (combinations) more complex unities of perceptions, 
representations, concepts, moods, and so on, were formed. Complex psychical 
processes were thus mechanical groupings of elementary units” (ibid.). 
Associationist psychology was found severely wanting.
Most recently other systems have surfaced, which whilst operating with materials 
different from those used by the associationist psychologists, still borrowed from 
them all their principles and structure. Contemporary reflexology may serve as a 
typical example. It does not recognize any types of behaviour other than reflexes 
and conditional formations created on the basis of reflexes (once more resulting 
from the synchronized convergence of any two agents, even if completely 
unrelated) and uses them to construct not only the most rudimentary floor but the 
whole building of psychology. Hence reflexology takes to its logical extreme the 
propositions of the old associative psychology by asserting that the behaviour of 
man in its entirety may be reduced to mechanical combinations of mechanically
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formed conditional reflexes. That is, what in the old psychology was known as 
association by contiguity (4).
Thus, within a short space of time, Luria recognized that he no longer had to work 
within a framework that had seemed to be leading both him and Vygotsky into a 
theoretical cul-de-sac. Gestalt psychologists, in contrast to reflexologists, set out 
initially “to study the integral personality, as an organic unity, and not only 
because these are the requirements of daily life, but because the psyche is an 
integral indivisible process, an integral system of behaviour which is not reducible 
to its elements” (4-5). As regards any natural process we find most applicable the 
proposition “profoundly formulated by dialectical philosophy: with the ever 
growing complexity of this or that process, at each new stage we obtain a new 
closed system, and a new qualitative unity” (5). Here Luria is clearly referring to 
the Hegelian approach as made concrete by Marx. Fortuitously, in the same year 
that Luria made the acquaintance of Lewin -  1925 -  Engels’ theoretical work, 
Dialectics o f Nature, was published. This is more apparent in Luria’s article from 
1928, but the coincidence was fruitful for both Luria and Vygotsky.
What factors of form {Gestaltfaktoren) were significant in creating an organic 
unity as opposed to a mechanical unity?
This relation of man to his environment constitutes the factor defining the moulds 
into which human behaviour is poured. In the most extreme cases these identified 
forms of the equilibrium between man and environment are echoed in the sense of 
changes in the structure of the organism ([Oskar] Hertwig had already 
demonstrated this with his [response to the] biogenetic law). In less extreme 
instances no changes in anatomical form are recorded, but we do observe fully 
defined functions, in other words, a fully defined psyche (6-7).
Here Luria, like Vygotsky, shows his concern with issues of development. 
Hertwig was famous for arguing against Ernst Haeckel’s theory - that ontogeny 
recapitulates phylogeny - on the grounds that the similarities were not due to 
recapitulation, but simply because there was no alternative means for developing a 
many layered structure from a single cell (cf. Gould 1977, 431, n.29). Here again.
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and especially in the arguments below, Luria has set aside the arguments implicit 
in Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle.
“In constructing the psychology of personality, we must proceed not from the 
elementary to the complex, by means of mechanical combinations of elements 
into unities, but rather the reverse, from the interrelationships between the 
organism as a unity and the environment down to separate particular processes of 
behaviour. After lengthy experiments, the American biologist, [Charles M.] Child 
drew a conclusion, which he most aptly expressed as follows: ‘It is not the cells 
which create the organism, but rather the organism which creates the cells’.
Thus the German psychologists arrived at the conclusion which could be 
formulated using the paradox that ‘the complex precedes the simple’, i.e., that the 
complex system which is an integral organism, taking shape during its 
interrelationship with the environment may subsequently, and in the presence of 
appropriate conditions, differentiate itself and develop particular and elementary 
functions. The second conclusion to which the new German psychologists are 
drawn, is that there is not and cannot be anything in the organism which does not 
possess a defined vital significance. That is, which does not result from efforts at 
maintaining the equilibrium between organism and environment, and which does 
not answer earlier or current requirements to adapt to vital conditions (Luria 1926c,
7).
Although at first glance reminiscent of teleology, this merely means that “the 
integral closed system, which includes man, is a system of ‘organism- 
environment’ which demands the maintenance of equilibrium between its 
independent parts... ” (ibid.).
Luria then moves on to the relationship between instinct and reflex. Edward 
Thorndike, for instance, saw instincts simply in terms of ‘chains of reflexes’, a 
position also taken by Pavlov’s school. For these “the biologically expedient 
impact of instincts may be decomposed into a series of mechanical reflexes, none 
of which may possess the character of expediency”. Others, including Gestalt 
psychologists, hold that “instinctive activities possess a complex and integral
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character”, namely, that the satisfaction of the instinct may be achieved in 
different ways as distinct from a simple ‘chain of reflexes’ (9). Luria accepts that 
it may be valuable to artificially decompose the instinctive act for some purposes, 
but that it is nevertheless qualitatively distinct.
He cites Wolfgang Koehler’s famous experiments with chimpanzees (Koehler 
1921) as an example of an approach which demonstrates that higher organisms 
need, and are capable of, qualitatively new forms of behaviour, which were not 
reducible to instincts or simple combinations of habitual reflex responses. “He did 
not start from a simple stimulation on any part of the nervous system, nor did he 
place the animals in artificially contrived experimental settings, to artificially 
isolate reflexes. He decided to exploit natural-biological, integral settings in order 
to elicit ... a complex spontaneous act, by placing [the chimpanzees] in 
challenging circumstances, designed with a specific object in mind” (Luria 1926c, 
9). Different results were obtained, and some could not solve the problem -  
obtaining bananas by using a combination of objects potentially within their visual 
fields. Agitation was followed by cooling down, then immobility until the 
successful chimpanzee, [Sultan], suddenly [and famously] and without any further 
trials headed straight for a number of boxes, stacked them on top of each other and 
grabbed the fruit. Once achieved, this procedure was never forgotten. “Complex 
organized behaviour or, as the German writers prefer, ‘intellectual’ behaviour, 
cannot possibly be constructed from mechanical combinations of simple lower 
forms of behaviour” (10).
Luria, and Vygotsky, who cited and discussed Koehler’s experiment on several 
occasions, notably in part one of a joint work with Luria, Studies in the History o f 
Behaviour (Vygotsky and Luria 1930a), and in his 1930 introduction to the 
Russian translation of Koehler’s work, were enormously impressed by it.
[A ‘natural’ experiment based in the real world had the advantage that it propelled] 
the research of '‘intelligent acts" into the foreground. Not in the sense of whether 
they are accompanied by consciousness or not, (this question does not in the 
slightest, interest the German school [a point to note -  MH]), but rather in the sense 
that these acts must possess in the subject’s eyes, a fully defined significance, and
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be directed towards the implementation of a given biological or social task for it is 
precisely of such tasks that the real human behaviour consists (Luria 1926c, 11-12).
The structure of such acts was clearly of a different order from those 
accommodated within the frameworks of Freud and Pavlov, and Luria’s 
involvement in investigating such structures obviously received encouragement 
from the research methods of the Gestalt school.
But he was not uncritical. In his conclusions he said, “we must at once recognize 
that ... [the] method is not devoid of substantial shortcomings”. In reality the 
various experiments he mentions “primarily allow a ‘description’ of the acts under 
observation and only the registering of the most general interrelationships. So far 
the integral approach does not allow any quantitative expression of the 
phenomena observed and is far from any accurate resolution of the problem”. He 
admitted that these were early days.
However we maintain that these defects are so far characteristic of the integral 
approach to the human psyche... [But] one may think that the dialectical approach 
to these phenomena will come to the rescue. An approach which takes into account 
that each new stage of development gives new and utterly original forms of 
behaviour and reactions of the organism, but which at the same time understands 
that these new and original forms, skilfully analysed, may be explained by relying 
on the quantitative changes at their basis (14).
It was to be the contribution of Luria and Vygotsky to apply a developmental 
framework to the integral systems that Gestalt psychology proposed. Without such 
a framework and the work that could demonstrate changes in such systems, 
evident in child development and aphasia, the concept of such systems could be 
interpreted as perhaps another abstract idealist formulation. The application of 
approaches traditionally associated with Marxist analysis was to prove truly 
beneficial for this in the long term.
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II
‘Modern Psychology and Dialectical Materialism’
This application of Marxism is made more explicit in the title of Luria’s 1928 
article. Modern Psychology and Dialectical Materialism.
Psychological science came unconsciously upon the track of dialectics and 
materialism and needed to grasp this development consciously in order to master 
them. This development in psychology was expressed in two notable tendencies: in 
one, ... [American Behaviourism], to change psychology from a science of the 
subjective mind {Geist^  into an objective science of behaviour. In the other, ... 
[Gestalt theory], to change the system that the ‘world of the soul’ mechanistically 
puts together out of simple associations into a science that investigates unified 
psychic processes and their laws (Luria 1928b, 508).
Half the article is devoted to American Behaviourism and demonstrates familiarity 
with the work of J. B. Watson, A. Weiss and others. As one would expect, Luria 
praises its attempts at introducing forms of objective measurement and recognizes 
that it has enriched psychology, but its limitations are manifested all too clearly. 
Its monism was so one-sided, that consciousness had no place in it. Luria (513) 
cites Edward Tolman to the effect that Watson was virtually reducing behaviour to 
muscle contraction. Consciousness for Watson can only exist if muscular activity 
can be found. Thus before a child acquires speech, it cannot be conscious. Luria 
recognizes that many of the examples he cites would not be considered worthy of 
serious discussion. On the other hand such approaches are “widespread not 
accidental and characteristic of the primitive-objective mechanical method”. 
Furthermore, it “has not grasped the failings of the old associationist psychology”.
[Thus it sought to reduce human behaviour to] a mechanical combination of very 
simple individual reflexes and instincts. Undoubtedly a standpoint, reduced in such 
a way, one that asserts that all complicated forms of behaviour arise as a 
mechanical superstructure \Ueberbau\ -  a ‘conditional’ doubling of primitive 
reactions -  is false and unsatisfactory. The mechanical Weltanschauimg considers 
neither the uniqueness of such new forms of behaviour nor the circumstances
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whenever they arise, not individually, but as dependent on the biological setting of 
the whole organism, by which they are organized and regulated (517).
In varying degrees these accusations could also be levelled at Pavlov and Freud.
Gestalt psychology, says Luria, offers “a serious critique of the mechanical 
Weltanschauung and placed itself on a clear dialectical standpoint” (ibid.). Its 
founders “united around a basic thesis from which they all proceeded: that the 
complicated processes of psychic-nervous life presented qualitative structures, 
which could certainly not be reduced in a simple mechanical fashion into 
constituent ‘elements’... [Only rarely may this be possible], without the whole 
object losing its identity”. “In most cases the objects of the physical world have 
their completed form, and this has its own specific laws” (518). “Life processes 
have their own precise forms which are characteristically unique precisely because 
of their complexity. These phenomena add in principle nothing new to a range of 
physical, chemical processes, but are qualitatively distinguished from these in that 
their Gestalt conforms to the complicated conditions under which they developed” 
(519).
In all these cases the whole is, of course, composed out of fimctional parts, but the 
parts do not determine the whole. Rather, the whole broadly determines the parts...
The psychic processes -  more so than other kinds of process -  are processes of a 
totality, structurally formed processes. From observant investigations ... we can 
obtain a conception both of its own structure and of the inner orderliness of these 
structures. Perception, capacity for thought and behaviour -  all give us examples of 
such structurally formed processes, and to want to comprehend them, without 
proceeding from the structure, is naturally hopeless (519).
Later (522), Luria praises the work of Kurt Goldstein (1878-1965) for his concrete 
application of this approach. In a posthumous appreciation (1966, 311) Luria 
wrote:
There is every reason to regard Kurt Goldstein as one of the founders of 
contemporary neuropsychology, and every scholar who took part in the 
development of this new science has felt his influence. I remember the days in the 
1920s when I started work in this field, and the deep impressions which I gained
125
from his basic works, although I cannot agree with most of his philosophical and 
theoretical ideas... [Specifically], in 1925 a short paper by Goldstein appeared. 
Das Symptom, seine Entstehung und Bedeutung [The Symptom, its Origin and 
Significance, (Goldstein 1925b)], and this was the start of neuropsychology. The 
symptom cannot be regarded as an immediate expression of the damaged function: 
it has to be analysed, and only an analysis of the basic function, which has to be 
singled out, can show its real essence. This basic disturbance can solve the riddle of 
the entire syndrome -  and only when it becomes clear is the clinical analysis of the 
patient over” (ibid. 312, cf. also Goldstein 1925a, 398).
The very term ‘symptom’ itself as applied to neurology would today seem 
meaningless without a conception of structure and development which Gestalt 
theorists had started to elaborate, though I do not think Luria intended to attribute 
this change exclusively to Goldstein.
Luria’s 1928 paper turns to look at the nervous system as a whole. Gestalt 
theorists proposed that
If our perceptions are formed according to a particular structure, that is merely a 
sign that just such physiological structures are concealed behind. The subjective 
‘ phenomenological ’ forms represent their reflection. These writers accept that if 
the stimuli are received by the eyes not as elements but as forms, the processes of 
the retina and in a large part of the cerebral cortex do not proceed in a mosaic-like 
fashion, but possess an overall, structurally formed character. In the dynamic of the 
physiological processes we can follow the same regularities as in the field of 
perception. As with the one, so with the other: it is subjected to apparently unified 
basic laws in the spread of nervous arousal (Luria 1928b, 521-2).
Precisely such a monist presentation of basic research into perception has brought 
the scholars of this school to completely new laws about the structure and 
regulation of the activity of the nervous system. These views basically come down 
to the perception that the nervous system continuously functions as a whole and 
that, for the purpose of undertaking any movements and behavioural acts, it does 
not at all require the premise of specifically located stimuli to be present with a 
consequent associative ‘connection’. All relationships in which an organism 
succeeds have the capacity to elicit overall and plastic changes of the organism and 
its relationships, complete alterations to the whole nervous system. These then (and 
again in consequence of specific relationships of the situation and the structure of
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processes) become localized and altered, are capable of embracing distinct 
processes, and so forth. In this dynamic of the structure of nervous excitement and, 
in the opinion of these writers, the same basic laws apply as do in the perception of 
appearance. Thus for example, in K. Goldstein’s view, in the activity of the 
nervous system, as also in perception, this fact plays a role. The arousal does not 
extend totally to all sections of the nervous system, [but] according to the 
‘neighbourhood’ and ‘appropriateness’ to the given excitation. This obtains due to 
the dominating system and such systems built, which can be designated as the 
‘ground’ (background) for the main process proceeding in front of it. In the 
structure of nervous excitement such factors play a part as the previous states of the 
functioning [fiinktionierend] systems and the residual ‘background’, the law of 
inertia in processes already started, the regulation of the levels of tension in 
processes, the influx of opposing impulses, and so forth. All this creates a highly 
complicated system of activity, that nevertheless possesses strictly internal laws 
(522; cf. Goldstein 1925a, 394).
These comments are most intimately related to Luria’s work at this time. Indeed 
he uses Goldstein’s term '‘Adequaetheif, literally ‘adequacy’ in The Nature o f  
Human Conflicts on several occasions to refer to the problem of the nervous 
system under-responding or, more often, over-responding to a given situation. 
(Gantt’s maintenance of the term ‘adequacy’ in his translation is misleading as it 
actually signifies ‘appropriateness’ in common parlance). Luria also used parts of 
Goldstein’s terminology, such as "Nahewirkung^ and ‘Kurzschluss’ (cf. e.g. 
Goldstein 1925a, 378-9, 388). On the other hand Luria did not make use of the 
terms ‘figure’ or ‘background’ in his own works. He continued to refer to 
Goldstein’s work, ‘The Symptom’ (1925b), and to another article. On the Theory 
o f the Function o f the Nervous System (Goldstein 1925a). Rather surprisingly, 
Goldstein merits only one mention in Luria’s book. Luria later wrote:
Goldstein made a heroic attempt to overcome the conflict of strict localization and 
the mentalistic approach of the noetic school, [which held that only the brain as a 
whole can be responsible for the complex mental functions]. Although [Goldstein] 
highly sympathized with the latter, [he] remained to the end of his life a brilliant 
representative of classical neurology with its analytical approach. The conflict of 
two traditions was the basic content of his life, the attempt to construct a new
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neurology which had to include the truth of both was his endeavour (Luria 1966, 
311).
The influence of the ‘noetic’ school on Goldstein was, however, most apparent 
after he left Germany and, Luria tells us, he lost his intimate connection with his 
experimental laboratory, where he worked with, among others, Adhemar Gelb and 
where his cousin, the philosopher Ernst Cassirer, famously observed his work on 
aphasia. It is this later work which was translated into English, but very little of 
his path-breaking work. Yet Goldstein never really understood the importance of 
the investigation of the ontogenetic development of neurological working systems 
and consciousness. He regarded the ‘higher centre’ as providing a more 
complicated system which gave humans more scope, but he seemed to see this as 
a quantitative rather than a qualitative change (Goldstein 1925a, 395). 
Nevertheless the evidence of Goldstein’s analytical work is apparent throughout 
Luria’s studies of the structure of nervous excitation and elsewhere. One 
important point that Goldstein recognized was that although a damaged organism 
showed “certain similarities with those of a primitive one, it does not thereby ever 
become a primitive organism”. Or, more forcefully, “A reduced organism is a 
defective system, a primitive one is always complete” (Goldstein 1925a, 404). In 
view of the fact that in the late 1920s several psychologists were comparing the 
verbal and thought processes of children, schizophrenics and so-called ‘primitive’ 
peoples, this was a significant point.
Luria’s article concludes with another brief look at Koehler’s studies with 
chimpanzees. Surprisingly he does not examine Lewin’s work. In The Nature o f  
Human Conflicts it is Lewin’s work that appears to be the most significant Gestalt 
influence on Luria’s work. It is to this that we now turn.
Ill 
The Influence of Kurt Lewin
Like Goldstein, Kurt Lewin (1890-1947) also moved away fi’om his early work 
related to ‘tension-systems’ to the application of field theory to social psychology 
when he left Germany. Few of his earlier works are available in English 
translations. But in the 1920s his work was also considered to be particularly
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original. In his book Luria refers to three works of Lewin (Lewin 1926, 1927, and 
1929). The one referred to most by Luria is Vorsatz, Wille, und Beduerfnis 
(‘Intention, Will, and Need’), published in 1926 and available in English in a 
translation which, however, does omit passages. In section two, ‘The Theory of 
Intentional Action’, Lewin raised a number of issues that Luria found relevant for 
his own work, and significant for its development. The section deals with the 
consequences of Quasi-Beduerfnisse or ‘quasi-needs’, needs other than those 
directly associated with drives. These needs were conscious, intentional, often 
voluntary, though often constrained by cultural influences. They could be as 
mundane as posting a letter. But they introduced a connection between higher 
mental functions and the concept of needs, thus moving the discussion about 
needs on from Freud’s concern with instincts to one apparently compatible with 
conceptions of ‘new, historically formed needs’ associated with Lujo Brentano, 
Marx and many others.
When Luria came to write about Lewin’s work in his book, he was particularly 
concerned to draw attention to Lewin’s experimental talents. He wrote that 
“Lewin, in a series of carefully executed experiments, attempted to show a more 
sharply marked relation between the processes of tension, discharge, and affect” 
(Luria 1932a, 13). Again, Luria (ibid. 207-8) wrote:
Kurt Lewin, in our opinion, has been one of the most prominent psychologists to 
elucidate [the] question of the artificial production of affect and the experimental 
disorganization of behaviour. His method of proceeding -  the introduction of an 
emotional setting into the experiment -  helped him to obtain an artificial disruption 
of the affect of considerable strength. And in his experiments it is only rarely that 
the affect elaborated experimentally passes over into actual living experience, and 
the subject begins to feel success in the experiment, in a very broad sense, just as 
he would in life. Here the fundamental conception of Lewin is very close to ours.
Every elaborated excitation manifests a tendency to a direct discharge 
{unmittelbare Entladung). Obviously, it is precisely the inhibition of this tendency 
(linked to a specific conflict) that can produce an acute disruption of affect and a 
series of hitherto unobserved phenomena. The closer the action is to realization, the 
greater the affective disruption that can be provoked by its inhibition. In this 
situation, conditionally characterized as the beinahe Entladung [imminent
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discharge], the inhibition naturally elicits the maximal disruption of affect... The 
experiments in inhibition of the imperative process lead to confused activity, motor 
agitation, and finally the complete disorganization of behaviour, whether they are 
elicited by external artificial inhibition (interrupted activity -  [as in the experiments 
of] Ovsiankina, Isko), or the impossibility of finding a solution to the problem 
(Dembo). In all these cases, the conflict that appears in a definite phase of activity 
leads to special forms of disturbance of ordinarily organized behaviour.
Here we see Luria in his element, and the discovery of what one might call ‘fellow 
travellers’ along his research path must have had an extraordinarily liberating 
effect on him. (Maria Ovsiankina and Tamara Dembo had incidentally also been 
bom in Russia). In the above passage we find he is so at home in the German 
terminology that at times he apparently even fails to translate the terms into 
Russian. But we must return to Lewin’s text. The major part of the section titled 
“The Theory of Intentional Action” is subtitled “The Effect of the Act of 
Intending Is a Quasi-Need”. Almost its first words are, “There exists ... an 
internal pressure of a definite direction, an internal state of tension which presses 
for the implementation of the intention even if no predetermined occasion invites 
the action” (Lewin 1926/1951, 114). “The recognition that the driving-force of 
intentional activity is not an associative coupling [as in associationist psychology], 
but an internal tension-state -  that is, directed internal pressure -  makes it possible 
to explain the phenomena described” (116). There are of course parallels with 
basic needs -  instincts. But there are other reasons for such phenomena. “The 
objects and events of the environment are not neutral towards us in our role as 
acting beings. Not only does their very nature facilitate or obstmct our actions to 
varying degrees, but we also encounter many objects and events which face us 
with a will of their own: they challenge us to certain activities” (117). This is 
particularly evident in children. “The development of the achievement abilities of 
an individual does not depend only on the potentialities of ‘endowment’. For 
instance, the development of speech or intellectual achievements is basically 
influenced by the degree and direction of such ‘inclinations’ [both challenges and 
preferences within them], which are the motors of psychic processes” (120). This 
whole approach had an enormous effect on Vygotsky as well as Luria. Not only 
was it a psychology that treated humans as active and acting beings, but it
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recognized that challenges could be motors of psychic processes and 
development.
Vygotsky, like Luria, appears to have been a little slow to make use of Lewin -  at 
least in print. But he certainly found these positions interesting. In 1931 he wrote:
The teachings of interests during the transitional [i.e., adolescent] age may serve as 
the best illustration of Lewin’s position ... that interests cannot be understood 
outside the process of development, that concepts of growth, crisis, and maturation 
are the basic concepts in the approach to this problem. It is enough to consider the 
history of the development of interests at this age to be definitively convinced of 
how erroneous it is to identify interests with habits and driving forces with 
mechanisms of behaviour” (Vygotsky 1998, 12).
In the previous pages he also discussed integral, structural dynamic tendencies as 
well as quasi-needs. But he also recognized that Lewin focused on the 
developmental aspects of interests and challenges in terms of the structure of the 
whole field of which they were a part. That is, he grasped everything as a whole 
within a limited section of time, without including the transformative effects of 
such situations in his structural whole, where “the structure of the field changes 
radically”. Levdn had proceeded one-sidedly. “Structural [i.e.. Gestalt] theory 
proceeds along the path marked out by Hegel”, but fails to grasp the dialectics of 
change (ibid. 10).
It establishes a series of functional and structural differences between temporary 
and real needs, but does not take into account the principal difference... In essence, 
only man in the process of historical development has risen to creating new driving 
forces of behaviour. Only in the process of the historical, social life of man did his 
new needs arise, form and develop: the most natural needs underwent a profound 
change in the process of man’s historical development (ibid. 11).
In what one might term Vygotsky’s ‘retrospective’ assessment of Lewin and 
Gestalt theory as a whole, written from the perspective of ‘cultural-historical 
theory’, one needs to remind oneself of Vygotsky’s own recent relationship to 
psychoanalytic thinking. The transition that Vygotsky and Luria underwent was 
enormous. Undoubtedly their application of Marxism to psychology deepened 
over the years, but Gestalt psychology, in its widening of their horizons, itself
131
played a crucial role in breaking them from their earlier positions. I think they 
were justifiably critical of its limitations from the beginning, but it gave them the 
confidence and the fresh perspective necessary to embark on their own 
transformation. The concept of quasi-needs is a case in point.
In his comparison of genuine-needs and quasi-needs, Lewin writes:
Needs imply states of tension which press toward satisfaction. Satisfaction 
eliminates the tension-state and may, therefore, be described as psychological 
‘satiation’. The valences that a region of structures and events has before 
satisfaction ... are eliminated by satiation. The region becomes neutral. Needs and 
intentions are analogous in this respect... This basic phenomenon of the intention- 
effect, which a theory of associative couplings can hardly explain without complex 
auxiliary hypotheses, becomes understandable if the intention-effect is considered 
to be the arising of a quasi-need and the consummation of the intention to be its 
satisfaction, that is, satiation (LqWiw 1926/1951, 124-5).
With this formulation we see that the neurological disturbances that Luria had 
been investigating -  in particular in relation to intentional and non-instinctive 
behaviour -  did not need to be reduced to some hypothetical drive, because both 
intentional and instinctive needs produced analogous effects. What became more 
significant was the structure of the dynamic processes and the causes of its 
disruption. It was clear that one no longer needed to employ reductionist theories. 
Practical experimentation, observation and analysis now had to be considered the 
prerequisites of any theory. Indeed, in the mid 1920s experimental findings were 
vital to the theories that shattered the old simplistic and reductionist frameworks. 
Luria could build on these experiments even though he had not yet developed his 
own theoretical framework. This is evident when Lewin asks, “Is there some 
genuine- or quasi-need for [a given] case even if the major [genuine-] need is 
absent? Is it possible that here we have tensions which are intermediary forms 
between genuine- and quasi-needs and are related to those general goals of will 
which shape our everyday life: arising, dressing, taking meals, going to sleep? ... 
Only experimental analysis can answer the question...” (131-2).
There is yet a further major issue that Lewin raised, which Vygotsky in later years 
regularly referred to.
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The relation and clashing of quasi-needs and genuine-needs lead us to the problem 
of ‘’freedom ’ of intentions. The extraordinary liberty, which man has, to intend any 
- even nonsensical -  action -  that is, his freedom to create in himself quasi-needs -  
is amazing. This is characteristic of civilized man. Children, and probably also 
preliterates, have it to an incomparably lesser degree. It is likely that this freedom 
distinguishes man from kindred animals more than does his higher intelligence 
(136).
And Lewin adds, “This distinction is obviously related to the problem of 
‘controT” (ibid.), an important consideration, particularly for the future theorizing 
of both Luria and Vygotsky.
Lewin discussed at some length the relationship between genuine- and quasi­
needs. This, he felt, explained the paradoxical result that
The intensity of the act of intending does not decide the effectiveness of the 
intention... The tensions and valences to which the act of intending gives rise are 
not primary. They derive from some genuine-needs, which in turn arise from drives 
or general goals of will. After a quasi-need arises from a genuine-need, it still 
remains in communication with the complex of tensions implicit in the genuine- 
need. [It is “embedded” in the genuine need] (137).
Again this has an intimate cormection with Luria’s experiments, in terms of the 
relation of affect to controlled behaviour and its measurement, and the theoretical 
models applied. Goldstein also talked in terms of systems, of one being 
‘embedded’ within another. This was a far cry from simplistic reflex theory and 
one that, as we shall see, Luria was quick to develop. The editor of the book in 
which this translation of Lewin is contained, the psychoanalyst David Rapaport, 
notes the “dependence on and derivation from hierarchically more fundamental 
needs” of these intentional needs, but notes that Lewin will below also 
“emphasize their autonomous and segregated characteristics” (ibid. n.ll5). Here 
again it appears that Lewin, though far from rejecting all psychoanalytic work, 
may have encouraged Luria to move yet further from its intrinsically reductionist 
positions. Lewin notes, “Whether or not, besides these genuine-needs, there is an 
individually variable reservoir o f active energy, used by intentional action not
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based on genuine-needs is an open question awaiting experimental exploration” 
(139). Rapaport (ibid. n. 118) may link this question to the Freudian concept of 
the libido, but to me this leaves all options open pending scientific exploration.
Lewin wrote, “This relation of needs is not merely theoretical, like that which 
obtains between different yet conceptually comparable types of needs. It is a real 
communication between concrete tension-systems” (138-9). But perhaps more 
significant in confirming the importance of Luria’s line of research is the moment 
when a mere wish “crystallizes into a definite quasi-need. The crucial difference 
[between these two states] seems to be that crystallization of a quasi-need creates, 
in principle, an avenue to the motor region which did not exist before” (141). 
Furthermore “the extent to which a psychic event or force influences other psychic 
structures depends on whether they are embedded in the same or different 
complexes” (142).
On the other hand, a consequence of learning a new task is often that the task 
becomes almost automatic. Independent and segregated from the rest of the motor 
region, it is “tuned together with a previously subordinate part of the perception- 
basis into an independent action-organism. The kind and intensity of Gestalt ties, 
of system-relations, undergoes a dynamic change: old bonds are dissolved and a 
new, relatively closed structure is formed” (143). Where a task is particularly 
painful to the subject, “the tensions of the quasi-need arising ... are far more 
strongly segregated from the rest of the ego ... [thus creating] a boundary between 
this quasi-need and the other psychic complexes...” (ibid.). The new couplings are 
of systems, not associations or reflexes. They allow for dynamic and plastic 
changes of a different order to previous theories. They can be ‘segregated’, 
sometimes with special boundaries. This plasticity thus allows for increased 
differentiation. Another advantage of the ‘segregation’ is noted by Lewin.
It is clear that the essential achievement of the intention is one of preparation. Due 
to the act of intending, at some subsequent time a psychological field appears 
which otherwise would not have existed, or at least not in the same form Forming 
an intention creates conditions which allow us later simply to abandon ourselves to 
the effects of the field (letter and mailbox), or permit a (psychological) field to be
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so transformed, or so supplied with additional forces, that a controlled action 
becomes feasible or easier (148).
Lewin was truly justified in describing his work as a dynamic theory of 
personality”. The potential of this paper was enormous, and recognized as such by 
Luria and Vygotsky. It is a tragedy that Lewin limited his future work to the 
investigation of psychological fields, within a philosophical framework so 
manifestly Platonic. One speculates that if Vygotsky had lived, and reactionary 
regimes had not driven them all apart or even suppressed their work, the history of 
psychology could have been very different. As it transpired, it was not Lewin, but 
Luria and Vygotsky who developed the theoretical potential here.
Towards the end of The Nature o f Human Conflicts Luria assesses the problem of 
the concept of quasi-needs and its importance in the development of his own 
work. Lewin and others consider voluntary acts to be automatic, like those of a 
machinist.
They claim that these automatisms direct the free T’, and they posit that the 
executive of these automatisms is necessity, inclination, emotion... The primitive 
hedonistic theory of will does not convince us. We cannot believe that the will is 
such a ‘slave of passion’ as is represented by this system. The behaviour of the 
social human is sharply distinguished from the animal in this: it is often directed 
towards overcoming necessity, inhibiting it, controlling it. The complex forms of 
human labour presupposing ‘will expressed in attention’ (Marx) [cf. Marx 1976, 
283-4] cannot be understood as a simple discharge of the tension created by 
necessity. The researches concerning the mechanisms of ‘artificial’ necessity, i.e., 
Quasi-Beduerfnisse  ^ help us to understand the mechanics of the voluntary 
processes better, but they fall far short of telling us by what means the human 
establishes new requirements. And they do not explain the process of human 
voluntary action in all its specificity” (Luria 1932a, 399-400).
Nevertheless, the study of Quasi-Beduerjhisse put us on the right path in resolving 
these complicated questions. In view of the fact that the ‘voluntary mechanism’ is a 
mechanism of subordination, especially via artificially created stimuli that may 
replace natural necessity, this theory makes a real step forward in the scientific 
understanding of this problem.
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Even though the existing mechanisms enter into the composition of the ‘voluntary 
act’, this theory does not however disclose the specificity of the resulting 
behaviour. The mechanism of the Quasi-Beduerjhisse and subordination to them 
are component parts of the voluntary act, but they are always something extra, 
because they are not specific [my emphasis-MH] for the resulting activity. When 
the child is interrupted and prevented from completing what he is doing, he returns 
to it thanks to that tension that is created in the broken structure of the action, then 
this is completed by virtue of the Quasi-Beduerjhisse... (400).
(Here Luria refers to Ovsiankina’s experiment. An analogous experiment by 
Zeigamik showed that memory was greater in respect of interrupted and hence 
uncompleted actions -  the so-called ‘Zeigamik effect’). In this whole passage, it is 
impossible to fault Luria’s logic: the process involved in the quasi-need facilitates 
the completion of the activity, but not the concrete and specific processes involved 
in its formation and operation. He is not prepared to explain higher mental 
processes as epiphenomena of lower processes. He is, however, willing to accept a 
joint involvement in terms of systems.
This then leaves the question of the role of artificial stimuli in the origin of 
specific willed acts, and allows us “to follow the investigation along the path of 
genetic development. The question that arises is this: what is the origin of such 
artificial needs and of the subsidiary internal stimuU which distinguish the human 
from the animal, and, to some extent, the child fi-om the adult?” (ibid.). There is a 
great difference between ‘natural’ needs “and those complex forms of behaviour 
characterized by the ability to create and make use of the Quasi-Beduerfnisse. The 
difference is what primarily distinguishes the human fi’om the animal, and the fact 
that the humans are able to control not only the external world but also their own 
behaviour. This is achieved indirectly by the creation of artificial needs, and 
stimuli produced artificially especially for the purpose. This is a cardinal factor in 
the development of behaviour.
“We have good reason to believe that such behaviour is a compound product of 
psychological growth, in the process of which the primitive, natural forms of 
behaviour are made more complex by new cultural ones. As a result of this a new 
relation of the personality to its own behaviour is created” (ibid. 401). At this
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point Lewin’s concept of the individual’s control of his own behaviour is joined to 
that of Herder, Marx and others who say that this control may be conscious, 
because it is mediated and facilitated by language and other tools.
The late Eckart Scheerer (1980, 124) considered Luria’s two theoretical articles in 
Under the Banner o f Marxism to be the high point of Gestalt theory in Russia. It is 
also notable that Luria’s three major articles published abroad on the combined 
motor and verbal response method were not published in any psychoanalytic 
journal, but in German academic journals, one of which, Psychologische 
Forschung, was the journal of the Gestalt movement (Luria 1929a). Certainly he 
used terminology used by Goldstein and Lewin such as ‘coupling’, ^Nahewirkung^ 
and '‘Kurzschluss^ in The Nature o f Human Conflicts' (cf. II, ii). There is no 
disputing the enormous impact that Gestalt theory had in shifting the perspectives 
of both Luria and Vygotsky. Scheerer (1980, 127) adds:
Perhaps the most extensive use of Gestalt ideas is found in Luria’s work employing 
the ‘combined motor method’, involving the combination of verbal and motor 
responses to one and the same stimulus. The method is justified by the assumption 
that it results in the merging of the peripheral (motor) and central (verbal) 
components in one unitary functional system.
This last point is an oversimplification. The motor components are central to the 
dominant hand, peripheral for the non-dominant. The relation of the centre and 
periphery is, however, crucial to Anokhin’s theory of functional systems. Since I 
have already noted in the preface that Luria frequently propounded Anokhin’s 
version as a cover for his own, this may account for the misunderstanding here.
[Scheerer Continues:] It should be noted that both the term Funktionssystem and 
the concept, as used in Luria’s early work, are borrowed from Kurt Goldstein, the 
outstanding representative of Gestalt theory in neurology. The results are 
interpreted in a language borrowed from Lewin (‘functional barrier’, etc.), but 
transposed from the phenomenal sphere of the ‘living space’ to the physiological 
sphere -  once again an instance of the ‘organismic’ bias in the [Russian] reception 
of Gestalt ideas.
Van der Veer and Valsiner (1991, 175) also note, “The functional systems in the 
brain, which Kurt Goldstein’s holistic perspective had charted out in his
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neurology, provided Vygotsky with much material for thought”. Unfortunately 
none of these writers provide references (and, of course. Van der Veer and 
Valsiner typically omit all mention of Luria’s contribution to Vygotsky’s work).
My own attempts to confirm the above statements by a trawl of Goldstein and 
Lewin’s contemporary writings have proved interesting, and do not exactly 
confirm them, but that may be due to the limits of my search. Certainly there is 
enough material quoted above to suggest a strong possibility of their validity -  
e.g. with the use of ‘functioning systems’ and ‘boundaries’ and also ‘functional 
relation’ [Beziehung] (Goldstein 1925a, 398). Certainly Lewin’s remarks about 
couplings of systems to form a new system greater than its parts is of fundamental 
importance. Although, strictly speaking, the term ‘functional barrier’ as used in 
The Nature o f Human Conflicts refers primarily neither to ‘living space’, nor 
neurology, but to the role of cultural influences, its role is intimately connected to 
neurology, and it almost certainly derives firom Lewin’s work.
But it is different in the case of the concept of functional systems. As Goethe once 
said that there is no fact without a theory, one might add a corollary that the 
significance of a concept depends on the overall theory of which it is a part. It is 
of fundamental importance that functional systems in Luria are not used within a 
Gestalt framework of figure and background, such as used by Goldstein to the end 
of his life (cf. 1925b, 144: 1967, 156). This very fact suggests a very different 
perspective. Although Scheerer correctly uses the term Funktionssystem with 
reference to Luria (cf. Lebedinsky and Luria 1929, 474), I have not found it in the 
Gestalt theorists. It implies a system of different functions, that may not be 
conceived simply as one system embedded in another, but something to be 
analysed in its own right -  as interactive both internally and externally. At the end 
of Chapter VII we will look at the development of the term, but from the outset, 
even if only implicitly, there is a difference in emphasis in Luria’s use of this 
term.
A colleague from Luria’s later years, Elkhonon Goldberg (1990b, 5), explained 
Luria’s achievement.
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Luria was able to go beyond the simplistic brain-behaviour dilemma of the first 
half of the century: narrow localization (phrenology style) versus equipotentialism. 
Luria formulated his concept of functional systems, which were neither. He was 
probably the first to state explicitly and succinctly that (a) behaviours, skills and 
traits as they appear in the lay, real-life nomenclature are not the units appropriate 
for cerebral localization; (b) the identification of localizable elements of cognition 
is in itself a trivial task; and (c) the relationship between the ‘lay’ and the 
‘localizable’ nomenclatures is not a simple one-to-one mapping. [In the light of the 
previous discussions, the attribution of being first is something we would dispute - 
MH]. In Luria’s terms, a behaviour or trait is the product of the interaction of many 
cognitive elements, each mediated by a different brain structure or region. Such a 
constellation of interacting brain structures, each mediating a particular cognitive 
dimension, constitutes a distinct functional system. Conversely, any given 
cognitive dimension enters a variety of behaviours and competencies as defined in 
terms of the lay nomenclature. Furthermore, according to Luria, externally similar 
behaviours can be controlled by differently composed functional systems with 
different cerebral representations in different individuals, or even in the same 
individual at different developmental stages.
Naturally these last points were to prove central to many attempts to rehabilitate 
those suffering fi*om brain damage. While Scheerer is correct in implying that 
Luria did not reach these conclusions all in one go, it is also true that such a 
theoretical outcome was a possibility fairly early on in Luria’s development. It is 
also true that such an outcome replaces Goldstein’s vacillation between classic 
neurology - even when extended to the analysis of systems - and Gestalt’s overall 
approach. Luria also goes beyond Lewin in recognizing the role of consciousness 
in activity. His functional systems extend to the higher mental functions as well as 
the lower. His version of functional systems almost constitutes a theory in itself, 
though since it involves fairly open on-going exploration rather than a simplistic 
reductionism, it is not a ‘grand’ theory, but a scientific ‘approach’ to studying the 
structural dynamics of the brain and behaviour. Luria certainly never presented it 
as a ‘grand’ theory, and later even attributed it to Anokhin. Yet it was also a 
theoretical prerequisite for the scientific investigation of Vygotsky’s view of 
human psychology.
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IV
Moving Beyond Pavlov and Freud
It remains to remove, as promised, any outstanding doubts that Luria had moved 
on once and for all from the simplistic approaches of Pavlov and Freud, though 
accepting the valuable stepping stones their work had either provided or 
generated. Given the transformation in Luria’s thinking evident in this chapter, the 
following comments relating to Pavlov should be taken merely as a postscript.
At the 1929 Ninth International Congress of Psychology both Luria and Pavlov 
attended. Karl Lashley (1890-1958), the American neurologist, gave the 
presidential address. Although an associate of Watson and promoter of the 
objective method in behaviourism, he too had moved on from reflexology. His 
address, titled Basic Neural Mechanisms in Behaviour, contained discussions of 
great interest. “The units of cerebral functions are not single reactions, or 
conditioned reflexes as we use the term in America, but are modes of 
organization. The cortex seems to provide a sort of generalized framework, to 
which single reactions conform spontaneously, as the words fall into the 
grammatical form of language” (Lashley 1930, 203). “This unity of action seems 
to be more deeply rooted than even the structural organization.” Indeed such 
phenomena as compensation “suggest that the nervous system is capable of a self­
regulation which gives a coherent logical character to its functioning, no matter 
how its anatomical constituents may be disturbed" (ibid. 204). There is some truth 
in this. But Luria was later to criticize Lashley and Goldstein for their 
overemphasis on overall plasticity and overall organization as an extreme reaction 
to the limitations of localization. There were, however, many shared perceptions 
also. Lashley was also interested in central excitation, irradiation, and the effect 
on the motor cortex, though his own experiments were primarily on non-human 
animals. Luria was particularly impressed with his critique of localizationist 
positions and the limitations of reflex theory.
On the second page of his book, Luria (1932a, 4) praises Lashley’s “brilliant 
criticism of the model of the telephone station” in reflexology. Lashley wrote that 
although reflexology was “a welcome addition” to neurological theory, “the
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model for the theory is a telephone system. Just as two instruments can be 
connected only by certain wires, so the sense organs and muscles concerned in 
any act are connected by nerve fibres specialized for that act” (Lashley 1930, 
192). Even if stated more subtly with “the interplay of inhibition and facilitation” 
and so forth “the fact remains that the essential feature of the reflex theory is the 
assumption that individual neurons are specialized for particular functions. The 
explanatory value of the theory rests upon this point alone...” (ibid. 192-3). 
Pavlov had used the analogy of the telephone station in 1909 (Pavlov 1928, 123) 
as a way of proposing the advantages of temporary connections over what we 
would now call hard wiring. But clearly the demands of neurology had moved on.
Pavlov may well have been stung by these criticisms, and also by Luria’s 
repetition of them. Although Luria described Pavlov in The Nature o f Human 
Conflicts as a “great physiologist” (1932a, 12), Pavlov gave the work a hostile 
reception. Luria’s attempt to present Pavlov with a copy of the book in recognition 
of the debt he owed to Pavlov was rebuffed.
Towards the end of his book Luria writes:
The external similarity and astonishing syncretism of thinking has induced many 
authors to correlate the reactive process of the human with conditional reflexes. 
Only the presence of stimulus and motor response is common in the two cases. 
While the conditional reflex is formed by the union of the unconditional stimulus 
with the conditional signal, the simple psychological reaction is elaborated on the 
basis of speech and includes the higher symbolic mechanisms in its genesis and 
social character. Though the conditional reflex requires many reinforcements of the 
unconditional reflex, the psychological reaction is elaborated at once and does not 
need any support; it does not obey the law of extinction, and on further repetitions 
it is only strengthened the more... There is reason to believe that in the two cases 
we are dealing with different mechanisms (Luria 1932a, 388).
The normally reticent W. Horsley Gantt, translator of both Pavlov and Luria, felt 
constrained to append the following footnote: “For an exposition of the opposite 
view, that words themselves are but conditional stimuli, one must consult Pavlov 
and his pupils” (ibid.).
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In the case of psychoanalysis and Luria, it is more a question of resolving 
misunderstandings.
Firstly, in his groundbreaking book. Psychology in Utopia, Alex KozuHn 
correctly states that Luria’s 1932 article. The Crisis o f Bourgeois Psychology 
(Luria 1932b), briefly criticized his youthfiil fascination with psychoanalysis. He 
then suggests that this was a cunning ploy to obscure the fact that simultaneously, 
in The Nature o f Human Conflicts, Luria “preserved a limited psychoanalytical 
approach” (Kozulin 1984, 89). The Crisis o f Bourgeois Psychology largely repeats 
criticisms of certain western psychologists that Luria had already made, including 
the criticisms of Adler and Freud from 1926 and 1928 that we have already dealt 
with (cf. IV, i, 96). It is true that the article was couched in terms appropriate to 
someone trying to placate the authorities. As someone who saw himself as a 
member of an international scientific community, and personally averse to 
engaging in polemics, he would no doubt have preferred to avoid this form of 
article, but the psychological discussion was completely consistent with Luria’s 
previosly stated views. Although an attempt at thorough editorial consistency in 
The Nature o f Human Conflicts was not possible due to the rushed nature of its 
publication and its conveyance to the publisher in parts, those rare occasions 
where positive comments on psychoanalysis do appear are usually of a strictly 
scientific nature, though occasionally they seem anomalous. An alert editor would 
quickly have clarified the latter, though followers of psychoanalysis will, I hope, 
be pleased that in the following two chapters I do discuss references to 
psychoanalysis in addition to those that may be located via the book’s index.
Kozulin also cites Luria’s views, quoted by Levitin, to the effect that “Luria was 
at least partially ‘forced’ from psychoanalysis. Luria claims that Kornilov refused 
to publish his article. The Experience o f Objective Psychoanalysis, which was 
already in proofs, and after that their relations cooled” (ibid.). What Levitin 
actually writes is that Luria, when talking about his book, said, “This, by the way, 
was the occasion of my last dispute with Kornilov. He suddenly made a show of 
his power and forbade me to pubHsh my article. An Experiment in Objective 
Psychoanalysis, which was already being copyedited. The word psychoanalysis 
sounded terrible to the director of this institute” (Levitin 1998, t, 73; previously
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Levitin 1978, 54). Since Kornilov had been stripped of any influence well before 
the publication of Luria’s book, the incident almost certainly refers to the period 
around 1925 when Luria was working along these lines (cf. II, iii, 66). It would in 
part explain his early disagreements with Kornilov (cf. II, I, 48-50). Presumably 
the experimental results were incorporated into the book (minus the 
psychoanalytical theory), which would explain why Luria recalled it in this 
context. The chapter on the use of hypnosis to artificially create affective 
complexes (Chapter 4) is almost certainly a presentation of this missing research. 
Not only was the majority of the work done in 1924-5, but Luria even describes it, 
admittedly in quotation marks, as a form of “experimental psychoanalysis” (Luria 
1932a, 150, also cf. Vl.i).
Secondly, Van der Veer and Valsiner (1991, 188) claim that one reason 
publication of Vygotsky and Luria’s Studies in the History o f Behaviour was 
delayed beyond 1927 “was that Vygotsky was extremely dissatisfied with the first 
variants of his co-author’s chapter on child development. They contained far too 
many -  uncritical -  references to work done by psychoanalysts such as Vera 
Schmidt, Melanie Klein and others for his taste (Vygotsky in letters to Luria dated 
July 26, 1927 and Leont’ev, dated July 23, 1929)”. The relevant passage of the 
letter to Luria is unpublished, but that to Leont’ev is available. Here Vygotsky 
says that the chapter “is wholly in accord with the Freudians (actually, not in 
accord with Freud, but with V. F. Schmidt in terms of its content, and with 
Melanie Klein and other stars of second magnitude). Further, [Jean] Piaget [1896- 
1980], who absolutized beyond all measure, is the stumbling block”. Despite this 
and other complaints “this is not something for which Luria is personally to 
blame: it is rather the entire epoch of our thought that is at fault” (cited in 
Vygodskaia and Lifanova 1999, II, 5).
The early draft of Luria’s chapter probably owed something to a talk Luria had 
given to the Psychoanalytic Society on 23 February 1927, On Experimental 
Research on the Primitive Mode o f Thought in Children (Schmidt 1927). The 
published version of Vygotsky and Luria’s joint work contains verbatim reports of 
children’s speech cited fi’om works by Schmidt, Klein and others, but no 
exclusively psychoanalytic positions. But the principal source o f Vygotsky’s
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irritation related to some of Piaget’s ideas about child development. Piaget was 
admittedly under some psychoanalytic influence himself -  he was analysed by 
Sabina Spielrein (cf. Etkind 1997, 162fif). He held that children were initially 
egocentric and their speech was more like an autistic monologue than a social 
dialogue. Vygotsky held that children were initially social and took time to 
become individualized. For him so-called ‘egocentric speech’ was evidence of the 
transitional process leading from the social to the social individual. The child 
spoke aloud about itself, its activities and plans. Subsequently it largely 
internalized what Vygotsky recognized as a planning process.
Piaget’s position was consistent with Freud’s theory of the pleasure principle, but 
Vygotsky’s frustration with Piaget was not so much that he was importing views 
into child development theory that were specifically psychoanalytic, but that they 
denied the initially social nature of the infant. Luria actually adopted Vygotsky’s 
position on ‘egocentric speech’ in his chapter (Vygotsky and Luria 1930a, 99). 
Indeed when Vygotsky was criticizing Luria, the latter was in America. He 
delivered a paper by Vygotsky and himself on The Function and Fate o f 
Egocentric Speech. This concluded that Piaget’s understanding of egocentric 
speech as “an expression of the general autistic attitude of the child” had been 
found wanting in their own research. Here external speech preceded egocentric 
speech, which in turn preceded internal speech. Egocentric speech had “a specific 
organizing function”, where the child tried “to solve the problem verbally, in order 
to organize its subsequent activity”. It is an important developmental process 
“having a specific function in the evolution of the cultural behaviour of the child” 
(Vygotsky & Luria 1930b, 464-5).
We do not know when and how much Luria amended his chapter of their joint 
work. Luria did, however, discuss other ‘egocentric’ aspects of infant behaviour 
(Vygotsky & Luria 1930a, 99fl). This may well have incurred Vygotsky’s 
irritation, because it failed to take account of the socially interactive nature of the 
infant and its carers. Like Vygotsky, Piaget, Edouard Claparede, Wilhelm Stem 
and many others, Luria was concerned to differentiate the stages of a child’s 
development, and in particular to understand the changes that developed from 
early -  or, as it was then called, ‘primitive’ behaviour. This initially evoked many
144
primitive theories from among psychologists and most of these were arrived at 
independently of psychoanalysis. We shall deal with this in Part III. But it should 
be noted that while virtually all psychologists, including Luria, had some naïve 
ideas about this field, Luria was not necessarily investigating the same areas as 
Vygotsky. His investigations led him within a short period to draw important 
conclusions about the direct and impulsive character of the infant’s behaviour as 
expressed in its thinking. Here he was concerned not with Piaget’s distinction 
between egocentricity as opposed to sociality, but with the development of self­
regulation of the child’s behaviour (Luria 1932a, 358-9). This we will examine 
shortly.
Thirdly, there is the question of Luria’s work with the Psychoanalytic Society. 
Luria was actively involved in it at the beginning of 1927, though the above- 
mentioned talk was the only one he gave of work related to his own. Vygotsky 
also gave a talk on the psychology of art in Freud’s work. But on 7 April 1927 
Luria resigned as secretary of the Society and was replaced by Vera Schmidt. 
Subsequent reports of the Society’s activities were limited and infrequent, but 
neither Luria nor Vygotsky figure in them. Nor does their friend N.A. Bemshtein 
appear, though he had been active in 1926. [NB. The tantalizingly brief report of a 
talk he gave could be seen as another instance of the significance of functional 
systems. “A sharp distinction must be drawn between form and scheme. The first 
is determined quantitatively; the second qualitatively, or topologically” (Luria 
1927b)].
It is therefore somewhat surprising that in 1929 a membership list appeared 
including all three (List of Members 1929). It is clear, however, that this is an 
earlier list introduced to substitute for the lack of reports. Mikhail Reusner is 
included though he had died on 8 August 1928. The list does omit Moshe Wulff, 
the former president, who had emigrated to Berlin in November 1927. Therefore it 
seems likely at first sight that the list dated from the end of 1927 or beginning of 
1928. However, given the appearance of Luria, Vygotsky and Bemshtein on it, 
dating it to the beginning of 1927 seems more plausible. Wulff s emigration was 
significant enough to be adjusted for. Reusner received an obituary from the 
German psychoanalytic journal (‘Prof. M. A. Reussner’ 1929), but not from the
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English journal. Since it was the latter that published the hst, it may explain why 
that journal failed to make an adjustment for Reusner’s death. Although evidence 
may turn up to contradict this in the future, at the moment there is no reliable 
evidence that Luria took any part in the Psychoanalytic Society after his 
resignation, or that he even remained a member.
There remain those who argue that Luria’s later theories show evidence of 
psychoanalytic thinking. Similarities are inevitably bound to appear -  not least in 
the minds of psychoanalytic writers. On the other hand I think the developmental 
approach to Luria’s theory that I have undertaken would suggest otherwise. It is 
certainly true that Luria would never abandon practical or theoretical approaches 
if they were useful or had partial explanatory value. The suggestion that his 
treatment of patients as individuals throughout his life was influenced by 
psychoanalysis is certainly plausible (cf. Sacks 1990). On the other hand the fact 
that his father stressed the importance of doctor-patient relationships and the 
dangerous impHcations of iatrogenic disorders suggests that Luria junior may 
already have had a role model in this respect.
There are many articles devoted to Freud’s high estimation of the work of John 
Hughlings Jackson (1835-1911) and his attempt to apply it to his own theories (cf. 
e.g. the references in Sulloway 1979). In the early 1930s Luria and Vygotsky 
made use of Jackson’s ideas. They adopted, though critically, his approach to the 
development and organization of the brain. Jackson, through his reading of 
Herbert Spencer, had metaphorically applied to neurology the Hegelian notion 
that the functions of levels were transcended at each stage of ontogenetic 
development through their incorporation into higher levels. This led to the 
implication that, after the disablement of higher cortical functions, the lower ones 
were unable to reassume the form of their operations at a previous stage of 
development. Or, as he put it, “Scarcely ever, if ever, do we meet with a case of 
dissolution which we can suppose to be the exact opposite of evolution” (Jackson 
1932, II, 47).
There are those who correctly hold that Luria used Jackson’s ideas, but tend to 
present a theoretical line of legitimacy comprising Jackson, Freud and Luria (cf. 
Solms and Saling 1986, 412). Since virtually all major neurologists including
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Head and Goldstein were similarly influenced, but not of a psychoanalytic 
persuasion, this form of argument is unsatisfactory. This is especially so, given 
that Freud’s use of Jackson was in combination with Haeckel’s biogenetic law that 
ontogeny recapitulates phytogeny. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle he then 
applied this eclectic mixture in reverse fashion to account for neurotic disorders. 
Unfortunately Freud ignored Jackson’s central assumption that the process of 
dissolution was different to that of evolution. Although it was impossible for 
Freud to ignore this in his practical work, his application of Jackson’s ideas in 
combination with those of Haeckel in his ‘grand theory’ was perverse. As we have 
seen in section II, Goldstein supported Jackson on this point. We shall see later 
how Luria used Jackson (cf. VII, ii, iii).
Goldstein in later years summed up the problems of the approaches current at the 
beginning of the 1920s. “Our observations of normal and pathological behaviour 
have taught us that the activities of the organism cannot be understood as effects 
of fixed patterns of reaction to stimuli coming from the outside or inside, as was 
generally assumed in mechanical concepts, such as reflexes, drives, instincts, or 
will” (Goldstein 1967, 157). He adds (ibid. 158) that, although Freud was at times 
close to putting “the person into the centre of his concept of sickness and 
therapy,” his “use of it was more than doubtful” precisely because of his 
introduction of these mechanistic concepts. In retrospect these passages explain 
why it seemed so natural for serious scientists to attempt to link reflexology and 
psychoanalysis. Both reflexes and instincts are unarguably real and material, and 
this was the assumption of Luria in his 1925 article. Psychoanalysis as a System o f 
Monistic Psychology^ with its reliance on internal and external stimuli. But as we 
saw with Adler in 1909 this led to a form of reductionism where the ideals of 
socialism were reduced to aversion to soiling. Psychologists recognized the need 
to move on to more sophisticated analyses and theories.
This conclusion seems to be shared by two recent psychoanalytic articles on 
neurology and the role of language. Wilson and Weinstein (1992) consider that it 
is crucial for psychoanalysts to study Vygotsky’s theories in relation to the mind. 
Solms and Saling (1986, 413) accept that, while “Freud remained aloof from 
developments in neuroscience”, its development “under the leadership of Luria ...
147
has the potential to offer new knowledge and insights to psychoanalysis”. While 
these writers’ views may be far from mine, and fall somewhat short of recognizing 
the need for a new overall theory, there is recognition that Vygotsky and Luria 
developed new and important scientific approaches independently of 
psychoanalysis.
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Chapter 6: ‘The Nature of Human Conflicts’ -  the Book 
Experiments and Theoretical Advances
1
A Brief Overview and Summary of the Book
In the introduction to Chapter 5 we have already described how Luria’s 
manuscript arrived in America over a period of one to two years and in at least 
two parts. We have also given the translator’s account of how he dealt with the 
manuscript. The Nature o f Human Conflicts is the title of Luria’s American 
publishers, Liveright. “My title was Affect, Conflict and Will, but the publisher 
thought it sounded too technical and suggested instead The Conflict o f  Human 
Nature. That sounded catchy but did not reflect the content of the book. So I 
suggested the words be shifted to make The Nature o f Human Conflicts, and that 
was how it appeared in English” (Luria, cited in Levitin 1982, 159). The title page 
adds “or Emotion, Conflict and Will”, together with a subheading “an objective 
study of disorganization and control of human nature” (Luria 1932a, iii).
Luria’s book contains both theoretical and methodological considerations and 
reports of a great number and variety of experiments. We have looked at two 
reports so far. It is important to list and briefly outline the experiments first so that 
it becomes possible not only to grasp the enormous compass of the work, but to 
relate the dating of the experiments and their writing up to specific theoretical 
developments. This seemingly obvious and necessary task does not appear to have 
been undertaken since its first publication. The theoretical developments become 
apparent in the course o f Luria’s exposition o f his work. I add various comments 
and points of clarification throughout, and at the end of the following chapter.
The first dated experiment took place in the spring of 1924, but other individual 
experiments or examinations of individuals may have taken place earlier. 
Certainly the preparations for the experiments themselves occurred earher and 
confirm Luria’s statement that the research was carried out largely at the Institute 
of Experimental Psychology during the period 1923-30 (Luria 1932a, ix). The last 
dated experiment is given as May 1930 (ibid. 390).
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Although Luria’s pre-Gestalt influences do show through at times, Luria states 
(ibid. 47) that the discussion of the first experiment was based on an article (Luria 
& Leont’ev 1926) from the period when he began to be influenced by Gestalt 
theories. The work does show the influence of the Gestalt school to some degree 
in many chapters. On the other hand the experimental design for this first 
experiment clearly predates this, and the book is a working out of Luria’s own 
ideas, which naturally builds on the work and ideas of many others including, in 
the later experiments, those of John Hughlings Jackson, as presented by Henry 
Head, Head himself, and Vygotsky.
Luria gave most of the work to his American publishers in the summer of 1929. 
He completed the remainder in 1930 or 1931. He writes of a forthcoming book by 
one of his collaborators, M. S. Lebedinskii (Luria 1932a, 333). This book, with 
Luria’s preface (cf. Luria 1931a), appeared in 1931. It is relatively easy to 
distinguish the later sections The Nature o f Human Conflicts from those handed 
over in 1929 by the dates of the references, and from the changing focus of 
Luria’s research. In a paper written in 1928 and published subsequently 
(Lebedinsky & Luria 1929), the authors used the term ‘functional system’, but not 
the term ‘functional barrier’. In the comparable part. Chapter VIII, Luria does use 
the latter term. Therefore I assume that chapters using this term were generally 
written or amended from 1929 onwards. But this should only be taken as a rough 
guide, which may be superseded when more Russian material becomes available.
Firstly we present a brief introduction to the parts, the chapters, their titles, pages, 
and, where such data are known, dates of publication of related papers, dates of 
experiments, and known collaborators. Most of this detail comes from the text 
itself. The references to related papers are not comprehensive, as we do not have 
reliable information about some of the Russian papers. Additional comments are 
given in some cases. Subsequently we will comment on the experiments not 
already discussed, briefly in some instances, in more detail in others.
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Summary of the Contents o f * The Nature of Human Conflicts*,
The three parts of the book basically follow three phases of Luria’s work. The 
‘Author’s Preface’ (ix-xi) looks briefly at the organization of the book and is 
quoted extensively in this section. The Introduction contains Chapter I: Problems 
o f the Disorganization o f Behaviour (3-39). Both these pieces were written after 
the completion of the remainder and provide both a guide to it and attempt to 
show how the three parts are linked.
Part /, The Psychophysiology of Affective Traces, examines the disruptive effects 
of emotion on normal behaviour. The dramatic and almost unprecedented nature 
of the experiments with people reacting in real-life situations ensured that this 
became the most frequently cited part of the book. The accounts of the 
experiments are given at some length, whereas those in the succeeding parts are 
briefer and serve a more illustrative fimction. Here the accounts describe Luria’s 
earlier experiments, which were the first to be written up. They serve as an 
essential prerequisite for the advances shown in the succeeding parts. In his 
preface Luria writes:
The chief problems ... were [to provide] an objective and materialistic description 
of the mechanisms lying at the basis of the disorganization of human behaviour and 
an experimental approach to the laws of its regulation. The first of these tasks 
forced the author to investigate the whole series of phenomena in which the 
disorganization of human behaviour was clearly expressed: the problem of the 
diffuse, acute affect, of trauma and neurosis. An analysis of these states and the 
description of the symptoms characterizing acute affect, as well as its traces, are 
given in the first part of the book (Luria 1932a, ix).
Central to its approach is the recognition and concentration on the fact that there is 
such a thing as a structure to the process of the control and organization of human 
behaviour, which was to require further examination in Part II.
In Chapter II, The Investigation o f Mass Affect (43-76), Luria states that this 
chapter is based on the published articles mentioned below. Section A,
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‘Experiments in a Situation of “Purgation”’, reports on experiments undertaken at 
Moscow University in the spring 1924 with A. N. Leont’ev (of. Luria and 
Leont’ev 1926). It sought to chart the course of the dynamics of the collapse of 
higher regulation in cases o f ‘mass affect’. It could compare these with normal 
responses and less severe responses that could be closely correlated with the 
stimuli presented. It thereby also confirmed the value of Luria’s experimental 
method. Section B, ‘Experiments in a Situation of School Examination’ took place 
in the autumn 1927, also with A. N. Leont’ev (cf. Luria and Leont’ev 1929). This 
in addition compared the response of groups of ‘normal’ and ‘labile’ subjects, 
finding genuine differences. Luria also thought that there was a distinct similarity 
in structure of these temporary disturbances to neurosis.
Chapter III, The Investigation o f Affect in Criminals (77-127), involves 
experiments that took place over five years, though the cases presented cover the 
period 1925-7. Lev Sheinin (a detective), doctors and assistants collaborated (cf. 
Luria 1927a, 1928a, 1930a). It also aimed at uncovering the structure of the 
process involved in both ‘mass affect’ and less severe disturbances. It had 
predictive value in the case of the latter: these responses could be correlated with 
specific verbal stimuli related to the cases in which they were suspects. Luria’s 
work was not part of the legal evidence, but the verdicts of the court tended to 
support his conclusions from the evidence of individual cases.
In Chapter IV, The Investigation o f Complexes Produced during Hypnosis by 
Suggestion (128-68), the majority of the experiments discussed took place in 
1924-5. Luria says some continued after the death of B. E. Varshava, his 
collaborator, in 1927, though he may be referring to the experiments in Chapter 
VII. Other collaborators in the hypnosis were Dr. G. Z. loUes (?) of Paris, Dr. R. 
V. Valenich of Moscow, and V. I. Zabrezhnev of Leningrad. These experiments 
involved the use of hypnosis to artificially insert an affective complex into a 
subject connected with a supposed action of that subject. Luria described the 
dynamic changes in behaviour, as the subject, under the stimulus of selected 
verbal stimuli, gradually became conscious of the complex. Initially unaware of 
the nature of the complex, the subject tried to reject the implications of the stimuli, 
thereby displacing the complex from the consciousness to avoid connecting with
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the motor system. This proved impossible as awareness dawned and motor 
behaviour disintegrated. Full awareness and comprehension ultimately led to a 
resumption of normal behaviour.
Chapter V, Some General Features and Mechanics o f the Affective Processes 
(169-201), discusses some of the implications of the work. Luria concludes that 
affect occurs where separate systems join. ‘The degree of expressiveness of this 
or that system depends not so much on its anatomical position as upon its 
inclusion in one or another complicated psychological structure’’' (172), that is, 
when its fimctional role begins to be connected with activity.
Part II, The Psychophysiology o f  Conflicting Processes, reports on experiments 
with both artificial conflicts and artificial neuroses. It attempted to analyse both 
the structure and dynamics of the conflicting processes that were thereby induced. 
These were influenced initially by the experiments of Pavlov and his school with 
animals and subsequently by the experiments of Lewin and his Berlin team with 
humans. Here the aims were more precise. The disruptions induced were 
specifically targeted to examine in more detail the processes and mechanisms 
involved in the control and disruption of behaviour and therefore did not involve 
either the dramatic real-life situations or the trauma that accompanied ‘mass 
affect’. This change was a direct consequence of Luria’s earlier observations.
The study of affects and neuroses and their psychophysiological mechanisms 
suggested ... that it was not possible to seek the causes of the affective processes in 
the peripheral apparatus, but that the affective disorganization of behaviour was 
connected primarily with central changes -  with the disturbances of human activity 
and consequent profound changes in all the systems of psychological function, the 
correlations of which are fundamentally modified during the state of affect. To 
accomplish [similar effects experimentally] it was necessary to artificially create 
affects and models of experimental neuroses which made possible an analysis of 
the laws lying at the basis of the disintegration of behaviour. The experiments with 
artificial conflicts, outlined in the second part of the book, constitute an approach 
to the psychological structure and dynamics of affect (Luria 1932a, ix).
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Chapter VI, Experiments with Artificial Conflicts (205-38), used two forms of 
experimental design -  the conflict of setting and the conflict of defection -  to 
elicit different forms of delays in activity. The former presented subjects with a 
difficult choice between two close options. The latter led a subject to believe that 
a difficult task was possible, when in fact there were not only deliberate 
diversions, but the task ultimately proved to be unachievable. In the former the 
delay occurred after the formulation of the intention to act. In the latter the delay 
occurred earlier, thereby making it possible to transfer conflicts ft"om the motor 
sphere to the ‘connecting sphere’, i.e., where options are considered and prepared, 
and thereby isolate them fi*om the motor sphere. Other verbal tests and 
comparisons of healthy and neurotic groups were undertaken.
Chapter VII, Experiments with Artificial Neuroses (239-66), employed hypnotic 
suggestion to advocate or prohibit the use of certain words. Conflict was elicited 
when the experimenter instructed subjects to use contradictory sets of words. The 
responses were comparable to those suffering from compulsive neurosis. But 
conflicts could also be isolated or resolved by using the connecting sphere to seek 
verbal compromises. These experiments took place c. 1926-7 in collaboration with 
B. E. Varshava and V. I. Zabrezhnev.
Chapter VIII, The Structure o f Conflicting Processes (267-300), followed up the 
different outcomes of the above experiments in delays to activity. Luria looked at 
the effect of displacement to the connecting sphere. He concluded that the likely 
explanation for this is that the receptory-connecting system and the effector 
system “play functionally unequal roles in the activity of the organism, and they 
control noncomparable structures” (289). This means that in the normal adult 
there are two phases to his or her activity and that there is a barrier between these 
two phases that obstructs the direct transfer of excitation to the motor area. This 
Luria explored in experiments with patients suffering fi-om aphasia and 
Parkinson’s disease. Luria’s collaborator at the laboratory of the Clinic for 
Nervous Diseases at the First Moscow University was M. S. Lebedinskii (cf. 
Lebedinsky & Luria 1929). They investigated more than 200 patients there (ibid. 
474). While this work dates fi-om before 1929, some of the other experiments in 
section 3, for example, may have occurred a little later.
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Chapter IX, The Dynamic Analysis o f Conflicting Processes (301-28), uses some 
of the research collected in the previous chapter, though more probably from late 
1929-1930, to make the structure of the reactive processes and their separate but 
linked parts more comprehensible. It introduces a revolutionary new approach 
(Luria 1932a, 302-3) which examines the structural and neurodynamic 
implications of looking at the ontogenetic development of levels of organization 
in a dialectical way. Luria concludes that “the inclusion of speech alters 
fundamentally the organizational principles of behaviour. It changes the natural 
forms of the gradual organization ‘from below’ to the cultured forms of behaviour 
‘from above’” (303).
Part III, The Genesis of the Reactive Processes and the Psychophysiology of the 
Control of Behaviour, assesses the theories that Luria was developing. Control of 
behaviour was evidently possible only as a human matured and Luria sought to 
explain how this control became possible through the role of speech and other 
signs. He studied the acquisition of speech in child development, and its partial 
loss or disintegration in cases of aphasia, Parkinson’s disease, hysteria and 
neurosis. He used his theoretical explanations to help patients to develop forms of 
compensation for their illnesses. Luria wrote:
The complex forms of organization and disorganization of human behaviour can in 
no wise be explained as a simple play of neurophysiological processes, ... no 
phenomena of elementary neurodynamics can elucidate these configurations of 
integrated behaviour specific for the human being as a social subject. It is more 
probable that elementary neurodynamics, as observed in the human, is 
comprehensible only by an analysis of those higher forms of organized behaviour 
connected with the culturally created psychological functions as in, for example, 
the complex behaviour of work, speech and intricate indirect operations. The 
inclusion of neurodynamics in the system of such higher psychological functions 
brings about a specificity of its organization.
The desire to study the development of these higher forms of the regulators of 
human behaviour led initially to genetic experiments whose purpose was to 
investigate the regulation of behaviour in early childhood, and to experiments 
dealing with pathological material in which models of these regulations were
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created in an experimental situation. Thus we were able to study the mechanism of 
the control of behaviour. Part HI is devoted to this subject (Luria 1932a, x).
This was the culmination of the first phase of Luria’s work and a platform on 
which he based the rest of his life’s work. It could also be said to have laid the 
basis for an integrated psychology, and thereby helped to resolve the perennial 
‘crisis in psychology’, which we will expand on later (VII, iii).
Chapter X, The Development o f the Reactive Processes (331-66), reported on 
simple reaction experiments with children and adults, to determine the differences 
in their structures of reactions. The development of neurodynamic structures was 
now an intrinsic part of the whole approach. In this it began to follow up Luria’s 
theoretical advance in Chapter IX. The experiments took place c. 1929-30 at the 
Institute of Experimental Psychology, and at the psychological laboratory at the 
Communist Academy of Education and the Clinic for Nervous Diseases. Although 
Luria had other unnamed collaborators, most of the research used was that 
undertaken by M. S. Lebedinskii. Statistics and other relevant material not 
published in Luria’s book are to be found in the book by Lebedinskii (Lebedinskii 
1931). Luria also used material collected by P. S. Lubimov, a colleague at the 
Institute.
Chapter XI, Nature o f the Functional Barrier (367-96), began to address the 
significance of Henry Head’s work on aphasia. (At the beginning of the chapter I 
interpolate a review of relevant ideas from Head, Hughlings Jackson and 
Anokhin). It looked at experiments discussed in Chapters VIII and IX, including 
the independent work of Lebedinskii and Lubimov. It also used experiments from 
c. 1929-30 comparing those suffering from fimctional neuroses, the learning 
disabled, and those suffering with fatigue to clarify the nature of the ‘functional 
barrier’ and demonstrate its development as part of higher psychological 
functional systems. These latter, when taken as a whole, are in a sense as much the 
subject of this chapter as the titular part. An attempt to draw out some of the 
elements that deserve amplification occurs later (cf. VII, iii).
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Chapter XII, The Control o f Behaviour (397-428), reported on experiments 
undertaken in c. 1929-30 with children, hysterics, and sufferers from Parkinson’s 
disease. These concentrated on showing how indirect stimulation, including auto­
stimulation is central to higher psychological processes and enables an individual 
to control his or her behaviour and is an important approach used in compensating 
for weaknesses.
In his preface Luria is clear about the changes he has made:
In this latter series of experiments the author attempts to define his overall 
psychological point of view. Whilst dealing with the experimentally manifested 
psychophysiological mechanisms of affects, complexes, and conflicts, he does not 
become a psychoanalyst; nor a behaviourist in objectively analysing the 
psychophysiological structure of the disintegration and integration of the psychical 
apparatus; and least of all does he attempt to deduce the laws of higher activity 
from simple neurodynamic processes.
The author does not believe that the problems of the most complicated forms of 
human behaviour can be solved by the laws of the dynamics of tendency, nor by 
the analysis of the conditional reflex connections playing a role in the nervous 
system. The solution of this problem will be attained only by a careful description 
of the specific problems of behaviour produced in the process of socio-historical 
development, which are distinguished by the peculiarities of the human, and 
without which the organization of the higher neurodynamics remains 
incomprehensible (Luria 1932a, x-xi).
Below I have attempted to give an account of key theoretical developments to be 
found in The Nature o f Human Conflicts. I have done so on a chapter by chapter 
basis, and placed the chapters in bold type when moving to a new chapter. 
Consequently, as stated in the preface, the references in this chapter and the 
following one usually comprise only the page number. This provides a fairly 
comprehensive review, but one in which I try to draw the threads of Luria’s 
theoretical development together. I have attempted to use Luria’s own words. My 
comments, elaborations and clarifications are, I believe, relatively easy to 
differentiate from Luria’s text and my summaries of it.
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Although I have made many amendments to Gantt’s translation, these are usually 
consistent with his translations and, I trust, the Russian original. They are intended 
to remove confusing formulations and sentence structures, and thus to make it 
clearer and more consistent with what I understand as English. Without the 
original Russian it is impossible to convey Luria’s style. In it, sentences are 
lengthy, clauses are many, and translations can only work if they are elegant. 
Gantt’s translation does not permit a reconstruction of such a style. I have also 
regularly interpolated words in square brackets to help clarify the meaning. It is as 
though Gantt made an initial translation and then exhaustion prevented him 
making a consistent attempt at making it rational or readable. It is willy-nilly 
diversionary and barely digestible, which is why I have concentrated on drawing 
Luria’s threads together. Having said that, while many page references refer to 
passages that may be hard to recognize from my reorganizations and 
‘retranslations’, there are many lucid passages that I have left unchanged or 
virtually unchanged. Also I have selected excerpts, and made corresponding 
alterations and interpolations that have nothing to do with my criticisms of the 
text.
My own struggle with Gantt’s translation has itself been relatively exhausting. 
However, it is not simply a question of readability and comprehension. There are 
clearly many occasions when Gantt, though then at the forefront of Western 
knowledge about Russian psychology, simply fails to grasp Luria’s intentions. A 
comparison with my version of his translations will show this. Without the 
Russian original, it has proved extremely fi*ustrating. Although at times it may 
prove that I have re-interpreted too freely, at others I have felt obliged to leave 
certain unsatisfactory passages untouched or even unused, rather than risk adding 
to the confusion. Similarly, terminology will have changed over the last seventy 
years. Ideally I should have consulted a neuropsychologist about many terms, but 
I felt it appropriate to wait until the publication of the Russian original. I have 
however usually replaced ‘adequate’ by ‘appropriate’, ‘destruction’ by 
‘disintegration’, ‘intellectual’ by ‘higher cognitive’ or ‘higher psychological’, and 
‘psychoneurology’ (which Gantt translates as ‘psychobiology’) with 
‘neuropsychology’. In the last instance, it should be noted that the Russians
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considered psychology to be the dominant partner in neuropsychology (Rawles 
2002, personal communication). I have inevitably made other alterations, but 
since there is no vs^ ay that I can yet satisfy myself, other readers will also be 
dissatisfied with my omissions and compromises. The intention is clear, however, 
namely to make Luria’s formulations more comprehensible than hitherto. This 
must also be recognized as an ongoing process. The need for this was expressed 
clearly and often at considerable length by the book’s early reviewers (cf. VII, iii, 
212).
n
The Introduction
The Introduction, i.e.. Chapter I, offers a major challenge to the claims of the old 
theories and presents quahtatively new approaches. Therefore it is a chapter one 
cannot afford to skip. Consequently, I have quoted extensively fi*om parts of it all 
through this section. Luria comments on this new approach throughout the work, 
and the theory is substantially extended in Part III. The chapter opens with the 
words, “We are concerned here with the investigation of the disorganization of 
human behaviour, with the mechanism of its falling and rising” (Luria 1932a, 3). 
Whether or not this is an oblique reference to Hughlings Jackson’s famous work. 
The Evolution and Dissolution o f the Nervous System^ it nevertheless clearly 
intends to cover a similarly wide area. Luria notes that [contrary to Jackson’s 
position] it is common to see the whole nervous apparatus as consisting of 
separate neurons, and the brain as “nothing more than a centralization of them and 
their circuits... Consequently the laws of behaviour must inevitably be influenced 
in those laws which already hold for individual neurons. The whole of behaviour 
might be understood merely as the preservation of equilibrium between the 
separate apparatuses of the nervous system. Its pathology is understood as 
destruction of this equilibrium” (5). Since “the elementary processes of excitation 
and inhibition are the basic ones which are found in every nerve cell, they are 
carried throughout the whole organism, and the most eminent school of objective 
neuropsychology attempts to explain every process of behaviour in terms of 
excitation and inhibition... The normal behaviour of the human is consequently 
examined as the preservation of a certain equilibrium between the inhibitory and
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excitatory processes”. Luria then refers to the works of Pavlov as examples of this 
(ibid.).
In respect of the organization or disorganization of human behaviour and the 
disturbances treated by neuropsychology this approach was not simply partial.
Researches in human behaviour, both normal and pathological, lead us to doubt the 
adequacy of these fundamental conceptions. The facts that we observed 
demonstrate convincingly that behaviour cannot be explained as an equilibrium of 
separate systems, and that the concepts of elementary inhibition and excitation, not 
being included in the highest and specific whole [but only at an elementary level- 
MH], are completely inadequate... [Disease of the mechanisms involved] does not 
by any means evoke the same affect and often causes general changes, which are 
comprehensible only [within the context] of a most complicated functional 
reciprocity of internal behaviour (5-6).
This inadequacy is manifest in the case o f aphasia, the disturbance of the function 
of speech and symbolic activity, where the most marked feature is confusion.
Can we understand [the symptoms of aphasia] only as a failure of a separate 
system, or can it be expressed in terms of inhibition and excitation? ... Attempting 
to express this state as a complicated mosaic of inhibition and excitation does not 
satisfy us in any way. Undoubtedly both neurodynamic forces, inhibition and 
excitation, are included in our [experimental] phenomena, but it would be naïve to 
represent or presuppose that they are created from those elementary processes... 
Inhibition and excitation are included here in a higher complex whole, and may be 
understood only on this basis. Entering into the whole, they inevitably acquire a 
qualitatively new significance, inhibiting as well as organizing the role of speech.
(6).
The structure of the organism presupposes not an accidental mosaic, but a complex 
organization of separate systems. This organization is expressed most significantly 
in the functional correlation of these systems, in that they do not combine together 
in an accidental way, but unite as very definite parts into an integrated functional 
structure.
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The basic feature of this overall structural organization of behaviour is a functional 
inequality of the different systems entering into it. Certain systems appear as 
governing and regulating, others as subordinate, executing one function or another. 
It is clear that the significance of these in the system of organization is not always 
the same. The whole activity of the organism can be understood only as a dynamic 
system, a conditioned activity of its component parts. It is hard to describe this 
system in terms of inhibition and excitation, but much more appropriate here to 
consider the conception of organization and disorganization, which regulates the 
disintegration of the system of behaviour. In these concepts we see a far greater 
possibility of understanding the dynamics of behaviour than if we approach the 
subject from those mechanical concepts described above.
The behaviour of the aphasie person would be more comprehensible to us if we 
attempted to depict him in terms of organization and disorganization. ... The 
cortex, and in particular its highest parts, has been for a long time described as 
having a regulating function. This function was discussed in a series of special 
investigations on speech and symbolic activity... Speech and the higher 
psychological processes that played a special, regulating and leading role in 
behaviour were thus distinguished from other processes. It is understandable that 
an injury to these higher processes should produce not a partial destruction of 
definite processes, but the destruction of the whole system of behaviour that is 
shown to be incapable of functioning with a destroyed executive regulating system. 
The confusion observed in the behaviour of the aphasie person, the uncertainty of 
all his activity, the disorganization of his behaviour, which has been so brilliantly 
described by [Henry] Head [in Aphasia and Kindred Disorders of Speech], is 
comprehensible if we direct our attention to the neurophysiological apparatus as a 
system of separate partial apparatuses capable of being inhibited or stimulated. We 
shall proceed from this conception of the organization of behaviour connected with 
the distribution of the executive regulating systems.
The mechanisms of inhibition and excitation serve us admirably to understand the 
processes of regulation and disintegration, but they participate as part of the 
mechanisms [undertaking] the general purpose, and will be best understood only in 
the light of the complicated dynamic relation of the separate systems of the 
organism. It is thus the organization and disorganization of human behaviour, and 
the conditions, laws and forms that appear as the most important problem of 
neuropsychology... (6-8).
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Thus Luria wrote in the opening pages of his work. Today someone unaware of 
the history of the subject might accept Luria’s words as fair comment and proceed 
unaware of the enormous change in thinking that Luria had been part of in the 
nineteen-twenties. I did not fully appreciate the significance of Luria’s 
achievement myself till I had completed the previous five chapters. But while 
Luria has evidently and conclusively subsumed various reductionist concerns as 
real yet subordinate -  as well as lower -  elements of human behaviour, he had 
also differentiated his ideas from those of Goldstein and Lewin. Their emphasis 
on wholes and schemata, though crucial in breaking with the old reductionism, did 
not embrace the concepts of an interrelationship of many unequal systems or the 
role of speech and other symbolic systems in the restructuring of consciousness. 
But there was still much in common between Luria and the ‘structuralists’, as they 
were known in Russia.
Luria continues: “The conception of structure and organization does actually make 
up most of the new neuropsychology, and based on these concepts are the latest 
ideas expressed by Koehler, Koffka, Wertheimer, Goldstein, Lashley, Child and 
others...” But there were dangers in some of these approaches, such as “the wish 
to transform the complicated forms of the organization of behaviour into general 
laws...” (8).
This “inevitably leads us to ignore and misunderstand the details of human 
neurodynamics and the highest and specific forms of behaviour always remain 
beyond the field of vision of the mechanists. The opposite danger is represented 
by those who connect the principles of behaviour with a vital structure”. Even the 
best minds, such as Constantin von Monakow see “the higher forms of 
organization as the products of some special forces, [and thereby] exclude every 
possibility of a scientific investigation of the mechanism of this organism and 
replace analysis by postulating some new entity, obscure and not accessible to 
analysis” (9).
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Luria could not ignore general laws or special factors, but he could not accept 
simplistic formulations. One approach in particular seemed to demand answers 
that could not be satisfied within these limits:
In the first stages of this development the forms of the organization of behaviour 
are certainly of a different order than those forms of organization which 
differentiate more complex behaviour. And this development proceeds more along 
the path of dominating the primitive laws, than along the path where they are 
simply repeated in the new stages. The problem of human behaviour proves, we 
think, to be the problem of development, and only this way can we reach an 
understanding of the mechanism that lies at the basis of the activity of the human 
personality (ibid.). [Luria elaborates on these themes in Part III of the book].
He continues:
The material makes us think that the genesis of organized human behaviour is 
through the development and inclusion of all the new regulating systems, which 
overcome the primitive forms of behaviour and transfer them to that which is a new 
and more systematized organization. There is every reason to suppose that the 
primitive forms of the organization of behaviour, characterized by the sub-cortical 
type of activity, are completely transformed into the processes of the highest 
development... This replacement of one type of behaviour with another is 
connected with the development of newly regulated systems, coming into conflict 
with the primitive sub-cortical activity and overcoming it, creating all the new 
forms of organization (9-10). These new forms of organization are not in any way 
organized -  as many authors think -  by the development of inhibition and the 
restraining influence of the cortex on sub-cortical activity. Neurodynamic 
development from early childhood to adulthood results in a gradual overcoming of 
primitive difrusion in the activity of the nervous system and the elaboration of new 
functionally organized forms of behaviour. In this process, the higher cortical 
mechanism does much more than play a simple negative role. Precisely because of 
its participation in behaviour, those regulating systems [can] transfer the 
organization of behaviour to higher and higher stages and create totally new forms” 
of regulation and behaviour...
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The inclusion of [higher psychological mechanisms] in the behaviour of the child 
began first with the complicated organic mechanism and then with the higher 
cultural systems, which condition new forms of organization (10).
This approach dispenses completely with both abstract general laws and any need 
for ‘vital forces’. In a completely concrete analysis of the organization of 
behaviour, Instead “we treat it as a function of definite regulating systems, 
unequal at various stages of the development of behaviour, and fully accessible 
through scientific analysis” (ibid.).
This is examined in the investigation of the disorganization of behaviour. Many 
writers have avoided going beyond description in this field, but even when 
scientific developments promised the possibility of objective study of it, many still 
balked at the idea or explained it as a loss of equilibrium. Disorders that were not 
physiological were also often treated similarly -  as in the James-Lange theory of 
emotions. [This theory held that “emotions were caused by changes in the 
voluntary motor sphere and by involuntary changes in the visceral sphere” 
(Petrovsky & Yaroshevsky 1987, 158)]. Indeed “the present investigator, in 
attempting to work in this field, finds that he is building on air or, in any case, on 
very uncertain ground” (Luria 1932a, 11). However, the research of W. B. Cannon 
and Pavlov was important, and several others had tried “to introduce affect into 
the system of active human behaviour... Kurt Lewin attempted to show, in a 
series of carefully executed experiments, a more sharply marked relation between 
the processes of tension, discharge and affection” (13).
Many scientists, however, measured excitement itself rather than seeking to find 
measures that could examine which particular mechanisms and structures were 
involved, let alone the dynamic interrelationships of these structures. “In order to 
do this, we study the symptoms, mechanisms and dynamics of affect as one of the 
existing forms of disorganization of human behaviour. We try especially to think 
of the conditions of the origin of this disorganization, and of those systems that 
play decisive roles. We also apply the methodology of psychology to 
physiological processes, not forgetting for a minute that we are studying the 
structure and function of human behaviour” (13-4).
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In the second, larger section of the Introduction (14-39) Luria considers various 
investigatory approaches. The subjective school had never progressed beyond the 
stage of describing symptoms. Wundt’s theory in effect concluded that “affect is 
not an act of behaviour but a reaction to a series of psychological problems”. This 
resulted in “the peripheral theory of emotion” [as in James’s approach -MH], 
which in turn also led to the investigation of symptoms, but no explanation of the 
processes involved (15). What was important was a way of measuring behaviour 
before, during, and sometimes after the period of affect. How else could one 
measure the changes in structural dynamics? It was necessary to turn from “the 
observation of peripheral symptoms... to the study of the structure of the central 
processes...”. This would be in keeping with the findings of Cannon, whose 
animal subjects continued to show affective behaviour after the excision of the 
viscera. “These experiments confirm that the physiological changes usually 
considered as the basis for the affective processes are in reality only secondary 
and accompanying processes, the diminution of which does not remove the 
affect”. The peripheral approach was therefore inappropriate. “Only in the 
alterations of the active forms of human activity can we hope to find a suitable 
reflection of that structure of the affective processes in which we are interested... 
The affect appears when something happens with the organized phenomena of 
activity. Therefore it should be reasonable to hope to obtain a more adequate 
structure of the affective processes by the investigation of the fate of the active 
functions connected with this process” (17).
The second consideration follows immediately from the first; only a system of 
active behaviour -  speech or motor -  appears capable of manifesting an actual 
structure that changes under the influence of affective behaviour. All the events of 
interest to us that cannot be expressed in physiological symptoms are fully obtained 
in the structure of active ‘spontaneous’ acts.
We may follow at a glance the variation and conflict of the experimental character, 
whether active or passive, of the reaction, the disturbance of the process, and its 
control. The complicated character of the behaviour, directed to a known external 
activity, allows us to estimate with great exactitude not only the general character
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of the disturbance. And also it allows us to ascertain in which system of activity, in 
which of its phases, from the very beginning to motor termination, arose those 
changes that elicited the characteristic disorganization of behaviour. Consequently 
this enables us to turn in a new direction in the investigation of the affective 
processes, replacing the study of symptoms by the investigation of the structure, 
switching from the path of physiology to that of psychology (18).
Furthermore not only could Luria amplify the disorganization of behaviour in 
respect of the central processes through the use of activity in the verbal and motor 
systems, he was also able through these very same systems “to reflect this process 
in systems accessible and suitable for examination. The motor function is such a 
systematic, objectively reflected structure of the neurodynamic processes 
concealed from immediate examination. The use of the motor fimction as a system 
of the reflected structure of hidden psychological processes is therefore available 
to us. We proceed therefore along the path that we call the combined motor [and 
verbal response] method” (ibid.).
We must find a system of activity such as will include in [both] its parts and central 
process the affective disorganization involved, and the motor process that should 
be capable of reflecting the central activity and its fate. This motor process should 
not be something extraneous, but a special phase [of the activity], included within 
the overall structure. Only under these conditions of the participation of the central 
changes and motor-reflected processes in one general structure can we hope to 
adequately represent in our study all the phenomena arising in the concealed 
concatenation of changes. Certainly if we combine in one functional system two 
activities, the central and the motor, we can record that every central change is of 
necessity primarily reflected in the motor system. The latter is formed into a united 
whole [in the course of action], and only secondarily evokes certain changes in the 
physiological system to which it spreads. Such a division of the united dynamic 
structure, including the central part concealed from direct study and the motor 
functions capable of being objectively registered, is the basic combination of the 
motor method with which we have acquired the essential material dealt with in this 
volume (22-3).
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Thus we have revisited the point where we introduced the combined verbal and 
motor response method in the discussion of Luria’s experiments (cf. I, iii and 
particularly II, ii). In retrospect we can clearly see how the methodological ‘time 
bomb’ implicit in this method, as described by Radzikhovskii and Khomskaia, at 
last emerges. This is acknowledged implicitly in the fact that, at this point, Luria 
cites two of his papers on the method (Luria 1928c, 1929a). Equally significant, or 
perhaps more so, is Luria’s above reference to his version of the fimctional 
system, again explicitly in connection with his method. In this case the practical 
method had eventually led to the introduction of “a psychological theory capable 
of assimilating the data obtained by Luria” (Radzikhovskii and Khomskaia 1981, 
8-9; cf. the discussion of this in II, ii, 55-6).
Luria now takes up the speech part of his ‘prototypical’ functional system.
The subject must reply to a word that is given him with the first thought that enters 
his mind verbally. At the same time he must press the finger of the right hand on 
the receiver of an apparatus lying before him. Here we stimulate in our subject two 
systems of activity that are connected with each other so closely that they are set in 
motion by two simultaneously occurring activities of one and the same process. 
Actually, the proposal to answer a given word by any other word excites in our 
subject a certain central process of a very complicated order, one close to the 
speech system. Analysing it psychologically, we can see its associative process in 
some cases; in others, its primitive fate... (Luria 1932a, 23).
We are concerned here not with the phenomenal existence of this process. Our 
attention is chiefly directed to the fact that we are able to evoke a definite, very 
complicated neurodynamic process that is concealed from immediate observation, 
which, after a certain period, leads to a verbal response. This neurodynamic 
process can be at one moment entirely organic and regular, at another moment it 
may meet a certain obstacle in its path and collide with it, resulting in a certain 
disorganization. It is clear that the neurodynamic process that lies at the base of the 
habitual associative response is actually different fi'om that characteristic of the 
higher psychological process. The former varies in response to, and is obstructed 
by, the affective tone... In all these cases the structure of the neurodynamic 
processes will of course be very different and appear inaccessible to direct and
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objective analysis. Our concern consists in attempting to experimentally bring the 
disintegration to the structure and by this approach permit the emphasis to be 
placed on the analysis...
In uniting the word response and the motor reaction into a single process we have a 
method by which we can estimate the actual changes in this obscure process as 
necessarily reflected in a clearly defined process, whereby we see the differences in 
the neurodynamic structure of the central process reflected in the evident 
differences of structure in the motor curve. Precisely this union of both functions 
into a single active system leads us to believe that every sharp fluctuation and 
every tendency to a speech response and, even more so, every marked affective 
disorganized character of the central process affects the structure of the combined 
motor reaction. In analysing this, we [now] have available a very objective means 
for drawing conclusions concerning the structure of the internal dynamic process 
(24).
We shall continue discussion of the overall theory in the following chapter.
The remainder of the Introduction explains in detail how the combined verbal and 
motor response method is to be applied and interpreted. There are several 
photographs showing the apparatus in use and figures showing examples of 
experimental responses, as there are throughout the book. Figure 5 (27) is an 
example of the possible reactions that could be registered. Since we have 
discussed the method earlier (1, iii, 11, ii) we will not elaborate further at this point. 
It should be noted that the ‘Luria technique’, as it came to be known, received a 
great deal of favourable attention at the time and was adopted in Western 
experiments. Luria’s claims for its validity were generally accepted and, while 
Luria remained working in psychology and in communication with the West, i.e., 
until 1936, his reputation remained high. The literature on this is quite extensive 
(cf. the references in Reymert and Speer 1938-9). His subsequent use of similar 
techniques in measuring the control of behaviour in developing children was also 
favourably received (cf. Beiswanger 1968, Jarvis 1968, Wozniak 1972, Wilder 
1976, Bain 1976, Pressley 1979). It was possible to simultaneously record the 
subjects’ verbal responses, but not practical to display them on the same sheets 
that gave the motor reactions. Today this would be relatively easy to do. A
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comparison of the use of the ‘Luria technique’ in an experiment along his lines 
with a simultaneous brain scan would probably be a more appropriate 
contemporary method of confirming his findings, though this does not appear to 
have been undertaken.
ni
Part I
We have already looked at the first experiment in Part I -  that which took place at 
Moscow University in the spring of 1924 (cf. II, ii). Chapter II also deals with a 
similar set of experiments that took place in the autumn of 1927, again in 
collaboration with A. N. Leont’ev. Here 51 men and 58 women aged from 18 to 
35 took part in an experiment prior to and after exams. Similar word responses 
were measured. Before the examination 72 per cent showed signs of disturbance, 
11 per cent markedly so. “Both of these figures coincide almost exactly with the 
results obtained” in 1924 (Luria 1932a, 65). Disturbance or breaking of the 
regulatory restraint was also evident, sometimes “destroying that which we must 
conditionally designate as the ‘functional barrier’” (72).
But in addition to Luria’s introduction of this term, which he examined at length 
in Chapter XI, he also compared the responses of psychological groups, some of 
which were considered ‘stable’ and others ‘labile’, a terminology borrowed from 
Pavlov. Luria had medical investigations carried out on both groups. The results 
showed some normal reactions among the labile group and vice versa. Luria 
concluded, however, that “the degree and character of the reactions of the 
individual to the affective situation are primarily connected with the neuropathic 
status, with that fatigue or weakness of the nervous system in many of our 
‘workers by brain’ [i.e., ‘white collar’ workers]” (74-5). “Here we witness the 
confluence of affect and neurosis. The affective situation provokes a reaction 
similar in structure to that of neurosis. It creates, as it were, a temporary but real 
neurosis, which is most distinct in those subjects already showing a neuropathic 
disposition”. Luria concluded, on the basis of later findings about his subjects, 
“that our research may serve as an early diagnosis of neuropathic disorders” (75).
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Indeed he was to follow up these ideas in Parts II and III of his book (cf. also 
Clarke 1955).
Since we have already looked at the contents of Chapter III on affect in suspect 
criminals (cf. IV, iii), we will turn directly to the subject of Chapter IV, ‘The 
Investigation of Complexes Produced during Hypnosis by Suggestion’. (This is 
the main area of new research to be introduced in this section). Hypnotism, 
incidentally, remained a subject of interest for Luria in the 1930s. An article by 
K.I. Platonov, On the Objective Proof o f the Experimental Age Regression, 
received by an American journal in August 1932 was accompanied by a 
recommendation from Luria. Platonov notes intriguingly (Platonow 1933, 208), 
“At present we are starting, with Professor A. R. Luria and Dr. M. S. Lebedinskii, 
a series of investigations which ought to provide more objective proofs in support 
of the reality of the phenomena of regression to previous ages”. Unfortunately I 
have found no publication on this listed in the works of any of the three 
investigators. One possible reason is the personal attacks on Luria that occurred at 
this time. More likely it was due to government policy of cracking down on 
‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘degenerate Western’ concerns. This would explain why 
neither the topic nor the above publication is mentioned in Platonov’s major 
English publication (Platonov 1959), even though hypnotism itself is discussed 
positively, having been sanctioned by Pavlov’s use of it.
This chapter, however, deals with research that was mainly carried out in the 
period 1924-5. As we saw in the introduction, several doctors were involved in 
ensuring that the subjects’ health was not put at risk. Luria’s principal collaborator 
was Boris Efimovich Varshava (1900-1927), who was also a member of the 
Russian Psychoanalytic Society. A tribute to him by Vygotsky can be found at the 
beginning of the psychological dictionary Varshava was compiling and which 
Vygotsky completed (Varshava & Vygotskii 1931).
Luria begins by noting that in ‘real-life’ experiments, such as those that he had 
undertaken with criminal suspects, one could never eliminate the possibility that 
behavioural disturbances had other origins. “The ideal for the experimenter in 
psychology has become the option of artificially reconstructing the phenomenon
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under examination, because this enables one to keep it entirely under control... It 
is therefore quite comprehensible that only the artificial insertion of an affective 
complex, known in all details, into the psyche of a subject, can create a situation 
for the psychologist in which it would be easier for him to record all the factors 
forming the affective reaction” (Luria 1932a, 129).
We suggested to the subject, while in a sufficiently deep hypnotic state, a certain 
situation, more often a disagreeable one, in which he played a role irreconcilable 
with his habits and contrary to his normal behaviour. We made those suggestions 
insistently and forced the hypnotized person to feel the [conflict-] situation with 
‘appropriate’ pain. We thus obtained a real and rather sharply expressed acute 
affect. We woke the subject and allowed him a period of amnesia, natural or 
hypnotically suggested. We thus had a subject ‘primed’ with certain definite 
affective complexes, mostly unknown to him, but recorded by us in almost all 
important details (ibid.).
Given the period of these experiments, the experimental design, and the non- 
conscious suggestive elements involved at the core of these experiments, this can 
hardly be other than the basis of the article that Kornilov refused to publish (cf. V, 
iv, 141-2). Indeed the title of the unpublished article. An Experiment in Objective 
Psychoanalysis, is echoed when Luria refers to “such ‘experimental 
psychoanalysis’” (Luria 1932a, 150). Here, though, it is necessary to note that 
Luria placed the term in inverted commas, i.e., while the experiments might still 
be relevant to psychoanalysis, he himself saw it within a new framework.
“The suggestions that were given ... were usually received with active 
objections...” (131). So traumatic was the process that subjects were cdrefully 
screened, prepared, and attended by a physician during the experiment. Subjects 
were observed making “restless defensive movements, trembling during sleep”. In 
one example, K, a 23-year-old obstetrics student is told she is in a position where 
she is being offered money to perform an abortion on a desperate woman. K has 
no right to perform this and vigorously refuses. The experimenter is only able to 
bypass the subject’s objections by stating, “You have agreed and the woman has
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gone away”. The subject is then woken, and asked how she feels. “Something 
very disagreeable has happened, but she does not know what” (132).
“Suggesting a conflict connected with action, we obtained an affective reaction. 
This is one of the fundamental ideas of this book”, and distinguishes it from 
previous experiments, such as the school of Wundt, which used agreeable and 
disagreeable stimuli to produce ‘evoked emotions’.
We have an entirely new structure of the affective process, compared to those 
previously analysed. Here a strong emotion is hidden in the past and concealed not 
only from the experimenter [at this stage of the experiment], but also from the 
individual herself. It is removed from consciousness, though apparently still active.
It is quite natural that we should expect symptoms entirely different from those 
which we observed in cases of marked and violent emotion (133).
The results from three sets of tests using selected word stimuli were conq^ared. 
The first took place before the introduction of the hypnotic suggestion to the 
subject, the second took place when the subject was under its influence, and the 
third took place after the suggestion had been removed. Luria was able to draw 
several conclusions from the information gathered:
We have before us artificially obtained symptoms entirely similar to those which 
we observed in cases of natural affective traces. The difference lies only in this: 
three varying situations, which are usually observed in different subjects, are here 
shown in three tests with the same subject. The first test deals with a man who is in 
a state of emotional balance, whose behaviour is entirely organized. In the second, 
a personality with a markedly apparent central defect, similar to the one we 
observed with criminals or with hysterical people. The third one shows again a 
picture of more or less quiet state with but few traces of these past experiences or 
of reactive, sometimes completely eliminated affect (136, 139).
The second group of tests proved particularly interesting. In some instances the 
affective symptoms had a distinctly localized character.
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We believe the concentrated nature of the traces, not passing into irradiated 
disturbance of behaviour, is in this instance a result of the disconnection of the 
affective complex from consciousness... [Here related] with separation from the 
motor area...
We encountered affect every time when some initial activity was retarded and the 
potentially powerful activity of the organism was inhibited... There are two ways 
of checking it -  either by providing an outlet for the tension which accumulated as 
a result of the retardation, or by removing it from the motor area. We have seen 
how the first way appears in the act of admission (149) [cf. the confessions of 
criminal suspects].
The second way involves the post-hypnotic act of forgetting the complex.
[This is a] question of vast importance to psychology, as well as in the pathology of 
psychological situations. The amnesia that we created artificially, insulating 
consciousness from the traumatic picture, leads to a process quite similar to that of 
displacement. [NB: Gantt translates this as ‘shifting’ -MH]. The authors who 
described the latter, beginning with Freud, have often pointed out that the active 
side of the insulation from consciousness must be seen as insulation from the motor 
area... The connecting of consciousness is one of the most interesting problems of 
psychology... [It is summarized in the formula:] Removal from consciousness: 
insulation from the motor area; consciousness: spread into the motor area (149-50).
Our tests make it possible to observe what neurodynamic factors are being evoked 
by consciousness of the suggested affect. The associative experiments [of selected 
word stimuli] that we used seem especially well adapted for this. Each stimulus 
connected with the suggested situation provokes distinct disturbances in the 
reactive process. Every such stimulus is, however, another step toward breaking the 
barrier that separates the affect, already introduced into the psyche, from 
consciousness... By using a prolonged associative experiment we may ... build a 
model of the very process of its becoming conscious... It then makes it possible to 
trace the neurodynamic mechanisms connected with that consciousness... We may 
... construct a much fuller picture of such ‘experimental psychoanalysis’ if we 
adopt prolonged and more adequate observations (150).
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In this respect Luria refers again to the case of K, the obstetrics student.
The object of our test is to trace the neurodynamic correlations of that gradual 
[attainment of] consciousness, and thereby clear up the problem of the 
psychophysiology of the conscious [as distinct from] the inhibited affect... After 
having constructed an ‘experimental unconsciousness’ we would naturally employ, 
as a method, ‘experimental psychoanalysis’. Free association was the best means 
for our purpose. Being determined not only by the logical, but also by the affective 
data of the personality, this method clearly showed the inhibited complexes. The 
acute character of the suggested affective complex, ensured that it would be 
exposed by even a small number of free associations (151).
Luria seems to be making something of a joke in his references to psychoanalysis, 
but quite a complex one. He is probably referring to the time of the original 
experiments when he was a major figure in the psychoanalytic movement in 
Russia. But there was an element of ambivalence then in that, unlike other 
psychoanalysts, he was always involved in ‘experimental’ and ‘objective’ 
research. By the time he was writing this up, he was no longer a member of that 
school. But here he is also commenting on the censorious views of the Russian 
rulers, or rather their ‘intellectual’ agents, towards psychoanalysis. The quotation 
marks imply his distance from real psychoanalysis, but he seems to be saying also 
that he, as a scientist, has the right to investigate and utilize the methods that he 
considers to be appropriate. One wonders what subtleties may be revealed in the 
Russian text, though the following passage is also intriguing. An ironical reading 
could explain why Luria gained a reputation among his friends as something of a 
joker, though there may be no irony intended.
In one important respect the method of our free associations was distinctly different 
from the psychoanalytic method of research. It was contained entirely within the 
framework of a psychophysiological experiment, and herein lie both its strong and 
weak points. The complex, the appearance of which we have studied, was known 
to us beforehand, and this is what made it possible for us to avoid complicated 
methods and interpretations. We had no ground to believe that the [hypnotic] 
suggestion would be subjected to some especially deep modification, and we 
expected that it would appear almost straight away in the first or second association
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series. Noting all associations that ‘freely came to mind’, the intervals between 
them and their connected symptoms, we were able to obtain accurately fixed 
associative series, and to study in detail their dynamics (151-2).
[Naturally the experimental approach] entirely excluded extensive research on the 
problems of the unconscious and of its dynamics. This was not, however, the object 
of our psychophysiological work (152).
It should be noted that Luria’s comment on the ‘associative series’, also known as 
the ‘(free) chain association’, refers to a 1927 work by A. N. Leont’ev titled The 
Structural Analysis o f Chain Associative Series, which suggests a fiuther 
refinement in the approach that is related to the sequencing and intervals of the 
word stimuli -  for example, bunching of words likely to produce an affective 
reaction.
In the case of K -  or Kar -  as she has now become, her motor reactions both 
before the hypnotic suggestion and after awakening from it proved regular and 
normal in the first test and initially so in the second. Luria’s preliminary 
conclusions were as follows. “TTzg insulation o f affective traces from 
consciousness simultaneously produces insulation from the motor area, 
transforming active affect into one that is concealed or potentiaC 
(154).’’However, the appearance of irregular intervals at the end of the chain series 
[in a later part of the test], and the presence of some single marked inhibitions is 
of special interest to us and leads us to suppose that some destructive factor has 
intervened”. These associations are understood by the experimenter, but not yet by 
the subject. This shows convincingly that important symptoms o f neurodynamic 
changes are connected with reconstruction o f parts o f the complexes in speech 
series'*' (155). “The later symptoms were more intense. There is a clear 
appearance o f the affective situation in the subject *s consciousness, followed by a 
motor storm, which, for a time, breaks up any normal reactive process" (156). 
“The dynamics of the suggested complex now become sufficiently clear. Being 
disconnected from the conscious area, that complex, nevertheless, shows an 
insistent tendency to creep into the speech series... The affective complex 
constructed by us, though not yet conscious, creates an affective state and
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determines the flow o f the free associative series'"^  (157). “The connection between 
the process of becoming conscious and the removal of the reaction to the 
complexes -  the basis of psychoanalytic therapy -  becomes much clearer. In fact, 
the end of the series quoted above - [the text contains both the word series and the 
motor reaction graphs -  MH] -  shows with sufficient clearness that after the basic 
complex has become conscious, the subject is able to pass into a considerably 
more stable chain of neutral reactions than previously” (159).
On the other hand, the neurodynamic explosion, which appears [initially] after the 
affective complex has become conscious, presents a new view of the mechanical 
structure of displacement. The insulation fi'om consciousness and the simultaneous 
insulation from the motor area seem to be the mechanism that saves the personality 
from the over-excitement and disorganization connected with an open appearance 
of conflict. In that respect the construction of a certain functional barrier between 
the affective centre and the motor area is of decisive importance for the personality 
in retaining the possibility of acting normally... (159-60).
Luria then goes on to discuss a case where the suggestion, though very traumatic, 
was not accepted during hypnotism. This produced quite different neurodynamic 
symptoms (161 ff). He concludes, “Substantial confirmation of the differences 
between the psychophysiological structures of the complex and the trauma are 
found in the different pictures of hysteria and traumatic neuroses”, particularly 
with respect to the involvement of the motor area (167).
Luria’s investigation of the structure and dynamics of affective complexes and 
their route to consciousness seems in retrospect a remarkable series of 
experiments, worthy of far more attention than the first two series which we 
discussed. Strangely, it seems to have been largely ignored, even by those 
psychoanalysts who ought to have been interested in what seemed consistent with, 
and very relevant to, their approach (though cf. VII, iii, 212). On the other hand it 
is clear that Luria had no difficulty in discussing the processes discussed above in 
terms that were not specifically psychoanalytic, consistent with his own 
theoretical development.
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Chapter V, ‘The General Features and Mechanics of the Affective Process’, 
provides a theoretical conclusion to Part I. Appropriately it starts by reminding us 
that “every investigation proceeds in cycles, and the attempt to complete one cycle 
is at the same time an attempt to begin planning around the issues of subsequent 
researches” (169). It is relevant, not only because it connects the experiments 
involving hypnotism in Parts I and II, but also because this chapter considers both 
the analytical and the synthetical sides of the investigation of the mechanics of 
affective processes.
Specifically, Luria notes that “the affective process is by no means equally related 
to all the stages of human activity, but it is connected with special functional 
zones, and [this connection] itself requires analysis” (170).
[While the majority of authors, including those of Wundt’s school,] were inclined 
to see in the affective process a functional connection with a special stable system 
... we take the opposite position. In the unstable affective symptoms revealed we 
see a result of this, that the affect is each time a function of a dissimilar structure, 
that the symptoms of disintegration we study are parts of dissimilar units. We 
should [therefore] seek the neurodynamical laws of affect on the basis of a 
conception that takes account of these dynamic peculiarities (171).
Even when a person is in a more or less acute affective state, the different motor 
systems reveal the affect in unequal degrees. [But this is not simply a question of 
morphology]. We believe that the degree of expressiveness of this or that system 
depends not so much on its anatomical position as upon its inclusion in one or 
another complicated psychological structure. Therefore one and the same motor 
system can be either expressive or inexpressive, depending on what function it is 
fulfilling at the given moment and to what psychological structure it belongs. If, for 
example, the foot system is ordinarily the least expressive, then this is because it is 
ordinarily the least connected with the higher cortical processes and the least 
included in those psychological structures which have the property of maximum 
labileness and are of maximally conflicting character (172-3).
“Consequently, the expressiveness of the system is conditioned not by its 
morphological but by its functional situation” (173). More specifically, “affective
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disorganization of behaviour begins where the problem of cortical control by the 
direct diffusion of excitation arises, i.e., motor impulsiveness. It disappears where 
the action permits the direct motor discharge of impulses. Affect arises in the place 
where the conflict begins to be connected with activity” (174). At this point we 
will leave Chapter V and Part I. As we can see Luria was by no means in need of 
questions to ask, but which to deal with first, and how. As he noted with regard to 
his very first experiments involving fatigue, disorganization was intimately 
connected with speech and the manual motor area. The ‘Luria method’ was also 
intimately involved with this, as was the recognition that this involved a 
‘functional system’ as distinct from a morphological system. That this system 
connected two initially separate systems led Luria to the point of recognizing the 
importance of such systems not only for the purpose of explaining affect and its 
role in the disorganization of behaviour, but of their importance for a great deal of 
human organization, activity and behaviour. The Nature o f Human Conflicts, as 
Luria well knew, was eventually to have many imphcations for all other aspects of 
behaviour.
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Chapter 7: ‘The Nature of Human Conflicts’ Parts II & HI, and the 
Significance of the Development of the Concept of Functional Systems for
Psychology
I: Part H
Part II, titled ‘The Psychophysiology of Conflicting Processes’, represents a later 
cycle of Luria’s experiments. He differentiates it from that discussed in Part I at 
the beginning of the first chapter. Chapter VI, (‘Experiments with Artificial 
Conflicts’). The new aim was to artificially create “a model of affective 
disorganization [without using] natural emotional tendencies, but producing it 
experimentally with psychological mechanisms that in themselves are not 
[directly] connected with any affect or emotion” (Luria 1932a, 206). “We will 
artificially introduce specific and completely isolated conflicts into the activity we 
are studying, and attempt to show under what conditions these lead to a wide­
spread disorganization of human behaviour, to a model of artificial affect and 
experimental neuroses. With such an artificially created model we are able to 
control and understand the processes we have studied” (ibid.).
Luria’s models were those of the experiments of Pavlov and his school (cf. Iv, ii, 
107) and of Lewin and his school, to both of which he pays tribute. He notes, 
“here the fundamental conception of Lewin [i.e., to achieve the above] is very 
close to ours” (207). Rather than focus on introducing emotional disturbances that 
might spill over into the real life of the subject, the conflicts were introduced into 
what Luria called ‘the intellectual system’, which we might call the higher 
cognitive or higher psychological system. This was possible by “introducing the 
conflict into the definitive leading system, the active system of speech” (208). The 
importance of the role of speech in controlling behaviour was a subject that was to 
loom high in Luria’s subsequent career, but he does not spell out his views here.
He opts for two main experimental approaches, the conflict o f setting and the 
conflict o f defection. The former, borrowed from Pavlov, is about choosing 
between two close options, known in philosophy as the dilemma of Buridan’s ass. 
(Here Gantt renders the medieval philosopher as ‘Buridanov’). It can result in a
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conflict of purpose. The latter involves the stress, which the subject demonstrates 
when faced with diversions that deflect him or her from the task of solving a 
difficult problem, and the impossibility of solving the problem may even be part 
of the design.
The first trial of the former method involved moving the hand upward or 
downward according to signal -  a red or yellow colour. Contrary to the 
expectations aroused by Pavlov’s analogous experiments with dogs, humans 
reacted more calmly when presented with intermediate colours. “In place of 
impulsive pressure, the subject forms a link between his behaviour and speech, 
and begins to reason out the inhibitions of his reaction and finally gives an 
organized response -  for example, making both movements, or perhaps none” 
(210). Humans have more complicated means of adjusting than other animals, and 
the experimenter has to reduce the options available to such forms of 
rationalization to achieve the desired conflicts. Speeding up the required tempo of 
response did bring some disorganization of behaviour but only in those subjects 
considered as having a hyperexcitable nervous system. Abrupt changes in the 
tempo demanded, however, produced perceptible conflict and disorganization, but 
hardly ever an instance of acute conflict.
Another experiment used bilingual subjects and verbal stimuli from both 
languages. The subject had to respond to the stimuli in the same language. Here 
the conflict was introduced via the sudden change of language. Sometimes the 
subject’s response indicated that he or she did not grasp the word during the 
switch. Since the words were isolated from a meaningful context this could not, 
however, be attributed to an emotional response. Delays and inappropriate 
answers were symptoms of the disorganization of the associative process, and 
sometimes involved impulsive reactions or perseveration. “The conflict elicited 
very often produces considerable shock to the subject’s higher speech processes 
accompanied by a rupture of the ‘functional barrier’... In a series of cases we 
observed that, during acute conflict, inhibition of verbal reaction is connected with 
the fact that excitation is directly transferred to the motor sphere...” (220). Such 
disturbances were “evidence of weakened participation from the higher 
psychological system and of a return of the reactive process to a primitive diffused
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State” (223). The experimental design not only took preemptive action against the 
rationalizing option of the speech system, but also challenged its very link with 
meaning, thereby denying both its conventional flexibility and escape routes.
The prescribed activity in experiments with conflict o f defection should likewise 
tax the subject’s ability. Indeed, it should exceed the limits of his or her 
capabilities.
[In the ensuing] result of such a collision between the attempt at activity and the 
impossibility of achieving it, between hope and weakness, inevitably brings about a 
state characterized by confusion and affective disorganized behaviour... The 
conflict of defection should be [seen as] directly linked to the problem of neurosis. 
There is not a single neuropathologist who would not point to social or biological 
weaknesses of the subject as the basis of the entire series of psychoneuroses. Alfred 
Adler constructed round this conflict a whole system that greatly aided us in the 
comprehension of neurotic mechanisms, [i.e., the impossibility of compensating for 
the deficit] (224-5).
In Luria’s attempt to obtain such a result ‘synthetically’, however, the subject was 
led to believe that success was possible, otherwise he or she might reasonably 
decide not to take part. Luria found the experiments of Lewin and Tamara Dembo 
to be excellent models.
Luria’s experiments again involved verbal responses to words, and again these 
involved “limited associations”. The first experiment required giving an example 
of a relevant ‘part’ in response to being given a ‘whole’. Most wholes were easy 
to find such parts for, but there were a few ‘provocative’ examples, which seemed 
more like ‘parts’ themselves. Luria compared two groups, one of 15 students, the 
other of 30 neurotics. In this initial test the results of both groups coincided. The 
‘provocative’ words elicited excitation in the motor sphere. The intentional 
sphere, involving the process of speech, was also implicated and produced 
excitation of the speech apparatus. “The process is characterized by the production 
of activity and a transfer of excitation to the speech sphere”. “The intention to 
answer, meeting with the impossibility of giving a ready response produces a
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diffused, disturbed neurodynamic reaction.” (229). Even the passive left hand 
shows disturbance. Another experiment required the subjects to give lists of birds 
or fish. As the answers began to dry up, motor actions became disorderly and 
impulsive, rather as one might expect.
Attempts by other authors to arrive at general laws for these processes had failed, 
thought Luria, because they failed to take account of the structural dynamics of 
the situation, instead preferring to concentrate on what he called ‘subjective 
material’. He concluded, however, that “two types of conflicts [involving simple 
intellectual processes] can create the same symptoms that are usually the result of 
affects and affective traces. These two types of conflict were most closely 
connected with two types of mechanism” (236). These two types were represented 
by the conflicts of setting and defection.
In both cases the fundamental fact was the delayed activity. In the first of these 
cases, the delay in activity came about after having been formulated and prepared 
as a motor response. In the second case, the intention was simply reinforced by 
inhibition, as the intention was not formulated as a prepared reaction. [This delay 
or withholding from activity] is the chief mechanism of the affective processes, and 
it is precisely with this that those symptoms characteristic of the presence of the 
affective process are connected (ibid.). [The combined verbal and motor method] 
makes it possible to establish the presence of the affective process -  and not only 
this -  it also enables us to show what type of structural conflict it corresponds to 
(236-7).
Luria admitted that these conflicts “arose within the borders of a very limited 
system, and usually did not extend into the entire personality^^ (239). Although 
such ground had been covered in Luria’s ‘real-life’ experiments, he wanted to 
address the issue of obtaining an artificial, but more stable and more intense 
disorganization of behaviour. This he did in Chapter VII, ‘Experiments with 
Artificial Neuroses’ Again he refers to Lewin’s experiments. Luria admitted that 
in his own experiments he very rarely obtained an overreaction fi*om the subject, 
despite “the delay or limitation of which should actually have produced an acute 
reaction on the part of the individual” (240). The best way of resolving this
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difficulty was by using hypnosis -  again with the assistance of Zabrezhnev and 
Varshava. The structure of the previous ‘artificial’ experiments was maintained, 
for example, by suggesting during hypnosis an obligatory verbal activity, which is 
then replaced on waking by a different one. These experiments were undertaken in 
1926 and 1927 with about twenty subjects.
Again Luria used Leont’ev’s findings that “every emotional complex creates a 
certain tendency to reproduce itself in a chain of associations ... [and that] in 
different subjects the chain of associations dominates different objective 
structures” (243). In the first experiment described, a group of subjects received 
the hypnotic suggestion to think of the names of birds. Their performance in the 
following free chain association was compared with the free associations they had 
given before the process of hypnotic suggestion. Although some individuals were 
instructed when awake to include the names of, for example, fish or trees, but not 
birds, all the subjects peppered their free associations with the names of birds. 
They even rationalized this in the form of memories or confabulations. In one case 
the suggested theme was ‘square’. The response was, “The first thought that came 
into my mind was that in the square they feed the doves” (245). Although there is 
no apparent conflict, the subject feels compelled to override the conscious 
instructions. “This series convinces us of the stability of the suggested tension”. 
Often the tension is more evident, in that the hypnotically suggested verbal 
category “appears as a foreign body -  and then the individual begins to struggle 
with it, tries not to discharge, but to inhibit it as something unconnected, foreign, 
onerous” (247). A subject refused to continue the associations after the following 
vivid example. “Raven -  stork -  goose — duck -  store -  poverty -  word -  time -  
Mary Pickford -red -  beyond the sea -  they flew -  storks -  I do not want to say 
anything more... (Why do I tremble! I am shaking so that even my hands 
tremble!)” (249). Here “we succeeded in creating a model of the compulsive state, 
which furthermore evoked independently those conflicts, which completely 
destroyed the normal course of neurodynamic processes, and from which a 
neurotic tendency usually develops” (251).
To preface the second set of experiments Luria writes:
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In the clinical practice of medicine it has been frequently observed that the more 
acute attacks of fear are obtained when we try to prevent the patient with an 
anxiety neurosis from completing his compulsive activity... [Here he refers to 
Freud]. This fact leads us to believe that just here in the more acute forms of 
conflict, which arise from the inhibition of the compulsive tendency, we may 
approach the mechanism of the affect more closely. In the process of affective 
disruption some fairly powerful system of activity (usually connected with the 
subcortical apparatus) falls under the sway of the inhibition. The conflict arising is 
the more intense the more insistent the arrested tendency and the more categorical 
the inhibition. The tension produced in the neurodynamic system strives to escape 
along the path of inappropriate innervation, the appropriate exit being closed. Thus 
are created the symptoms of an intense diffuse excitation, characteristic of affect 
(253t
Experiments with inhibited compulsions were designed to create a model of this 
structure. Hypnotic suggestion of certain words, accompanied by the suggestion 
that they cannot be said, enabled Luria to examine these mechanisms that result in 
symptoms resembling motor aphasia. An example of this hypnotic suggestion is 
the following. “When you come into the experimental room and sit before the 
apparatus, you will want to repeat two words -  red and blue, red and blue. 
However, you will not be able to say them, though they will continue to be present 
in your thoughts” (254). When asked to repeat the names of colours the responses 
were normal, except that those to ‘red’ and ‘blue’ were inhibited and resembled 
the most severe cases of affect. When the suggested conflict was hypnotically 
removed all the responses returned to normal.
Luria concluded that the experiment had provided examples similar to those of 
compulsive neurosis. Forms of substitution were evident including 
‘extrasignalling’ or stereotypy. Some verbal substitution was attempted e.g. ‘rose’ 
but often completely unconnected words were used. The subjects did not attempt 
to break through the motor dam; instead they sought new connections, new speech 
exits, an appropriate ‘intellectual’ exit.
The conflict is displaced from the motor sphere to the connecting one, and the 
substitution begins to take on an entirely new character. From the senseless
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substitution by alliteration, which are only trials in pronouncing the beginning of 
the word, the subject goes over to a rational replacement of the forbidden colour by 
others -  instead of red: rose, carmine, violet -  or [shifting to] a replaced image -  
‘red handkerchief. These replaced images help to determine the subsequent 
associative series, replacing the peripheral conflict by a centrally reconstructed 
series. Without doubt, here we dealt with two very different compulsive states, and 
it is very important that we [already] had two special [theoretical] structures for the 
neurodynamic processes.
The movement of the inhibition from the motor system to the connecting, 
coupling-up one relieves the individual personality of open conflict and avoids that 
affective rupture which is inevitable in the presence of inhibition of the already 
formulated compulsive activity (264).
This central displacement relieves the affective disturbances and leads to further 
questions that are considered in Chapter VIII, ‘The Structure of Conflicting 
Processes’. These conflicts - of setting and defection - showed a great functional 
difference. In the latter it even proved possible to transfer the conflict from the 
motor sphere to the connecting system where it becomes isolated from any direct 
disorganization of behaviour. “Many processes we have observed in the 
experimental conflicts bring us strikingly close to the phenomena of aphasia” 
(269-70). The first set of experiments in this chapter, ‘Experiments with Conflicts 
of Aphasia’ lead on directly from this observation.
Aphasia is an ideal disorder for the study of these problems. Not giving any 
constant neurodynamic disturbance, and often accompanied by few changes to the 
patient’s practical behaviour, aphasia enables us to observe the acute forms of 
conflict at the point when the patient is returning to his normal speech activity. The 
conflict during motor paraphasia and cases of amnestic aphasia often has an acutely 
expressed character of ‘conflict at the motor termination’. The patient understands 
the word he wants to say, sometimes pronounces the first letter of it but is not able 
to utter the word itself owing to inhibition during its final formation and 
pronunciation. This is why it is possible to observe in the general behaviour and 
[form of] excitability an acute neurodynamic disorganization that is clearly 
dependent on the actual speech conflict. It is possible to observe ... in aphasia the
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exact fixation of the naturally occurring conflicts, here manifested in an unusually 
well-defined and isolated form (270).
It is also possible that we could experimentally move the conflict “fi’om the motor 
sphere to the receptory-connecting area. We can arrange the experiment so that 
the patient encounters an obstacle, not during the reaction to a word, but during 
the reception and elaboration of the given stimulus and the search for an 
appropriate reaction. Those changes we obtained in the neurodynamic processes 
will be especially instructive because they occur in the subject’s ‘own’ motor 
conflict, and also deprive his behaviour of its ‘normal’ organization” (271). In 
these examples Luria expands the concept of the ‘connecting’ sphere to that of the 
‘receptory-cormecting sphere. He later notes that this sphere has “a wealth of 
functional possibilities” (289) [see following page for the full quote]. Although he 
was speculating about the precise neurophysiology involved, it does seem 
plausible.
In collaboration with M. S. Lebedinskii, Luria studied many aphasie patients (cf. 
Lebedinsky and Luria 1929). He foimd that, as in his previous experiments, “the 
receptory part of the process [in these aphasie patients] was completely lacking 
the neurodynamic disturbances that were so active during the conflict that arose in 
direct proximity to a motor terminal”. He thought this could be explained either by 
“some kind of ‘barrier’ impenetrable to the conflict arising in the prepared central 
process,” or that “the connecting system itself is constructed according to another 
principle” (280).
Luria next set out “to create a model of sensory and motor aphasie phenomena in 
one and the same subject, guaranteeing the presence of excitation in its active 
tendency in both cases”, i.e., at the very beginning of the receptory as well as at 
the end of the motor phase (ibid.). In this section, ‘Experiments with 
Displacement of Conflicts in Speech Difficulties’, Luria selected non-aphasic 
subjects to perform associative language experiments where the subjects were not 
very fluent in a given foreign language. Here “we could count on obtaining an 
acute conflict of defection, produced by a collision of the setting of the associative 
response and the insufficiency of vocabulary. We could certainly expect that the
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structures of the conflicts produced were far from being equal” (280-1). In some 
cases the lack of vocabulary led to reactions to be found in amnestic aphasia, in 
others there was a wide variation of reactions as the subjects attempted to 
understand the word rather than respond to it. This had the characteristics of 
receptory conflict. This latter displacement occurred in the majority of cases 
involving the ‘cultured adult’.
Here “we begin to understand how the conflict displaced from the motor area 
plays the deciding role in the preservation of the personality... For this reason, the 
leading role among those mechanisms that bring about control o f the actual affect 
should unquestionably be taken by the mechanism of the displacement of the 
conflict, which isolates it from the motor sphere” (288-9). Luria concludes that the 
likely explanation for this is that the receptory-connecting system and the effector 
system “play functionally unequal roles in the activity of the organism, and they 
control noncomparable structures... The first system in the cultured adult is 
isolated from the motor area in such a way that the excitation beginning in it is not 
directly transferred to the motor apparatus, but only when the elaborated process 
is completed” (289).
This division of all the activities into two strictly separated phases is characteristic 
of the behaviour of every adult. Thus in normal behaviour one feels that there is 
some ‘barrier’ between the two phases that obstructs the direct transfer of 
excitation to the motor area, thereby allowing the organism to prepare itself for 
activity, in order that it may then complete the prepared connection with the 
organized motor act. The fact that the connecting apparatus is so extremely labile 
and has such a wealth of functional possibilities, whereas the motor apparatus is 
comparatively simple, is perhaps the reason why every conflict occurring in the 
latter disrupts normal motor activity, while the same conflict, when displaced to the 
receptory-connecting terminal, is successfully utilized by complex psychological 
mechanisms and remains isolated from any detrimental behavioural influence 
(ibid.).
Here Luria broaches the issue of a hierarchy in the brain, and furthermore one that 
is associated with educational and physical maturity.
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The final section of the chapter concerns The neurodynamic type’ as it affects the 
relationships between the motor sphere and the receptory-connecting area. Luria 
sought to examine how the reactions of subjects suffering from various disorders 
and diseases differed in this respect from the reactions we have already seen. 
These subjects included those of a labile or excitable state considered 
pathological, those suffering from pseudobulbar paralysis, Parkinson’s disease, 
neurasthenia, neurosis, and hysteria. In most of these subjects the so-called 
‘functional barrier’ between the two systems did not operate normally. Usually 
shifting a conflict to the receptory-connecting system isolates it from the motor 
system. In the labile motor system, however, “such a shift ceases to play its role -  
especially in the diffused structure of behaviour that we see in neurosis. Here the 
conflict freely passes over into the motor sphere, at the same time disorganizing 
behaviour. We have arrived at the fundamental neurodynamic mechanism lying at 
the basis of neurosis...” (300).
This passage which optimistically looks forward to Part III is consistent with 
having been delivered to America in 1929. The change of emphasis on the 
importance of the ‘functional barrier’ as distinct from that of the qualitative 
difference between the systems, although in itself no contradiction, shows that 
Luria was still in the process of developing his own ideas on the issues.
There is further speculation to be found in Chapter IX, ‘The Dynamic Analysis 
of the Conflicting Process’. Here it seems that the issues concerning qualitatively 
different systems and the functional barrier are quite rightly subsumed within 
larger issues.
We are undoubtedly justified in speaking of the presence of certain levels of 
organization in the behaviour of every personality. While the more primitive of 
them are already regulated at the earlier stages of their development, the more 
complex and difficult ones are also more labile even in the very complex human 
organism. The [possibility of] estimating the labileness of the neurodynamics of the 
personality may arise not only in relation to the ability to keep the conflict going on 
within it outside the motor sphere ... but also in relation to [the particular] stratum
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of behaviour where the conflict ... begins to produce its disintegration and 
disorganization (301-2).
[NB. ‘Labileness’ is a term for the tendency to slip and also to change. Hence the 
word for the tendency to instability may sometimes be ambivalently, but 
legitimately, associated with the ability to make many and complex changes].
[The organization of the behaviour of the very young is not complete.] It appears 
clearly organized if we observe it at a primitive level, for example, in the act of 
sucking, and disorganized if we then look at the more complicated levels 
concerned with the activity of the cortical apparatus. In the adult the 
disorganization of behaviour is shifted to a much more complicated stratum of 
behaviour and is under the influence of entirely different factors and therefore 
characterized by a qualitatively different structure. In our previous analysis of the 
affective processes ... the whole series ... of the simplest movements were 
completely attainable by the subject, ... while the inclusion of the more 
complicated, mainly higher associative processes inevitably produced a rupture and 
severe disorganization of behaviour (302).
How do we find that level of complexity in the adult that makes such changes 
possible? It is not an even or gradual process of change.
[On the contrary] the process of development actually has a complicated and ... 
dialectical character [so that the role of] key factors changes at different levels [of 
development]... [In the adult] all the elementary behavioural functions in which 
speech plays a part are stable and organized, and excluding its participation makes 
the behaviour much more unstable. The satisfactory explanation of this is the fact 
that the inclusion of speech alters fundamentally the organizational principles of 
behaviour. It changes the natural forms of the gradual organization ‘from below’ to 
the cultured forms of behaviour ‘fi*om above’. That which was previously the more 
complicated and difficult level of behaviour now not only appears as the more 
stable level, but rather the system actually playing the organizing role in relation to 
other levels of behaviour... Our analysis must necessarily take into account this 
dialectical approach, calculating the new context of the given phenomena and the 
new organizational forms and principles at each stage of development, starting
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from the analysis of the new leading factors, and the ensuing new structure of the 
given phenomena.
This makes us recognize that we are only at the very beginning of that path which 
can lead us to a satisfactory study of the degree of neurodynamic labileness of the 
personality. This question presupposes a prolonged investigation of those actual 
[interrelations and] correlations existing between the different fimctional systems 
and that structure characterising behaviour at the various stages of development 
(303).
In this passage we see in a nutshell the argument presented in Vygotsky’s 1934 
article, Psychology and the Theory o f the Localization o f Psychological Functions 
(of. VII, iii, 224-6), first translated by Luria with his own accompanying article 
(Vygotsky 1965, Luria 1965). This approach is, I believe, as important as any 
other theory to be foimd in either Luria or Vygotsky. The enormous changes of 
which Liuia speaks are most evident in the field of child development, and it is 
likely that Vygotsky also played a key role in the development of this approach. 
Luria’s involvement in this field of work was not only vital for Vygotsky, but also 
for Luria in widening the scope of his thinking. On the other hand, the 
development of Luria’s own work seems to have led him independently or 
perhaps together with Vygotsky to this theory - for Vygotsky too studied in what 
are conventionally seen as ‘Luria’s’ areas. I have amended Gantt’s translation in 
the passage above not only to make it more comprehensible, but to make this 
theory more explicit and recognizable for what it is, rather than what it has been 
hitherto -  at least in English! We will return to look at this theory especially in 
the section dealing with the development of the functional systems approach. Here 
it is important to note that Luria’s comment, that “we are at the very beginning of 
that path which can lead us to a satisfactory study of the degree of neurodynamic 
labileness of the personality”, seems in the circumstances to be an understatement 
of the first water. Here he has come up with a theory of developmental 
neuropsychology that has surpassed every previous one, including those of the 
leading figures of the Gestalt school, Kurt Goldstein and Kurt Lewin. But, of 
course, Luria’s whole series of investigations was leading in this direction; the 
study of ‘labileness’ was intended to unlock many theoretical doors and also to
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find appropriate treatment for many of those sufferers of its various pathological 
forms.
For what Gantt translates as “the dynamical stratified analysis of the conflicting 
processes”, i.e., a dynamic analysis of conflicting processes at [separate] levels, 
Luria used material from the investigations of the previous chapter. There is no 
evidence from Lebedinskii and Luria’s German article of 1929 (received by the 
journal on 9 February 1929), that Luria had yet conceived of his new theory. Nor 
does it appear in the various presentations of his method in 1929. One therefore 
assumes that these preliminary ‘pilot’ studies are not a re-analysis of existing 
material, but a new series of investigations probably undertaken after his return 
from America in 1929. Luria’s reference to a 1930 publication on page 325 gives 
us a general time frame within which the theory was developed and the 
experiments undertaken.
“The simplest example shows us in which comparatively primitive strata ... the 
behaviour of a neurotic acquires a conflicting character” (Luria 1932a, 304). In 
this case the neurotic was a ten-year-old boy. His task was to tap rhythmically on 
a pneumatic plate until he received a signal to stop. The signal produced, instead 
of the expected inhibition, “an acute impulsive rupture of the motor activity” 
(ibid.). In other cases neurotic subjects were not able to perform the simple 
rhythmic tapping without destroying the rhythm. “Here these reactions remain 
regular in form, but disorganization is reflected chiefly in the disturbed rhythm 
and intensity of the [response] curves [on the recording graph], i.e., in the loss of 
that standard character that distinguishes this process in the normal [subject]" 
(307).
Yet responding to a signal is not the most elementary act, despite the views of a 
generation of psychologists. Luria notes that this will be examined in more detail 
in Chapter X, and explains briefly why this is so. “The reactive response to the 
internal stimulus presupposes primarily not an internal coordination of the 
separate links of a spontaneous system of movements, but movements [whose 
control is] transferred to an external agent. Even this is a much more complex
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action than those that are not connected with spontaneous external movements” 
(310).
Luria ran a series of tests on a number of neurotic patients, as a result of which he 
was able to place them in a series of groups that were characteristic of different 
grades of labileness of the nervous system. They took part in a test where they 
were asked to respond slowly to stimuli. The ability to inhibit movements that this 
required often proved short-lived and attempts to do so sometimes led to the 
complete destruction of behaviour. “Under these circumstances the inclusion of 
speech is not a strong enough means for controlling the neurodynamic process” in 
these neurotics (315). Luria summed up this section with the recognition that, 
“Conflicts connected with even the most primitive levels of behaviour may cause 
acute disturbances” (319).
Despite all these difficulties, Luria was convinced that it was important to create a 
differential analysis of the mechanisms involved in order to form a genuine and 
useful scientific typology.
In studying the degree of organization of behaviour at different levels, and in 
substantiating the effect of conflict on the failure of the reactive process in ... 
[relation to these levels], the possibility came nearer of expressing individual 
differences in several dynamic units... Establishing that the behavioural 
disturbances in the different subjects are clearly expressed only at a definite level 
of activity, we are able to describe the labileness of this behaviour in special 
[measurable] stages, ... thus making our individual analysis dynamic... We are 
[also] in a position to substantiate the analysis of [such] disturbances, and to speak 
of the functional peculiarities of that degree of labileness with which we are 
dealing (324).
Precisely how far Luria had got in this process is not made clear or concrete at this 
stage. One speculates that the measurable stages were to some extent and 
inevitably provisional. But Luria was in no doubt that they were required.
In our comparative typological analysis we must each time decide two questions.
In what degree is the neurodynamic labileness manifest in a given subject and.
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secondly, what structure characterizes the usual failure of the behaviour? The 
answer to the first question provides a dynamic analysis of our subject’s reactions 
at definite levels of his behaviour. The second problem is decided by a study of the 
following: the qualitative nature of the disturbance, the stage it is at, what its 
reciprocal parts are in the disorganization of the somatic and vegetative systems, 
and whether the inhibited and deformed state of the subject is passive or active, 
intentional or [in the process of] formation (ibid.).
Although such a formulation appears as an agenda, which is indeed what it is, 
rather than exhibiting its dialectical structure, the dialectics are implicit. Luria 
does add that these are only some of the aspects that need studying. “The whole 
dynamic analysis of the typological differences is the task for the future, and here 
we shall express only a few generalities relating to the problem” (325).
A comparison of two cases of hysteria illustrates the value of Luria’s approach
The differences between these two cases consist in the degree of neurodynamic 
labileness, but that is not all. The varying activity of the conflict, the varying extent 
of its irradiation, and finally the varying participation of the motor system in the 
conflict create a structure specific to each case, and force us to think about the 
different structures of hysterical behaviours.
We are convinced that under the general term ‘hysteria’ very divergent 
neurodynamic processes are included. The detailed neurodynamic investigation 
helps us to unveil the exact picture of those disturbances that are usually brought 
together under the label of hysteria, and to describe exactly those differences, and 
finally to classify them as groups (327).
Nevertheless Luria admitted that the processes under study were not entirely 
comprehensible.
We are convinced that the laws of this disorganization will be fully comprehensible 
when we are able to give their genetic analysis, approaching their study through the 
[developmental] method. Only by a careful investigation of those successive stages 
through which the organized behaviour of the child passes in the process of 
transition to adulthood, can we thoroughly understand to what degree the facts
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observed by us in affective and conflicting processes originate at some more 
primitive stages in the development of neurodynamic processes” (ibid.).
On the other hand, “the human does not only experience failure in [the 
organization] of his behaviour; he also tries to master it, to control it... The 
individual descriptions of the laws we have given are comprehensible only when 
we consider in detail those means that the human applies in controlling his 
behaviour, and those stages through which his mastery of behaviour passes”. This 
is also central for therapeutic work. “We believe that only experiments dedicated 
to the genetic analysis of organized forms of behaviour and the experimental 
model of their control can give us a foundation upon which we may make a 
contribution to the contemporary growth of knowledge” (328).
Thus the inner logic of Luria’s own investigations led him to the study of forms of 
child development and their relevance for studying the mind, its problems and its 
possibilities.
n
Part III
‘The Genesis of the Reactive Processes and the Psychophysiology of the Control 
of Behaviour’, i.e.. Part 111, contains three chapters. Chapter X is titled 
‘Development of the Reactive Processes’. Having recognized the key role of 
development in understanding neurological structures and their breakdown, Luria 
examined current theories. He concluded that throughout the world writers tended 
to opt for the view that affect does not create new forms of behaviour; on the 
contrary it throws the individual back on old mechanisms. Often this was to the 
extent of seeing the individual as reverting “backward through many generations, 
so that affect returns to ancient phases of behaviour and neurosis regresses toward 
an archaic stage of development” (331). More plausibly, in neurological terms, it 
represented “a transfer fi’om the cortical type of excitation to that which is 
connected with the subcortical ganglia. These form the ancient parts of the brain 
and are the seat of archaic types of process” (331-2).
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Luria considered this approach to be both “daring” and containing “the golden 
kernels of dialectics”. He does not refer to Freud by name, but the language is so 
similar to that used in the preface written by Vygotsky and himself to Freud’s 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (cf. IV, I) that it is undoubtedly Freud that he is 
considering. (In my discussion of this preface I tried to offload the rather 
extravagant ideas and language onto Vygotsky, and since they also sound so 
unlike Luria in this context, I see no reason to revise my views). At this point, 
however, Luria urged caution. True, disorganization did not unravel along 
individual ad hoc paths. But “we may suppose that the process we have studied 
will occur not so much according to a scheme of simple regression, but rather to a 
scheme of reversion in which the archaic and new forms [of behaviour] in a sense 
change places because, even in the newly destroyed form of behaviour, the higher 
mechanisms continue to play a role, even though a ‘perverted’ one. This is why in 
each destruction we must necessarily expect a return to some of the former stages 
of development” (332). Here Luria’s position is consistent with that of Hughlings 
Jackson, though, as previously stated, he probably did not yet have access to the 
relevant writings of the latter, which explains the absence of some of Jackson’s 
finer points. Luria here also adds the qualification that “these manifestations of the 
reappearing archaic forms will naturally be different in people of different cultural 
states, different types and different individual peculiarities” (ibid.). Here we see 
the influence of cultural-historical theory, which we will discuss later in a more 
appropriate context.
“Consequently, in our investigations we must not look for a simple regression of 
behaviour ... representing a primitive form of development. Yet we still face the 
important issue of studying these former stages of development in order to 
understand the characteristic mechanisms forming the skeleton of those higher 
regulations of human behaviour which disintegrated” (332-3). “We must first take 
up the ontogenesis of the reactive processes and turn our attention to the study of 
the neurodynamic characteristics of childhood” (333). Luria raised the key 
relevant questions: do the reactions of child and adult differ in structure?, if the 
‘functional barrier’ is lower in the young child “under what conditions is it 
destroyed and to what mechanisms does it belong?” (ibid.).
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The main proposition, which seems to us proven by a series of experiments, is that 
human reactive processes complete their development not by the gradual 
combination of earlier given mechanisms, but, on the contrary, ... by the 
conflicting characteristics being transferred into qualitatively new phases subsumed 
by the new regulating mechanisms. Thus the reactions of the young child differ 
fundamentally in their structure from those of the adult... Every behavioural act in 
the young child has a direct character and the excitation arising manifests a 
tendency not to be restrained, but to proceed to its motor termination. Secondly 
every reaction exhibits the ability to bring with it an inappropriately large mass of 
excitation into the active process... [These characteristics] reveal to us the genetic 
roots of those neurodynamic deformities found in the disorganization of human 
behaviour in the states of affect, conflict and neurosis (334).
The experiments in this chapter attempted to discover the development of 
organized forms of behaviour at different neurodynamic stages, and their different 
levels of complexity.
The first experiment required pre-school children to press a pneumatic apparatus 
at a speed of their choice. This procedure actually “presupposes a fairly high 
development of the cortical processes; only with a fairly well-organized action of 
the motor cortex and development of higher cortical automatic mechanisms could 
we reckon on obtaining an accurate [response]” (335). For this reason children as 
young as thirty months were prepared for the experiment by watching older 
children perform it. Nevertheless in the young child the process associated with 
the cortex transferred rapidly to subcortical mechanisms which involved diffused 
processes. “A series of equal, regular pressures, readily and automatically given 
by the adult, evidently requires a very high organization of the cortex that is 
lacking in the child...” (336). The children’s reactions are typical and are seen in 
children up to the age of seven. “In adults we may easily evoke them by 
instructing the subject to produce the reactions at maximal speed” (337-8).
The following experiment involves reactions to a signal. Again, as Luria has 
already explained, this is a far firom elementary process. Here he adds an 
interesting comment. “Authors who have considered psychology as a science of
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reactions have evidently taken for granted that this process is exceedingly 
elementary and totally unchangeable during the course of development as a 
w^ hole”. He also made the point that “the development of the reactive processes 
from child to adult does not occur in any sense by the quantitative improvement of 
the process, but through a qualitative change in structure overcoming primordial 
diffriseness which is transformed into a new, intricate, functioning, organized 
structure that controls the reaction” (338). No wonder leading followers of the 
Pavlovian orthodoxy instituted by Stalin’s regime at the end of the 1930s, men 
like A.G. Ivanov-Smolenskii (whose work is mentioned, not unfavourably, by 
Luria in this book), seemed to enjoy humiliating Luria in the early 1950s - for 
almost incidental comments, such as the above, robbed Pavlovian theory of any 
claims to pre-eminence whatsoever.
The experiment seems initially to have been undertaken by Lebedinskii and 
replicated by Luria with very similar results. Lebedinskii even came up with a 
formula for the ‘coefficient of inhibition’. Precisely whose material was used is 
left unclear by the English text. The subjects were aged from two and a half to 
seven or eight and they were to respond by pressure to a sequence of signals. 
Sometimes even beyond the age of five the reactions “showed that each signal 
mobilized a large amount o f excitation''  ^ (338). The spontaneous pressures of the 
youngest “are hardly at all connected with the external signal, b u t... may even be 
inhibited by it... [At this age] it is still very difficult to bring about a 
differentiation of an organized reaction from the overall excitation”. By three and 
a half the child typically produces separate pressures coordinated with the signal, 
but “is not able to inhibit the succeeding excitation” (339). “All the further 
development of the reactive processes consists primarily in the development of 
[the] ability to restrain the remaining impulses and overcome the amount of 
excitation caused by the stimulus” (339-341). This requires additional 
mechanisms. Another experiment showed that children of six or seven were 
incapable of organizing any form of delayed response. This is crucial. For “all 
higher psychological behaviour is possible only ... when the solution of problems 
can be deferred for a time. The problem is temporarily isolated from the motor 
sphere and from the seat of those preliminary internal trials which are not
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immediately reflected in the motor system. Here lies a [key] mechanism of the 
intellect” (346-7).
Perhaps other forms of experiment could help explain the behavioral transition 
from child to adult. Luria experimented with choice reactions. Here he also 
included material collected by P. S. Lubimov. In one experiment Luria even 
attached a small light to the index fingers of children and adults so that its 
pointing responses could be ‘cyclographically’ recorded. Again the cyclograms 
showed two phases in adult reactions, namely preparation and then motor 
fulfilment; children’s remained impulsive (349ff).
Luria looks at evidence from Lewin’s photographs of infants clinging with the 
whole body, and the experiments of G. E. Coghill, reported at the 1929 
International Congress of Psychology on diffused movements of the human 
embryo. These confirmed Luria’s views about the diffuse reactions of young 
humans. Even voluntary activities show a similar structure. In experiments 
performed with another lifelong colleague, A.V. Zaporozhets, (1905-81), a one­
time actor with Eisenstein, Luria proposed that children make different kinds of 
drawings, with either ‘neutral’ or ‘emotional’ content, for example, ‘a kind aunt’ 
or ‘war’. The motor actions registered by a six-year-old exhibited intense motor 
discharges for the latter, but in older children the motor activity barely differed 
between the two drawings. Luria links the difference with two facts. “On the one 
hand, that direct character of the reactive processes, the tendency of all excitation 
to be immediately associated with activity... On the other hand, the higher 
psychological mechanisms, particularly that of speech, which have not yet begun 
to play the regulating role in the child that it later takes in adolescents and adults. 
In the young child speech is not a perfect means of making judgments and 
planning, and the absence of this preliminary phase gives a primitive form to the 
intellectual processes of the child...” (359). Direct impulsiveness is restrained, yet 
remains an element for many years, and may return unexpectedly in adults.
How does one arrive at a neurodynamic age? Chronological age, physical 
maturity, and even ‘intellectual’ age are not necessarily guides to this. In the final 
analysis it comes down to the issue of the control of behaviour. It therefore
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“ceases to be a question of biology and becomes one of cultural elaboration on a 
biological basis, i.e., a problem of psychophysiology” (362). Some valuable work 
had been done on this in the field of nervous excitation by, among others, A. G. 
Ivanov-Smolenskii (!). But a second tier of methods should also be used in 
conjunction with this, namely the area concerned with the control of ‘voluntary’ 
activity, which is what Luria was currently occupied with. These experiments 
would require “a series of problems of increasing complexity and the inclusion of 
more intricate mechanisms” (ibid.). The role of the mechanisms involved in the 
functional barrier would also require explanation. Clearly this would be, and was 
to be, a long-term project for Luria. The role of speech, which Luria has said 
above, almost in passing, was very important, was indeed to prove crucial to this 
work. Allied to this question was the need to characterize neurodynamic types. 
Any symptomatology of the latter would have to be based on a dynamic analysis, 
rather than on existing ‘static’ forms of classification. This Luria correctly terms a 
“dialectical analysis” in the provision of a typology (364), one that included a 
genetic study of the phenomena.
Although much, if not most, of the work that would validate Luria’s approach 
would lie in the future, it is evident that this work needed to be envisaged within 
an overall theory. Aspects of this approach would need to be amended or replaced, 
but in general it gave the opportunity to proceed on many fronts and in theory 
simultaneously. Luria chose next to look at one of his key concepts, and Chapter 
XI is titled ‘The Nature of the Functional Barrier’. He asks:
Is it inborn, congenital, only gradually appearing in the process of unnatural 
growth, or is it a product of education, becoming manifest in combination with 
certain new cultural contributions in human neuropsychology? Must we consider it 
a morphologically formed apparatus? Or is the ‘functional barrier’ a functional 
conception that conceals no new morphological elaborations, and concerned only 
with the combination of different systems, or other structural processes of 
behavioural neurodynamics including new and culturally higher psychological 
relations that influence the course of the reactive processes? (367).
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To which one adds another question. These are such large issues: is it possible for 
Luria to solve them?
The supposition that the development of psychological functions is necessarily 
connected with the growth of new cortical formations is a barely tenable 
conjecture. The facts are rather that we know many more complex forms of 
development connected to new combinations in the use of those same 
morphological elaborations that are accompanied by a change in their functional 
significance. Those modifications that are encountered in the development of child 
behaviour may be related to processes of the second type. The inclusion of social 
surroundings, speech acquisition, the use of instruments, and the transition to 
culturally new forms in the organization of individual behaviour -  does this not 
change the structure of psychophysiological processes just as much as the 
appearance of some purely morphological alteration of the nervous apparatus? 
Moreover, in this complicated organization of behaviour, these functional changes 
are often predominant, and we know scores of cases whereby it was possible to 
compensate for serious defects in the coarse morphological structure of the nervous 
apparatus (369).
As a materialist Luria does not deny the role of the morphological structures. But 
“the higher forms of behaviour as well as the primitive can be functions of an 
identical morphology in the brain; cultured behaviour does not require a new brain 
morphology, and the brain of the savage may be morphologically identical with 
that of a member of the Academy of Sciences, [- a point made by Herder in 
1784!]. The most intricate psychological elaborations may be contained in a plan 
of functional structures, and the same functions used in entirely new combinations 
involving new and adapted environmental mechanisms” (369-70). Here Luria has 
laid out much of his theory, which we might consider as a contribution to the 
nature-nurture debate, but would then have been considered as implying an 
acceptance of the cultural-historical approach.
At this point Luria does finally introduce Hughlings Jackson, who -  he states - 
concluded in 1884:
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That the higher level of the nervous apparatus was inhibitory, restraining the 
primitive reactions of the older [subcortical] cerebral systems. This included the 
restraining and organizing role of the morphologically higher layers of the 
apparatus as well as the analogous role of the higher functional systems, creating 
the complex processes of biological and historical evolution. Jackson and Head in 
their work on aphasia pointed out the primary organizing role played by speech in 
the voluntary and emotional disturbances occurring when these complex fimctional 
levels were damaged. This exposition is of vital importance for us. Indeed our 
further discussion is based on it. Many experiments show the markedly inhibitory 
role of the cortex (370).
Here, it is almost as if Luria takes on the views of these masters just as his own 
research had led him to the same point and the same conclusions, and also at the 
same time when their work finally became available to him.
Luria refers to other recent Western research, including reports from R. S. 
Woodworth, Sherrington, Wilder Penfield and Philip Bard, which support the 
above comments on the effect of the weakening of higher cortical systems and 
could be consistent with the concept of the functional barrier. “We may assuredly 
expect that the action of the functional barrier will be closely connected not only 
with the participation of the new morphological layers of the cortex, but also with 
the inclusion of those higher functional systems indicated by Jackson and Head, 
which could be elaborated only in the most intricate processes of psychological 
development, and which play not only an inhibitory, but also a formative, 
organizing role” (371). This second reference to the concept of functional systems 
in respect to the work of Jackson and Head is striking.
Although in much later works Luria does refer to a collection of Jackson’s texts 
published by Head in 1915 in volume 38 of the journal Brain, he does not refer to 
any specific publications by Jackson here (Jackson’s major relevant works were 
republished in 1932). Therefore we must assume that Luria’s knowledge of 
Jackson derives largely from Aphasia and Kindred Disorders o f  Speech, which 
frequently cites the 1915 collection (Head 1926). That this latter work became 
available to Luria about this time is confirmed by Michael Cole (1979, 210). It is
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also referred to by name in this work (Luria 1932a, 7). Luria’s reference on page 
370 to the effects of chloroform on the cortex, immediately after referring to 
Head, echoes Head’s remarks on the subject (1926, I, 487). But it has to be said 
that neither Jackson nor Head refers to fimctional systems. What then did Luria 
find in their work that played the same role as in his own? Indeed, what role did it 
play in Luria’s own development of the concept? And, perhaps most important, in 
what overall approach was it embedded?
Neither Head nor Jackson is mentioned in any of Luria’s three German papers 
fi’om this period. Even in the article that has a special section on aphasia, the very 
article that appears to be the first to use the term Funktionssystem (Lebedinsky 
and Luria 1929, 474), there is no mention of them. I therefore conclude that Luria 
came up with this concept independently and in relation to his combined verbal 
and motor response method, in which the speech and motor parts acted together as 
one system. But this was a system that could disintegrate under pressure. It was 
something that developed in the course of ontogeny and was one of the higher 
cortical processes. I think that reading Head’s work gave Luria the confidence to 
expand both the meaning of his concept and the scope of his approach. It seems 
quite possible that Luria obtained the book en route to America or actually when 
he arrived there in 1929. In The Nature o f Human Conflicts it seems to be a 
relatively late arrival -  virtually everyone else cited had already featured in 
Luria’s writings, apart fi*om some more recent supporting material fi’om the 1929 
lecturers, Lashley and Coghill. Head’s work was not merely supportive, but 
radically accelerated Luria’s moves towards a recasting of his overall approach.
First we will look at the material consistent with Luria’s concept of functional 
systems, and then look at the context in which Jackson and Head embedded it. 
Head’s book includes a section on Jackson’s work and often refers to his ideas 
elsewhere. Head refers to an 1864 lecture by Jackson, which discusses two types 
of speech, intellectual or propositional and emotional or inteijectional. Of these. 
Head cites Jackson, “Healthy language could be divided into two distinct forms, 
which may be separated by disease”, and then adds himself “speech, apart fi’om its 
articulatory aspect, is double, consisting of intellectual and emotional language, 
and it is the former that is usually disturbed in consequence of cerebral disease”
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(1926,1, 35). More recently these two forms have been linked to the dominant and 
non-dominant hemispheres, and such separations are not disputed. To me they 
represent two different and complementary parts of a functional system, or indeed 
a Funktionssystem or system of [different] functions - as envisioned by Luria. 
Tntellectual’ or ‘propositional’ language played a similar role in Luria’s work (cf. 
Jackson cited in ibid. I, 51). More importantly the many symptoms of the various 
forms of aphasia listed by Jackson (in ibid. I, 37,40-3, 45) are almost sufficient in 
themselves to prompt the use of a concept like ‘system of functions’ to help 
explain the dynamics of such systems and their disorders. Head draws the 
following conclusions. “Speech, reading and writing are acquired at a period when 
the central nervous system is structurally complete... [Such] acts of symbolic 
formation and expression ... employed highly integrated arrangements, developed 
originally for simpler purposes. These in turn depend on the integrity of a series of 
arcs or circuits subserving processes on the most diverse physiological levels, the 
highest of which are to be found in the cortex” (ibid. I, 475). Here again we find 
functional systems, not of the ‘complementary’ type above, but ones that integrate 
many different activities across levels, and most consistent with Luria’s 
‘prototype’ of the combined verbal and motor functional system. [NB. The 
Russians too would probably have enjoyed the supplementation of the old reflex 
‘arcs’ with ‘circuits’]. Jackson was a firm opponent o f ‘faculty’ theory, especially 
as regards speech. Head amplifies this in respect of the localization debate when 
he argues against centres as such. Instead such apparent convergences of activity 
should be considered as “foci of integration” (ibid. 1,498).
There is as yet no evidence that Luria read Jackson directly in the period covered 
by this thesis. Certainly Vygotsky’s later works give no sign of this, though 
possibly Luria was more fortunate, but he could only have read him in 1932 or 
1933 at the very earliest. Jackson wrote of different kinds of centres at different 
levels, but not those considered in localizationist approaches tied to faculty theory. 
In his classic series of lectures from 1884, Evolution and Dissolution o f the 
Nervous System^ Jackson wrote, “ (1) Evolution is a passage from the lowest and 
the best organized, that is to say, from the lowest, well-organized centres; putting 
this otherwise, the progress is from centres comparatively well-organized at birth 
up to those highest centres, which are continually organizing through life. (2)
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Evolution is a passage from the most simple to the most complex; again from the 
lowest to the highest centres... (3) Evolution is a passage from the most automatic 
to the most voluntary” (Jackson 1932, II, 46). He also said, “A consideration of 
the effects of epileptic paroxysms lead, I submit, to the conclusion that the highest 
centres represent, through the mediation of the middle and lowest centres -  that is 
re-represent -  all parts of the organism in most intricate combinations” (ibid. 64). 
The concept of re-representation was to be important in Luria’s subsequent 
theoretical development. It explained why frontal cortical lesions led to systemic 
failure. It also explained why Luria was correct to see that the new systems did not 
operate on the basis of reflexes and instincts, but incorporated them in higher, 
more voluntary systems. That is, there was a qualitative change in adult human 
behaviour. Jackson adopted the concept of ‘levels of integration’ from Herbert 
Spencer -  much to Spencer’s surprise. Spencer, of course, had borrowed this 
concept from Hegel. As Joseph Needham pointed out, “Dialectical materialism ... 
based itself on that very evolutionary progression which Spencer described with 
so much care. His successive levels of integration are allowed for in the dialectics 
of nature, as in hardly any other philosophy” (Needham 1986, 255-6). We have 
already seen instances of all these key points in Luria’s comments at the 
beginning of Chapter IX (Luria 1932a, 301-3). They were all to play a very 
significant role in his future work.
P. K. Anokhin, the physiologist and friend of Luria, followed at a short distance. 
Although he later used Spencer and Jackson’s concept o f ‘levels of integration’ he 
did not do so at the time. His concept of the fimctional system was unlike Luria’s 
initial use of the term. Instead he saw it as a relatively self-contained physiological 
system in which feedback was central to its functioning (Anokhin 1935b, 52-5). 
[NB. I intend to publish an article that will explain his theory in more detail]. He 
wrote:
According to our concepts developed in 1932-5, the functional system is a selective 
integrative formation of the organism. It is a true unit of integration, which arises 
during the dynamic development of any qualitative activity of the organism as a 
whole. We have always emphasized [since 1935 -cf. Anokhin 1935a, 1935b] that 
the functional system is always a selective central-periphery formation and not
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merely a formation of the central nervous system per se. The mere fact that this 
concept developed in our laboratoiy was the result of the difficulties that we 
experienced in 1932 in explaining the compensatory mechanisms of the organism 
as a whole solely on the basis of the generally accepted reflex arc, emphasizes its 
special physiological architecture. It turned out that systematic adjustments of 
motor acts in connection with compensation of disturbed functions proceed on the 
basis of continuous information from the results obtained. Consequently, to an 
extent the entire process of compensation acquires a circular character (P. K. 
Anokhin 1974, 190; cf. Anokhin and Ivanov 1935).
Amazingly Jackson foresaw this entirely in a series of published notes from 1868- 
9. He even spells out that “The unit of the sensori-motor management, by the 
excitation of which the movement results, must then have organic connections 
with the units of the sensori-motor arrangements, by excitation of which the 
movements before and after result” (Jackson 1932, II, 236). It now begins to look 
as though the concepts of feedback and self-regulation have roots not only earher 
than Norbert Wiener, but also Anokhin and Bemshtein. Jackson adds (ibid.) 
“Similarly there must be an organic connection betwixt the two sensori-motor 
arrangements for the word ‘ball’ and the image ‘ball’ as the two are in 
indissoluble association”. This further example of an ‘organic connection’ has 
implications beyond that of the physiology of functional systems. It extends to 
language and human relationships, as Luria and Vygotsky were very well aware 
(cf. Ill, i, 72-3, & iii, 87). It is significant that the last publication of Macdonald 
Critchley, a postwar international collaborator of Luria’s, was a major biography 
of Jackson (Critchley and Critchley 1998).
Head made the important point: “That form of behaviour which we call the use of 
language has a history, and many of the phenomena of disordered speech 
resemble [though not strictly] the stages by which the complete act was developed 
in each individual” (Head 1926, I, 510). Again Head re-emphasizes the 
importance of the process of the development of higher cortical functions. More 
significant for Luria perhaps were Head’s comments on the role of language in 
differentiating humans from other animals, in regulating human behaviour. “When 
man learned to speak and understand spoken words, he acquired the power of
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registering relations. Action was no longer determined by perception or 
unformulated mental responses... The use of symbols materially shortened the 
processes and extended his powers of thinking” (ibid. I, 523). “Logical thinking 
holds in check and diminishes affective and intuitive responses. An animal, or 
even a man under certain conditions, tends to react directly to the perceptual or 
emotional aspects of a situation; but symbolic formulation enables us to subject it 
to analysis and regulate our behaviour accordingly. We thereby gain the power of 
breaking up a situation for the purpose of selective action...” (ibid. I, 525). Of 
course, most of these points had been said, in one way or another, by Herder and 
his successors. Head’s reputation for analysing the effects of war wounds was as 
high as Goldstein’s; his field of aphasia concentrated more on language and 
disorganization, and his overall approach answered more of Luria’s questions and 
was also consistent with his own thinking. Therefore his words would almost 
certainly have carried weight with Luria. Above I noted that Luria’s comments on 
functional structures involving environmental elements would today be seen in 
terms of the nature-nurture debate, and would at that time have been seen in terms 
of cultural-historical theory. But here apparently Head is talking of those same 
‘environmental’ elements, which he termed “symbols” in a neurological 
framework. He also talks of development within this same framework. 
Neurological thinking was clearly not isolated from that of other sciences and 
ideas. But the point is that this time round, when Vygotsky re-introduced the ideas 
of Herder, as mediated and amended by Potebnia, they took flight because they 
were not accompanied by various assumptions or speculations as to how the mind 
or the brain worked, but based on plausible scientific hypotheses that were rapidly 
becoming theories. Vygotsky, no amateur himself in these matters, was 
undoubtedly aware of the significance of this sea change, and he himself took part 
in investigations at the Clinic for Nervous Diseases and elsewhere. Whether their 
private correspondence will show if they saw things in this Hght remains to be 
seen, but I believe Luria’s neuropsychological investigations not only formed the 
basis of his own development, but formed a substantial and necessary complement 
to Vygotsky’s work. We will discuss this further in section III and assess the 
influence of Vygotsky’s approach on Luria. Chapter 8 will also show how the 
cultural-historical approach of Vygotsky was intimately related to the 
development of these theories.
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Chapter XI continues with a brief look at the structure of the reactive processes in 
functional neuroses, based on material presented in Chapters VIII and IX. Luria 
found that, whereas increasing the intensity of stimuli to those with a functional 
neurosis led to a proportionate overreaction, normal adults, able to isolate their 
responses from the motor system, suffered no such problem (Luria 1932a, 373). 
He concluded that the structure of the reactions of hysterics was relatively 
primitive, and reported experiments done with Vygotsky and a researcher named 
Eidomov as confirming this view (377). During periods of excitabihty the 
functional barrier was destroyed. In those suffering from brain damage at birth 
and lacking higher cortical mechanisms, the higher regulation often proved to be 
absent. In such cases (largely based on material from Lebedinskii) reactions were 
different from those of disturbed adults, varying both in form and intensity. “The 
behaviour of the [oligophrenic] is not disorganized, because it never was 
organized...” (380). This insufficiency of the cortical apparatus accounts for the 
absence of a functional barrier. This “is connected with the activity of the higher 
functional systems” (384).
Luria found it possible to lower this barrier in normal adults by experimenting 
when they were tired. Also, instead of allowing them to focus on the experiment, 
they were talked to or given a book to read. “Such a functional exclusion of the 
higher cortical mechanisms [from the intended task] evokes a return to the 
primitive, diffuse type of reactive process and a sharp lowering of the ‘functional 
barrier’” (385). Nevertheless “the reactive processes of the [adult] human do not 
[present] the simple phenomena which might be governed by the laws of the 
lower reflex mechanisms” (387). They differ qualitatively, “in that they are 
constructed not only from below out of the simplest neurodynamic mechanisms, 
but also from above, according to the laws that govern the activity of the higher 
psychological systems” (ibid.). On the following page Luria makes further 
criticisms of reflex theory, leading the translator to refer to publications of the 
Pavlov school presenting the opposite view (cf. V, iv, 140). Luria continues, 
noting the “instrumentar' nature of speech. “Precisely in the activity connected 
with speech we succeeded in observing the transfer from the primitive, diffuse and 
direct process to the process that spht into two fimctionally different phases -  the
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phases of preparation and execution. By virtue of speech, the primitive 
impulsiveness is overcome, and direct attempts of adaptation are substituted by 
the preliminary connection in words; after this comes the motor execution”. “We 
intentionally started this book with a discussion of cases of aphasia... In aphasia 
there occurs not only a simple dropping out of speech as a communicating 
function, but also the associated disintegration of the whole of organized 
behaviour...” (Luria 1932a, 389). This is markedly so in the elaboration of 
intention. Here Luria refers to two experiments from April and May 1930 with 
two aphasie people (390-1). Although in some cases actions may be isolated fi*om 
the normal effector processes by the nature of the disorder, in other cases the 
fimctional barrier can be shown to be weakened. “This is shown by the prominent 
role of perseveration in aphasia; the whole structure of the paraphasic disturbance 
of speech with the jumbled and broken words can be explained fi’om this point of 
view... We conclude that speech is a preeminent factor in behaviour”, which is 
why the investigation of aphasia is so central to our work (393).
Luria notes the emergence of the fimctional barrier alongside the development of 
speech and the higher cortical mechanisms. “This leads us to believe that in the 
fimctional barrier we have not a natural mechanism, but one of cultural origin,” 
but nevertheless having a regulating character (394). “We think that the inclusion 
of the systems of internal speech or the analogous systems of auxiliary stimuli in 
the reactive process is fully sufficient to explain the mechanism of the functional 
barrier”. “By considering a reaction not as a mechanical habit, but as a 
mnemonic-technical act, realized by the inclusion of complex psychological 
mechanisms, we are able to illuminate the nature of psychological reactions” 
(395).
As we have seen, “a slight intellectual disturbance” may evoke a major 
disorganization in behaviour. The inclusion of speech as a regulating factor in the 
higher psychological processes explains how this can occur.
The reactive process gains a tremendous advantage by the inclusion within it of the 
regulating functional system, thereby becoming more plastic and independent of 
the mechanical conditions, but at the same time this lays it open to accidents that
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may occur in the regulating system. In the case of the failure of speech, the 
affective disorganization of the higher cognitive processes shows how profound the 
disintegration provoked by damage to the higher regulating systems may be. The 
reactive process of the adult human cannot be explained as a mechanical habit. It is 
constructed not only from below, but also from above, including within itself the 
regulating systems of a higher psychological order (ibid.).
Although “these systems may be disturbed during affect and conflict, they may 
also aid humans in overcoming disorganization” (396). Furthermore, one might 
add that finding the means of compensating for various disorders might also be 
the means of proving Luria’s ideas about the nature of higher psychological 
processes.
In a small way this is what Luria set out to do in Chapter XII, ‘The Control of 
Behaviour’. This final chapter begins by dismissing current theories on the nature 
of voluntary activity or ‘will’, mainly on the basis that they were too abstract to 
take account of psychological processes. They were either voluntaristic - even 
hedonistic - or mechanically reductionist. The supporters of the latter approach, 
who included Kurt Lewin with his theory of Quasi-Beduerfnisse, consider “the 
voluntary act as automatic, [claiming] that these automatisms direct the free ‘I’, 
and they posit that the executive of the automatisms is necessity, inclination, 
emotion” (399). “Nevertheless, the study of the Quasi-Beduerfnisse put us on the 
right track in the resolution of these complicated questions. In view of the fact that 
the ‘voluntary mechanism’ is a mechanism of subordination, especially by 
artificially created stimuli that may replace natural necessity, the theory makes an 
actual step forward in the scientific understanding of this problem” (400). This is 
evident in the tension created by the structure of an action that is interrupted 
before completion -  as in the experiments of Ovsiankina and Zeigarnik.
[The difference in the use of auto-stimuli and quasi-needs is] what primarily 
distinguishes humans from animals, together with the fact that humans are able to 
control not only the external world, but also their own behaviour indirectly by the 
creation of artificial necessities and stimuli produced artificially especially for the 
purpose. This is a cardinal factor in the development of behaviour.
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This cultural development is the means whereby humans may include a dynamic 
mechanism, which allows them to master their own behaviour and [also] bring 
about automatically the corresponding actions. While in the first stages of his 
development humans were able to act only on the surroundings, making 
instruments that helped them gain mastery over the external situation -  his further 
growth began to elaborate those artificial stimuli that enabled them to think of 
themselves as objects of action and that aided them in controlling their own 
behaviour... Voluntary behaviour is the ability to create stimuli and to subordinate 
them", or in other words, to bring into being stimuli of a special order, directed to 
the organization of behaviour (401).
Luria then cites his works with Vygotsky as evidence that initially such control 
came from without in the form of the production of cultural stimuli. “This external 
auto-stimulation is substituted by an internal one. The ‘spontaneous’ 
estabUshment of complicated Quasi-Beduerfnisse seen in the adult are the result 
of the profound cultural reconstruction of activity dependent on the cortical 
apparatus, without which we could not understand complex psychological 
functions” (402). However in the experiments about to be discussed we should 
remember “the fundamental law: direct attempts [by the subject] to control his 
behaviour always lead to negative results; its mastery is achieved only by indirect 
means'"' (403).
This law is confirmed - notably in attempts by young children or hysterics to exert 
direct, unmediated control over their behaviour. Luria felt obliged to note the 
paradoxical nature of this ‘voluntary control’. This was shown firstly in an 
experiment with a five and a half-year-old child that took place in April 1930 
(404-5), and then in experiments with hysterics (408-9). In the latter case Luria 
found that the use of indirect methods proved more successful. It was to be 
expected that both children and hysterics would react impulsively. Those suffering 
from Parkinson’s disease were affected by a disorder of the subcortical ganglia, 
but the cortical processes ought to operate relatively normally, and so ought to be 
able to compensate in appropriate circumstances. Luria’s combined method often 
met with too rigid a response. It was found that a subject not able to walk across 
the floor was able to climb stairs (Gantt has ‘ladder’), and that if pieces of paper
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were placed on the floor as signals to stimulate each separate step, as on the stairs, 
the subject could then walk across the floor (410). (In later accounts, Luria (1979, 
128-9, and E. Luria 1994, 72) attributes the discovery of this method to Vygotsky. 
Vygotsky also reports the experiment (Vygotsky 1997f, 105-6) and possibly 
implies the presence of I. D. Sapir). The problem lay in linking an appropriate 
stimulus or signal to a fimctional system. Luria found that the act of winking, a 
semi-voluntary activity, still functioned well and required minimal effort. So “this 
activity (winking) was made a conditioned signal in order to connect two reactions 
into a single functional system...” (Luria 1932a, 410). Speech has more 
significant fimctions, among which is
the means of regulating and organizing the external world by including the separate 
elements in a stable framework. On the other hand it is the agency for organizing 
behaviour, planning further action, and making it possible for the human to avoid 
complete reliance on direct optical situations... While some authors, such as 
Piaget, consider the speech of the young child to be ‘egocentric’, merely 
accompanying the activity of the child, we have proven that ‘egocentric’ speech 
has the function of planning the activity of the child and thus stimulating it. [Here 
the ‘we’ refers to Vygotsky]. This new planning role for speech ... begins with 
cases of auto-commands and ends with complex forms of judgment.
After this disturbances in behaviour associated with the failure of speech become 
clear. Namely, those facts showing that the primaiy defect in aphasia is one of 
‘volition’: the inability to elaborate intentions, the dependence upon external 
situations, and the marked distractibility of the subject -  are comprehensible when 
we study the central role that speech plays in the organization of human behaviour 
(Luria 1932a, 412).
In one experiment an hysteric proved able to control his movements by including 
auto-dictation -  something that he was unable to do by direct, i.e., unmediated 
effort (413). Although Parkinson’s disease often proved intractable, if the speech 
connection was included within a larger structure, some success was obtained. 
That is, while a direct attempt to control behaviour failed, it succeeded when 
activated within a different system (414-6). “The process of the elaboration of the 
functional barrier consists in the transfer fi*om direct action to a cultural, indirect
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operation. The delay of the immediate impulses, the isolation of the excitation 
from a direct discharge into the motor sphere, and the turn to a preliminary, 
central preparation of the process preempts direct attempts” to act. “The inclusion 
of the reactive process within the ‘circuit’ of higher psychological systems 
constitutes the mechanism of the functional barrier” (420).
Finally Luria looks at the importance of the case where a patient is gradually 
drawn into making conscious a traumatic situation. The case was dealt with by 
Luria’s old colleague, the psychiatrist, analyst, historian, and sometime therapist 
for Adolf Ioffe, namely luri Kannabikh. The patient was hysterical. She suffered 
from an alcoholic and abusive husband. Under hypnosis she was eventually able 
to come to terms with her trauma by the mediation of drawing her terror in 
symbolic form, a picture which included a snake, a common symbol in Russia for 
drunkenness. Having produced this, she was then able to go on to control her 
emotions (423-6). “This experiment allows us to understand the mechanics 
underlying the action of symbols as emotional signals, and on the other hand, it 
helps us to see how the mechanism of substituting cultural symbols for the 
primitive process is the most important factor in the control o f behaviour” (426). 
Perhaps Luria chose this example to bring us full circle in his experimental 
explorations. This time he could explain such a result both in detail and in terms 
of an overall scientific theory.
The development of the human as an historical subject occurs as the elaboration of 
historical, cultural behaviour. This development elicits certain new mechanisms 
that are peaks in his historical evolution. Speech and the use of signs, the 
permeation of activity by the use of cultural means [transform the human]. These 
new functions do not remain isolated psychological processes, but permeate the 
whole activity and structure of behaviour so that we find them literally in every 
finger movement. To understand human behaviour and its disintegration and 
organization without these cultural, psychological mechanisms is impossible... The 
analysis of complex cultural mechanisms is the key to understanding simple 
neurodynamic processes. We have done this with only a few psychophysiological 
processes, but we are convinced that this system of investigation answers many of 
the riddles of human psychology (428).
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The Significance of the Development of the Concept of Functional Systems
for Psychology
Of the six reviewers of the book that I have read from 1933-5, five wrote, often at 
great length, about the shortcomings of the translation. One, Lawrence Kubie, 
stated among many complaints that the book was “full of passages which are 
either partially or totally unintelligible” (Kubie 1933, 331). He attributed other 
shortcomings to Luria, including the use of undefined pseudo-physio logical 
terminology, but this is impossible to justify without the Russian original. Another 
reviewer, J. F. Brown, who had worked in Germany with Kurt Lewin and was at 
that time publishing his own research in Psychologische Forschung, commented 
that Luria’s German papers “would certainly not convince one that he is an 
unbelievably clumsy stylist” (Brown 1933, 381). This I can confirm from both his 
German and Russian texts. Kubie criticized Luria’s presentation of experiments 
and methodology. It is quite clear from the text, however, that Luria is in many 
cases citing the research of others, and is also often using the examples in an 
illustrative way. In a book already 450 pages long a detailed account of every 
experiment was impossible. Kubie’s evident animus towards Luria may be based 
on an over-zealous defence of psychoanalytic tenets against Luria’s theoretical 
developments or sheer ftnstration at the text. He did, however, consider Chapter 
TV’s use of hypnotic suggestion to be “of real value to all who are interested in 
dynamic psychology and particularly perhaps to the psychoanalyst” (Kubie 1933, 
334). He considered it confirmed fundamental psychoanalytic findings. The editor 
of the Psychoanalytic Review, on the other hand, omitted to mention this chapter 
altogether, but was much more favourable to the book as a whole, describing it as 
“this very significant contribution” (White 1934, 236).
This appears to have been the general response to the work. I did initially wonder 
whether the quality of the translation and Gantt’s ‘condensing’ of explanatory 
passages might have prevented the reviewers from grasping its key points, but 
although Kubie was not alone in some of his criticisms, only Taylor found Luria’s
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theory “confiised” and his accounts of experiments “sometimes puzzling” (1934- 
5, 232). Most noted Luria’s comments that he was neither a psychoanalyst nor a 
behaviourist and the important role of his method, and half saw the influence of 
Lewin. Myers mentioned the important role of language in child development and 
the concept of ‘neurodynamic age’ (1933, 1362), Taylor also noted the latter, the 
importance of the central mechanisms, and the construction of the reactive 
processes not only from below but also from above (1934-5, 231). Everyone 
commented on the important role played by the ‘functional barrier’ in Luria’s 
work, but none mentioned the functional system or the influence of Head. Geldard 
(1933, 487), Myers, White and Brown all considered the work to be an important 
scientific contribution, but only Brown showed any real insight into it.
Brown was already familiar with Luria’s German and English articles. He was 
very impressed. “In Luria’s work we have the beginnings of an experimental 
psychopathology. Its significance is therefore scarcely to be overrated” (1933, 
377). “Primarily the significance of Luria’s work is a methodological one, 
although his factual contributions are by no means few or unimportant” (378).
Before he was able to devise [the combined verbal and motor response] method, 
however, he was forced to consider the theory of organized behaviour. Before he 
was able to set up his working hypothesis he was forced to define precisely the 
concepts with which he wished to operate. His general mode of attack is what 
Lewin calls the ‘constructive’ method... [This comprises three steps:] (1) a precise 
definition of concepts ... , (2) the manufacture of a working hypothesis, (3) its 
experimental verification or invalidation. Of the hundreds of workers on emotion, 
Lewin and Luria have been the only two to use this method consistently and have 
hence, in my estimation at least, made the most important contributions of 
contemporary psychologists to our knowledge of emotion (ibid.).
Although Khomskaia considered Luria’s planning of experiments to be similar to 
Anokhin’s approach (Homskaya 2001, 115; cf. II, ii, 58), I think Brown has a 
relevant point here. He adds, “In using this method Luria first defines his concepts 
in terms of a theory of organization” (1933, 278). This is true and exceedingly 
important in view of the various reductionist approaches that did not even look at
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organization. Undoubtedly also Gestalt theory helped Luria enormously in this. 
But, contrary to Brown, not only did he not use the ‘configurationar approach, but 
he went beyond Gestalt theory. Brown adds another important point, namely that 
“Luria’s greatest contribution seems to me to be in the application of the 
‘constructive’ method to the psychology of emotion... What we need in 
psychology is more rather than less theory. On this point Luria’s work is 
convincing... [He] uncovers an impressive array of facts and the beginnings of 
some laws about the dynamics of conflict” (ibid. 379).
Luria “develops a theory of the ‘functional barrier’ which receives confirmation in 
his researches on the ontogenetic development of organized behaviour, on 
hysterical patients and on the mentally deficient” (ibid.). Here Brown seems to be 
going along with Luria on the importance of development -  further than his 
Gestalt colleagues are often presented as going. He cites Luria on the importance 
of complex cultural mechanisms as the key to understanding simple dynamic 
processes, and agrees with Luria that “this system of investigation answers many 
of the riddles of human psychology”. Although he does not formally tie the two 
points together, he also quotes Luria, “Psychology finds itself in a great crisis, and 
what had been formerly studied apart as independent isolated activities are not 
investigated in their functional relations to one another” (ibid. 380, cf. Luria 
1932a, 428).
Brown at least could see where Luria was going. But he never mentions 
‘functional systems’. While I do have the luxury of hindsight and a great deal 
more space than Luria’s reviewers, I do think it is legitimate to conclude fi*om 
Luria’s book that logically, for him, the concept of the functional barrier, the 
ontogenetic development of higher psychological processes, and the 
transformation of a psychology of isolated studies into an integrated science do, in 
a sense, depend upon the concept of the fimctional system, especially as applied to 
higher psychological processes. It is, however, true that the connections do need 
to be spelled out. It is also true that Gantt admitted that he had condensed the 
theoretical discussion (cf. V, introduction), so that we do not have Luria’s 
complete views on the functional barrier and the functional system. Indeed the 
additional material in the new Russian edition of the book will almost certainly
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confirm this and help elaborate this key area. I will now attempt to draw out the 
theoretical implications of these concepts from the presently available material.
Today many people will be familiar with Luria’s association with the term 
functional system, but few will be familiar with the term functional barrier. Indeed 
the latter term does not seem to appear at all in Luria’s later works. Although 
much of his postwar work concerned aphasia and other neurological disturbances, 
he did not find it necessary to employ this concept. Perhaps the term was more 
closely related to thinking about neurotic disorders. In a sense the incorporation of 
cultural mechanisms in this barrier might be extended to cultural meanings, 
cultural mores and ideologies. Perhaps when W. H. R. Rivers criticized Freud’s 
use of the ‘political’ concept of censorship in a neuropsychological context, Luria 
felt that a term like functional barrier might be a suitably scientific 
reinterpretation. But there is no evidence for this. Perhaps Luria was worried that 
it might indeed be interpreted in this way, because it only seems to have real value 
in a psychiatric sense, and then only as a metaphor. Perhaps the theoretical 
commentary about to be published in Russian but ‘condensed’ in English will 
clarify this.
However, even in The Nature o f Human Conflicts, Luria formulates an alternative 
solution - namely, that the receptory-connecting system and the motor effector 
system “play fimctionally unequal roles in the activity of the organism, and they 
control incomparable structures” (Luria 1932a, 289). As I said in my commentary 
(cf. VII, i, 187), this does not mean that Luria viewed the two approaches as 
incompatible. Perhaps, rather, he subsequently saw the concept of the fimctional 
barrier as something of a distraction from the main points he was trying to put 
over. After all, the higher psychological processes as a whole were formed with 
the incorporation of the same cultural mechanisms that were found in the concept 
of the functional barrier. As I suggested earlier, the concept of barrier owed much 
to Kurt Lewin and, though it made sense in terms of his concepts of structures and 
fields, perhaps Luria felt it was a distraction in terms of his emphasis on systems 
and processes. To have one’s theory misunderstood on the basis of an additional 
and, I would say, marginal and, in the final analysis, logically unnecessary 
concept would not reflect good scientific practice. It may also be the case that, in
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the hostile climate that Luria faced from his involvement with cultural-historical 
theory, he felt he should cut his losses and jettison the concept. On the whole I 
prefer the ‘scientific’ argument for Luria made no attempt to resurrect the concept, 
whereas in the case of the functional systems approach, he maintained its use 
throughout his career, even though pretending it was the physiological version of 
the concept proposed by his friend Anokhin.
As previously stated, the fimctional system appeared in its debut as a 
Funktionssystem or system of fimctions. Luria did not connect it with Goldstein or 
Lewin, but related it instead to Hughlings Jackson and Head. It seems that Luria 
came up with the term independently of them all and in relation to his own 
‘prototypical’ model of the combined verbal and motor system. He saw how this 
system operated when joined and when in a state of disintegration. Inevitably 
when he read Head’s book on aphasia, he recognized the systemic nature of the 
various disorders. This not only provided a key to the structural organization of 
the higher mental processes that he was studying, but elicited a stream of 
publications from Luria about aphasia that continued for the rest of his career. 
Head wrote, “A want of chronological exactitude [in cases of aphasia] will throw 
the whole movement into disorder; its ‘kinetic melody’ has been destroyed” (Head 
1926,1, 88-9). [NB. Head may have borrowed the term ‘kinetic melody’ from the 
early Gestalt theorist Christian von Ehrenfels’ (1859-1932) studies on music -  see 
his articles in Smith 1988]. Luria responded warmly to this term and often used it 
in his later writings. And it is the creation of these working systems that underlie 
not only the operation of the higher mental processes, but their very existence. In 
accepting that new psychological systems can be created out of already existing 
morphological formations in the brain, together with external stimuli, including 
the mediation of various cultural instruments, including languages, all the 
limitations of holistic and localizationist approaches to the operation of the brain 
became redundant. It is the comprehensive nature of this theoretical 
transformation that is so striking.
The fimctional systems approach is also non-reductionist in that it can 
accommodate many other forms of partial or apparently discrete systems in its 
overall approach, especially in lower physiological systems. It is not a theory as
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such, which thereby allows it to be more inclusive. It is not initially prescriptive 
about the nature of interrelations and interactions between such systems -  that 
would require a theory. Certainly the relationships between many systems were 
already apparent at some level. Furthermore the Spencerian concept of ‘levels of 
integration’ as mediated by Jackson and received by Anokhin (1974, 190), and 
discussed in the previous section of this chapter, while not explicit in Luria’s 
book, is certainly implicit and only awaiting the republication of Jackson’s work 
for it to be made explicit. As it stands at this time, however, it is rather an 
explanatory approach that facilitates research into the nature and operation of such 
systems as a necessary prerequisite for such higher order theorizing. But in World 
War II it fell to Luria to follow in the steps of Kurt Goldstein and Henry Head and 
diagnose and treat those who had suffered war wounds; his approach was already 
of immense practical use.
It is true that much of this is implicit in Lewin. The researches of Lewin and Luria 
confirmed that one could not achieve anything, including a degree of self-mastery, 
by a simple direct voluntary act, but that it was mediated and indirect. Although 
speech itself is considered to be a fairly direct form of action in comparison with 
other forms of signalling or self-signalling that Luria employed, such as winking 
or placing sheets of paper across the floor, it also has many components that in 
turn may be party to many different functional systems. This fact is now well 
known to students of aphasia. The point is that even apparently direct activities are 
themselves mediated in many ways.
Although both Lewin and Luria accepted this, Luria felt that Lewin adopted an 
automatic and determinist approach to the solution of needs. He did grasp that 
humans possessed this form of organization, which meant that both the bottom up 
and top down systems combined in quasi-needs. Yet he failed to accept a possible 
consequence of this, namely, that if humans could operate from the top down in 
order to meet those needs, they could consciously formulate their own needs and, 
to a degree, take charge of their own destiny. Although Luria introduced this 
important element into The Nature o f Human Conflicts, he does not expound on it 
at any great length. This was a major contribution of Vygotsky, following Herder, 
Marx et al. Surprisingly Vygotsky barely appears in the book. Perhaps this is
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explained by Luciano Mecacci in his survey of Russian neuropsychology and 
psychology. Brain and History. Although Vygotsky was a strong exponent of the 
position that there was a cerebral reorganization of higher psychological functions 
and did pursue studies of his own, his ideas “could not be adequately developed 
by him. However the idea of a ‘growth’ of cerebral functions in the course of 
ontogenetic development and the possibility of delineating their real ‘history’, 
strictly connected to the individual history, remained fundamental. It should be 
noted that Vygotsky’s conception does not concern the concrete ‘way’ in which 
the functional connections of the brain come about, this being to him the territory 
of physiological research” (Mecacci 1979, 63). This confirms my view that 
whatever Vygotsky’s theoretical contribution, which was surely considerable, and 
also inspired by the work of Goldstein, Lewin, Head, and Jackson, Luria’s 
complementary contribution was vital in order to ground Vygotsky’s work in 
terms of neuropsychology.
In Luria’s preface to Mecacci’s book, probably one of the last things he wrote, he 
does praise the contribution of Anokhin and Bemshtein to the development of 
physiological theory and the role of the concept of the functional system in their 
work, but he does not attribute his own ideas and theoretical development at this 
stage (1932) to them. This is entirely comprehensible since we have seen that 
Anokhin’s own account states that he did not develop his ideas till a little later. 
Instead, while Luria again fails to discuss his own role, he praises that of 
Vygotsky and, at the end of this passage, that of Leont’ev. He writes:
Without denying that every type of behaviour can be broken down into elementary 
reflexes, Vygotsky recognized behavioural ‘units’ not in the reflexes themselves, 
but in those complex forms of mediated activity that arise in society and in history 
and that constitute the essential components of complex human mental activity. It 
is apparent that this point of view would lead to a revision of the principal 
conceptions of mental activity. This is why Vygotsky, from the outset, 
concentrated on those complex and chsavgmg functional systems of cerebral activity 
that are formed in the historical-social process. He called these systems ‘extra- 
cortical functions’ and then came to include in the natural processes of cerebral 
activity such things as external supports, objects in the external world, helping
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means, and, above all, language. These represented the cerebral work that is carried 
on by means that are objective and external to the brain, and that had been created 
in the course of the history of human society. Vygotsky’s students and one of those 
who continued his work, Alexei N. Leont’ev, used to call them ‘functional organs’, 
meaning that the brain, in its process of development, confronted new tasks not so 
much by forming new morphological organs but rather by creating new and 
changeable functional systems (Luria 1979b, xiii, cf. also Luria 1979a, 124ff).
At this stage one begins to wonder whether Luria suffered from some sort of 
delusion, a ‘Luria syndrome’, of being pathologically unable to present his role in 
any process of discovery that also involves Vygotsky. Vygotsky’s role in the 
founding of cultural-historical theory remains unquestioned, but to see 
neuropsychology and functional systems entirely in these terms is completely one­
sided. No wonder several serious scholars attribute the developing use of the 
concept of the functional system to Vygotsky. Yet we have seen how the ‘system 
of functions’ developed from Luria’s combined verbal and motor response 
method. He never mentions his collaborator Lebedinskii in respect of the term. 
Lebedinskii’s own book does not use the term (Lebedinskii 1931); nor was it used 
in an earlier joint article (Lebedinskii and Luria c.1929) that was the Russian 
version of the German article in which the term first appeared. We have also seen 
that at the time Luria did not mention Vygotsky in this respect, but rather Jackson 
and Head.
The long-running confusion caused by the ‘Luria syndrome’ is well documented. 
Levitin writes, “Luria shunned publicity and avoided answering [Michael] Cole’s 
question” of how he came to be the best known Russian psychologist in America. 
He later complained to Levitin “over the telephone that his name had [appeared in 
an article] ranked with those of the great scientists Pavlov and Sherrington” 
(Levitin 1982, 134, also 165). Although he was willing to talk about concrete 
studies and other scientists, he presumably felt it was not his role to express his 
own specific contribution or to judge his own significance -  and when others did 
he became embarrassed. But finally, as a form of postscript to the discussion of 
this issue, we must accept that the most significant factor in this ‘Luria syndrome’ 
was not a personal problem, but, as Michael Cole very recently pointed out (2002,
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personal communication), simply the fear o f having a high public profile that 
Stalin engendered in generations of Russians.
Since most Western writing focuses on Vygotsky, Luria’s praise of him is simply 
taken for granted. Luria said, “The most exciting years of the century and of my 
own life were the twenties -  those associated with Vygotsky. I can hardly claim 
any credit for what I’ve done” (ibid. 164). We cannot leave such statements 
unaddressed. As regards cultural-historical theory we should ask instead why 
Vygotsky chose Luria as his principal partner. Previously he had also encouraged 
Luria’s independent work, particularly in the development of what became a 
whole new approach to neuropsychology -  and was rewarded with what in effect 
provided the neuropsycho logical ‘ground’ of cultural-historical theory. When 
Luria says how Vygotsky encouraged him to use the combined motor and verbal 
method in investigating the role of speech in the organization of voluntary activity 
and planning, we should ask why (cf. Luria, cited in E. Luria 1994, 43, Luria 
1979a, 51-2). Luria may not have been prepared to face this issue, and many 
writers have failed even to recognize it. But Vygotsky certainly recognized the 
significance of Luria’s work, both his independent work and their joint work, and 
he knew that without Luria he would not have achieved half of what he set out to 
do. On his part Luria certainly felt the same. Together they were more effective, 
stimulating and significant scientists than on their own, which is why Luria looked 
back so often to their time together. I think this is the only realistic and 
comprehensive way of understanding their relationship.
Oddly enough, Vygotsky shared a common feature with Head and Jackson: he 
never used the term functional system -  except in one article which he co-wrote 
with Luria, to which we will now turn. Tool and Sign in Child Development was a 
long work apparently intended for publication in Carl Murchison’s Handbook o f  
Child Psychology in 1930. It is not clear whether it was completed in time, nor 
why it was not published in full until the 1980s (Vygotsky and Luria 1994b, 170 
notes). It was nevertheless written about the time that Luria was completing The 
Nature o f Human Conflicts. The style of the writing is certainly that of Vygotsky, 
but the use of the term functional system several times in the conclusion appears 
to confirm the presence of Luria as co-author. But it is clearly Vygotsky’s agenda
221
and literary approach that drive the piece, which is not only interesting, but 
important in that it raises issues that will be dealt with at greater length in the 
following chapter.
Part 6 of Tool and Sign, ‘Conclusions’, comprises three sections. In the first, ‘The 
Problem of Functional Systems’, they write:
As our studies show, not only is there an internal reconstruction and improvement 
of separate functions [in the process of the child’s psychological development], but 
intra-functional connections and relations change in a radical way. As a result new 
psychological systems appear that unite in complex co-operation a number of 
separate elementaiy functions. For want of a better term we call these 
psychological systems, these units of a higher order that replace homogeneous, 
single, elementary functions, the higher psychological functions (Vygotsky and 
Luria 1994b, 162).
Given the modus operandi of these systems we must “acknowledge the unity, but 
not the identity, o f higher and lower psychological functions’'’' (ibid. 163).
In the second section, ‘The Use of Tools by Animal and Human’, they add:
The higher form of activity is present wherever there is a mastery of one’s own 
behavioural processes, and initially one’s reactive functions. In subjecting the 
process of his own responses to his will, man thereby enters into a substantially 
new relationship with the environment, comes to a new functional use of 
environmental elements as stimuli-signs that he uses as external means to guide 
and regulate his own behaviour... Internal regulation of purposeful activity arises 
initially in external regulation. Reactive activity elicited and organized by man 
himself ceases to be reactive and becomes goal-directed. In this sense, the 
phylogenetic history of man’s practical intellect is closely linked, not only to 
mastering nature, but also to mastering himself. The history of work and the history 
of speech can scarcely be understood without the other (Vygotsky and Luria 1999, 
63).
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“The development of [this] freedom o f action^ as we have tried to show [in the 
previous parts], is in direct functional dependence on the use of signs” (ibid. 65). 
Whereas the quotations from the first part are totally consistent with Luria’s work, 
this second set of quotations, though implicit within it, clearly shows the influence 
of Vygotsky’s development of language theory in its application to child 
development and learning processes. It is a significant complement to Luria’s 
research in that the linking of the two enables us to begin to see psychology as a 
unified science, joining physiology and neurology to the development of both 
cognitive abilities and voluntary behaviour. This is related in turn to the mastery 
of nature, a historical conception developed by Marx. Although there may always 
be semi-discrete areas of study within psychology and associated sciences, the 
possibility of a unified science is again made apparent, this time more from 
Vygotsky’s perspective.
In the final section, ‘Word and Act’, they recognize “that all of the history of 
higher psychological functions is nothing but a change in initial fimctional 
relations and connections and the appearance and development of new mental 
functional systems” (ibid.). The ‘novaia psikicheskaia funktsional ’naia sistema ’ 
is now, unsurprisingly applied to that to which Luria first applied it, namely “the 
interflmctional relation of word and act” (ibid.).
[The studies of Luria and Vygotsky led them] to the conviction that there cannot be 
a singular formula that would encompass the whole range of variability of the 
relations between speech and action at all stages of development and in all forms of 
disintegration. In truth, the dialectical character of the development of functional 
systems cannot be adequately reflected in any one constructive formal, logical 
scheme ... [because none of them] considers the movement of concepts and the 
processes that lie behind them, the changeability of relations, the dynamics and 
dialectics of development (ibid. 66).
The most remarkable part of what happens with action and word in the process of 
development is ... the development of egocentric speech and ‘thou-centric’ action 
[i.e., speaking and acting as if to another], the conversion of a social method of 
behaviour into a function of individual adaptation, an internal transformation of 
action with the help of the word, [and the recognition of] the social nature of all
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higher mental functions, including practical action in its higher forms... This new 
relation of action to the individual, which arises due to the word and leads to 
mastery of action, this new relation of the actor to the external world, is manifested 
in free action, controlled and directed by the word -  none of this arises at the 
beginning of the process of development, and, for this reason, is not [normally] 
taken into account at all (ibid. 67).
Finally, “we might say: if the act, independent of the word, stands at the beginning 
of development, then at its end stands the word, which becomes the act. The word, 
which makes man’s actions free” (ibid. 68). This gloss on Goethe’s Faust is a 
typically Vygotskian literary flourish. Similar presentations almost certainly 
contributed to those ignorant commentators who dismissed him as not really being 
a psychologist. Yet not only has Goethe’s remark “in the beginning was the deed” 
been directly linked to his onetime teacher. Herder (cf. Schuetze 1925, 546), but 
Herder also recognized that reason was not innate, but arose only in the course of 
human development, involving both historical and ontogenetic factors (cf. 
Appendix I).
Inevitably, in the circumstances of the early 1930s (cf. VIII, i), Vygotsky was 
criticized for seeing psychology in individual terms. But without a theory of 
internalization, its social origin and cognitive, educational, intellectual, social and 
emotional consequences, not only do we lack the rudiments of a psychology, but 
the alternative theory of the individual as a sausage skin filled with social content 
-  all too common in Russia in the 1920s - is not only reductionist, but leaves the 
concepts of both society and the individual totally unarticulated. Those who 
attacked Vygotsky in the name of society were obviously unaware of Marx’s own 
stated position, namely that, “We must avoid postulating again ‘society’ as an 
abstraction vis-à-vis the individual. The individual is the social being'' (Marx 
1975, 298-9). Luria’s version of their joint comments in The Nature o f Human 
Conflicts (Chapter IX, 301-3) says much the same thing, but in very much ‘safer’ 
terms. Vygotsky and Luria were also criticized for introducing the concept of the 
sign into the discussion in an idealist fashion. We shall examine this aspect in the 
following chapter.
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Between 1932 and World War II Luria published only two papers directly related 
to his work in The Nature o f Human Conflicts. These were ‘Psychology and the 
Theory of Localization’ and ‘Problems of the Development and Disintegration of 
Higher Psychological Functions’ (Luria 1933a and 1933b). As yet I have not 
succeeded in obtaining a copy of either. Thus we do not know how he developed 
this side of his theory in the 1930s. Vygotsky also wrote two papers on identical 
subjects. Luria was at that time forced to work in Kharkov and Vygotsky hoped it 
might be possible to join him there and work together in the field of clinical 
psychology, but this move did not happen (E. Luria 1994, 72). Both Luria’s 
papers were delivered in the Ukraine, as were Vygotsky’s. Vygotsky did not 
deliver them himself as he was dying. ‘The Problem of the Development and 
Disintegration of Higher Mental Functions’ (Vygotsky 1960) has not been 
translated into Enghsh, though it is available in Italian (in Mecacci 1976, 330-47). 
The other paper ‘Psychology and the Theory of the Localization of Mental 
Functions’ exists in two translations, one by Luria (Vygotsky 1965), and one in 
the Collected Works (Vygotsky 1997g). It is a major work. In a few pages it 
brings together the threads of several arguments in The Nature o f Human Conflicts 
-  both explicit and implicit - and crystallizes them quite neatly. When Luria 
rescued it jfrom obscurity he ensured its publication, translated it and accompanied 
it with his own article. It would be interesting to compare his own paper from 
1933 on the subject, but that is not at present an option.
Localization is usually a subject closely tied to the diagnosis and treatment of 
lesions to the brain. In the nineteenth century famous discoveries by Carl von 
Wernicke and Paul Broca had uncovered areas of the brain associated with speech 
and its disorders, specifically sensory and motor aphasia. However in general such 
disorders proved to be more systemic and Goldstein and Lashley thought that the 
brain acted in a more holistic fashion. Vygotsky (1965, 381) argued that “the 
problem of localization is in essence the problem of the relation of the structural 
and the functional units in brain activities”. Although Gestalt psychology 
appeared “to be very productive in the early critical part of [its analysis by] 
overcoming the atomistic approach” (ibid.), it did not address the issue of the 
functional units.
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An adequate approach to the localization of functions can [however] be built on the 
basis of a historical theory of the higher psychological fonctions, with the basic 
idea that the higher mental processes are meaningful functional systems. The 
leading assumptions of this approach are: (a) the assumption of plastic, changeable 
interfonctional relations; (b) the assumption of complex dynamic systems which 
have to be considered as the result of the integration of elementary functions; and 
(c) the assumption of a categorical reflection of reality in the human mind. All 
these basic assumptions reflect the most important features of man’s psychological 
features. They are an important example of the dialectical leaps in the transition 
from perception to conceptual cognition, which is as basic as the transition from 
the inorganic to the organic forms of existence (ibid. 382).
I have chosen Luria’s translation on the basis that his version draws out better the 
significant phrases and issues from what is described as a summary of Vygotsky’s 
conference paper. It has to be admitted, though, that in the original (cf. Vygotsky 
1982, 169) the term Afunctional system’ does not appear. On the other hand, the 
addition of ‘functional’ does improve the sense, especially in terms of Vygotsky’s 
initial statement.
[A comparison of the effects of local lesions in children and adults] led us to the 
conclusion that identical syndromes in both cases can be a result of the different 
localization of lesions and vice versa that lesions with identical localization in 
children and adults can result in very different disorders. We can formulate a law 
for these basic differences. In disturbances occurring in early stages of 
development resulting from a local brain lesion, it is the nearest higher centre that 
suffers the most, whereas the nearest lower centre suffers less. In local brain 
lesions to a mature brain it is the nearest lower centre that functionally depends on 
the higher zone that suffers primarily, whereas the nearest higher centre, which 
became independent in the course of development and which functions at a higher 
regulatory level, suffers less (Vygotsky 1965, 384). An explanation of these data 
can be found in the basic fact that the complex interrelations of different cortical 
zones are the result of development, and that different interrelations exist at early 
and late stages of development of a human being. ‘Lower’ levels are basic for the 
development of the ‘higher’ levels, and it can be easily proved at the early stages of 
development. But as a result of the general law of a shifting of fonctions towards 
the highest level, these ‘higher’ levels become independent in the cause of further
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ontogenetic development. Development goes upward, dissolution downward. Some 
additional proofs come from the observation of compensatory mechanisms in cases 
of local defects. In the mature brain these compensatoiy functions are performed 
by the higher ‘centres’, in the earlier stages of development, by the ‘centres’ lower 
than the injured zone. That is why a comparative study of development and 
dissolution is one of the most fruitful methods of the analysis of localization of 
function in general and especially of the problem of so-called chronogenic 
localization (ibid. 385).
Clearly you do not have to be an intellectual ‘apparatchik’ to understand the value 
of ‘materialist dialectics’ here. Interestingly Luria renders the Russian for 
‘development’ and ‘disintegration’ into the Jacksonian terms ‘evolution’ and 
‘dissolution’, and quite appropriately too (cf. Vygotsky 1982, 173).
In the final quotation we present here Vygotsky reports on a study of aphasia, 
agnosia and apraxia. He concludes (1965, 385):
‘Extra-cerebral’ connections play an important role in the localization of functions 
in these areas. These ''extra-cerebraV connections are basic for the functioning of 
speech, cognition and action in the normal person, and their disturbance results in 
the syndromes mentioned above. We come to this conclusion after a series of 
observations of the course of development of higher forms of psychological 
processes. These observations showed that in the first stages these functions are 
intimately connected with external activities, and only in the later stages of 
development do they become ‘interiorized’ [and convert] to ‘inner mental 
activities’. The same can be seen in the observation of the [source] of 
compensation for functions disturbed by local brain injuries. It was seen that an 
‘exteriorization’ of the functions and their connection with some external objects as 
instruments is one of the most efficient ways for their compensation.
With this confirmation of the later experiments in Luria’s book, and the clear 
connection with the means of social and historical activity (marked by Luria’s 
footnote about tools and signs in his commentary) we will now turn to the origins 
and development of cultural-historical theory.
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PART III
CULTURAL-HISTORICAL THEORY
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Chapter 8: Cultural-Historical Theory as a Developmental Approach;
Epilogue 
I 
The Growth of Stalinism
As a result of World War I and the invasions and interventions of Western 
governments in the Russian Civil War of 1918-21 the Russian economy was put 
back decades. The results were twofold. Firstly the major cities were depopulated 
as the workers returned to the countryside to search for food. This meant that the 
government lost its necessary popular-democratic base and decisions were made 
by a small number of people. This lack of accountability facilitated the rise of 
governmental cliques, notably that of Stalin. Secondly, the government was forced 
to adopt the New Economic Policy (N.E.P.), which tried to encourage the peasant 
market economy and get the country back on its feet. After Lenin’s death in 1924, 
Trotsky argued that the balance should be altered so that industry should dominate 
over agriculture, and the working class, the backbone of the party, should be 
rebuilt. This decision was postponed until the end of the twenties. By this time 
Stalin had sent Trotsky into exile, expelled him ft-om the Party and in 1929 
expelled him from the Soviet Union. Effective opposition was thereby stilled, but 
Stalin did not yet have the confidence to have Trotsky killed.
In 1929 Stalin introduced the first Five-Year Plan to industrialize Russia at a 
breakneck pace. This was not what Trotsky had argued for. Stalin had opted to use 
the state to implement a form of primitive accumulation of capital, as had 
occurred in Britain in the early nineteenth century. He followed British practice by 
starving the peasantry and driving them off the land and into the cities. There, as 
workers, they were ruthlessly exploited to an extent surpassing the horrors of the 
period of the primitive accumulation of capital in the West. This was a full-scale 
counter-revolution. The workers were denied all rights, thus ensuring that there 
was no basis for a democratic socialist party and that Russia would be ruled by 
various cliques for the rest of the century. As justification for this rapid 
industrialization Stalin cited the danger of another Western invasion -  for which 
no real basis in fact existed at that time. He instituted a state of siege mentality.
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staged show trials of foreign engineers to demonstrate the real danger from 
outside, and interned Trotskyists to stem the alleged danger from internal 
agitators. This state of siege mentality proved crucial in preventing opposition to 
his implementation of state capitalism. It also intimidated the intelligentsiia, who 
were afraid of being accused of cosmopolitanism.
Stalin was not interested in improving working conditions or understanding 
theories of educational development. What he wanted for the economy was basic 
training for large numbers of unskilled workers, together with extra training for 
skilled workers. He had no use for psychological theories or psychologists. By the 
end of 1936 psychology had been largely eliminated as an independent academic 
discipline. In the nineteen twenties Stalin adopted Bukharin’s slogan o f ‘Socialism 
in One Country’, a contradiction in terms for any Marxist, and in 1936 he declared 
Russia had achieved socialism. As one celebration of this in 1938 he had 
published A Short History o f the Communist Party o f the Soviet Union 
(Bolsheviks) in which he notoriously changed the philosophy of Marxism. It was 
perverse of Stalin to continue to promote himself as a Marxist, when he was in 
fact a Russian chauvinist who treated the workers worse than did self-confessed 
capitalists, exterminated the ‘Old Bolsheviks’, and anyone else whom he deemed 
a potential threat. Bekhterev had been overheard describing Stalin as paranoid in 
1927 and was allegedly secretly poisoned by Stalin’s agents within hours (Moroz 
1989). Stalin had real reason to be paranoid now. The sectarian divisions he had 
inflicted on the international workers’ movement had split the left in Germany and 
could be seen as the primary reason why Hitler had been able to gain power. Now 
Hitler did indeed represent a threat to Russia, and since Stalin was culpable of this 
in addition to his crimes against the people and the collapse of agriculture due to 
his policies, he could only govern by terror. This transition between 1929 and 
1937 is now relatively clear, but it was extremely confusing at the time. For those 
Marxists attempting to create a unified approach to psychology it was a veritable 
minefield to negotiate. Literally the only way to avoid trouble was if no one was 
aware of your existence.
The famous ‘troika’ of Vygotsky, Luria and Leont’ev met first at the Institute of 
Psychology to organize their research into child development. Later they were
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joined by the ‘five’: L. I. Bozhevich, R, E. Levina, N. G. Morozova, L. S. Slavina 
and Alexander Zaporozhets at Vygotsky’s apartment (cf. Luria 1979a, 45-50). 
Later they worked at the Krupskaia Academy of Communist Education where 
Luria was director of the psychology department. There they “set up an 
experimental laboratory ... to deal with pictography, i.e., a method of studying 
what Vygotsky called indicative activity -  the mental processes whereby signs, 
tools and instruments are invented”. The team investigated how these aided the 
cognitive development of primary and secondary school children (Levitin 1982, 
162). Unfortunately there is no space here to discuss this celebrated experimental 
team, its other members, and the famous experiments that were reported in 
Vygotsky’s publications. So this is probably the first study of Luria to omit 
discussion of the work of this team. But there are plenty of such discussions in the 
books on Vygotsky and, more significantly, the evidence is clearly to be found in 
Vygotsky’s major works, especially Thinking and Speech (Vygotsky 1986). This 
team was ordered to be broken up in 1931 and Luria, Leont’ev, Bozhevich and 
Zaporozhets moved to the Psycho-Neurological Academy in Kharkov in 
December 1931 (E. Luria 1994, 69). Vygotsky also worked there periodically, 
while Luria also continued to work in Moscow until the Institute closed his 
laboratory. When Vygotsky’s educational theories and its academic supporters 
were vilified in the late 1930s, Luria had already moved into the world of 
neurology and he was not mentioned. On the other hand, when the cultural- 
historical theory was attacked in the early 1930s, Luria and Vygotsky were 
presented as its joint creators (cf. the translations in Van der Veer (ed.) 2000).
The Academy of Communist Education was also named the Krupskaia Academy 
after Lenin’s widow, Nadezhda Krupskaia, who ran it for most of the twenties in 
an enlightened way. Luria seems to have worked there as well as at the Institute 
and the Psychoanalytic Society almost firom the time he arrived in Moscow. He 
later said that he was pleasantly surprised when, as a young lad of 22 without 
party affiliation, he was appointed head of the laboratory, and also as director of 
the sub-faculty of psychology there, at a time when it normally only accepted 
party activists (cited in E. Luria 1994, 35). Although we have seen Luria’s interest 
in the issues of biological, historical and ontogenetic development there is no way 
that cultural-historical theory could have been developed without Vygotsky’s
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knowledge and commitment to the writings of Marx and Engels. “The only 
member of the Institute with a solid Marxist background was Lev Vygotsky”, said 
Leont’ev (Levitin 1982, 116). Luria confirms that “Vygotsky was ... the leading 
Marxist theoretician among us” and cites Vygotsky’s early use of Marx’s 
comparison of the architect and the bee. He adds, “In Vygotsky’s hands, Marx’s 
methods of analysis did serve a vital role in shaping our course. Under Marx’s 
influence, Vygotsky concluded that the origins of higher forms of conscious 
behaviour were to be found in the individual’s social relations with the external 
world” (Luria 1979a, 43). Not, however, in the sense of being a passive reflection 
of the external world, as many thought. Indeed the use of the signs, tools and 
implements in inter- and intrapersonal relationships, mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, was to be a key element in both the area of child development and 
cultural-historical theory.
Luria’s comment on Vygotsky’s thoughtful and creative use of Marxism is also 
important to distinguish from the misuse made of Marx by his opponents. In the 
appendix I have explained how many of Marx’s ideas on language, human nature, 
consciousness and even dialectics were taken from or absorbed from Herder. 
Although this relationship has not been made explicit till now, Vygotsky was able 
to read Marx in something like a ‘Herderian’ way, because of his lifelong interest 
in the works of Potebnia. Vygotsky appears to have had no direct knowledge of 
Herder’s writings, but Potebnia, as the man who introduced Humboldt’s language 
theory to Russia, undoubtedly passed on some of Herder’s ideas, though in a 
somewhat different mixture.
As I have already pointed out, in his translated article of 1930, Kornilov used the 
same Marxist sources as Luria had in Psychoanalysis as a System o f Monistic 
Psychology, i.e., the sources were accessible to all and used by all. But the 
interpretations were different. When Vygotsky broached his views on cultural- 
historical or ‘instrumental’ theory at the Institute he was attacked and ridiculed by 
Kornilov (E. Luria 1994, 42). Fortunately Luria’s grasp of Marxism improved 
over this period. Although in later years regarded as a ‘good party man’, who 
could be relied upon to present the current line, this was simply a necessary 
condition of existence in becoming or remaining a prominent scientist. This was a
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point he made to Elkhonon Goldberg in his attempt to assist the latter’s career in 
Russian psychology (Goldberg 2001, chapter 2). But he was also well aware of 
genuine Marxist theory as opposed to varieties of political propaganda on behalf 
of a state-capitalist Russia. Apparently he made pencilled comments in his 
Russian edition of the Short History o f the CPSU (B) to the effect that it, i.e., 
Stalin, had got at least some of it wrong (Rawles 1998, personal communication). 
Thus when Vygotsky and then Luria began to theoretically develop and undertake 
research in the field of cultural-historical theory, they knew what they were doing 
in terms of Marxism. Cultural-historical theory was not an attempt to adapt 
psychology to Marxism in a verbal way, as sometimes happened at the time. 
Although it might be presented simply as a theory about cognitive development, it 
was an attempt to apply developmental approaches to psychology in general. Thus 
the emphasis of Marx and Engels on both materialism and the dialectics of change 
were what drew Vygotsky to view them as crucial for this attempt. Although he 
had always been a Marxist, it was in his works of 1928-30 that one finds most of 
his Marxist citations.
n
Cultural-Historical Theory as a Developmental Approach
Psychologists had already accepted the need to examine fields other than child 
development from developmental perspectives. Comparisons abounded between 
the thinking and speech of children, adults with schizophrenia or forms of aphasia, 
and so-called ‘natural’ peoples, and how they were all distinguished from non­
speaking animals and from educated Westerners. The relationship between these 
cognitive ‘levels’ was confused. Common explanations included that of the 
biogenetic law, and theories containing partial versions of it. Another overall 
explanation, that development reflected a gradual move from diffuse forms of 
behavioural organization to a differentiation into more specialized structures, was 
often presented abstractly and without research. From 1927 onwards Vygotsky 
and Luria systematically reviewed and criticized these various proposals.
In an article on The Biogenetic Law in Psychology and Pedagogy Vygotsky 
criticized not only the attempts to introduce Haeckel’s recapitulationist law into
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psychology by Freud’s maverick American supporter, G. Stanley Hall, but 
Wilhelm Stem’s attempt to distinguish six phases in childhood that allegedly 
corresponded to six stages of cultural-historical development. The successive 
phases of reflex activity/ the ability to grasp and imitate/ upright gait and the use 
of speech/ play and fairy tales/first school years/ middle school years/ and semi­
maturity allegedly corresponded to lowest animal/ higher apes/ entrance into 
human history/ antiquity/ Christianity/ and the present-day. Vygotsky criticized 
Claparede, KofQca and Blonskii for not recognizing that their acceptance of onto- 
and phylogenetic correspondence implied acceptance of an immanent logic in the 
process of development itself. It was tme that this theory, together with that of 
sociogenesis, associated with Zalkind, Kornilov and A. P. Pinkevich were an 
improvement in that their adherents attempted to operate scientifically. But 
nevertheless these latter approaches made an almost identical mistake as the other 
approaches -  an unjustified and scientifically one-sided move to attribute 
universal significance to biogenetic parallelism. Vygotsky considered that any 
attempt to apply them to education would be fraught with danger. Moreover 
attempting to apply the biogenetic law to pedagogy would be deeply reactionary 
(Vygotsky 1927).
In a review of Heinz Werner’s major work of 1926, Einfuehrung in die 
Entwicklungspsychologie (Introduction to Developmental Psychology) Luria 
echoed Vygotsky’s views on the biogenetic law. Luria noted how immensely 
complicated was the investigation of the constituents of human development 
involving as it did biogenesis, historical development and ontogenesis. Werner 
pursued an approach that proposed increasing differentiation and restructuring in 
his examination of the animal, the ‘natural’ human and the child, to which he 
added a fourth area of comparison, namely mental illness.
In this totally interesting and valuable book, certain fundamental deficiencies are, 
however, evident in his material, characteristic of most general philosophical- 
psychological subjects considered in West European writing. Would such a broad 
general principle as ‘structural differentiation’ really be sufficient to elucidate all 
special qualities of psychic development? Would it not thereby leave out of 
consideration a whole number of concrete conditions that determine the transition
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from one form of behaviour to another? [In short the answer was that] a 
materialistic investigation can in no way be satisfied with such general assertions 
that are already known to us from [the works of Herbert] Spencer and the 
Spencerians. Within these general determinations the concrete circumstances must 
also be established that determine psychic evolution more precisely (Luria 1929b, 
483).
Luria specifically criticizes the presentation of the psyche of ‘natural’ peoples as 
detached from their real life, their “being”. In later years Vygotsky and Luria Avere 
accused under Stalinism of uncritical borrowing from Western sources and 
eclecticism (cf. the articles in Van der Veer 2000). Recently even, one Western 
writer accused Vygotsky and Luria of having endorsed the biogenetic law 
(Joravsky 1989, 369). Yet others have suggested that cultural-historical theory 
was a form of reductionism, allegedly Marxist, that connected psychological 
development and thinking to the mode of production of a given society. But we 
have seen that a philosophically similar position is actually criticized above, under 
the term ‘sociogenesis’, for its one-sided approach.
We can see that both Vygotsky and Luria were alert to both possible pitfalls and 
the need for concrete scientific research. In 1927 they began to consider the 
question of development in the fields of evolution, history, and ontogeny. This 
resulted in the only substantial work of theirs that was published at the time, 
namely Studies in the History o f Behaviour: Ape, Primitive, Child (Vygotsky and 
Luria 1930a). This reviewed Wolfgang Koehler’s studies on the thought processes 
of chimpanzees and, more critically, the writings of Lucien Levy-Bruhl and 
Richard Thurnwald on differences in the way people think in different forms of 
society. Finally, it looked at current theories of child development in the light of 
Vygotsky and Luria’s own ideas and research. By the time it was published 
Vygotsky’s own work was already in the process of reaching a substantially 
higher level in the field of the development of higher mental functions, but 
remained unpublished (Vygotsky 1997h). Both Luria and Vygotsky looked 
forward to undertaking serious cross-cultural research of their own.
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Cultural-historical theory and its implications are rarely looked at as a whole. 
Following Vygotsky and Luria’s demands for concrete empirical investigations, it 
has been assessed in terms of these constituents, namely child development, 
comparative psychology, with cross-cultural studies as a possibly dubious 
element, probably best left to anthropologists. We have, however, seen previously 
that, in addition to the examination of research into the mental development of 
apes, ‘primitive’ men and children, Luria examined the neuropsychological 
implications of psychological development. Generally speaking Luria’s findings 
are omitted from the whole discussion. To me they are central to it, and possibly 
represent the most successful part of it. But, since we have spent the major part of 
this thesis on that question, we will look at cultural-historical theory as a whole.
How did it ever come to be seen as a whole? What sense of logic informed it? 
Was it simply the result of evaluating, sifting, and creating a series of 
investigations that could disprove or build on the work of such Western writers as 
Koehler, Levy-Bruhl, Thurnwald, Werner, Piaget and so forth? It is undeniable 
that their work played a crucial role in stimulating the development of the theory 
(cf. e.g. Van der Veer and Valsiner 1991).
But it is also impossible to ignore the fact that at no other time in their careers did 
Vygotsky and Luria rely so much on the works of Marx and Engels to stimulate 
their theoretical ideas, and they clearly saw their work as Marxist. It was by no 
means an attempt to simply create a ‘Marxist psychology,’ and the criticisms of 
their alleged reliance on ‘bourgeois theorists’ in Stalinist Russia show that this use 
of Marxism was no mere attempt to placate the authorities. But they -  particularly 
Vygotsky -  did creatively develop the ideas of Marx and Engels.
Marx noted and distinguished our “natural history” and “historical nature” (Marx 
& Engels 1976, 39-40). It was the latter that primarily concerned Marx, together 
with the key role that social production plays within human history. He saw the 
first humans as dominated by nature and barely distinguishable from other 
animals, except that they were not ruled by their instincts. Gradually with the 
increase in population and the division of labour -  including that between physical 
and mental labour -  humans change (ibid. 44-5). By “developing their material
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production and intercourse, [they] alter, along with their actual world, also their 
thinking and the products of their thinking” (ibid. 37).
He amplifies these comments in Capital:
Labour is first of all a process between man and nature, a process by which man, 
through his own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between 
himself and nature. He confronts the materials of nature as a force of nature. He 
sets in motion the natural forces ... Through this movement he acts upon external 
nature and changes it and in this way he simultaneously changes his own nature.
He develops the potentialities slumbering within nature, and subjects the play of its 
forces to his own sovereign power. We are not dealing with those first instinctive 
forms of labour which remain on the animal level (Marx 1976, 283).
Vygotsky and Luria’s position is identical. Not only do the products of our 
thinking change, but also the nature of human thinking - not simply in terms of 
our view of the world and our relationship to it, but in that the processes of human 
thinking are added to -  by the cultures of the societies in which we live.
Luria, together with A.N. Leont’ev, responded to one misinterpretation (by Jerry 
Fodor) in the 1970s. “The adult has various levels o f logical thought, and he can 
use these levels differently according to his purposes and environmental 
requirements ...[the same position as held by Levy-Bruhl and Heinz Werner -  
MH]. A young child does not have these different levels of thought and some 
theoretical operations are not accessible to the child... ”
[But when a child is educated] the acquisition of abstract operations opens new 
possibilities to thought and results in an immense enrichment in the possibility of 
finding new relations between concrete objects. This is why we do not believe in 
the separation of abstract and concrete thinking but -  as in Marx’s philosophy -  we 
suppose that a transition from the empirical to the categorical approach provides a 
new opening in dealing with concrete objects. There are different ways open to this 
development, and Vygotsky himself mentions that the acquisition of empirical and 
scientific concepts has different psychological mechanisms (Leontiev & Luria 
1972,314-5).
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In the preface to the Studies, Vygotsky and Luria explained that in differentiating 
the three principal lines of development - phylogeny, history and ontogeny, they 
were not attempting to explain the entire range of behaviour of anthropoid apes, 
primitive humans or children. Instead they selected “only a single dominant 
feature or single aspect o f behaviouf \  Furthermore, “in each study, therefore, we 
have identified a single essential component that has served as a link connecting a 
given stage of development of behaviour with the very next new stage of 
development” (Vygotsky and Luria 1930a, xi). This had the drawback of failing to 
show how these various levels related within adults. But, since the concrete is 
subject to many determinations, Vygotsky followed Marx’s approach of ascending 
to the concrete via the abstract. This seems to me to be an unavoidable procedure 
in such a complex and dynamic set of processes.
After drawing a line under the thinking of chimpanzees in his commentary on 
Koehler, Vygotsky then tried to set baselines for human thinking -  both historical 
and ontogenetic. In both of these, of course, language was central, though not 
necessarily the embodiment of ‘reason’. These baselines derived from his own 
studies and those of Wemer into thinking in ‘complexes’ in child development 
and from Levy-Bruhl’s concept o f ‘participatory’ thinking in so-called ‘primitive’ 
societies. Participatory or ‘complexive’ thinking is thinking seen not in the 
accepted formal categories of today, but using associations often idiosyncratically 
placed within so-called ‘families’ - as opposed to abstraction.
On the one hand, it could be argued that the sum total of all known historically 
developed cognitive processes -  reading, for example - must fall within the same 
set as all known personal cognitive developments. On the other hand, to draw a 
continuum and label one end as ‘primitive’ and the other as ‘cultured’ could be 
seen as both judgmental and abstracted from concrete situations. The following 
comment of Vygotsky seems to fit the judgmental interpretation. With respect to 
learning disability he wrote, “The meaning of the concept of primitivism is 
defined by its opposite -  acculturation, ... primitiveness is the polar opposite of 
cultural developmenf’ (Vygotsky 1993, 43).
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IfoYLQ were to apply this definition to ‘primitive’ peoples it would imply that they 
are at the ‘primary’ or ‘natural’ stage and that their culture has developed no new 
cognitive processes. In the Studies, however, Vygotsky states, “The primitive 
human in the strict sense of the word ‘primitive’ exists nowhere today. The human 
type as represented among [existing] primeval peoples may only be termed 
relatively primitive”. Moreover, “a psychology of the primitive human has not 
been founded yet,” (Vygotsky & Luria 1993, 68).
Vygotsky accepted that people in societies conventionally labelled ‘primitive’ by 
Western writers did have a ‘practical’ intellect. He also rejected the view that such 
people were ‘pre-logical,’ instead holding that their logic was based on different 
complex-based premises, as opposed to logic based on syllogistic reasoning and 
its associated categories. He also accepted that, because such societies adapted to 
different environments and priorities than ours, they could outdo us in different 
forms of activity. It is well known in anthropology that pre-capitalist, and even 
pre-agricultural societies have despised the mode of life and social values of many 
allegedly ‘advanced’ forms of society. Vygotsky himself recognized that such 
changes often involved losing previous creative cognitive approaches. In an 
unpublished response to a reviewer’s misrepresentations of the views expressed in 
the Studies, Vygotsky reiterated, “‘Primitive man’ is at the lowest level of cultural 
development. But this is merely the conventional usage. ‘Primitive man’ in the 
strict sense simply does not exist!” (Vygodskaia & Lifanova 1996, 109).
There was a large body of informed opinion in Russia that agreed to some degree 
with Levy-Bruhl that there were historical and cultural differences in the 
conventional forms of thinking. They found to be insufficient the view, espoused 
for example by W. H. R. Rivers, that people everywhere had always used similar 
thinking processes. The logical scientific response in such a debate was to go into 
the field to do the research that would prove the points one was attempting to 
make. There had been an exploratory expedition to Siberia by educational 
psychologists (including Zaporozhets) around 1930. Vygotsky and Luria planned 
theirs.
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In 1931 and 1932 Luria led expeditions to Central Asia to remote, mountainous 
regions where a basically illiterate peasantry, long under semi-feudal and clerical 
rule, was at long last beginning to obtain some public education. It was also 
beginning the first stages of agricultural collectivization. Vygotsky and Luria felt 
that they had to grasp the opportunity to compare cognitive changes in a society in 
transition. This was easier said than done, as the first reaction of the most remote 
inhabitants was to flee at the sight of Luria and his team (E. Luria 1994, 61). 
Many other problems are discussed in Luria’s book (1976), but space prevents any 
elaboration of this here. The expedition’s results confirmed everything that Luria 
and Vygotsky had expected. The dominant practical mode of thinking could not 
be shaken by suggestions that the peasants try to look at questions in a more 
categorical or syllogistic way. Only those groups whose lives were in the process 
of change, who had experienced education, training and/or had begun to learn 
farm management skills could operate with these new approaches. Subsequent 
investigations of other societies have confirmed the findings of Luria’s studies (cf. 
e.g. Cole et al. 1971). Of course, the interpretations vary (cf. Cole 1976).
In August 1931 Vygotsky wrote to Luria and praised the success of his 
investigations into the changing thought processes. Luria’s report was a 
significant event, “the systematic study of systemic relations in historical 
psychology, in a living phylogenetic process... ”. He subsequently added:
It has been experimentally demonstrated [by Luria’s expedition] -  on the basis of 
phylogenetic material richer than any other ethnological research, more clear cut 
and faithful than in Levy-Bruhl -  that there is a phylogenetic stratum of 
complexive thinking and, subject to it, another formation, of all the basic systems 
of the mind, all the principal types of its operations, and -  in the long-term 
perspective -  of consciousness itself’ (Vygodskaia & Lifanova 1996,215).
Thus it seems that Vygotsky and Luria achieved their historical baseline for 
humanity. Vygotsky incorporated these findings in Thinking and Speech, where he 
wrote, “The history of language shows that complexive thinking with all its 
peculiarities is the very foundation of linguistic development” (Vygotsky 1986, 
130). The seeking of this foundation was the occasion of yet further hostile
240
criticisms. It was not the foundation itself, but the political climate that was the 
problem.
Unlike Levy-Bruhl, Vygotsky did not limit the scope of complexive thinking to 
Durkheimian ‘collective representations’ of a society, nor did he link it to a 
specifically ‘mystical’ approach of such societies. It is used as a distinct 
psychological concept. But to apply the term ‘primitive’, or even ‘primary’, to 
historical processes of adaptation, which necessarily involve rational decision­
making in a variety of practical situations is methodologically unacceptable. If, as 
Leont’ev and Luria said above, the “adult has various levels of logical thought”, 
these levels must include thinking in complexes or associations. One may 
speculate that historically, or even phylogenetically, complexive thought might be 
the primary linguistic form for humans, but one can only prove, or attempt to 
prove, its validity in child development. Perhaps this is what Luria meant when in 
1974 he said, “We obtained a surprising picture from which it became clearly 
evident that all the categories that we have become accustomed to consider 
‘natural’ were in reality ‘social’” (E. Luria 1994, 62). It is possible that he was 
referring to the investigations of perception that were undertaken, but perhaps he 
is also referring to modes of thinking. It would be reassuring to think that they 
were no longer seeking a notional ‘primary’ baseline. On the other hand, 
Vygotsky and Luria appear to have concluded that complexive thought was found 
to exist apparently without other levels in these remote villages. This clearly is a 
significant finding. Vygotsky did investigate its forms in child development at 
some length (1986, chapter 5). Perhaps if the third expedition had gone ahead, 
Luria would have investigated the various roles of complexive thought in adults, 
comparing the groups using it alone with those using other forms in similar 
situations. Only in this way could a legitimate comparison be made. Luria was, 
however, banned from undertaking a third expedition as a result of the witch hunt 
against him (cf. Vlll, iii).
The link between what a people thought with its mode of life was a common 
eighteenth century view (cf. Meek 1976), propounded by the early theorists of 
capitaUsm among others and subsequently given a more scientific formulation by 
Marx. But in addition those influenced by Herder recognized that the way people
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used language was also affected, but they did not try to link it mechanically with 
every historical stage in the transformation of production. It should be clear that 
this latter version is what Vygotsky and Luria, as well as Marx and Engels, were 
considering when they discussed historical developments in cognition. The first 
recorded forms of writing and new forms of numeracy were undoubtedly 
introduced at the time of the rise of the first great agricultural civilizations to aid 
in tax accounting, the promulgation and enforcement of state laws, and the 
invention of property in land (cf. Goody 1986, 1987). Abstract and categorical 
concepts and forms of thinking were undoubtedly encouraged by such changes in 
social organization and new intellectual tools. Many societies in history have 
followed in their footsteps, including Stalinist Russia. In discussing the changes 
found in Luria’s expeditions and their connections with socio-economic changes it 
is relatively easy for those unaware of the two versions of the argument to fail to 
recognize that Luria follows Herder’s tradition rather that of the eighteenth 
century economists. Also, although relating cognitive changes mechanically to 
changes in the mode of production may be reductionist, in certain circumstances, 
as in the growth of those early agricultural civilizations, there may be some 
validity in this process. Needless to say, in the West this was often misunderstood 
not only as an attempt to justify Stalin’s programme, but also as an attempt to link 
stages of cognitive development to stages of transformation in modes of 
production in a rather rigid manner. Luria was certainly forced to use both 
versions when defending himself against Stalinist attacks (cited in E. Luria 1994, 
67-8), but Luria’s invitation to Wolfgang Koehler to join the 1932 expedition 
clearly shows his intentions. These are apparent not only in his additional 
invitations to Lewin, Koffka and Richard Thurnwald (only KofiQca was able to 
come), but also in his statement of the expedition’s aims. These included the task 
of investigating “thinking as a function, subject to historical alterations -  namely 
in the process of the use of speech, interpretation, metaphor and symbol, logical 
thinking, and so forth” (cited in ibid. 64). Similarly, G. F. concludes his attack on 
Luria by noting that a defence of cultural-historical theory that Luria gave in 1936 
maintained “that the sign is the determining factor in the development of the 
child’s psychical activity” (cited in ibid. 75).
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We turn now to the nature of the cognitive changes, how they are effected or 
mediated, and their relation to social change. Marx resumes his comments in 
Capital:
A spider conducts operations which resemble those of a weaver, and a bee could 
put many a human architect to shame by the construction of its honeycomb cells.
But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect 
builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax. At the end of every labour 
process a result emerges which had already been conceived by the worker at the 
beginning ... he realizes his own purpose. And this is a purpose he is conscious of, 
it determines the mode of his activity with the rigidity of a law, and he must 
subordinate his will to it. This subordination is no mere momentary act. ... a 
purposeful will is required for the entire duration of the work (Marx 1976, 284),
In The Instrumental Method in Psychology, Vygotsky referred explicitly to this 
passage, explaining that his method “seeks to present the history of how the child 
accomplishes in the process of education what humankind accomplished in the 
long history of labour, i.e., how he ‘changes his nature’...” (Vygotsky 1981, 147). 
Marx clearly understood that conscious planning and a purposeful will were 
mediated by our use of language. He had earlier written that “Language is as old 
as consciousness, language is practical, real consciousness that exists for other 
people as well, and only therefore does it exist for me” (Marx and Engels 1976, 
43-4).
Herder wrote, “ speech was to a certain degree the prototype of all that followed” 
(Herder 1989, 356), and Luria (1974, 261) tells us that Vygotsky intended to call 
his approach ‘instrumental psychology.’ Regarding education Vygotsky wrote, 
“The first law of development of the structure of higher mental functions ... can 
be called the law o f the transition from direct, mute, natural forms and methods o f 
behaviour to mediated, artificial mental functions that develop in the process o f  
cultural development. This transition during ontogenesis corresponds to the 
process of the historical development of human behaviour...” (Vygotsky 1998, 
167-8). Presumably when he realized that others such as Karl Buehler had used 
the term ‘instrumental psychology’ (Vygotsky and Luria 1994b, 101), he
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abandoned the idea to avoid confusion. Another reason was that the term 
eventually chosen implied recognition of its place among, and relation to, other 
areas of developmental psychology. Nevertheless, the term ‘instrumental’ appears 
consistent with Marx, for it does not imply a mechanical relationship to society. 
On the contrary it involves dialectical relationships -  and not only in the mode of 
life of a given society and the changes that it undergoes in the course of history. 
The ‘prototype’, language, in particular is not a simple tool. As Herder wrote, 
“The first sign that I grasp is both a symbol for myself and a communicating 
symbol for others” (Herder 1993, 21). And both Marx and Vygotsky understood 
the social and dialogical nature of language, and its role in personal 
consciousness, as well as its role in conscious activity. Many, however, fail to 
grasp this point -  for example, proponents of the Russian school of activity theory 
associated with S. L. Rubinshtein. He and his students criticized Vygotsky and 
Luria’s emphasis on the role of language as a non-Marxist turn to technological 
determinism (Rahmani 1973, 45). He had clearly failed to notice that they were 
following in the footsteps not only of Herder, Humboldt, and the Ukrainian A. A. 
Potebnia, but also of Marx and Engels.
The Part played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man, (an unfinished 
introduction by Engels to a work on slave labour), was frequently cited by 
Vygotsky and Luria. Today Engels would probably reformulate his suggestion 
that proto-humans became social because of their need to work co-operatively, 
which in turn led them to develop the need for language. Although Engels was 
aware that our nearest evolutionary relatives are social, the weight of this evidence 
is now such that a necessity driven by co-operative work as something distinct 
from social life is no longer called for. Furthermore, since it is in childhood, not 
adulthood, that humans learn to speak, it no longer appears likely. It has been 
suggested (Kain 1986, 82) that, unlike Marx, Engels was attempting to explain 
biological evolution in a historically materialist way, i.e., by stressing the effect of 
the forces and relations of production on thinking processes. While it is true that 
some unreflecting Marxists seem by default to take this view, and perhaps even 
approve of it, this should by no means prevent scientists from investigating the 
activities of proto-humans in relation to their cognitive development. It is equally 
important to recognize Engels’ concerns as evidence of the importance he
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attached to linking language to consciousness, and of linking both to human 
activity.
From the sequence of the article it is clear that Engels, like Marx, recognized that 
only after the acquisition of language did real human labour begin (Engels 1987, 
455, 457). This, together with his comments on the cognitive abilities of animals, 
was strongly endorsed by Vygotsky and Luria. They used the comments on 
animal thinking to support their view that thinking is qualitatively transformed 
when linked to language as a cultural-historical creation. Engels also wrote what 
might be taken for an introduction to cultural-historical theory.
The effect on labour and speech of the development of the brain and its attendant 
senses, of the increasing clarity of consciousness, power of abstraction and 
conclusion, gave both labour and speech an ever-renewed impulse to further 
development. This development did not reach its conclusion when man finally 
became distinct from the ape, but on the whole made further powerful progress, its 
degree and direction varying among different peoples and at different times, and 
here and there even being interrupted by local or temporary regression. This further 
development has been strongly urged forward on the one hand, and guided along 
more definite directions on the other, by a new element which came into play with 
the appearance of fully-fledged man, namely [human] society (ibid, 456), [That is,] 
by the combined functioning of hands, speech organs and brain, not only in each 
individual but also in society, humans became capable of executing more and more 
complicated operations, and were able to set themselves, and achieve, higher and 
higher aims (ibid, 458),
Engels continued, noting that humans not only change the environment, but also 
master it. With our greater understanding of it we may even be able to avoid the 
ecological disasters we provoke, especially if we replace production based on the 
profit motive with production based, not on exploitation, but on working co­
operatively and in harmony with nature (ibid. 460-1).
Marx and Engels clearly stand in a tradition that supports the significance of 
socially mediated forms of communication and analysis for cognitive psychology, 
and see language and other sign systems as mediating and fecilitating cognitive
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development. Changes to and inventions of such systems are in turn the result of 
attempts to adapt to, or control, various natural conditions, and to organize the 
various forms of production, together with the societies involved in this ongoing 
relationship between humans and nature (see Goody 1987). These cognitive 
developments also allow humans to organize major areas of their lives voluntarily, 
but as Vygotsky said, a child’s acquisition of language is not like putting on a new 
set of clothes. Rather it totally transforms our mental operations. In Tool and Sign 
in Child Development, he and Luria made it plain that they did not accept that the 
structure of higher mental processes “is invented and discovered by the child... ”. 
Nor did they accept “that symbolization is the primary and irreducible facultas 
signatrix, a part of human consciousness capable from the beginning of creating 
and comprehending symbols” - an a priori conception of higher psychological 
functions associated with Ernst Cassirer (Vygotsky and Luria 1994b, 147.).
Rubinshtein, who condemned Vygotsky and Luria for the technological 
determinism of which they were obviously innocent, had also been, with Cassirer, 
a student of the neo-Kantians Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp. He, however, 
reacted against Kant’s position that, although it was possible to be a “knowing 
subject”, one could not simultaneously be an active participant. Kant’s supporters, 
Fichte and Schiller, adopted as a corrective to this an equally metaphysical 
position, namely that one only realizes one’s essence through one’s activity. 
Rubinshtein seems to have confined his principal psychological concerns to 
activity, the area most closely related to their primary epistemological concerns 
(cf. Rubinshtein 1989, 15-16). He took the view that language was simply a 
medium and not a form of activity -  there could not therefore be any such thing as 
a speech-act. His response to Luria and Vygotsky was that consciousness is 
merely cloaked in words. In Rubinshtein the crucial mediating and facilitating 
parts of the process -  social interaction, language, culture, ideology were 
peripheral to his theory (cf. Rubinstein 1946). In short, he failed to recognize the 
dialectical unity of the processes in which languages partake. Other exponents of 
the activity theory, such as Leont’ev, certainly used it as political cover, and 
thought that an extension of Vygotsky’s work into less controversial areas was 
also theoretically valid, but Rubinshtein seems to have been the only one to have 
developed it from an initially idealist philosophical approach. The scientific
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research carried out by the adherents of this school was, however far from 
negligible (cf. the contributions in Wertsch 1981).
In conclusion, the methodology of cultural-historical theory has the virtue of 
integrating many areas of study and by explaining the nature of their mutual 
interaction limiting the scope for single factor forms of reductionism in 
psychology. The alternatives mentioned here: the biogenetic law, abstract 
generalizations that claimed to explain everything, and some aspects of the work 
of Rubinshtein and Cassirer are all ultimately reductionist and/or metaphysical. 
Cultural-historical theory was repressed before it could iron out its 
inconsistencies. It has returned, and in part been absorbed into our thinking, 
because it belongs to one of the great non-reductionist traditions, that stemming 
from Herder. For him understanding was neither a priori, nor an added faculty, 
but developed on the basis of social communication and experience.
Luria himself applied the approach to neurology in the application of his concept 
of functional systems. This functional systems approach seems in retrospect to be 
the perfect way to account for and include all the influences to which the systems 
are subject, and thus to avoid reductionism. This is crucially so, in the unification 
of the new cultural-historical forms of mental processing with the phylogenetic 
and ontogenetic formations in the brain. It is a model example of the application 
of dialectics. In comparison with Rubinshtein’s separation of language and 
activity, we can turn to Vygotsky and Luria’s account of the changes they found 
in functional systems linking speech and action during the child’s transition from 
a situation where speech reflects or accompanies activity to one where it becomes 
involved in its planning.
This change consists in the fact that the child’s speech, which previously 
accompanied its activity and reflected its vicissitudes..., moves more and more to 
the turning and starting points of the process, beginning thus to precede action and 
throw light on the conceived but as yet unrealized action. [Hence] this 
displacement signifies not only the temporary transfer of speech as related to 
action, but also the transfer of the entire system’s hmctional centre (Vygotsky and 
Luria 1994b, 120).
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Here is an example of how children may eventually develop the various 
psychological tools at their disposal in order to be able to voluntarily organize 
their own behaviour. A vivid example of how functional systems may vary 
between and within cultures is the relatively recent work in Japan, which shows 
that those using the traditional logographic writing system are vulnerable to 
different areas of brain injury than those using the phonetic system (Goody 1987, 
249-250). Not only are different areas of the brain involved, but different 
instrumental activities are used to achieve similar ends. Both are indubitably 
cultural-historical inventions. This is how humans have continued to develop after 
the initial biological evolution of our species.
Ill
Epilogue
After the second expedition to Central Asia in 1932 the Control Commission of 
the Moscow Workers and Peasants Inspectorate investigated the work of the 
Institute of Psychology. Criticisms of Luria’s expeditions had been made, but he 
had published nothing. Nor had Luria prepared anything - for he still had to 
process and assess all the reports. Nevertheless the commission accepted all the 
criticisms. The aim was basically to complete the destruction of Vygotsky’s 
research team, make support of cultural-historical theory unacceptable, and 
intimidate independent-minded psychologists. This episode was merely part of a 
widespread process. Here it was achieved by closing down the team’s meeting 
place and Luria’s last foothold in the Institute, namely his experimental 
laboratory.
The commission’s report does not appear to have been published, but Elena Luria 
implies that a 1934 article contained the substance of it (Razmyslov 2000). 
Basically it seems to have accused Luria’s work of showing a racist, colonialist 
attitude towards the people of Central Asia. There is no truth in this. Perhaps the 
authorities were concerned that, at a time when Stalin was not far fi’om declaring 
that Russia had attained socialism, Luria was drawing attention to societies that 
were economically, socially and politically barely reformed. But I would not put
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money on the authorities demonstrating any form o f ‘sensitivity’ in this period. As 
mentioned in the preface, Luria had to keep a low profile in 1933-4 and was 
concerned that without an employer prepared to even partially defend him against 
the commission, he might be arrested even in Kharkov.
At the very time when the problem of the separation of psychology into discrete 
fields with discrete methodologies seemed on the point of being largely resolved 
by the work of Vygotsky and Luria, their ideas were being maliciously 
misrepresented, attacked, and on the point of being banned. Neither Luria nor 
Vygotsky were about to rest on their laurels, since even their friends held 
alternative views and did not recognize the extent of their achievements. Luria and 
Vygotsky’s research into the fields of ‘psychoneurology’ and medicine and the 
extensive retraining that they undertook at this time are clear evidence that they 
themselves considered that they had at last unlocked the gate to new and wider 
fields of work.
In October 1933 Luria obtained some work at the Medico-Genetic Institute in 
Moscow, run by Solomon Levit. Here there was an enormous programme 
comparing twins educated under differing circumstances. In March 1934 Luria 
returned to live in Moscow, being somewhat fearful of his management’s attitude 
in Kharkov. In October 1934 he also obtained work at the Institute of 
Experimental Medicine. But recent experiences had taken their toll. In May 1933 
he wrote of having aged considerably during the past two to three years (E. Luria 
1994, 80). In the summer of 1933 he married Lana Pimenovna Linchina who 
worked at the endocrinology laboratory at Moscow University. She proved to be 
of enormous support to Luria in all his trials. One that was not political was the 
unexpected death of Vygotsky in June 1934.
Luria found his work with A. N. Mirenova and others at Levit’s institute to be 
stimulating. But in July 1936 the state issued a decree attacking ‘pedology’, i.e., 
educational psychology (Wortis 1950, 242-5). Zalkind died of a heart attack when 
he read it. A vociferous campaign against Levit and his associates, including 
Luria, was whipped up (E. Luria 1994, 74-5). In December 1936 Luria resigned 
his two posts and became a full-time student at the Moscow Institute of Medicine.
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This is what saved his life (cf. Preface, 9). While purges and famine rocked 
Russia, Luria at last found a situation where he was both forgotten by his enemies 
and could also work productively, something that had not happened in six years. 
He could now begin to apply the functional systems approach in neurology in 
what he described as the most fruitful two years of his life (E. Luria 1994, 89). 
But that is another story.
This thesis has, I hope, clarified the elements involved in Luria’s theoretical 
development in the period 1921-1936 and demonstrated the enormous strides 
made by psychological theory as a result of his and Vygotsky’s work. It is true 
that this work was the end result of an international effort, but the particular steps 
that Luria and Vygotsky took amounted to a resolution of the ‘crisis in 
psychology’ and the potential unification of the discipline.
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Appendix I
The influence of Herder’s approach to language, human nature, dialectics 
and cultural-historical theory on Marx -  a contribution on their relevance for 
the study of psychology and philosophy in the works of Vygotsky and Luria ^
The works of Herder played an important role in the development of Vygotsky and 
Luria, especially in the late 1920s. Although it is accepted that Marx wrote about 
language, it has never been stated that he actually supported a particular theory of 
language. This is not altogether surprising since few eighteenth century theories of 
language would be recognized as such today. Although Marx’s comments on 
language are not extensive, they are consistent enough to be recognized as being 
based on the writings of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803). Marx’s views thus 
belong to a great and varied European tradition of thinking about both language 
and human nature.
In common with most other eighteenth century writings on language those of 
Herder contain a view of human nature, which in turn is linked to both a 
psychology and a philosophy. He should be seen as a founder of the genetic 
approach to psychology and cognition, and also as a precursor of the ‘cultural- 
historical’ school developed by the Russian psychologists Lev Vygotsky and 
Alexander Luria in the late 1920s.
Part I concentrates on showing how Herder’s writings on language and human 
nature influenced Marx. Part II looks at how Herder’s philosophy can be seen in 
the context of the history of the methodology of materialist dialectics, and is more 
exploratory. It is all too common to restrict Marx’s sources to Smith, Ricardo, 
Hegel, Feuerbach, and the French socialists. Adding new elements to these helps to 
place Marx and his sources in a wider historical perspective -  as he himself would 
have expected. I hope it will allow a clearer perspective on the relevance of Marx’s 
writings in the fields of language, psychology, and also philosophy -  all areas of 
crucial importance in the work of Vygotsky and Luria.
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It thereby permits the examination of these writings, and their role in the work of 
Vygotsky and Luria, in a way that does not necessarily assume that they were used 
for purposes other than their own scientific work. Some might consider in 
retrospect that Vygotsky and Luria were attempting to articulate the psychological 
and neuropsychological mechanisms of such a model. In so far as this model 
proposes that humans are not simple mechanisms, but may be able to consciously 
make their own history, there is a strong element of truth in this. Indeed this 
appendix aims to demonstrate its relevance for Vygotsky and Luria's work, though 
as the main text demonstrates, it was some time before it was possible for them to 
raise such questions in a theoretical form, or indeed a practical form. Where it is 
relevant to the development of their work, I have referred to this appendix in the 
main text, and it should be treated as a historical and philosophical companion to 
the main text. It can also be used in our assessment of their work, and in 
understanding their development of a theoretical tradition. As far as I am aware, no 
attempt to do this deals with the aspects considered here. A comprehensive 
approach to this lies beyond the scope of this thesis, but the lack of a discussion of 
these questions needs to be addressed.
The development of individuals, like the history of humans in general -  as of nature 
as a whole, is what Herder called “a theatre of transformations” (Herder 1969b, 
283). Human understanding is neither a priori, nor an added faculty, but has to be 
developed in society on the basis of communication and experience. In order to 
think, then act, consciously we need first to isolate, focus on, and analyse 
individual moments within a stream of impressions. Language makes this possible 
through the use of arbitrary signs. Sound can be employed sequentially to convey 
information and explain processes. Through speech, hearing becomes a fulcrum 
for the other senses and for the development of understanding. “This most difficult 
of arts, speech, was to a certain degree the prototype of all that followed” (Herder 
1989, 356, cf. Herder 1969b, 314), and humans must develop their arts for they 
“must learn everything” (Herder 1969b, 314-5).
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The mind, for Herder, is a developing unity within a developing active social 
individual. To attempt to understand this simply in terms of the ‘materialist’ 
philosophies of rationalism, or sensualism, or the psychologies (such as they were) 
of faculty theory and associationism was nonsense. Herder insisted on “the integral 
unity of sensibility, reason, impulse, and ethical will” (cited in Schuetze 1925, 536). 
As Schuetze wrote, “the four crucial conceptions of modem humanism, namely: 
genetic history, biological growth, the social character of man, and the integral 
active unity of the three within individual personality, received their essential 
meanings at the hands of Herder” (ibid. 549).
There is absolutely no evidence at all that Vygotsky and Luria read Herder, though 
the latter’s views on language and human nature were at least partly disseminated 
in Russia -  though mediated to some extent by the views of Humboldt - through a 
writer whom Vygotsky did read seriously, namely A. A. Potebnia (1835-1891). 
The title of Vygotsky’s book. Thinking and Speech (Vygotsky 1986), must be seen 
as a comment on Potebnia’s Thought and Language. Indeed, Nadia Kerecuk has 
alleged that Vygotsky’s ideas on children’s acquisition and development of speech 
were largely borrowed from Potebnia (Kerecuk 2001, personal communication). 
Hopefully her forthcoming translations of Potebnia will clarify this. It bears 
repeating, though, that the approaches adopted by Vygotsky and Luria needed 
experimental formulation and verification. Vygotsky and Luria also read the 
works of Karl Marx, whose views on language and consciousness were taken 
directly from Herder. Since this connection has never been seriously envisaged, 
and it also to some extent involves a reassessment of both Herder and Marx, this 
essay concentrates on demonstrating it in respect of those elements that I consider 
relevant.
Marx attempted to settle accounts with his philosophical background in The 
German Ideology (1846), part I of which was first published in Russian in Moscow 
in 1924. (It was cited almost immediately by Vygotsky -  see below). Here Marx 
also sketched out the first version of his materialist conception of history and, in
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the midst of this, made his most extensive comments on human nature, language, 
and consciousness. He took the latter straight from the works of Herder, of which 
he possessed a collection (Marx and Engels 1985, 265).
Because of the conq)lex and unfinished nature of this part of The German Ideology 
I have singled out the points taken from Herder and have added Herderian points 
from elsewhere in Marx’s writings. The references are from his Essay on the 
Origin o f Language (1772) and Ideas for a Philosophy o f the History o f  
Humankind (1784-91). It is important to note that generally speaking Herder’s 
positions are easily distinguished from those of his predecessors and 
contemporaries, such as Locke, Condillac and Rousseau, and that the following 
points could not derive from other sources
1) Language is material. “The mind is from the outset aflOicted with the curse of 
being ‘burdened’ with matter, which makes its appearance in the form of agitated 
layers of air, of sounds, of language” (Marx and Engels 1976, 44). In his comments 
Herder notes that “All humans have ever thought, wanted, done, or will do ... 
depends on an agitated breath of air” (Herder 1989, 346).
2) Animals specialize, whereas humans generalize and are therefore less dependent 
on instincts. The early human “is distinguished from sheep only by the fact that 
with him consciousness takes the place of instinct or that his instinct is a conscious 
one” (Marx and Engels ibid.). Vygotsky noted (1971, 80-1) that, in the light of 
these comments, psychoanalysis had exaggerated the role of the unconscious. Kurt 
Goldstein (1939, 478) actually cited Herder in arguing against those who proposed 
separate, competing levels of the organism. Marx’s bald assertion is elaborated 
more plausibly in Herder’s version (Herder 1969b, 264, 268). Emotions too are 
integrated within human psychology and are not compartmentalised.
3) The clearest connection between Herder and Marx is found in Vygotsky’s 
favourite passage from Capital, which we have previously cited. Marx wrote, “A 
spider conducts operations which resemble those of a weaver, and a bee would put 
many a human architect to shame by the construction of its honeycomb cells. But
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what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect 
builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax. At the end of every labour 
process, a result emerges that had already been conceived of by the worker at the 
very beginning, hence already existed ideally” (Marx 1976, 284). Although 
humanity is not personified as an architect in Herder there are numerous examples 
from which Marx almost certainly borrowed both the spider and the bee.
Herder wrote (1993, 21, 1969c, 127-8): “The bee in its hive builds with a wisdom 
that Egeria could not teach her Numa, but apart from these cells and its pre­
ordained business therein, the bee is nothing. The spider weaves with the skill of 
Minerva, but all its skill is woven into this narrow spider space. That is its world. 
How marvellous is this insect, and yet how narrow the sphere of its activity”. 
[Richard Rawles informs me that Ivana Markova cited this passage in the same 
connection (Markova 1990,151)].
4) In 1844 Marx wrote, “The animal is immediately one with his activity. It does 
not distinguish itself from it. It is its life activity, Man makes his life activity itself 
the object of his will and his consciousness. He has conscious life activity. It is not 
a determination with which he directly merges. Conscious life activity distinguishes 
man immediately from animal life activity. It is just because of this.... That he is a 
conscious being, that his own life activity is an object for him. Only because of that 
is his activity free activity” (Marx and Engels 1975, 276).
Herder wrote (1993, 26, 1969c, 130-1): “If man has conceptual powers which are 
not limited to a honey cell or cobweb -  and which therefore are inferior to the 
skiMul capabilities of animals within those spheres -  it is precisely because they 
thereby acquire a wider perspective. Man has no single activity which he cannot 
impréve, he has the opportunity to practise in many spheres and hence always to 
improve. A thought is not a direct act of nature and hence it can become his own 
work. If instinct must thus disappear.. .man thereby obtains increased clarity.. .he 
thus becomes independent, can seek a sphere of self-reflection, can mirror himself 
within himself. No longer an infallible mechanism in the hands of nature, he himself
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becomes the purpose and goal of his activity”. And this reorganization of powers 
leads to humanity’s relative freedom.
Thus far consciousness and language have been largely presented as cognitive 
phenomena, and as such they empower the species, the group and the individual. 
Hence they meet many of Marx’s basic theoretical requirements for psychology, 
because they give an explanation of the qualitative difference of humans, their 
social life and their labour, and equally significantly, the recognition that humans 
can potentially organize their lives rationally. Marx wrote, “Humans make their 
own history, but not of their own free will, not under the circumstances they 
themselves have chosen, but under the given and inherited circumstances with 
which they are directly confronted” (Marx 1973a, 146). Without a view of human 
nature that sees humans as capable of changing these conditions, socialism would 
be inconceivable -  as, indeed, would an effective psychology.
5) The following quote leads on to language as a social phenomenon. Here Marx 
links language directly to consciousness. “Language is as old as consciousness, 
language is practical, real consciousness that exists for other people as well, and 
only therefore does it also exist for me; language, like consciousness, only arises 
from the need, the necessity of intercourse with other people”. And 
“Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product and remains 
so as long as humans exist at all” (Marx and Engels 1976, 44).
Herder wrote (1993, 43, 1969c, 141): “How splendid that this new man-made 
sense of the spirit also constitutes at its very beginning a means of communication. 
I cannot think the first human thought, nor form the first reflective judgment, 
without conversing within my mind, or striving to converse with others 
{dialogieren). The first human thought therefore -  in accordance with its nature, is 
placed in a position to dialogue with others. The first sign that I grasp is both a 
symbol for myself and a communicating symbol for others”. It is difSmlt to think 
of a more ‘Vygotskian’ sentiment!
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6) In the Grundrisse Marx wrote: “As regards the individual, it is clear that... he 
relates even language itself as his own only as the natural member of a human 
community. Language as the product of an individual is an impossibility. Language 
itself is the product of a community, just as it is in another respect the presence of 
the community” (Marx 1973b, 490).
Herder concluded that same-language communities would be the ideal basis for the 
social organization of communities, replacing the competing, aggressive and 
oppressive class-ruled states based on the private ownership of property (Herder 
1969b, 303-5, 307, 310). But he wasn’t prescriptive about the same language 
element -  his basic criterion was that humans should live and organize themselves 
in neighbourly “living communities”. His views were later deliberately distorted by 
German nationalists, but were correctly seen by nineteenth century Slavs as 
supporting their anti-imperialist struggles -  as witnessed in the support of T. G. 
Masaryk, the leader of the Czechs in 1918.
The last quotation from Marx applies to early societies. It deals a neat blow to the 
‘theories’ of Nikolai Marr, whose views dominated Russian linguistics from 1928 
to 1950. Marr held that language arose only in class societies as a by-product of 
production. He even allegedly criticized Engels for stating that humans could speak 
before the advent of class societies (cf. Chikobava 1950, Thomas 1957). 
Unfortunately his views became necessary to cite under Stalin’s rule. Bakhtin, 
publishing under the name of his friend Voloshinov, famously used them in 1929 as 
camouflage to pass the censor. Rather surprisingly, many well-known 
commentators of very differing persuasions have uncritically adopted these views, 
and even attempted to marry Bakhtin’s views with those of Vygotsky
Languages do reflect social and historical divisions and changes, and change 
themselves in certain ways -  e.g. vocabulary, linguistic conventions, stress or 
otherwise on individuality, predominance of more concrete or more abstract terms 
or ways of thinking -  as Luria discovered in his psychological surveys in Central 
Asia in 1931 -2  (Luria 1976). This, we have seen, is explicit in Herder and Marx,
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although the latter felt that in revolutionary circumstances language lagged behind 
social change (Marx 1973a, 146-7).
So far I have abstracted those statements of Marx on language, consciousness and 
human nature, which demonstrate that his views on language and psychology were 
taken from Herder. In The German Ideology Marx, like Herder, does attack 
idealist theories of consciousness, and when concentrating on historical 
materialism he naturally stresses the importance of labour and production. But he 
does accept that production does not play a driving role in history until the 
increase of population that accompanied the adoption of agriculture (Marx and 
Engels 1976, 31, cf. Herder 1969b, 290, 315), and, later, that language and 
consciousness are preconditions for human labour - a position also held by Engels 
(Marx 1976, 284; Engels 1987, 455-7). Marx would hardly have made such 
memorable comments on language and consciousness if he did not consider it a 
prerequisite for his position.
I began this section by noting the connections to be found in Herder between ideas 
on language, human nature, psychology and philosophy. It is important to realize 
that with regard to the first three, any theory purporting to derive from Marx 
cannot get past first base without recognizing that Marx had a humanistic and 
cognitive approach to language, consciousness and human nature that borrowed 
much from Herder.
Vygotsky and Luria, after many years’ practical work and study, including an 
intensive examination of Marx’s ideas, came to similar conclusions. As a result 
they were the only Marxists / psychologists to develop the ideas of Marx and 
Herder into significant scientific concepts, and, because of this work, were also 
praised as major scientists in their own right by their colleagues. I hope it is evident 
from this thesis that they also saw the centrality of these areas for any serious 
philosophy, Marxist or otherwise. Luria’s work recognized language’s central 
place in the reorganization of higher psychological processes, and its consequent
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role in many functional systems associated with, for example, social interaction, 
learning, planning, thinking, consciousness and self-identity. This, in itself, 
precluded attempts to claim legitimacy for any hypothesis that sought to reduce 
language theory to a single basic factor or system.
II
There is a dialectical dimension in Herder that precedes Marx. This should already 
be apparent. It is this that is referred to in Paul Reimann’s article portraying 
Herder as a precursor of Marx in his use of dialectics (Reimann 1929). Although he 
did not credit him with directly influencing Marx, I think that, now a direct 
connection between the two has been established, this link can be extended. This 
section examines how far we can legitimately extend this link.
Herder’s criticism of metaphysics was life long. In his Essay on Being (c. 1763-4) 
he pointed out that philosophers could not distinguish so-called “logical” being 
from so-called “real” being, whereas ordinary people knew what being was and 
that both it and they themselves existed long before any professional philosophers. 
But, even accepting the need for abstractions, being could not be theoretically 
isolated - it could only occur interdependently with time, space and energy. And, 
since we are part of this, it is legitimate for us to relate to them not as abstractions 
divorced from ourselves. “ Is there no order, no unity in the chaos of unanalysed 
and unresolved concepts? As long as we treat all matters as purely objective (and 
to that extent let subjective philosophy drop) we will make no progress. But don’t 
these material principles all have a point of connection in us - well then - we can 
draw them in”. This is not difiBcult for us, since “being is a concept of practical 
experience entirely” (Herder 1984, 586, 582).
He called this subjectivism. It is, but only in the sense that we recognize our 
connections and relative dialectical position within the scheme of things. It should 
be clear that both Herder and Marx accepted the existence of an objective reality, 
independent of humans, and also rejected subjective psychology. Herder could thus 
be said to have used “materialist dialectics” avant le mot. And in an active sense his
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position is also a philosophical precondition for the recognition that humans can be 
conscious historical subjects.
Trotsky wrote “Consciousness is a quite original part of nature, possessing 
peculiarities and irregularities that are completely absent from the remaining part of 
nature. Subjective dialectics must by virtue of this be a distinctive part of objective 
dialectics - with its own special forms and regularities... ” (Trotsky 1986, 102). 
Trotsky was talking of cognition here, but this distinctiveness is even more evident 
if we apply it to an individual’s growing comprehension of his or her 
interrelationships with the world. But there is a sense in which - at certain times 
associated particularly with revolutionary transformations of society and our 
interrelationships with nature - humans collectively passed through this stage, when 
they began to see both nature and their own activities as developing processes - 
concentrated historical phases of “subjective dialectics”.
In his oft quoted Theses on Feuerbach (1845), Marx wrote, “The chief defect of all 
previous materialism -  that of Feuerbach included -  is that things, reality, 
sensuousness are conceived only in the form of the object., or of contemplation, but 
not as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence it happened that 
the active side, in contradistinction to materialism, was set forth by idealism -  but 
only abstractly, since, of course idealism does not know sensuous activity as such” 
(Marx and Engels 1976, 6). If one thinks of Newton’s “mechanical universe” or La 
Mettrie’s L ’homme machine (1747) it is easy to take Marx’s comments at face 
value, but we must also remember that in later years Marx and Engels praised the 
dialectics of Diderot, and also Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origin o f Inequality 
(1755). This provides some recognition that they had previously overstated their 
case. But nevertheless they show no awareness of Diderot’s writings on evolution. 
The difficult publishing history of these works may partially explain this lapse, but 
given that Marx said that Diderot was his favourite pro se-writer, one would expect 
him to have at least commented on the conclusion of On the Interpretation o f  
Nature (1753).
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Trotsky wrote, “Dialectics is the logic of motion, development, evolution.” And 
also, “dialectics is the logic of Darwinism ... the logic of Marxism (in opposition to 
rationalistic, idealistic theories of the historical process), the logic of philosophical 
materialism (in opposition to Kantianism, etc.)” (Trotsky 1986, 86-7). In respect of 
evolutionary theories and those who criticized rationalism, idealism and Kant in the 
second half of the eighteenth century, Marx’s awareness was deficient, and not 
only in the case of Diderot.
Marx used Herder’s works with regard to language, but in print makes no 
acknowledgment of either them or Herder’s other contributions. Although not a 
supporter of evolutionary theories in biology, and, as head of religious education in 
Weimar, fi*equently likely to interpolate comments on God, Herder nevertheless 
conceived historical thinking along evolutionary lines. In Ideas for a Philosophy o f  
the History o f Mankind, he situated humans firmly within nature and history. He 
began by writing about the universe, the properties of the solar system, earth, 
natural history -  plants and animals, and finally humans. He saw humans not only 
as part of nature but also with the potential to operate very differently fi"om other 
creatures. Humans could use or misuse their rational potential. Humans weren’t 
innately blessed with “Reason,” nor did history inevitably involve “Progress”. 
Human potential could only be developed in the course of individual, social, and 
historical development. In various works he saw the development of both nature 
and history as inherently involving both evolutionary and revolutionary episodes -  
the latter arising fi*om contradictions within those processes of development (cf. 
Knoll 1992).
Herder celebrated the concrete - as one might expect fi’om a poet. He 
systematically attacked Kant’s abstractions - pure reason, practical reason and 
judgement - on the grounds that they should not be treated separately, as in the 
faculty theory of psychology, because they actually entail interactive prppesses. 
Certainly Kant sacrificed psychological reality in fevoui* of the logiîcai systems of 
his epistemology, and his “knowing subject” remains an abstract individual, a ghost 
of Herder’s real one. For Herder, since aU voluntary mental operations are 
mediated and facilitated by languages - which are neither abstractions, nor
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creations of God - but created and developed by humans in concrete historical 
societies, ideas cannot be treated as if they exist apart Ifrom our lives and activities 
(Herder 1967, 18-9, 63-6, 179; cf. also the quotations in Leventhal 1990).
As we have already seen, in The German Ideology Marx uses these ideas 
extensively. He adds “People are the producers of their conceptions, ideas - that is 
real active humans as they are conditioned by a definite development of their 
productive forces ... consciousness can never be anything but conscious being, 
and the being of people is their real life - process”. And “It is not consciousness 
that determines life, but life that determines consciousness” (Marx and Engels 
1976, 36-7).
Marx’s introduction of the concepts of “base” and “superstructure” into his work 
parallels this approach, and is certainly compatible with it. But the approach 
discussed in the previous paragraphs should be distinguished as a separate strand 
of Marx’s ideas, and he himself tends to use different phrases in discussing it such 
as “mode of life”, “life activity”, and “life-process”, instead of his economic 
terminology.
When Marx was writing. Herder’s version of this approach had already been 
attacked by Kant and Hegel, and distorted by their followers, and, perhaps because 
it has never been given a convenient label, it has never received appropriate 
recognition. Martin Schuetze (1930-1) showed how Kantian interpretations of 
Herder distorted his views. It helps us understand why Vygotsky and Luria had to 
return to Herder’s perspective in order to escape the Kantian approach of much 
nineteenth century psychology. Herder’s influence on Hegel is accepted, though 
not always understood (Taylor 1975) But Hegel’s negative remarks about 
Herder may explain, as with Rousseau, why Marx failed to acknowledge him. 
Perhaps more relevant than the negative influence of Hegel, fe the fact that, having 
already dug himself out fi*om under Hegel in his own works, Marx was unlikely to 
hand the credit to Hegel’s predecessor. Also significant is the fact that Marx’s 
access to the works of Herder during his crucial periods of exile was probably
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restricted to his own memory of a couple of his works, since his own copies had 
not been forwarded to him.
Hegel’s mystical depiction of the role of consciousness is a reflection of this 
growing awareness that humans could be historical subjects. But it is only from 
this real “subjective dialectics”, embodied in individuals, communities, and then in 
the beginnings of workers’ movements, and not from Hegel’s abstractions, that 
Marx conceived the historical role of the working class to liberate humanity. I 
suspect that Herder’s subjective dialectics helped Marx make this transition and 
break with Feuerbach’s ahistorical abstractions, and that this is why Marx used 
Herder’s work in particular in the opening chapters of The German Ideology. Marx 
should have recognized that there were materialist writers who grasped the 
subjective side. On the other hand, what was lacking in Herder’s time was either a 
unified humanity capable of taking advantage of this, or, from the Marxist 
perspective, a class potentially capable of representing the interests of humanity as 
a whole.
It should be noted that dialectical logic may be applied both idealistically and 
materialistically. It is said that dialectics can become materialist when it is applied 
to concrete processes. Although Marx clearly used the concept of ‘contradiction’ 
(used by Herder as well as Hegel) in The German Ideology, it is sometimes said 
that the influence of dialectics on Marx’s epistemology was at its lowest, and that 
in some senses the latter was largely empiricist from 1846 to 1856 (cf. Kain 1986, 
chapter 2). Herder argued that an empiricism that failed to recognize the dialectics 
of everyday life, ‘evolution’, and human history would remain an unusable 
abstraction. This subjective dialectical assunçrtion would therefore be a 
prerequisite for any epistemology (cf. Lenin 1981, 360). Since Marx’s position in 
the German Ideology was the same, we can safely assume that the dialectical 
influence remained strong. This made it possible for Marx to later employ both 
dialectical logic and abstract categories within these assumptions in his analysis of 
capital. Although it is not clear exactly how much of Hqrder Marx read or 
understood, the implications of what he did read surely contributed, if only in a 
subliminal way, to his introduction of “materialist dialectics”.
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Recent reinvestigations of Herder’s work have led to the rejection of nearly two 
centuries of misunderstanding and misrepresentation of his ideas. Herder was as 
unique a thinker as Marx, and contemporary writers have developed different 
aspects of his enormously varied thoughts. Many accept that this former student of 
Kant made the crucial ‘epistemological / critical turn’ that critically pre-empted 
Kant’s positions in the Critiques (cf. the essays in Mueller-VoUmer 1990, Menges 
et al 1992, Koepke 1990, 1996)
At the same time, it can also be said that Herder adhered to an eighteenth century 
view of creation, prompting Wuff Koepke’s description of him as a “conservative 
revolutionary”. Koepke elaborates: Herder’s “religious humanism is based on the 
conviction of Ganzheit (totality), which would preclude an arbitrary separation of 
nature and the realm of freedom. The creation is indivisible”. At the same time, 
because Herder saw all life as conforming to universal laws, he excluded divine 
intervention (Koepke 1987, 77, 58). This allowed him both to see unity in diversity 
and thus avoid reductionism, and to accept determinism and, within that, a realm of 
freedom. It embodied a dialectical approach to nature, history and psychology that, 
although consistent with Herder’s religious ideas, was genuinely rooted both in 
“human sensuous activity, practice” and materialism.
Recent writers have naturally used Herder’s positions to attack postmodernist 
positions. As I have pointed out Herder, the language theorist, grounded his 
epistemology not on language, perception, or cognition, but on natural social 
being, linked inseparably with space, time and energy. As we are part of all this, we 
are not passive observers in a universe befogged by discourse, or unable to see the 
“thing-in-itself’ for real, because we only have use of limited senses and 
perceptions. On the contrary we may be active historical agents operating with the 
knowledge that we live in a material and dialectical universe
In Russia, particularly after the overthrow of tsarism, it was strongly believed that 
it was possible to improve humans in many ways, as evidenced by Bauer’s book 
(1952), titled The New Man In Soviet Psychology. That it was not simply a product
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of Stalinist propaganda (though it was that as well) is shown by some of 
Vygotsky’s comments and a 1930 article entitled The Socialist Alteration o f Man 
(Vygotsky 1994b). Indeed, in Educational Psychology (1926) Vygotsky cited at 
length Trotsky’s version of this view. Alexander Etkind pointed out that the 
passage attributed to Vygotsky (cf. Van der Veer and Valsiner 1991, 55-6) is 
actually part of the conclusion to Literature and Revolution (Trotsky 1991, 282-
3).
Herder’s approach to history shows both major advances and limitations. Together 
with Vico, he was among the first to recognize distinct societies and forms of 
society in history. Herder also accepted other cultures and other values, notably 
those of non-European peoples, i.e., he opposed a Eurocentric view of history. He 
followed Rousseau in blaming the invention of property for humanity’s ills. He 
praised the egalitarianism and fi-eedom fi"om state rule of so-called “primitive” 
societies -  including early European societies. Yet he also accepted, like Rousseau, 
that however much he detested feudalism and developing capitalism, there was no 
prospect of a return to such early forms of society.
As we have seen. Herder argued that there was a relationship between a mode of 
life and the social and individual consciousness of the society based upon it. But he 
correctly concluded that the formulations of writers such as those of the Scottish 
Enlightenment and Turgot, who presented the bourgeoisie’s “own” version of 
historical materialism, were simplistic and inadequate. Yet despite the enormous 
advances that he and others made, they could not grasp the role of production in 
the dynamics of history (Herder 1969b, 302-4, 309-11, 314-6; cf. also Meek 1976, 
192-8, and Meek 1954).
With his versions of subjective dialectics, materialist dialectics, some recognition of 
the implications of historical materialism, together with his invention and use of the 
term ‘empathy’, he was able to envisage humans as actors in history, and in many 
senses he was one himself. He would thus have proved invaluable to Marx in 
overcoming Feuerbach’s ahistorical approach. But without grasping the role of 
production in the dynamics of history, he could go no further. We should not be
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surprised at this. In eighteenth century Germany there was barely a trace of an 
industrial revolution, let alone an industrial working class. The growth of the latter 
was an absolute prerequisite for the ideas of Marx himself. With Marx’s analysis of 
the dynamics of history aU these various threads could be brought together and we 
can better comprehend now not only their methodological significance, but also the 
extent of Marx’s achievement in uniting them.
When humans can understand these connections they can consciously attempt to 
make their own history. Marx also grasped that the workers oppressed under 
capitalism potentially represented the interests of humanity as a whole. Strangely 
enough, materialist dialectics are sometimes presented as being applied first to 
history and then illegitimately transferred to nature. I hope it is clear firom this 
essay that it was applied to humans only because they and their history were 
recognized as a part of nature -  as natural processes.
My conclusions are that Marx was directly influenced by Herder’s views on 
language. He also took on the approach of subjective dialectics that reflects 
Herder’s views, but that any influence may not have been direct. It could be argued 
that if Marx put Hegel on his feet, he was reversing the damage Hegel had done by 
standing Herder on his head, but with the reward of picking up in addition Hegel’s 
formal dialectical logic. To a certain degree, Diderot and Herder saw their 
approach almost as common sense, and they didn’t use the term ‘dialectics’ to label 
their work. The development of dialectical logic encouraged nineteenth century 
writers to employ it in a more focused manner. Marx was certainly blind to much 
of fierder - for reasons I have already suggested -  and would probably have been 
aiflàzed (to put it mildly) at the very suggestion that Herder had preceded him in so 
many ways. I hope this appendix raises awareness of, and clarifies liOw Marx, and 
through him Herder, (and probably also Potebnia), were impéftant sd&ces of ideas 
for Vygotsky and Luria, and help refocus views on some aspects of théîr work.
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Notes
\  As a prelude to my research into the work of Luria and Vygotsky, I read the 
classic works of language theory. Herder’s ideas could easily be seen not only in 
the writings of Luria and Vygotsky, but also in the works of Marx. An early 
version of my ideas exists in an abbreviated and somewhat undeveloped form 
(Hames 1998). I have checked/ amended the Enghsh translations of Herder in 
conformity with the German. I have often quoted both German and translated 
works for the additional reason that most of the latter are out of print. I have also 
checked/ amended the translation of Marx and Engels: The German Ideology in 
conformity with the German (Marx -Engels 1962).
It is true that versions of points 2 and 4 can be found in Rousseau (1987, 40, 44- 
5). Herder almost certainly used these, but he transformed the context, putting 
Rousseau “on his feet” -  for Rousseau had assumed that humans were originally 
virtually isolated with no communication (ibid. 48), whereas, for Herder, humans 
were social creatures.
\  Marxism and the Philosophy o f Language was published in 1929 under the name 
of Bakhtin’s friend, V. N. Voloshinov, in order to lower Bakhtin’s profile at a time 
when intellectuals as such were under attack fi’om the state. It amply justifies the 
description of Bakhtin as “the first Russian postmodernist” (Etkind 1997, 321). 
There are also similarities both with Althusser’s structuralism and Feuerbach’s 
abstract view of human nature: “In so far as I think, I cease to be an individual” 
(Feuerbach 1973, X, 8-9). Bakhtin brazenly opens by declaring, “To date, there is 
not yet a single Marxist work on the philosophy of language” (Voloshinov 1986, 
xiii). He misrepresents and disparages the school to which Marx belongs (Herder, 
Humboldt, Potebnia). He barely considers psychology to be a science -  the 
individual is merely a structural mediation between the biological and physiological 
sciences and the “ideological-semiotic superstructure”, ignores virtually all 
aspects of individual and social development and the multifunctional role of 
language in both (cf. ibid. 13, 34-6, 39, 85). He comment that, “as the process of 
immersion [into verbal communication] proceeds, the cMd’s consciousness is
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formed and filled with content” (ibid. 81 n.l6). Vygotsky would undoubtedly have 
extended his wrath at Bukharin’s simile that a human is like a sausage skin filled 
with social content to Bakhtin’s formulation (cf. main text III, iii, 85 and Vygptsky 
1997c, 66). The latter simply refused to accept the concept of what Vygotsky 
(1986, 228) called “the transition fi*om inter-psychic to intra-psychic functions”. 
Although it is well known that Bakhtin used Marr’s ideas as camouflage (cf. 
Voloshinov 1986, 23), I think it is becoming clear that he also used those ideas to 
sideline everything that was important to Herder, Marx, Vygotsky and Luria -  
indeed to psychology in general (cf. Hames 2000 ms).
It is possible that Marr on the other hand also had ideas other than his notoriously 
reductionist ones. Certainly Eisenstein thought so. Indeed, D. B. El’konin made an 
intriguing statement: “I remember when Luria was unable to get [Vygotsky] to 
visit Academician Marr when the latter came to Leningrad, although [Luria] 
wanted terribly to bring [them] together” (cited in Vygodskaia and Lifenova 1999, 
3, 38). Later they were introduced by Eisenstein, but unfortunately we learn 
nothing further.
By stressing what he terms the “expressivist” approach to self-realization, 
without linking it to Herder’s materialist agenda -  as distinct fi’om those of Hegel, 
Fichte and Schiller -  Taylor willy-nilly associates him with idealist philosophers.
The approach of Morton (1993), and others was stimulated by Wolff’s 1963 
study of Kant’s ideas of mental activity. In the context of Herder studies it is easy 
to read Wolff’s interpretation of Kant (320fQ as suggesting that Herder went 
further, more effectively than Kant. Mainstream philosophy has yet to address this 
issue. By and large the similarities between Herder and Marx remain unnoticed. 
For some East German contributions see Dietze et al 1980. W. Beyer’s article 
(ibid.), for example, points out Herder’s essentially monistic approach.
About 30 years ago, after completing a History degree, it was a revelation for 
me to read Trotsky’s writings on Germany in the years prior to Hitler’s rise to 
power -  to realize that humans were not entirely subject to uncontrollable forces, 
that they have a role to play in their own history, and that it was actually possible
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to predict the outcome of certain coufs^ b f  action -  i.e., the sectarian policy of the 
Stalinized German Communist Party, winch split the working class and allowed 
Hitler an easy route to power. History as taught in many schools still does not 
recognize that Hitler could have been stopped, or that this is even worth 
discussing. People do make their own history, but they also have the potential to 
make it consciously and rationally. Contemporary psychology clearly has 
something to teach such ‘historians’.
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